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[ Upstream commit 6170a506899aee3dd4934c928426505e47b1b466 ]
There is no need to log message if ATU hvapi couldn't get register.
Unlike PCI hvapi, ATU hvapi registration failure is not hard error.
Even if ATU hvapi registration fails (on system with ATU or without
ATU) system continues with legacy IOMMU. So only log message when
ATU hvapi successfully get registered.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc290a114fc6034b0f6a5a46e2fb7d54976cf87a upstream.
This fixes another cause of random segfaults and bus errors that may
occur while running perf with the callgraph option.
Critical sections beginning with spin_lock_irqsave() raise the interrupt
level to PIL_NORMAL_MAX (14) and intentionally do not block performance
counter interrupts, which arrive at PIL_NMI (15).
But some sections of code are "super critical" with respect to perf
because the perf_callchain_user() path accesses user space and may cause
TLB activity as well as faults as it unwinds the user stack.
One particular critical section occurs in switch_mm:
spin_lock_irqsave(&mm->context.lock, flags);
...
load_secondary_context(mm);
tsb_context_switch(mm);
...
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mm->context.lock, flags);
If a perf interrupt arrives in between load_secondary_context() and
tsb_context_switch(), then perf_callchain_user() could execute with
the context ID of one process, but with an active TSB for a different
process. When the user stack is accessed, it is very likely to
incur a TLB miss, since the h/w context ID has been changed. The TLB
will then be reloaded with a translation from the TSB for one process,
but using a context ID for another process. This exposes memory from
one process to another, and since it is a mapping for stack memory,
this usually causes the new process to crash quickly.
This super critical section needs more protection than is provided
by spin_lock_irqsave() since perf interrupts must not be allowed in.
Since __tsb_context_switch already goes through the trouble of
disabling interrupts completely, we fix this by moving the secondary
context load down into this better protected region.
Orabug: 25577560
Signed-off-by: Dave Aldridge <david.j.aldridge@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Gardner <rob.gardner@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0ede1c401332173ab0693121dc6cde04a4dbf131 ]
Mikael Pettersson reported that some test programs in the strace-4.18
testsuite cause an OOPS.
After some debugging it turns out that garbage values are returned
when an exception occurs, causing the fixup memset() to be run with
bogus arguments.
The problem is that two of the exception handler stubs write the
successfully copied length into the wrong register.
Fixes: ee841d0aff64 ("sparc64: Convert U3copy_{from,to}_user to accurate exception reporting.")
Reported-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9d53caec84c7c5700e7c1ed744ea584fff55f9ac ]
A large sun4v SPARC system may have moments of intensive xcall activities,
usually caused by unmapping many pages on many CPUs concurrently. This can
flood receivers with CPU mondo interrupts for an extended period, causing
some unlucky senders to hit send-mondo timeout. This problem gets worse
as cpu count increases because sometimes mappings must be invalidated on
all CPUs, and sometimes all CPUs may gang up on a single CPU.
But a busy system is not a broken system. In the above scenario, as long
as the receiver is making forward progress processing mondo interrupts,
the sender should continue to retry.
This patch implements the receiver's forward progress meter by introducing
a per cpu counter 'cpu_mondo_counter[cpu]' where 'cpu' is in the range
of 0..NR_CPUS. The receiver increments its counter as soon as it receives
a mondo and the sender tracks the receiver's counter. If the receiver has
stopped making forward progress when the retry limit is reached, the sender
declares send-mondo-timeout and panic; otherwise, the receiver is allowed
to keep making forward progress.
In addition, it's been observed that PCIe hotplug events generate Correctable
Errors that are handled by hypervisor and then OS. Hypervisor 'borrows'
a guest cpu strand briefly to provide the service. If the cpu strand is
simultaneously the only cpu targeted by a mondo, it may not be available
for the mondo in 20msec, causing SUN4V mondo timeout. It appears that 1 second
is the agreed wait time between hypervisor and guest OS, this patch makes
the adjustment.
Orabug: 25476541
Orabug: 26417466
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Gardner <rob.gardner@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Tai <thomas.tai@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7a7dc961a28b965a0d0303c2e989df17b411708b ]
Error queues use a non-zero first word to detect if the queues are full.
Using pages that have not been zeroed may result in false positive
overflow events. These queues are set up once during boot so zeroing
all mondo and error queue pages is safe.
Note that the false positive overflow does not always occur because the
page allocation for these queues is so early in the boot cycle that
higher number CPUs get fresh pages. It is only when traps are serviced
with lower number CPUs who were given already used pages that this issue
is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 047487241ff59374fded8c477f21453681f5995c ]
User processes trying to access an invalid memory address via PIO will
receive a SIGBUS signal instead of causing a panic. Memory errors will
receive a SIGKILL since a SIGBUS may result in a coredump which may
attempt to repeat the faulting access.
Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b5c3206190f1fddd100b3060eb15f0d775ffeab8 upstream.
My static checker complains that if "lvl" is ULONG_MAX (this is 64 bit)
then some of the strings will overflow. I don't know if that's possible
but it seems simple enough to make the buffers slightly larger.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c79a13734d104b5b147d7cb0870276ccdd660dae ]
Linux SPARC64 limits NR_CPUS to 4064 because init_cpu_send_mondo_info()
only allocates a single page for NR_CPUS mondo entries. Thus we cannot
use all 4096 CPUs on some SPARC platforms.
To fix, allocate (2^order) pages where order is set according to the size
of cpu_list for possible cpus. Since cpu_list_pa and cpu_mondo_block_pa
are not used in asm code, there are no imm13 offsets from the base PA
that will break because they can only reach one page.
Orabug: 25505750
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atish.patra@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0197e41ce70511dc3b71f7fefa1a676e2b5cd60b ]
The old method that is using xcall and softint to get new context id is
deleted, as it is replaced by a method of using per_cpu_secondary_mm
without xcall to perform the context wrap.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a0582f26ec9dfd5360ea2f35dd9a1b026f8adda0 ]
The current wrap implementation has a race issue: it is called outside of
the ctx_alloc_lock, and also does not wait for all CPUs to complete the
wrap. This means that a thread can get a new context with a new version
and another thread might still be running with the same context. The
problem is especially severe on CPUs with shared TLBs, like sun4v. I used
the following test to very quickly reproduce the problem:
- start over 8K processes (must be more than context IDs)
- write and read values at a memory location in every process.
Very quickly memory corruptions start happening, and what we read back
does not equal what we wrote.
Several approaches were explored before settling on this one:
Approach 1:
Move smp_new_mmu_context_version() inside ctx_alloc_lock, and wait for
every process to complete the wrap. (Note: every CPU must WAIT before
leaving smp_new_mmu_context_version_client() until every one arrives).
This approach ends up with deadlocks, as some threads own locks which other
threads are waiting for, and they never receive softint until these threads
exit smp_new_mmu_context_version_client(). Since we do not allow the exit,
deadlock happens.
Approach 2:
Handle wrap right during mondo interrupt. Use etrap/rtrap to enter into
into C code, and issue new versions to every CPU.
This approach adds some overhead to runtime: in switch_mm() we must add
some checks to make sure that versions have not changed due to wrap while
we were loading the new secondary context. (could be protected by PSTATE_IE
but that degrades performance as on M7 and older CPUs as it takes 50 cycles
for each access). Also, we still need a global per-cpu array of MMs to know
where we need to load new contexts, otherwise we can change context to a
thread that is going way (if we received mondo between switch_mm() and
switch_to() time). Finally, there are some issues with window registers in
rtrap() when context IDs are changed during CPU mondo time.
The approach in this patch is the simplest and has almost no impact on
runtime. We use the array with mm's where last secondary contexts were
loaded onto CPUs and bump their versions to the new generation without
changing context IDs. If a new process comes in to get a context ID, it
will go through get_new_mmu_context() because of version mismatch. But the
running processes do not need to be interrupted. And wrap is quicker as we
do not need to xcall and wait for everyone to receive and complete wrap.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7a5b4bbf49fe86ce77488a70c5dccfe2d50d7a2d ]
The new wrap is going to use information from this array to figure out
mm's that currently have valid secondary contexts setup.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c4415235b2be0cc791572e8e7f7466ab8f73a2bf ]
CTX_FIRST_VERSION defines the first context version, but also it defines
first context. This patch redefines it to only include the first context
version.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14d0334c6748ff2aedb3f2f7fdc51ee90a9b54e7 ]
The only difference between these two functions is that in activate_mm we
unconditionally flush context. However, there is no need to keep this
difference after fixing a bug where cpumask was not reset on a wrap. So, in
this patch we combine these.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 588974857359861891f478a070b1dc7ae04a3880 ]
After a wrap (getting a new context version) a process must get a new
context id, which means that we would need to flush the context id from
the TLB before running for the first time with this ID on every CPU. But,
we use mm_cpumask to determine if this process has been running on this CPU
before, and this mask is not reset after a wrap. So, there are two possible
fixes for this issue:
1. Clear mm cpumask whenever mm gets a new context id
2. Unconditionally flush context every time process is running on a CPU
This patch implements the first solution
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c982aa9c304bf0b9a7522fd118fed4afa5a0263c ]
VIO devices were being looked up by their index in the machine
description node block, but this often varies over time as devices are
added and removed. Instead, store the ID and look up using the type,
config handle and ID.
Signed-off-by: James Clarke <jrtc27@jrtc27.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112541
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 654f4807624a657f364417c2a7454f0df9961734 ]
When a TSB grows beyond its current capacity, a new TSB is allocated
and copy_tsb is called to copy entries from the old TSB to the new.
A hash shift based on page size is used to calculate the index of an
entry in the TSB. copy_tsb has hard coded PAGE_SHIFT in these
calculations. However, for huge page TSBs the value REAL_HPAGE_SHIFT
should be used. As a result, when copy_tsb is called for a huge page
TSB the entries are placed at the incorrect index in the newly
allocated TSB. When doing hardware table walk, the MMU does not
match these entries and we end up in the TSB miss handling code.
This code will then create and write an entry to the correct index
in the TSB. We take a performance hit for the table walk miss and
recreation of these entries.
Pass a new parameter to copy_tsb that is the page size shift to be
used when copying the TSB.
Suggested-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1b4af13ff2cc6897557bb0b8d9e2fad4fa4d67aa ]
Reported-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 48078d2dac0a26f84f5f3ec704f24f7c832cce14 ]
The ftrace function_graph time measurements of a given function is not
accurate according to those recorded by ftrace using the function
filters. This change pulls the x86_64 fix from 'commit 722b3c746953
("ftrace/graph: Trace function entry before updating index")' into the
sparc specific prepare_ftrace_return which stops ftrace from
counting interrupted tasks in the time measurement.
Example measurements for select_task_rq_fair running "hackbench 100
process 1000":
| tracing/trace_stat/function0 | function_graph
Before patch | 2.802 us | 4.255 us
After patch | 2.749 us | 3.094 us
Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit deba804c90642c8ed0f15ac1083663976d578f54 ]
Greetings,
GCC 7 introduced the -Wstringop-overflow flag to detect buffer overflows
in calls to string handling functions [1][2]. Due to the way
``empty_zero_page'' is declared in arch/sparc/include/setup.h, this
causes a warning to trigger at compile time in the function mem_init(),
which is subsequently converted to an error. The ensuing patch fixes
this issue and aligns the declaration of empty_zero_page to that of
other architectures. Thank you.
Cheers,
Orlando.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2016-10/msg02308.html
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-7/changes.html
Signed-off-by: Orlando Arias <oarias@knights.ucf.edu>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3c7f62212018b904ae17f5636ead18a4dca3a88f upstream.
When any of the functions contained in NGbzero.S and GENbzero.S
vector through *bzero_from_clear_user, we may end up taking a
fault when executing one of the store alternate address space
instructions. If this happens, the exception handler does not
restore the %asi register.
This commit fixes the issue by introducing a new exception
handler that ensures the %asi register is restored when
a fault is handled.
Orabug: 25577560
Signed-off-by: Dave Aldridge <david.j.aldridge@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Gardner <rob.gardner@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ae34dbd8afd790cb5f52467e4f816434379eafa ]
This commit moves sparc64's prototype of pmd_write() outside
of the CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE ifdef.
In 2013, commit a7b9403f0e6d ("sparc64: Encode huge PMDs using PTE
encoding.") exposed a path where pmd_write() could be called without
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE defined. This can result in the panic below.
The diff is awkward to read, but the changes are straightforward.
pmd_write() was moved outside of #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE.
Also, __HAVE_ARCH_PMD_WRITE was defined.
kernel BUG at include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:576!
\|/ ____ \|/
"@'/ .. \`@"
/_| \__/ |_\
\__U_/
oracle_8114_cdb(8114): Kernel bad sw trap 5 [#1]
CPU: 120 PID: 8114 Comm: oracle_8114_cdb Not tainted
4.1.12-61.7.1.el6uek.rc1.sparc64 #1
task: fff8400700a24d60 ti: fff8400700bc4000 task.ti: fff8400700bc4000
TSTATE: 0000004411e01607 TPC: 00000000004609f8 TNPC: 00000000004609fc Y:
00000005 Not tainted
TPC: <gup_huge_pmd+0x198/0x1e0>
g0: 000000000001c000 g1: 0000000000ef3954 g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001
g4: fff8400700a24d60 g5: fff8001fa5c10000 g6: fff8400700bc4000 g7: 0000000000000720
o0: 0000000000bc5058 o1: 0000000000000240 o2: 0000000000006000 o3: 0000000000001c00
o4: 0000000000000000 o5: 0000048000080000 sp: fff8400700bc6ab1 ret_pc: 00000000004609f0
RPC: <gup_huge_pmd+0x190/0x1e0>
l0: fff8400700bc74fc l1: 0000000000020000 l2: 0000000000002000 l3: 0000000000000000
l4: fff8001f93250950 l5: 000000000113f800 l6: 0000000000000004 l7: 0000000000000000
i0: fff8400700ca46a0 i1: bd0000085e800453 i2: 000000026a0c4000 i3: 000000026a0c6000
i4: 0000000000000001 i5: fff800070c958de8 i6: fff8400700bc6b61 i7: 0000000000460dd0
I7: <gup_pud_range+0x170/0x1a0>
Call Trace:
[0000000000460dd0] gup_pud_range+0x170/0x1a0
[0000000000460e84] get_user_pages_fast+0x84/0x120
[00000000006f5a18] iov_iter_get_pages+0x98/0x240
[00000000005fa744] do_direct_IO+0xf64/0x1e00
[00000000005fbbc0] __blockdev_direct_IO+0x360/0x15a0
[00000000101f74fc] ext4_ind_direct_IO+0xdc/0x400 [ext4]
[00000000101af690] ext4_ext_direct_IO+0x1d0/0x2c0 [ext4]
[00000000101af86c] ext4_direct_IO+0xec/0x220 [ext4]
[0000000000553bd4] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x140
[00000000005bdc2c] __vfs_read+0xac/0x100
[00000000005bf254] vfs_read+0x54/0x100
[00000000005bf368] SyS_pread64+0x68/0x80
Signed-off-by: Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit adfae8a5d833fa2b46577a8081f350e408851f5b ]
I encountered this bug when using /proc/kcore to examine the kernel. Plus a
coworker inquired about debugging tools. We computed pa but did
not use it during the maximum physical address bits test. Instead we used
the identity mapped virtual address which will always fail this test.
I believe the defect came in here:
[bpicco@zareason linus.git]$ git describe --contains bb4e6e85daa52
v3.18-rc1~87^2~4
.
Signed-off-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3805c546b275c8cc7d40f759d029ae92c7175f2 upstream.
Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET
to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Drop duplicate header scatterlist.h from iommu_common.h.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This new config parameter limits the space used for "Lock debugging:
prove locking correctness" by about 4MB. The current sparc systems have
the limitation of 32MB size for kernel size including .text, .data and
.bss sections. With PROVE_LOCKING feature, the kernel size could grow
beyond this limit and causing system boot-up issues. With this option,
kernel limits the size of the entries of lock_chains, stack_trace etc.,
so that kernel fits in required size limit. This is not visible to user
and only used for sparc.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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ATU 64bit addressing allows PCIe devices with 64bit DMA capabilities
to use ATU for 64bit DMA.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add Hypervisor IOMMU v2 APIs pci_iotsb_map(), pci_iotsb_demap() and
enable sun4v dma ops to use IOMMU v2 API for all PCIe devices with
64bit DMA mask.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In order to use Hypervisor (HV) IOMMU v2 API for map/demap, each PCIe
device has to be bound to IOTSB using HV API pci_iotsb_bind().
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Like legacy IOMMU, use common iommu_map_table and iommu_pool for ATU.
This change initializes iommu_map_table and iommu_pool for ATU.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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ATU (Address Translation Unit) is a new IOMMU in SPARC supported with
Hypervisor IOMMU v2 APIs.
Current SPARC IOMMU supports only 32bit address ranges and one TSB
per PCIe root complex that has a 2GB per root complex DVMA space
limit. The limit has become a scalability bottleneck nowadays that
a typical 10G/40G NIC can consume 300MB-500MB DVMA space per
instance. When DVMA resource is exhausted, devices will not be usable
since the driver can't allocate DVMA.
ATU removes bottleneck by allowing guest os to create IOTSB of size
32G (or more) with 64bit address ranges available in ATU HW. 32G is
more than enough DVMA space to be shared by all PCIe devices under
root complex contrast to 2G space provided by legacy IOMMU.
ATU allows PCIe devices to use 64bit DMA addressing. Devices
which choose to use 32bit DMA mask will continue to work with the
existing legacy IOMMU.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This change allows ATU (new IOMMU) in SPARC systems to request
large (32M) contiguous memory during boot for creating IOTSB backing
store.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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A compile warning is introduced by a commit to fix the find_node().
This patch fix the compile warning by moving find_node() into __init
section. Because find_node() is only used by memblock_nid_range() which
is only used by a __init add_node_ranges(). find_node() and
memblock_nid_range() should also be inside __init section.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Tai <thomas.tai@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When booting up LDOM, find_node() warns that a physical address
doesn't match a NUMA node.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c:835
find_node+0xf4/0x120 find_node: A physical address doesn't
match a NUMA node rule. Some physical memory will be
owned by node 0.Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.9.0-rc3 #4
Call Trace:
[0000000000468ba0] __warn+0xc0/0xe0
[0000000000468c74] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x34/0x60
[00000000004592f4] find_node+0xf4/0x120
[0000000000dd0774] add_node_ranges+0x38/0xe4
[0000000000dd0b1c] numa_parse_mdesc+0x268/0x2e4
[0000000000dd0e9c] bootmem_init+0xb8/0x160
[0000000000dd174c] paging_init+0x808/0x8fc
[0000000000dcb0d0] setup_arch+0x2c8/0x2f0
[0000000000dc68a0] start_kernel+0x48/0x424
[0000000000dcb374] start_early_boot+0x27c/0x28c
[0000000000a32c08] tlb_fixup_done+0x4c/0x64
[0000000000027f08] 0x27f08
It is because linux use an internal structure node_masks[] to
keep the best memory latency node only. However, LDOM mdesc can
contain single latency-group with multiple memory latency nodes.
If the address doesn't match the best latency node within
node_masks[], it should check for an alternative via mdesc.
The warning message should only be printed if the address
doesn't match any node_masks[] nor within mdesc. To minimize
the impact of searching mdesc every time, the last matched
mask and index is stored in a variable.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Tai <thomas.tai@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When the vmalloc area gets fragmented, and because the firmware
mapping area sits between where modules live and the vmalloc area, we
can sometimes receive requests for enormous kernel TLB range flushes.
When this happens the cpu just spins flushing billions of pages and
this triggers the NMI watchdog and other problems.
We took care of this on the TSB side by doing a linear scan of the
table once we pass a certain threshold.
Do something similar for the TLB flush, however we are limited by
the TLB flush facilities provided by the different chip variants.
First of all we use an (mostly arbitrary) cut-off of 256K which is
about 32 pages. This can be tuned in the future.
The huge range code path for each chip works as follows:
1) On spitfire we flush all non-locked TLB entries using diagnostic
acceses.
2) On cheetah we use the "flush all" TLB flush.
3) On sun4v/hypervisor we do a TLB context flush on context 0, which
unlike previous chips does not remove "permanent" or locked
entries.
We could probably do something better on spitfire, such as limiting
the flush to kernel TLB entries or even doing range comparisons.
However that probably isn't worth it since those chips are old and
the TLB only had 64 entries.
Reported-by: James Clarke <jrtc27@jrtc27.com>
Tested-by: James Clarke <jrtc27@jrtc27.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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code.
Just like the non-cross-call TLB flush handlers, the cross-call ones need
to avoid doing PC-relative branches outside of their code blocks.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Noticed by James Clarke.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If the number of pages we are flushing is more than twice the number
of entries in the TSB, just scan the TSB table for matches rather
than probing each and every page in the range.
Based upon a patch and report by James Clarke.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Additionally, if the offset will overflow the immediate for a ba,pt
instruction, fall back on a standard ba to get an extra 3 bits.
Signed-off-by: James Clarke <jrtc27@jrtc27.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When we copy code over to patch another piece of code, we can only use
PC-relative branches that target code within that piece of code.
Such PC-relative branches cannot be made to external symbols because
the patch moves the location of the code and thus modifies the
relative address of external symbols.
Use an absolute jmpl to fix this problem.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Now that all of the user copy routines are converted to return
accurate residual lengths when an exception occurs, we no longer need
the broken fixup routines.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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All of __ret{,l}_mone{_asi,_fp,_asi_fpu} are now unused.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Report the exact number of bytes which have not been successfully
copied when an exception occurs, using the running remaining length.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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