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2025-09-03x86/sev: Move __sev_[get|put]_ghcb() into separate noinstr objectArd Biesheuvel
Rename sev-nmi.c to noinstr.c, and move the get/put GHCB routines into it too, which are also annotated as 'noinstr' and suffer from the same problem as the NMI code, i.e., that GCC may ignore the __no_sanitize_address__ function attribute implied by 'noinstr' and insert KASAN instrumentation anyway. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-37-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/sev: Provide PIC aliases for SEV related data objectsArd Biesheuvel
Provide PIC aliases for data objects that are shared between the SEV startup code and the SEV code that executes later. This is needed so that the confined startup code is permitted to access them. This requires some of these variables to be moved into a source file that is not part of the startup code, as the PIC alias is already implied, and exporting variables in the opposite direction is not supported. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-36-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/boot: Drop redundant RMPADJUST in SEV SVSM presence checkArd Biesheuvel
snp_vmpl will be assigned a non-zero value when executing at a VMPL other than 0, and this is inferred from a call to RMPADJUST, which only works when running at VMPL0. This means that testing snp_vmpl is sufficient, and there is no need to perform the same check again. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-34-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/sev: Use boot SVSM CA for all startup and init codeArd Biesheuvel
To avoid having to reason about whether or not to use the per-CPU SVSM calling area when running startup and init code on the boot CPU, reuse the boot SVSM calling area as the per-CPU area for the BSP. Thus, remove the need to make the per-CPU variables and associated state in sev_cfg accessible to the startup code once confined. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-33-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/sev: Pass SVSM calling area down to early page state change APIArd Biesheuvel
The early page state change API is mostly only used very early, when only the boot time SVSM calling area is in use. However, this API is also called by the kexec finishing code, which runs very late, and potentially from a different CPU (which uses a different calling area). To avoid pulling the per-CPU SVSM calling area pointers and related SEV state into the startup code, refactor the page state change API so the SVSM calling area virtual and physical addresses can be provided by the caller. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-32-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/sev: Share implementation of MSR-based page state changeArd Biesheuvel
Both the decompressor and the SEV startup code implement the exact same sequence for invoking the MSR based communication protocol to effectuate a page state change. Before tweaking the internal APIs used in both versions, merge them and share them so those tweaks are only needed in a single place. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-31-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/sev: Avoid global variable to store virtual address of SVSM areaArd Biesheuvel
The boottime SVSM calling area is used both by the startup code running from a 1:1 mapping, and potentially later on running from the ordinary kernel mapping. This SVSM calling area is statically allocated, and so its physical address doesn't change. However, its virtual address depends on the calling context (1:1 mapping or kernel virtual mapping), and even though the variable that holds the virtual address of this calling area gets updated from 1:1 address to kernel address during the boot, it is hard to reason about why this is guaranteed to be safe. So instead, take the RIP-relative address of the boottime SVSM calling area whenever its virtual address is required, and only use a global variable for the physical address. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-30-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03x86/sev: Move GHCB page based HV communication out of startup codeArd Biesheuvel
Both the decompressor and the core kernel implement an early #VC handler, which only deals with CPUID instructions, and full featured one, which can handle any #VC exception. The former communicates with the hypervisor using the MSR based protocol, whereas the latter uses a shared GHCB page, which is configured a bit later during the boot, when the kernel runs from its ordinary virtual mapping, rather than the 1:1 mapping that the startup code uses. Accessing this shared GHCB page from the core kernel's startup code is problematic, because it involves converting the GHCB address provided by the caller to a physical address. In the startup code, virtual to physical address translations are problematic, given that the virtual address might be a 1:1 mapped address, and such translations should therefore be avoided. This means that exposing startup code dealing with the GHCB to callers that execute from the ordinary kernel virtual mapping should be avoided too. So move all GHCB page based communication out of the startup code, now that all communication occurring before the kernel virtual mapping is up relies on the MSR protocol only. As an exception, add a flag representing the need to apply the coherency fix in order to avoid exporting CPUID* helpers because of the code running too early for the *cpu_has* infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-29-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-01x86/sev: Indicate the SEV-SNP guest supports Secure AVICNeeraj Upadhyay
Now that Secure AVIC support is complete, make it part of to the SNP present features. Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828113225.209174-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com
2025-08-31x86/sev: Run RMPADJUST on SVSM calling area page to test VMPLArd Biesheuvel
Determining the VMPL at which the kernel runs involves performing a RMPADJUST operation on an arbitrary page of memory, and observing whether it succeeds. The use of boot_ghcb_page in the core kernel in this case is completely arbitrary, but results in the need to provide a PIC alias for it. So use boot_svsm_ca_page instead, which already needs this alias for other reasons. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-28-ardb+git@google.com
2025-08-31x86/sev: Use MSR protocol only for early SVSM PVALIDATE callArd Biesheuvel
The early page state change API performs an SVSM call to PVALIDATE each page when running under a SVSM, and this involves either a GHCB page based call or a call based on the MSR protocol. The GHCB page based variant involves VA to PA translation of the GHCB address, and this is best avoided in the startup code, where virtual addresses are ambiguous (1:1 or kernel virtual). As this is the last remaining occurrence of svsm_perform_call_protocol() in the startup code, switch to the MSR protocol exclusively in this particular case, so that the GHCB based plumbing can be moved out of the startup code entirely in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-27-ardb+git@google.com
2025-08-31x86/sev: Use MSR protocol for remapping SVSM calling areaArd Biesheuvel
As the preceding code comment already indicates, remapping the SVSM calling area occurs long before the GHCB page is configured, and so calling svsm_perform_call_protocol() is guaranteed to result in a call to svsm_perform_msr_protocol(). So just call the latter directly. This allows most of the GHCB based API infrastructure to be moved out of the startup code in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-26-ardb+git@google.com
2025-08-28x86/apic: Add new driver for Secure AVICNeeraj Upadhyay
The Secure AVIC feature provides SEV-SNP guests hardware acceleration for performance sensitive APIC accesses while securely managing the guest-owned APIC state through the use of a private APIC backing page. This helps prevent the hypervisor from generating unexpected interrupts for a vCPU or otherwise violate architectural assumptions around the APIC behavior. Add a new x2APIC driver that will serve as the base of the Secure AVIC support. It is initially the same as the x2APIC physical driver (without IPI callbacks), but will be modified as features are implemented. As the new driver does not implement Secure AVIC features yet, if the hypervisor sets the Secure AVIC bit in SEV_STATUS, maintain the existing behavior to enforce the guest termination. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828070334.208401-2-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com
2025-08-28x86/sev: Separate MSR and GHCB based snp_cpuid() via a callbackArd Biesheuvel
There are two distinct callers of snp_cpuid(): the MSR protocol and the GHCB page based interface. The snp_cpuid() logic does not care about the distinction, which only matters at a lower level. But the fact that it supports both interfaces means that the GHCB page based logic is pulled into the early startup code where PA to VA conversions are problematic, given that it runs from the 1:1 mapping of memory. So keep snp_cpuid() itself in the startup code, but factor out the hypervisor calls via a callback, so that the GHCB page handling can be moved out. Code refactoring only - no functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-25-ardb+git@google.com
2025-08-17Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.17_rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Remove a transitional asm/cpuid.h header which was added only as a fallback during cpuid helpers reorg - Initialize reserved fields in the SVSM page validation calls structure to zero in order to allow for future structure extensions - Have the sev-guest driver's buffers used in encryption operations be in linear mapping space as the encryption operation can be offloaded to an accelerator - Have a read-only MSR write when in an AMD SNP guest trap to the hypervisor as it is usually done. This makes the guest user experience better by simply raising a #GP instead of terminating said guest - Do not output AVX512 elapsed time for kernel threads because the data is wrong and fix a NULL pointer dereferencing in the process - Adjust the SRSO mitigation selection to the new attack vectors * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.17_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/cpuid: Remove transitional <asm/cpuid.h> header x86/sev: Ensure SVSM reserved fields in a page validation entry are initialized to zero virt: sev-guest: Satisfy linear mapping requirement in get_derived_key() x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs x86/fpu: Fix NULL dereference in avx512_status() x86/bugs: Select best SRSO mitigation
2025-08-15x86/sev: Ensure SVSM reserved fields in a page validation entry are ↵Tom Lendacky
initialized to zero In order to support future versions of the SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE call, all reserved fields within a PVALIDATE entry must be set to zero as an SVSM should be ensuring all reserved fields are zero in order to support future usage of reserved areas based on the protocol version. Fixes: fcd042e86422 ("x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/7cde412f8b057ea13a646fb166b1ca023f6a5031.1755098819.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2025-08-06x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validationTom Lendacky
An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private. The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation. CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit that, when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this vulnerability is not needed. Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP guest is vulnerable. Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2025-06-21x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86Vitaly Kuznetsov
Similar to zboot architectures, implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86. Put '.sbat' section in between '.data' and '.text' as the former also covers '.bss' and '.pgtable' and thus must be the last one in the file. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250603091951.57775-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
2025-05-31Merge tag 'mm-stable-2025-05-31-14-50' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton: - "Add folio_mk_pte()" from Matthew Wilcox simplifies the act of creating a pte which addresses the first page in a folio and reduces the amount of plumbing which architecture must implement to provide this. - "Misc folio patches for 6.16" from Matthew Wilcox is a shower of largely unrelated folio infrastructure changes which clean things up and better prepare us for future work. - "memory,x86,acpi: hotplug memory alignment advisement" from Gregory Price adds early-init code to prevent x86 from leaving physical memory unused when physical address regions are not aligned to memory block size. - "mm/compaction: allow more aggressive proactive compaction" from Michal Clapinski provides some tuning of the (sadly, hard-coded (more sadly, not auto-tuned)) thresholds for our invokation of proactive compaction. In a simple test case, the reduction of a guest VM's memory consumption was dramatic. - "Minor cleanups and improvements to swap freeing code" from Kemeng Shi provides some code cleaups and a small efficiency improvement to this part of our swap handling code. - "ptrace: introduce PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL_INFO API" from Dmitry Levin adds the ability for a ptracer to modify syscalls arguments. At this time we can alter only "system call information that are used by strace system call tampering, namely, syscall number, syscall arguments, and syscall return value. This series should have been incorporated into mm.git's "non-MM" branch, but I goofed. - "fs/proc: extend the PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl to report guard regions" from Andrei Vagin extends the info returned by the PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl against /proc/pid/pagemap. This permits CRIU to more efficiently get at the info about guard regions. - "Fix parameter passed to page_mapcount_is_type()" from Gavin Shan implements that fix. No runtime effect is expected because validate_page_before_insert() happens to fix up this error. - "kernel/events/uprobes: uprobe_write_opcode() rewrite" from David Hildenbrand basically brings uprobe text poking into the current decade. Remove a bunch of hand-rolled implementation in favor of using more current facilities. - "mm/ptdump: Drop assumption that pxd_val() is u64" from Anshuman Khandual provides enhancements and generalizations to the pte dumping code. This might be needed when 128-bit Page Table Descriptors are enabled for ARM. - "Always call constructor for kernel page tables" from Kevin Brodsky ensures that the ctor/dtor is always called for kernel pgtables, as it already is for user pgtables. This permits the addition of more functionality such as "insert hooks to protect page tables". This change does result in various architectures performing unnecesary work, but this is fixed up where it is anticipated to occur. - "Rust support for mm_struct, vm_area_struct, and mmap" from Alice Ryhl adds plumbing to permit Rust access to core MM structures. - "fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA merges" from Lorenzo Stoakes takes advantage of some VMA merging opportunities which we've been missing for 15 years. - "mm/madvise: batch tlb flushes for MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE" from SeongJae Park optimizes process_madvise()'s TLB flushing. Instead of flushing each address range in the provided iovec, we batch the flushing across all the iovec entries. The syscall's cost was approximately halved with a microbenchmark which was designed to load this particular operation. - "Track node vacancy to reduce worst case allocation counts" from Sidhartha Kumar makes the maple tree smarter about its node preallocation. stress-ng mmap performance increased by single-digit percentages and the amount of unnecessarily preallocated memory was dramaticelly reduced. - "mm/gup: Minor fix, cleanup and improvements" from Baoquan He removes a few unnecessary things which Baoquan noted when reading the code. - ""Enhance sysfs handling for memory hotplug in weighted interleave" from Rakie Kim "enhances the weighted interleave policy in the memory management subsystem by improving sysfs handling, fixing memory leaks, and introducing dynamic sysfs updates for memory hotplug support". Fixes things on error paths which we are unlikely to hit. - "mm/damon: auto-tune DAMOS for NUMA setups including tiered memory" from SeongJae Park introduces new DAMOS quota goal metrics which eliminate the manual tuning which is required when utilizing DAMON for memory tiering. - "mm/vmalloc.c: code cleanup and improvements" from Baoquan He provides cleanups and small efficiency improvements which Baoquan found via code inspection. - "vmscan: enforce mems_effective during demotion" from Gregory Price changes reclaim to respect cpuset.mems_effective during demotion when possible. because presently, reclaim explicitly ignores cpuset.mems_effective when demoting, which may cause the cpuset settings to violated. This is useful for isolating workloads on a multi-tenant system from certain classes of memory more consistently. - "Clean up split_huge_pmd_locked() and remove unnecessary folio pointers" from Gavin Guo provides minor cleanups and efficiency gains in in the huge page splitting and migrating code. - "Use kmem_cache for memcg alloc" from Huan Yang creates a slab cache for `struct mem_cgroup', yielding improved memory utilization. - "add max arg to swappiness in memory.reclaim and lru_gen" from Zhongkun He adds a new "max" argument to the "swappiness=" argument for memory.reclaim MGLRU's lru_gen. This directs proactive reclaim to reclaim from only anon folios rather than file-backed folios. - "kexec: introduce Kexec HandOver (KHO)" from Mike Rapoport is the first step on the path to permitting the kernel to maintain existing VMs while replacing the host kernel via file-based kexec. At this time only memblock's reserve_mem is preserved. - "mm: Introduce for_each_valid_pfn()" from David Woodhouse provides and uses a smarter way of looping over a pfn range. By skipping ranges of invalid pfns. - "sched/numa: Skip VMA scanning on memory pinned to one NUMA node via cpuset.mems" from Libo Chen removes a lot of pointless VMA scanning when a task is pinned a single NUMA mode. Dramatic performance benefits were seen in some real world cases. - "JFS: Implement migrate_folio for jfs_metapage_aops" from Shivank Garg addresses a warning which occurs during memory compaction when using JFS. - "move all VMA allocation, freeing and duplication logic to mm" from Lorenzo Stoakes moves some VMA code from kernel/fork.c into the more appropriate mm/vma.c. - "mm, swap: clean up swap cache mapping helper" from Kairui Song provides code consolidation and cleanups related to the folio_index() function. - "mm/gup: Cleanup memfd_pin_folios()" from Vishal Moola does that. - "memcg: Fix test_memcg_min/low test failures" from Waiman Long addresses some bogus failures which are being reported by the test_memcontrol selftest. - "eliminate mmap() retry merge, add .mmap_prepare hook" from Lorenzo Stoakes commences the deprecation of file_operations.mmap() in favor of the new file_operations.mmap_prepare(). The latter is more restrictive and prevents drivers from messing with things in ways which, amongst other problems, may defeat VMA merging. - "memcg: decouple memcg and objcg stocks"" from Shakeel Butt decouples the per-cpu memcg charge cache from the objcg's one. This is a step along the way to making memcg and objcg charging NMI-safe, which is a BPF requirement. - "mm/damon: minor fixups and improvements for code, tests, and documents" from SeongJae Park is yet another batch of miscellaneous DAMON changes. Fix and improve minor problems in code, tests and documents. - "memcg: make memcg stats irq safe" from Shakeel Butt converts memcg stats to be irq safe. Another step along the way to making memcg charging and stats updates NMI-safe, a BPF requirement. - "Let unmap_hugepage_range() and several related functions take folio instead of page" from Fan Ni provides folio conversions in the hugetlb code. * tag 'mm-stable-2025-05-31-14-50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (285 commits) mm: pcp: increase pcp->free_count threshold to trigger free_high mm/hugetlb: convert use of struct page to folio in __unmap_hugepage_range() mm/hugetlb: refactor __unmap_hugepage_range() to take folio instead of page mm/hugetlb: refactor unmap_hugepage_range() to take folio instead of page mm/hugetlb: pass folio instead of page to unmap_ref_private() memcg: objcg stock trylock without irq disabling memcg: no stock lock for cpu hot-unplug memcg: make __mod_memcg_lruvec_state re-entrant safe against irqs memcg: make count_memcg_events re-entrant safe against irqs memcg: make mod_memcg_state re-entrant safe against irqs memcg: move preempt disable to callers of memcg_rstat_updated memcg: memcg_rstat_updated re-entrant safe against irqs mm: khugepaged: decouple SHMEM and file folios' collapse selftests/eventfd: correct test name and improve messages alloc_tag: check mem_profiling_support in alloc_tag_init Docs/damon: update titles and brief introductions to explain DAMOS selftests/damon/_damon_sysfs: read tried regions directories in order mm/damon/tests/core-kunit: add a test for damos_set_filters_default_reject() mm/damon/paddr: remove unused variable, folio_list, in damon_pa_stat() mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix wrong comment on damons_sysfs_quota_goal_metric_strs ...
2025-05-30Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v6.16' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel: "Not a lot going on in the EFI tree this cycle. The only thing that stands out is the new support for SBAT metadata, which was a bit contentious when it was first proposed, because in the initial incarnation, it would have required us to maintain a revocation index, and bump it each time a vulnerability affecting UEFI secure boot got fixed. This was shot down for obvious reasons. This time, only the changes needed to emit the SBAT section into the PE/COFF image are being carried upstream, and it is up to the distros to decide what to put in there when creating and signing the build. This only has the EFI zboot bits (which the distros will be using for arm64); the x86 bzImage changes should be arriving next cycle, presumably via the -tip tree. Summary: - Add support for emitting a .sbat section into the EFI zboot image, so that downstreams can easily include revocation metadata in the signed EFI images - Align PE symbolic constant names with other projects - Bug fix for the efi_test module - Log the physical address and size of the EFI memory map when failing to map it - A kerneldoc fix for the EFI stub code" * tag 'efi-next-for-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: include: pe.h: Fix PE definitions efi/efi_test: Fix missing pending status update in getwakeuptime efi: zboot specific mechanism for embedding SBAT section efi/libstub: Describe missing 'out' parameter in efi_load_initrd efi: Improve logging around memmap init
2025-05-21include: pe.h: Fix PE definitionsPali Rohár
* Rename constants to their standard PE names: - MZ_MAGIC -> IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE - PE_MAGIC -> IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE - PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32_ROM -> IMAGE_ROM_OPTIONAL_HDR_MAGIC - PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32 -> IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC - PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS -> IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC - IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT -> IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT * Import constants and their description from readpe and file projects which contains current up-to-date information: - IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_* - IMAGE_FILE_* - IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_* - IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_* - IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_EX_* - IMAGE_DEBUG_TYPE_* * Add missing IMAGE_SCN_* constants and update their incorrect description * Fix incorrect value of IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE constant * Add description for win32_version and loader_flags PE fields Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2025-05-17x86/mm/64: Make 5-level paging support unconditionalKirill A. Shutemov
Both Intel and AMD CPUs support 5-level paging, which is expected to become more widely adopted in the future. All major x86 Linux distributions have the feature enabled. Remove CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL and related #ifdeffery for it to make it more readable. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516123306.3812286-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2025-05-15x86/cpuid: Set <asm/cpuid/api.h> as the main CPUID headerAhmed S. Darwish
The main CPUID header <asm/cpuid.h> was originally a storefront for the headers: <asm/cpuid/api.h> <asm/cpuid/leaf_0x2_api.h> Now that the latter CPUID(0x2) header has been merged into the former, there is no practical difference between <asm/cpuid.h> and <asm/cpuid/api.h>. Migrate all users to the <asm/cpuid/api.h> header, in preparation of the removal of <asm/cpuid.h>. Don't remove <asm/cpuid.h> just yet, in case some new code in -next started using it. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-cpuid@lists.linux.dev Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250508150240.172915-3-darwi@linutronix.de
2025-05-14x86/boot: Defer initialization of VM space related global variablesArd Biesheuvel
The global pseudo-constants 'page_offset_base', 'vmalloc_base' and 'vmemmap_base' are not used extremely early during the boot, and cannot be used safely until after the KASLR memory randomization code in kernel_randomize_memory() executes, which may update their values. So there is no point in setting these variables extremely early, and it can wait until after the kernel itself is mapped and running from its permanent virtual mapping. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250513111157.717727-9-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-13Merge branch 'x86/msr' into x86/core, to resolve conflictsIngo Molnar
Conflicts: arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c Semantic conflict: arch/x86/include/asm/sev-internal.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-05-13Merge branch 'x86/boot' into x86/core, to merge dependent commitsIngo Molnar
Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict with pending x86 changes: 6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-05-13Merge branch 'x86/asm' into x86/core, to merge dependent commitsIngo Molnar
Prepare to resolve conflicts with an upstream series of fixes that conflict with pending x86 changes: 6f5bf947bab0 Merge tag 'its-for-linus-20250509' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-05-12x86/boot: make sure KASLR does not step over KHO preserved memoryAlexander Graf
During kexec handover (KHO) memory contains data that should be preserved and this data would be consumed by kexec'ed kernel. To make sure that the preserved memory is not overwritten, KHO uses "scratch regions" to bootstrap kexec'ed kernel. These regions are guaranteed to not have any memory that KHO would preserve and are used as the only memory the kernel sees during the early boot. The scratch regions are passed in the setup_data by the first kernel with other KHO parameters. If the setup_data contains the KHO parameters, limit randomization to scratch areas only to make sure preserved memory won't get overwritten. Since all the pointers in setup_data are represented by u64, they require double casting (first to unsigned long and then to the actual pointer type) to compile on 32-bits. This looks goofy out of context, but it is unfortunately the way that this is handled across the tree. There are at least a dozen instances of casting like this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250509074635.3187114-14-changyuanl@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Cc: Ben Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Gowans <jgowans@amazon.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Pratyush Yadav <ptyadav@amazon.de> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com> Cc: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-05-06Merge tag 'v6.15-rc4' into x86/asm, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-05-05x86/sev: Disentangle #VC handling code from startup codeArd Biesheuvel
Most of the SEV support code used to reside in a single C source file that was included in two places: the core kernel, and the decompressor. The code that is actually shared with the decompressor was moved into a separate, shared source file under startup/, on the basis that the decompressor also executes from the early 1:1 mapping of memory. However, while the elaborate #VC handling and instruction decoding that it involves is also performed by the decompressor, it does not actually occur in the core kernel at early boot, and therefore, does not need to be part of the confined early startup code. So split off the #VC handling code and move it back into arch/x86/coco where it came from, into another C source file that is included from both the decompressor and the core kernel. Code movement only - no functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-31-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-04x86/boot: Provide __pti_set_user_pgtbl() to startup codeArd Biesheuvel
The SME encryption startup code populates page tables using the ordinary set_pXX() helpers, and in a PTI build, these will call out to __pti_set_user_pgtbl() to manipulate the shadow copy of the page tables for user space. This is unneeded for the startup code, which only manipulates the swapper page tables, and so this call could be avoided in this particular case. So instead of exposing the ordinary __pti_set_user_pgtblt() to the startup code after its gets confined into its own symbol space, provide an alternative which just returns pgd, which is always correct in the startup context. Annotate it as __weak for now, this will be dropped in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-40-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-04x86/sev: Move instruction decoder into separate source fileArd Biesheuvel
As a first step towards disentangling the SEV #VC handling code -which is shared between the decompressor and the core kernel- from the SEV startup code, move the decompressor's copy of the instruction decoder into a separate source file. Code movement only - no functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-30-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-04x86/sev: Make sev_snp_enabled() a static functionArd Biesheuvel
sev_snp_enabled() is no longer used outside of the source file that defines it, so make it static and drop the extern declarations. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-29-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-04x86/boot: Disregard __supported_pte_mask in __startup_64()Ard Biesheuvel
__supported_pte_mask is statically initialized to U64_MAX and never assigned until long after the startup code executes that creates the initial page tables. So applying the mask is unnecessary, and can be avoided. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-27-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-04x86/boot: Move early_setup_gdt() back into head64.cArd Biesheuvel
Move early_setup_gdt() out of the startup code that is callable from the 1:1 mapping - this is not needed, and instead, it is better to expose the helper that does reside in __head directly. This reduces the amount of code that needs special checks for 1:1 execution suitability. In particular, it avoids dealing with the GHCB page (and its physical address) in startup code, which runs from the 1:1 mapping, making physical to virtual translations ambiguous. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-26-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-04Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/boot, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-05-04x86/boot/sev: Support memory acceptance in the EFI stub under SVSMArd Biesheuvel
Commit: d54d610243a4 ("x86/boot/sev: Avoid shared GHCB page for early memory acceptance") provided a fix for SEV-SNP memory acceptance from the EFI stub when running at VMPL #0. However, that fix was insufficient for SVSM SEV-SNP guests running at VMPL >0, as those rely on a SVSM calling area, which is a shared buffer whose address is programmed into a SEV-SNP MSR, and the SEV init code that sets up this calling area executes much later during the boot. Given that booting via the EFI stub at VMPL >0 implies that the firmware has configured this calling area already, reuse it for performing memory acceptance in the EFI stub. Fixes: fcd042e86422 ("x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250428174322.2780170-2-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-24x86/boot: Work around broken busybox 'truncate' toolArd Biesheuvel
The GNU coreutils version of truncate, which is the original, accepts a % prefix for the -s size argument which means the file in question should be padded to a multiple of the given size. This is currently used to pad the setup block of bzImage to a multiple of 4k before appending the decompressor. busybox reimplements truncate but does not support this idiom, and therefore fails the build since commit 9c54baab4401 ("x86/boot: Drop CRC-32 checksum and the build tool that generates it") Since very little build code within the kernel depends on the 'truncate' utility, work around this incompatibility by avoiding truncate altogether, and relying on dd to perform the padding. Fixes: 9c54baab4401 ("x86/boot: Drop CRC-32 checksum and the build tool that generates it") Reported-by: <phasta@kernel.org> Tested-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250424101917.1552527-2-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-24x86/sev: Share the sev_secrets_pa value againTom Lendacky
This commits breaks SNP guests: 234cf67fc3bd ("x86/sev: Split off startup code from core code") The SNP guest boots, but no longer has access to the VMPCK keys needed to communicate with the ASP, which is used, for example, to obtain an attestation report. The secrets_pa value is defined as static in both startup.c and core.c. It is set by a function in startup.c and so when used in core.c its value will be 0. Share it again and add the sev_ prefix to put it into the global SEV symbols namespace. [ mingo: Renamed to sev_secrets_pa ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cf878810-81ed-3017-52c6-ce6aa41b5f01@amd.com
2025-04-23x86/boot: Disable jump tables in PIC codeArd Biesheuvel
objtool already struggles to identify jump tables correctly in non-PIC code, where the idiom is something like jmpq *table(,%idx,8) and the table is a list of absolute addresses of jump targets. When using -fPIC, both the table reference as well as the jump targets are emitted in a RIP-relative manner, resulting in something like leaq table(%rip), %tbl movslq (%tbl,%idx,4), %offset addq %offset, %tbl jmpq *%tbl and the table is a list of offsets of the jump targets relative to the start of the entire table. Considering that this sequence of instructions can be interleaved with other instructions that have nothing to do with the jump table in question, it is extremely difficult to infer the control flow by deriving the jump targets from the indirect jump, the location of the table and the relative offsets it contains. So let's not bother and disable jump tables for code built with -fPIC under arch/x86/boot/startup. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250422210510.600354-2-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-22x86/boot: Drop RIP_REL_REF() uses from early SEV codeArd Biesheuvel
Now that the early SEV code is built with -fPIC, RIP_REL_REF() has no effect and can be dropped. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250418141253.2601348-13-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-22x86/boot: Move SEV startup code into startup/Ard Biesheuvel
Move the SEV startup code into arch/x86/boot/startup/, where it will reside along with other code that executes extremely early, and therefore needs to be built in a special manner. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250418141253.2601348-12-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-22x86/sev: Split off startup code from core codeArd Biesheuvel
Disentangle the SEV core code and the SEV code that is called during early boot. The latter piece will be moved into startup/ in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250418141253.2601348-11-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-22Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/boot, to merge dependent commit and ↵Ingo Molnar
upstream fixes In particular we need this fix before applying subsequent changes: d54d610243a4 ("x86/boot/sev: Avoid shared GHCB page for early memory acceptance") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-04-18x86/boot/sev: Avoid shared GHCB page for early memory acceptanceArd Biesheuvel
Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the firmware, and this manipulation is not possible. So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed yet. For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the EFI stub. Fixes: 6c3211796326 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250404082921.2767593-8-ardb+git@google.com # discussion thread #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410132850.3708703-2-ardb+git@google.com # discussion thread #2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417202120.1002102-2-ardb+git@google.com # final submission
2025-04-18x86/asm: Replace "REP; NOP" with PAUSE mnemonicUros Bizjak
Current minimum required version of binutils is 2.25, which supports PAUSE instruction mnemonic. Replace "REP; NOP" with this proper mnemonic. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250418080805.83679-2-ubizjak@gmail.com
2025-04-18x86/boot: Remove semicolon from "rep" prefixesUros Bizjak
Minimum version of binutils required to compile the kernel is 2.25. This version correctly handles the "rep" prefixes, so it is possible to remove the semicolon, which was used to support ancient versions of GNU as. Due to the semicolon, the compiler considers "rep; insn" (or its alternate "rep\n\tinsn" form) as two separate instructions. Removing the semicolon makes asm length calculations more accurate, consequently making scheduling and inlining decisions of the compiler more accurate. Removing the semicolon also enables assembler checks involving "rep" prefixes. Trying to assemble e.g. "rep addl %eax, %ebx" results in: Error: invalid instruction `add' after `rep' Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Mares <mj@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250418071437.4144391-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
2025-04-17x86/boot/startup: Disable LTO for the startup codeNathan Chancellor
When building with CONFIG_LTO_CLANG, there is an error in the x86 boot startup code because it builds with a different code model than the rest of the kernel: ld.lld: error: Function Import: link error: linking module flags 'Code Model': IDs have conflicting values: 'i32 2' from vmlinux.a(head64.o at 1302448), and 'i32 1' from vmlinux.a(map_kernel.o at 1314208) ld.lld: error: Function Import: link error: linking module flags 'Code Model': IDs have conflicting values: 'i32 2' from vmlinux.a(common.o at 1306108), and 'i32 1' from vmlinux.a(gdt_idt.o at 1314148) As this directory is for code that only runs during early system initialization, LTO is not very important, so filter out the LTO flags from KBUILD_CFLAGS for arch/x86/boot/startup to resolve the build error. Fixes: 4cecebf200ef ("x86/boot: Move the early GDT/IDT setup code into startup/") Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250414-x86-boot-startup-lto-error-v1-1-7c8bed7c131c@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/CA+G9fYvnun+bhYgtt425LWxzOmj+8Jf3ruKeYxQSx-F6U7aisg@mail.gmail.com/
2025-04-12x86/sev: Prepare for splitting off early SEV codeArd Biesheuvel
Prepare for splitting off parts of the SEV core.c source file into a file that carries code that must tolerate being called from the early 1:1 mapping. This will allow special build-time handling of thise code, to ensure that it gets generated in a way that is compatible with the early execution context. So create a de-facto internal SEV API and put the definitions into sev-internal.h. No attempt is made to allow this header file to be included in arbitrary other sources - this is explicitly not the intent. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410134117.3713574-20-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-12x86/boot: Drop RIP_REL_REF() uses from SME startup codeArd Biesheuvel
RIP_REL_REF() has no effect on code residing in arch/x86/boot/startup, as it is built with -fPIC. So remove any occurrences from the SME startup code. Note the SME is the only caller of cc_set_mask() that requires this, so drop it from there as well. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410134117.3713574-19-ardb+git@google.com