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commit e68503bd6836ba765dc8e0ee77ea675fedc07e41 upstream
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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commit e78e5a91456fcecaa2efbb3706572fe043766f4d upstream.
In the __getcpu function, lsl is using the wrong target and destination
registers. Luckily, the compiler tends to choose %eax for both variables,
so it has been working so far.
Fixes: a582c540ac1b ("x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180901201452.27828-1-sneves@dei.uc.pt
Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu (CIP) <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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On Intel it is required to do CPUID(1) before reading the microcode
revision MSR. Current code in 4.4 an 4.9 relies on sync_core() to call
CPUID, unfortunately on 32 bit machines code inside sync_core() always
jumps past CPUID instruction as it depends on data structure boot_cpu_data
witch are not populated correctly so early in boot sequence.
It depends on:
commit 5dedade6dfa2 ("x86/CPU: Add native CPUID variants returning a single
datum")
This patch is for 4.4 but also should apply to 4.9
Signed-off-by: Evalds Iodzevics <evalds.iodzevics@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5dedade6dfa243c130b85d1e4daba6f027805033 upstream.
... similarly to the cpuid_<reg>() variants.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170109114147.5082-2-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Evalds Iodzevics <evalds.iodzevics@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The fast SYSCALL exit path returns with SYSRET to userspace after
verifying that there's no pending work. MDS mitigation mandates that CPU
buffers must be cleared on transition from kernel to userspace so do
that here too.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 396d2e878f92ec108e4293f1c77ea3bc90b414ff upstream.
The host reports support for the synthetic feature X86_FEATURE_SSBD
when any of the three following hardware features are set:
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31]
CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24]
CPUID.80000008H:EBX.VIRT_SSBD[bit 25]
Either of the first two hardware features implies the existence of the
IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR, but CPUID.80000008H:EBX.VIRT_SSBD[bit 25] does
not. Therefore, CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31] should only be
set in the guest if CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31] or
CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24] is set on the host.
Fixes: 0c54914d0c52a ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.x: adjust indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit edd4fa37baa6ee8e44dc65523b27bd6fe44c94de upstream.
Reallocate a rmap array and recalcuate large page compatibility when
moving an existing memslot to correctly handle the alignment properties
of the new memslot. The number of rmap entries required at each level
is dependent on the alignment of the memslot's base gfn with respect to
that level, e.g. moving a large-page aligned memslot so that it becomes
unaligned will increase the number of rmap entries needed at the now
unaligned level.
Not updating the rmap array is the most obvious bug, as KVM accesses
garbage data beyond the end of the rmap. KVM interprets the bad data as
pointers, leading to non-canonical #GPs, unexpected #PFs, etc...
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 1909 Comm: move_memory_reg Not tainted 5.4.0-rc7+ #139
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:rmap_get_first+0x37/0x50 [kvm]
Code: <48> 8b 3b 48 85 ff 74 ec e8 6c f4 ff ff 85 c0 74 e3 48 89 d8 5b c3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000021bbc8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff00617461642e RBX: ffff00617461642e RCX: 0000000000000012
RDX: ffff88827400f568 RSI: ffffc9000021bbe0 RDI: ffff88827400f570
RBP: 0010000000000000 R08: ffffc9000021bd00 R09: ffffc9000021bda8
R10: ffffc9000021bc48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0030000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88827427d700 R15: ffffc9000021bce8
FS: 00007f7eda014700(0000) GS:ffff888277a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7ed9216ff8 CR3: 0000000274391003 CR4: 0000000000162eb0
Call Trace:
kvm_mmu_slot_set_dirty+0xa1/0x150 [kvm]
__kvm_set_memory_region.part.64+0x559/0x960 [kvm]
kvm_set_memory_region+0x45/0x60 [kvm]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x30f/0x920 [kvm]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620
ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f7ed9911f47
Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 21 6f 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc00937498 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001ab0010 RCX: 00007f7ed9911f47
RDX: 0000000001ab1350 RSI: 000000004020ae46 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f7ed9214700
R10: 00007f7ed92149d0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000bffff000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f7ed9215000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
---[ end trace 0c5f570b3358ca89 ]---
The disallow_lpage tracking is more subtle. Failure to update results
in KVM creating large pages when it shouldn't, either due to stale data
or again due to indexing beyond the end of the metadata arrays, which
can lead to memory corruption and/or leaking data to guest/userspace.
Note, the arrays for the old memslot are freed by the unconditional call
to kvm_free_memslot() in __kvm_set_memory_region().
Fixes: 05da45583de9b ("KVM: MMU: large page support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3d51507f29f2153a658df4a0674ec5b592b62085 upstream.
All exception entry points must have ASM_CLAC right at the
beginning. The general_protection entry is missing one.
Fixes: e59d1b0a2419 ("x86-32, smap: Add STAC/CLAC instructions to 32-bit kernel entry")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200225220216.219537887@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ecb9c790999fd6c5af0f44783bd0217f0b89ec2b upstream.
The value in "new" is constructed from "old" such that all bits defined
as reserved by the ACPI spec[1] are left untouched. But if those bits
do not happen to be all zero, "new < 3" will not evaluate to true.
The firmware of the laptop(s) Medion MD63490 / Akoya P15648 comes with
garbage inside the "FACS" ACPI table. The starting value is
old=0x4944454d, therefore new=0x4944454e, which is >= 3. Mask off
the reserved bits.
[1] https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ACPI_6_2.pdf
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206553
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 81a34892c2c7c809f9c4e22c5ac936ae673fb9a2 ]
The load address is compared with LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR using a signed
comparison currently (using jge instruction).
When loading a 64-bit kernel using the new efi32_pe_entry() point added by:
97aa276579b2 ("efi/x86: Add true mixed mode entry point into .compat section")
using Qemu with -m 3072, the firmware actually loads us above 2Gb,
resulting in a very early crash.
Use the JAE instruction to perform a unsigned comparison instead, as physical
addresses should be considered unsigned.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200301230436.2246909-6-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-14-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c4409905cd6eb42cfd06126e9226b0150e05a715 ]
Re-execution after an emulation decode failure is only intended to
handle a case where two or vCPUs race to write a shadowed page, i.e.
we should never re-execute an instruction as part of MMIO emulation.
As handle_ept_misconfig() is only used for MMIO emulation, it should
pass EMULTYPE_NO_REEXECUTE when using the emulator to skip an instr
in the fast-MMIO case where VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN is invalid.
And because the cr2 value passed to x86_emulate_instruction() is only
destined for use when retrying or reexecuting, we can simply call
emulate_instruction().
Fixes: d391f1207067 ("x86/kvm/vmx: do not use vm-exit instruction length
for fast MMIO when running nested")
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 763802b53a427ed3cbd419dbba255c414fdd9e7c upstream.
Commit 3f8fd02b1bf1 ("mm/vmalloc: Sync unmappings in
__purge_vmap_area_lazy()") introduced a call to vmalloc_sync_all() in
the vunmap() code-path. While this change was necessary to maintain
correctness on x86-32-pae kernels, it also adds additional cycles for
architectures that don't need it.
Specifically on x86-64 with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y some people reported
severe performance regressions in micro-benchmarks because it now also
calls the x86-64 implementation of vmalloc_sync_all() on vunmap(). But
the vmalloc_sync_all() implementation on x86-64 is only needed for newly
created mappings.
To avoid the unnecessary work on x86-64 and to gain the performance
back, split up vmalloc_sync_all() into two functions:
* vmalloc_sync_mappings(), and
* vmalloc_sync_unmappings()
Most call-sites to vmalloc_sync_all() only care about new mappings being
synchronized. The only exception is the new call-site added in the
above mentioned commit.
Shile Zhang directed us to a report of an 80% regression in reaim
throughput.
Fixes: 3f8fd02b1bf1 ("mm/vmalloc: Sync unmappings in __purge_vmap_area_lazy()")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [GHES]
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191009124418.8286-1-joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/lkp@lists.01.org/thread/4D3JPPHBNOSPFK2KEPC6KGKS6J25AIDB/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191113095530.228959-1-shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f967140dfb7442e2db0868b03b961f9c59418a1b ]
Enable the sampling check in kernel/events/core.c::perf_event_open(),
which returns the more appropriate -EOPNOTSUPP.
BEFORE:
$ sudo perf record -a -e instructions,l3_request_g1.caching_l3_cache_accesses true
Error:
The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (l3_request_g1.caching_l3_cache_accesses).
/bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information.
With nothing relevant in dmesg.
AFTER:
$ sudo perf record -a -e instructions,l3_request_g1.caching_l3_cache_accesses true
Error:
l3_request_g1.caching_l3_cache_accesses: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
Fixes: c43ca5091a37 ("perf/x86/amd: Add support for AMD NB and L2I "uncore" counters")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311191323.13124-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 342993f96ab24d5864ab1216f46c0b199c2baf8e upstream.
After commit 07721feee46b ("KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest
mode") Hyper-V guests on KVM stopped booting with:
kvm_nested_vmexit: rip fffff802987d6169 reason EPT_VIOLATION info1 181
info2 0 int_info 0 int_info_err 0
kvm_page_fault: address febd0000 error_code 181
kvm_emulate_insn: 0:fffff802987d6169: f3 a5
kvm_emulate_insn: 0:fffff802987d6169: f3 a5 FAIL
kvm_inj_exception: #UD (0x0)
"f3 a5" is a "rep movsw" instruction, which should not be intercepted
at all. Commit c44b4c6ab80e ("KVM: emulate: clean up initializations in
init_decode_cache") reduced the number of fields cleared by
init_decode_cache() claiming that they are being cleared elsewhere,
'intercept', however, is left uncleared if the instruction does not have
any of the "slow path" flags (NotImpl, Stack, Op3264, Sse, Mmx, CheckPerm,
NearBranch, No16 and of course Intercept itself).
Fixes: c44b4c6ab80e ("KVM: emulate: clean up initializations in init_decode_cache")
Fixes: 07721feee46b ("KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8fde12ca79aff9b5ba951fce1a2641901b8d8e64 upstream.
If the page refcount wraps around past zero, it will be freed while
there are still four billion references to it. One of the possible
avenues for an attacker to try to make this happen is by doing direct IO
on a page multiple times. This patch makes get_user_pages() refuse to
take a new page reference if there are already more than two billion
references to the page.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ 4.4.y backport notes:
Ajay: - Added local variable 'err' with-in follow_hugetlb_page()
from 2be7cfed995e, to resolve compilation error
- Added page_ref_count()
- Added missing refcount overflow checks on x86 and s390
(Vlastimil, thanks for this change)
Srivatsa: - Replaced call to get_page_foll() with try_get_page_foll() ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat (VMware) <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 23520b2def95205f132e167cf5b25c609975e959 upstream.
When pv_eoi_get_user() fails, 'val' may remain uninitialized and the return
value of pv_eoi_get_pending() becomes random. Fix the issue by initializing
the variable.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 35a571346a94fb93b5b3b6a599675ef3384bc75c upstream.
Consult the 'unconditional IO exiting' and 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution
controls when checking instruction interception. If the 'use IO bitmaps'
VM-execution control is 1, check the instruction access against the IO
bitmaps to determine if the instruction causes a VM-exit.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e71237d3ff1abf9f3388337cfebf53b96df2020d upstream.
Checks against the IO bitmap are useful for both instruction emulation
and VM-exit reflection. Refactor the IO bitmap checks into a helper
function.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 07721feee46b4b248402133228235318199b05ec ]
vmx_check_intercept is not yet fully implemented. To avoid emulating
instructions disallowed by the L1 hypervisor, refuse to emulate
instructions by default.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Made commit, added commit msg - Oliver]
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 51dede9c05df2b78acd6dcf6a17d21f0877d2d7b upstream.
Accessing the MCA thresholding controls in sysfs concurrently with CPU
hotplug can lead to a couple of KASAN-reported issues:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sysfs_file_ops+0x155/0x180
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888367578940 by task grep/4019
and
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in show_error_count+0x15c/0x180
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888368a05514 by task grep/4454
for example. Both result from the fact that the threshold block
creation/teardown code frees the descriptor memory itself instead of
defining proper ->release function and leaving it to the driver core to
take care of that, after all sysfs accesses have completed.
Do that and get rid of the custom freeing code, fixing the above UAFs in
the process.
[ bp: write commit message. ]
Fixes: 95268664390b ("[PATCH] x86_64: mce_amd support for family 0x10 processors")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214082801.13836-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bff47c2302cc249bcd550b17067f8dddbd4b6f77 ]
When building with C=1, sparse issues a warning:
CHECK arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c:28:28: warning: symbol 'vdso32_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
Provide the missing header file.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36224.1575599767@turing-police
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ffc2760bcf2dba0dbef74013ed73eea8310cc52c ]
Fix a couple of issues with the way we map and copy the vendor string:
- we map only 2 bytes, which usually works since you get at least a
page, but if the vendor string happens to cross a page boundary,
a crash will result
- only call early_memunmap() if early_memremap() succeeded, or we will
call it with a NULL address which it doesn't like,
- while at it, switch to early_memremap_ro(), and array indexing rather
than pointer dereferencing to read the CHAR16 characters.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b83683f32b1 ("x86: EFI runtime service support")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-5-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 57211b7366cc2abf784c35e537b256e7fcddc91e.
This patch isn't needed on 4.19 and older.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit fb6d4d340e0532032c808a9933eaaa7b8de435ab upstream.
This is encoded as F3 0F C7 /7 with a register argument. The register
argument is the second array in the group9 GroupDual, while F3 is the
fourth element of a Prefix.
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a582c540ac1b10f0a7d37415e04c4af42409fd08 upstream.
RDPID is a new instruction that reads MSR_TSC_AUX quickly. This
should be considerably faster than reading the GDT. Add a
cpufeature for it and use it from __vdso_getcpu() when available.
Tested-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6c3a22012d10f1c65b9ca15800e01b42c7d39d.1479320367.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a4d956b9390418623ae5d07933e2679c68b6f83c ]
In case writing to vmread destination operand result in a #PF, vmread
should not call nested_vmx_succeed() to set rflags to specify success.
Similar to as done in VMPTRST (See handle_vmptrst()).
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe6ed369fca98e99df55c932b85782a5687526b5 ]
Reject writes to RTIT address MSRs if the data being written is a
non-canonical address as the MSRs are subject to canonical checks, e.g.
KVM will trigger an unchecked #GP when loading the values to hardware
during pt_guest_enter().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e30a7d623dccdb3f880fbcad980b0cb589a1da45 ]
Remove the bogus 64-bit only condition from the check that disables MMIO
spte optimization when the system supports the max PA, i.e. doesn't have
any reserved PA bits. 32-bit KVM always uses PAE paging for the shadow
MMU, and per Intel's SDM:
PAE paging translates 32-bit linear addresses to 52-bit physical
addresses.
The kernel's restrictions on max physical addresses are limits on how
much memory the kernel can reasonably use, not what physical addresses
are supported by hardware.
Fixes: ce88decffd17 ("KVM: MMU: mmio page fault support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4bf79cb089f6b1c6c632492c0271054ce52ad766 ]
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: 0105d1a52640 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 66061740f1a487f4ed54fde75e724709f805da53 ]
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
perspective.
Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14e32321f3606e4b0970200b6e5e47ee6f1e6410 ]
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write().
It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port
number with constants through a minor refactoring.
Fixes: 85f455f7ddbe ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9fecaa9e32ae7370878e5967d8874b6f58360b10 ]
We already have the exact same checks a couple of lines below.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 16be9ddea268ad841457a59109963fff8c9de38d upstream.
Free the vCPU's wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails after
kvm_arch_vcpu_init(), e.g. when installing the vCPU's file descriptor.
Do the freeing by calling kvm_arch_vcpu_free() instead of open coding
the freeing. This adds a likely superfluous, but ultimately harmless,
call to kvmclock_reset(), which only clears vcpu->arch.pv_time_enabled.
Using kvm_arch_vcpu_free() allows for additional cleanup in the future.
Fixes: f5f48ee15c2ee ("KVM: VMX: Execute WBINVD to keep data consistency with assigned devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
commit 25a5edea71b7c154b6a0b8cec14c711cafa31d26 upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: de9aef5e1ad6 ("KVM: MTRR: introduce fixed_mtrr_segment table")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3c9053a2cae7ba2ba73766a34cea41baa70f57f7 upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.
Fixes: 045a282ca415 ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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in x86.c
commit 6ec4c5eee1750d5d17951c4e1960d953376a0dda upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in set_msr_mce() and
get_msr_mce().
Both functions contain index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: 890ca9aefa78 ("KVM: Add MCE support")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8c86405f606ca8508b8d9280680166ca26723695 upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.
Fixes: a2c118bfab8b ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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attacks
commit 13c5183a4e643cc2b03a22d0e582c8e17bb7457d upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in the get_gp_pmc() and
get_fixed_pmc() functions.
They both contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled)
MSR number.
Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 670564559ca35b439c8d8861fc399451ddf95137 upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_write_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.
This patch depends on patch
"KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks".
Fixes: 70f93dae32ac ("KVM: Use temporary variable to shorten lines.")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8618793750071d66028584a83ed0b4fa7eb4f607 upstream.
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
These functions contain index computations that use the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: e7d9513b60e8 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea740059ecb37807ba47b84b33d1447435a8d868 upstream.
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.
Fixes: 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 125ffc5e0a56a3eded608dc51e09d5ebf72cf652 upstream.
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(). When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value. Using constants
prevents the attack.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5efc6fa9044c3356d6046c6e1da6d02572dbed6b ]
/proc/cpuinfo currently reports Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) feature to
be present on boot cpu even if it was disabled during the bootup. This
is because cpuinfo_x86->x86_capability HLE bit is not updated after TSX
state is changed via the new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL.
Update the cached HLE bit also since it is expected to change after an
update to CPUID_CLEAR bit in MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL.
Fixes: 95c5824f75f3 ("x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2529b99546294c893dfa1c89e2b3e46da3369a59.1578685425.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7720804a2ae46c90265a32c81c45fb6f8d2f4e8b ]
Since x86 instruction decoder is not only for kprobes,
it should be tested when the insn.c is compiled.
(e.g. perf is enabled but kprobes is disabled)
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: cbe5c34c8c1f ("x86: Compile insn.c and inat.c only for KPROBES")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2591bc4e8d70b4e1330d327fb7e3921f4e070a51 ]
apic->send_IPI_allbutself() takes a vector number as argument.
APIC_DM_NMI is clearly not a vector number. It's defined to 0x400 which is
outside the vector space.
Use NMI_VECTOR instead as that's what it is intended to be.
Fixes: 82da3ff89dc2 ("x86: kgdb support")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722105218.855189979@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4911ee401b7ceff8f38e0ac597cbf503d71e690c upstream.
The EFI mixed mode entry code goes through the ordinary startup_32()
routine before jumping into the kernel's EFI boot code in 64-bit
mode. The 32-bit startup code must be entered with paging disabled,
but this is not documented as a requirement for the EFI handover
protocol, and so we should disable paging explicitly when entering
the kernel from 32-bit EFI firmware.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191224132909.102540-4-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 31b35f6b4d5285a311e10753f4eb17304326b211 upstream.
It is completely unused and implemented only on x86.
Remove it.
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526172900.91058-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 112eee5d06007dae561f14458bde7f2a4879ef4e ]
Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because
future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode
init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this:
In file included from arch/x86/realmode/init.c:11:
./arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h:5:32: warning: ‘struct kimage’ declared inside\
parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
5 | int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image);
| ^~~~~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h:6:37: warning: ‘struct kimage’ declared inside\
parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
6 | int crash_copy_backup_region(struct kimage *image);
| ^~~~~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h:7:39: warning: ‘struct kimage’ declared inside\
parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
7 | int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image,
|
[ bp: Rewrite the commit message. ]
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: d.hatayama@fujitsu.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com
Cc: horms@verge.net.au
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108090027.11082-4-lijiang@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201910310233.EJRtTMWP%25lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit df4393424af3fbdcd5c404077176082a8ce459c4 ]
There is an issue with threaded interrupts which are marked ONESHOT
and using the fasteoi handler:
if (IS_ONESHOT())
mask_irq();
....
cond_unmask_eoi_irq()
chip->irq_eoi();
if (setaffinity_pending) {
mask_ioapic();
...
move_affinity();
unmask_ioapic();
}
So if setaffinity is pending the interrupt will be moved and then
unconditionally unmasked at the ioapic level, which is wrong in two
aspects:
1) It should be kept masked up to the point where the threaded handler
finished.
2) The physical chip state and the software masked state are inconsistent
Guard both the mask and the unmask with a check for the software masked
state. If the line is marked masked then the ioapic line is also masked, so
both mask_ioapic() and unmask_ioapic() can be skipped safely.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 3aa551c9b4c4 ("genirq: add threaded interrupt handler support")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191017101938.321393687@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f53e2cd0b8ab7d9e390414470bdbd830f660133f ]
We call native_set_fixmap indirectly through the function pointer
struct pv_mmu_ops::set_fixmap, which expects the first parameter to be
'unsigned' instead of 'enum fixed_addresses'. This patch changes the
function type for native_set_fixmap to match the pointer, which fixes
indirect call mismatches with Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190913211402.193018-1-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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