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commit 306d6c49ac9ded11114cb53b0925da52f2c2ada1 upstream.
When the oom killer kills a userspace process in the page fault handler
while in guest context, the fault handler fails to release the mm_sem
if the FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT option is set. This leads to a deadlock
when tearing down the mm when the process terminates. This bug can only
happen when pfault is enabled, so only KVM clients are affected.
The problem arises in the rare cases in which handle_mm_fault does not
release the mm_sem. This patch fixes the issue by manually releasing
the mm_sem when needed.
Fixes: 24eb3a824c4f3 ("KVM: s390: Add FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT for guest fault")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.15+
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ec837d620c750c0d4996a907c8c4f7febe1bbeee ]
Fix type warnings in arch/arc/mm/cache.c.
../arch/arc/mm/cache.c: In function 'flush_anon_page':
../arch/arc/mm/cache.c:1062:55: warning: passing argument 2 of '__flush_dcache_page' makes integer from pointer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page), page_address(page));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../arch/arc/mm/cache.c:1013:59: note: expected 'long unsigned int' but argument is of type 'void *'
void __flush_dcache_page(phys_addr_t paddr, unsigned long vaddr)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Elad Kanfi <eladkan@mellanox.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Cc: Ofer Levi <oferle@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2423665ec53f2a29191b35382075e9834288a975 ]
Fix build errors in arch/arc/'s delay.h:
- add "extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;"
- add <asm-generic/types.h> for "u64"
In file included from ../drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/cxio_hal.c:32:
../arch/arc/include/asm/delay.h: In function '__udelay':
../arch/arc/include/asm/delay.h:61:12: error: 'u64' undeclared (first use in this function)
loops = ((u64) usecs * 4295 * HZ * loops_per_jiffy) >> 32;
^~~
In file included from ../drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/cxio_hal.c:32:
../arch/arc/include/asm/delay.h: In function '__udelay':
../arch/arc/include/asm/delay.h:63:37: error: 'loops_per_jiffy' undeclared (first use in this function)
loops = ((u64) usecs * 4295 * HZ * loops_per_jiffy) >> 32;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Elad Kanfi <eladkan@mellanox.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Cc: Ofer Levi <oferle@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d5ea019f8a381f88545bb26993b62ec24a2796b7 ]
This reverts commit 2a027b47dba6 ("MIPS: BCM47XX: Enable 74K Core
ExternalSync for PCIe erratum").
Enabling ExternalSync caused a regression for BCM4718A1 (used e.g. in
Netgear E3000 and ASUS RT-N16): it simply hangs during PCIe
initialization. It's likely that BCM4717A1 is also affected.
I didn't notice that earlier as the only BCM47XX devices with PCIe I
own are:
1) BCM4706 with 2 x 14e4:4331
2) BCM4706 with 14e4:4360 and 14e4:4331
it appears that BCM4706 is unaffected.
While BCM5300X-ES300-RDS.pdf seems to document that erratum and its
workarounds (according to quotes provided by Tokunori) it seems not even
Broadcom follows them.
According to the provided info Broadcom should define CONF7_ES in their
SDK's mipsinc.h and implement workaround in the si_mips_init(). Checking
both didn't reveal such code. It *could* mean Broadcom also had some
problems with the given workaround.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reported-by: Michael Marley <michael@michaelmarley.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/20032/
URL: https://bugs.openwrt.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=1688
Cc: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami@allied-telesis.co.jp>
Cc: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ccd5b3235180eef3cfec337df1c8554ab151b5cc upstream.
The following commit:
39a0526fb3f7 ("x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init")
renamed init_new_context() to init_new_context_ldt() and added a new
init_new_context() which calls init_new_context_ldt(). However, the
error code of init_new_context_ldt() was ignored. Consequently, if a
memory allocation in alloc_ldt_struct() failed during a fork(), the
->context.ldt of the new task remained the same as that of the old task
(due to the memcpy() in dup_mm()). ldt_struct's are not intended to be
shared, so a use-after-free occurred after one task exited.
Fix the bug by making init_new_context() pass through the error code of
init_new_context_ldt().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which encountered the following splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_ldt_struct.part.2+0x10a/0x150 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:116
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006d2cb7c8 by task kworker/u9:0/3710
CPU: 1 PID: 3710 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4-next-20170811 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x24e/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:429
free_ldt_struct.part.2+0x10a/0x150 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:116
free_ldt_struct arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:173 [inline]
destroy_context_ldt+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:171
destroy_context arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h:157 [inline]
__mmdrop+0xe9/0x530 kernel/fork.c:889
mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:42 [inline]
exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1061 [inline]
flush_old_exec+0x173c/0x1ff0 fs/exec.c:1291
load_elf_binary+0x81f/0x4ba0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:855
search_binary_handler+0x142/0x6b0 fs/exec.c:1652
exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1694 [inline]
do_execveat_common.isra.33+0x1746/0x22e0 fs/exec.c:1816
do_execve+0x31/0x40 fs/exec.c:1860
call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x457/0x8f0 kernel/umh.c:100
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Allocated by task 3700:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x136/0x750 mm/slab.c:3627
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:493 [inline]
alloc_ldt_struct+0x52/0x140 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:67
write_ldt+0x7b7/0xab0 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:277
sys_modify_ldt+0x1ef/0x240 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:307
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
Freed by task 3700:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline]
kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline]
kfree+0xca/0x250 mm/slab.c:3820
free_ldt_struct.part.2+0xdd/0x150 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:121
free_ldt_struct arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:173 [inline]
destroy_context_ldt+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:171
destroy_context arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h:157 [inline]
__mmdrop+0xe9/0x530 kernel/fork.c:889
mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:42 [inline]
__mmput kernel/fork.c:916 [inline]
mmput+0x541/0x6e0 kernel/fork.c:927
copy_process.part.36+0x22e1/0x4af0 kernel/fork.c:1931
copy_process kernel/fork.c:1546 [inline]
_do_fork+0x1ef/0xfb0 kernel/fork.c:2025
SYSC_clone kernel/fork.c:2135 [inline]
SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/fork.c:2129
do_syscall_64+0x26c/0x8c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
Here is a C reproducer:
#include <asm/ldt.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
struct user_desc desc = { .entry_number = 8191 };
syscall(__NR_modify_ldt, 1, &desc, sizeof(desc));
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
srand(getpid());
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
Note: the reproducer takes advantage of the fact that alloc_ldt_struct()
may use vmalloc() to allocate a large ->entries array, and after
commit:
5d17a73a2ebe ("vmalloc: back off when the current task is killed")
it is possible for userspace to fail a task's vmalloc() by
sending a fatal signal, e.g. via exit_group(). It would be more
difficult to reproduce this bug on kernels without that commit.
This bug only affected kernels with CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL=y.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.6+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Fixes: 39a0526fb3f7 ("x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824175029.76040-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Patch for stable only to fix boot resets caused by the L1TF patches.
Stable trees reverted the following patch
Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers"
This reverts commit 87e2bd898d3a79a8c609f183180adac47879a2a4 which is
commit edc3b9129cecd0f0857112136f5b8b1bc1d45918 upstream.
but the L1TF patch backported here
x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
commit 958f79b9ee55dfaf00c8106ed1c22a2919e0028b upstream
set_memory_np() is used to mark kernel mappings not present, but it has
it's own open coded mechanism which does not have the L1TF protection of
inverting the address bits.
assumed that cpa->pfn contains a PFN. With the above patch reverted
it does not, which causes the PMD to be set to an incorrect address
shifted by 12 bits, which can cause early boot reset on some
systems, like an Apollo Lake embedded system.
Convert the address to a PFN before passing it to pmd_pfn()
Thanks to Bernhard for bisecting and testing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4 and 4.9
Reported-by: Bernhard Kaindl <bernhard.kaindl@thalesgroup.com>
Tested-by: Bernhard Kaindl <bernhard.kaindl@thalesgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3b885ac1dc35b87a39ee176a6c7e2af9c789d8b8 upstream.
Now that mb() is an instruction barrier, it will slow performance if we issue
unnecessary barriers.
The spinlock defines have a number of unnecessary barriers. The __ldcw()
define is both a hardware and compiler barrier. The mb() barriers in the
routines using __ldcw() serve no purpose.
The only barrier needed is the one in arch_spin_unlock(). We need to ensure
all accesses are complete prior to releasing the lock.
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7797167ffde1f00446301cb22b37b7c03194cfaf upstream.
Now that we use a sync prior to releasing the locks in syscall.S, we don't need
the PA 2.0 ordered stores used to release some locks. Using an ordered store,
potentially slows the release and subsequent code.
There are a number of other ordered stores and loads that serve no purpose. I
have converted these to normal stores.
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 923847413f7316b5ced3491769b3fefa6c56a79a ]
The AM3517 has a different OTG controller location than the OMAP3,
which is included from omap3.dtsi. This results in a hwmod error.
Since the AM3517 has a different OTG controller address, this patch
disabes one that is isn't available.
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b4c7e2bd2eb4764afe3af9409ff3b1b87116fa30 ]
Dynamic ftrace requires modifying the code segments that are usually
set to read-only. To do this, a per arch function is called both before
and after the ftrace modifications are performed. The "before" function
will set kernel code text to read-write to allow for ftrace to make the
modifications, and the "after" function will set the kernel code text
back to "read-only" to keep the kernel code text protected.
The issue happens when dynamic ftrace is tested at boot up. The test is
done before the kernel code text has been set to read-only. But the
"before" and "after" calls are still performed. The "after" call will
change the kernel code text to read-only prematurely, and other boot
code that expects this code to be read-write will fail.
The solution is to add a variable that is set when the kernel code text
is expected to be converted to read-only, and make the ftrace "before"
and "after" calls do nothing if that variable is not yet set. This is
similar to the x86 solution from commit 162396309745 ("ftrace, x86:
make kernel text writable only for conversions").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180620212906.24b7b66e@vmware.local.home
Reported-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Tested-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c1049dcb4ceec640d8bd797335bcbebdcab44d2 ]
PXA3xx platforms have 56 interrupts that are stored in two ICMR
registers. The code in pxa_irq_suspend() and pxa_irq_resume() however
does a simple division by 32 which only leads to one register being
saved at suspend and restored at resume time. The NAND interrupt
setting, for instance, is lost.
Fix this by using DIV_ROUND_UP() instead.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Signed-off-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2ceb2780b790b74bc408a949f6aedbad8afa693e ]
Select CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_ULPI and CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS so that
USB ULPI can be functional on some boards like that use ULPI
interface.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 157bcc06094c3c5800d3f4676527047b79b618e7 ]
Select CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_ULPI and CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS so that
USB ULPI can be functional on some boards like imx51-babbge.
This fixes a kernel hang in 4.18-rc1 on i.mx51-babbage, caused by commit
03e6275ae381 ("usb: chipidea: Fix ULPI on imx51").
Suggested-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ecd60532e060e45c63c57ecf1c8549b1d656d34d ]
Booting a ColdFire m68k core with MMU enabled causes a "bad page state"
oops since commit 1d40a5ea01d5 ("mm: mark pages in use for page tables"):
BUG: Bad page state in process sh pfn:01ce2
page:004fefc8 count:0 mapcount:-1024 mapping:00000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
raw: 00000000 00000000 00000000 fffffbff 00000000 00000100 00000200 00000000
raw: 039c4000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.17.0-07461-g1d40a5ea01d5 #13
Fix by calling pgtable_page_dtor() in our __pte_free_tlb() code path,
so that the PG_table flag is cleared before we free the pte page.
Note that I had to change the type of pte_free() to be static from
extern. Otherwise you get a lot of warnings like this:
./arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgalloc.h:80:2: warning: ‘pgtable_page_dtor’ is static but used in inline function ‘pte_free’ which is not static
pgtable_page_dtor(page);
^
And making it static is consistent with our use of this in the other
m68k pgalloc definitions of pte_free().
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3eb1b955cd7ed1e621ace856710006c2a8a7f231 ]
The intc #interrupt-cells is equal to 1. Currently gpio
node has 2 cells per IRQ which is wrong. Remove the additional
cell for each of the interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy <j-keerthy@ti.com>
Fixes: 2e38b946dc54 ("ARM: davinci: da850: add GPIO DT node")
Signed-off-by: Sekhar Nori <nsekhar@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 49a6ec5b807ea4ad7ebe1f58080ebb8497cb2d2c ]
The touchscreen driver no longer configures the device as wakeup source by
default. A "wakeup-source" property is needed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2f24ef7413a4d91657ef04e77c27ce0b313e6c95 ]
machine_desc->init_per_cpu() hook is supposed to be per cpu
initialization and would seem to apply equally to UP and/or SMP.
Infact the comment in header file seems to suggest it works for
UP too, which was not the case and this patch.
This enables !CONFIG_SMP build for platforms such as hsdk.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
[vgupta: trimmeed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b154886f7892499d0d3054026e19dfb9a731df61 ]
We can't call function trace hook before setup percpu offset.
When entering secondary_start_kernel(), percpu offset has not
been initialized. So this lead hotplug malfunction.
Here is the flow to reproduce this bug:
echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
echo function > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhizhou Zhang <zhizhouzhang@asrmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 71ca3409703b62b6a092d0d9d13f366c121bc5d3 ]
Fix I2C controller interrupt to use IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH for Broadcom
Cygnus SoC.
Fixes: b51c05a331ff ("ARM: dts: add I2C device nodes for Broadcom Cygnus")
Signed-off-by: Ray Jui <ray.jui@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 74c11e300c103af47db5b658fdcf28002421e250 ]
GCC built for arc*-*-linux has "-mmedium-calls" implicitly enabled by default
thus we don't see any problems during Linux kernel compilation.
----------------------------->8------------------------
arc-linux-gcc -mcpu=arc700 -Q --help=target | grep calls
-mlong-calls [disabled]
-mmedium-calls [enabled]
----------------------------->8------------------------
But if we try to use so-called Elf32 toolchain with GCC configured for
arc*-*-elf* then we'd see the following failure:
----------------------------->8------------------------
init/do_mounts.o: In function 'init_rootfs':
do_mounts.c:(.init.text+0x108): relocation truncated to fit: R_ARC_S21W_PCREL
against symbol 'unregister_filesystem' defined in .text section in fs/filesystems.o
arc-elf32-ld: final link failed: Symbol needs debug section which does not exist
make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1
----------------------------->8------------------------
That happens because neither "-mmedium-calls" nor "-mlong-calls" are enabled in
Elf32 GCC:
----------------------------->8------------------------
arc-elf32-gcc -mcpu=arc700 -Q --help=target | grep calls
-mlong-calls [disabled]
-mmedium-calls [disabled]
----------------------------->8------------------------
Now to make it possible to use Elf32 toolchain for building Linux kernel
we're explicitly add "-mmedium-calls" to CFLAGS.
And since we add "-mmedium-calls" to the global CFLAGS there's no point in
having per-file copies thus removing them.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fd7e315988b784509ba3f1b42f539bd0b1fca9bb upstream.
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then
use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of
duplicating the code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[Backported to 4.9 stable by AK, suggested by Michael Hocko]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f19f5c49bbc3ffcc9126cc245fc1b24cc29f4a37 upstream.
It turns out that we should *not* invert all not-present mappings,
because the all zeroes case is obviously special.
clear_page() does not undergo the XOR logic to invert the address bits,
i.e. PTE, PMD and PUD entries that have not been individually written
will have val=0 and so will trigger __pte_needs_invert(). As a result,
{pte,pmd,pud}_pfn() will return the wrong PFN value, i.e. all ones
(adjusted by the max PFN mask) instead of zero. A zeroed entry is ok
because the page at physical address 0 is reserved early in boot
specifically to mitigate L1TF, so explicitly exempt them from the
inversion when reading the PFN.
Manifested as an unexpected mprotect(..., PROT_NONE) failure when called
on a VMA that has VM_PFNMAP and was mmap'd to as something other than
PROT_NONE but never used. mprotect() sends the PROT_NONE request down
prot_none_walk(), which walks the PTEs to check the PFNs.
prot_none_pte_entry() gets the bogus PFN from pte_pfn() and returns
-EACCES because it thinks mprotect() is trying to adjust a high MMIO
address.
[ This is a very modified version of Sean's original patch, but all
credit goes to Sean for doing this and also pointing out that
sometimes the __pte_needs_invert() function only gets the protection
bits, not the full eventual pte. But zero remains special even in
just protection bits, so that's ok. - Linus ]
Fixes: f22cc87f6c1f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5e0fb5df2ee871b841f96f9cb6a7f2784e96aa4e upstream.
ioremap() calls pud_free_pmd_page() / pmd_free_pte_page() when it creates
a pud / pmd map. The following preconditions are met at their entry.
- All pte entries for a target pud/pmd address range have been cleared.
- System-wide TLB purges have been peformed for a target pud/pmd address
range.
The preconditions assure that there is no stale TLB entry for the range.
Speculation may not cache TLB entries since it requires all levels of page
entries, including ptes, to have P & A-bits set for an associated address.
However, speculation may cache pud/pmd entries (paging-structure caches)
when they have P-bit set.
Add a system-wide TLB purge (INVLPG) to a single page after clearing
pud/pmd entry's P-bit.
SDM 4.10.4.1, Operation that Invalidate TLBs and Paging-Structure Caches,
states that:
INVLPG invalidates all paging-structure caches associated with the
current PCID regardless of the liner addresses to which they correspond.
Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: cpandya@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-4-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 785a19f9d1dd8a4ab2d0633be4656653bd3de1fc upstream.
The following kernel panic was observed on ARM64 platform due to a stale
TLB entry.
1. ioremap with 4K size, a valid pte page table is set.
2. iounmap it, its pte entry is set to 0.
3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, update its pmd entry with
a new value.
4. CPU may hit an exception because the old pmd entry is still in TLB,
which leads to a kernel panic.
Commit b6bdb7517c3d ("mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page
table") has addressed this panic by falling to pte mappings in the above
case on ARM64.
To support pmd mappings in all cases, TLB purge needs to be performed
in this case on ARM64.
Add a new arg, 'addr', to pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page()
so that TLB purge can be added later in seprate patches.
[toshi.kani@hpe.com: merge changes, rewrite patch description]
Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-3-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f967db0b9ed44ec3057a28f3b28efc51df51b835 upstream.
ioremap() supports pmd mappings on x86-PAE. However, kernel's pmd
tables are not shared among processes on x86-PAE. Therefore, any
update to sync'd pmd entries need re-syncing. Freeing a pte page
also leads to a vmalloc fault and hits the BUG_ON in vmalloc_sync_one().
Disable free page handling on x86-PAE. pud_free_pmd_page() and
pmd_free_pte_page() simply return 0 if a given pud/pmd entry is present.
This assures that ioremap() does not update sync'd pmd entries at the
cost of falling back to pte mappings.
Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Reported-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: cpandya@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 792adb90fa724ce07c0171cbc96b9215af4b1045 upstream.
The introduction of generic_max_swapfile_size and arch-specific versions has
broken linking on x86 with CONFIG_SWAP=n due to undefined reference to
'generic_max_swapfile_size'. Fix it by compiling the x86-specific
max_swapfile_size() only with CONFIG_SWAP=y.
Reported-by: Tomas Pruzina <pruzinat@gmail.com>
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In linux-4.4.y, the definition of X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD is different from the upstream
definition. Result is an overlap with the newly introduced
X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV. Update RETPOLINE definitions to match
upstream definitions to improve alignment with upstream code.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1063711b57393c1999248cccb57bebfaf16739e7 upstream
The mmio tracer sets io mapping PTEs and PMDs to non present when enabled
without inverting the address bits, which makes the PTE entry vulnerable
for L1TF.
Make it use the right low level macros to actually invert the address bits
to protect against L1TF.
In principle this could be avoided because MMIO tracing is not likely to be
enabled on production machines, but the fix is straigt forward and for
consistency sake it's better to get rid of the open coded PTE manipulation.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 958f79b9ee55dfaf00c8106ed1c22a2919e0028b upstream
set_memory_np() is used to mark kernel mappings not present, but it has
it's own open coded mechanism which does not have the L1TF protection of
inverting the address bits.
Replace the open coded PTE manipulation with the L1TF protecting low level
PTE routines.
Passes the CPA self test.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[ dwmw2: Pull in pud_mkhuge() from commit a00cc7d9dd, and pfn_pud() ]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
[groeck: port to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0768f91530ff46683e0b372df14fd79fe8d156e5 upstream
Some cases in THP like:
- MADV_FREE
- mprotect
- split
mark the PMD non present for temporarily to prevent races. The window for
an L1TF attack in these contexts is very small, but it wants to be fixed
for correctness sake.
Use the proper low level functions for pmd/pud_mknotpresent() to address
this.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f22cc87f6c1f771b57c407555cfefd811cdd9507 upstream
For kernel mappings PAGE_PROTNONE is not necessarily set for a non present
mapping, but the inversion logic explicitely checks for !PRESENT and
PROT_NONE.
Remove the PROT_NONE check and make the inversion unconditional for all not
present mappings.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e14d7dfb41f5807a0c1c26a13f2b8ef16af24935 upstream
Jan has noticed that pte_pfn and co. resp. pfn_pte are incorrect for
CONFIG_PAE because phys_addr_t is wider than unsigned long and so the
pte_val reps. shift left would get truncated. Fix this up by using proper
types.
[dwmw2: Backport to 4.9]
Fixes: 6b28baca9b1f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation")
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d0f6249058834ffe1ceaad0bb31464af66f6e7a upstream
The PAE 3-level paging code currently doesn't mitigate L1TF by flipping the
offset bits, and uses the high PTE word, thus bits 32-36 for type, 37-63 for
offset. The lower word is zeroed, thus systems with less than 4GB memory are
safe. With 4GB to 128GB the swap type selects the memory locations vulnerable
to L1TF; with even more memory, also the swap offfset influences the address.
This might be a problem with 32bit PAE guests running on large 64bit hosts.
By continuing to keep the whole swap entry in either high or low 32bit word of
PTE we would limit the swap size too much. Thus this patch uses the whole PAE
PTE with the same layout as the 64bit version does. The macros just become a
bit tricky since they assume the arch-dependent swp_entry_t to be 32bit.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 11e34e64e4103955fc4568750914c75d65ea87ee upstream
336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf defines a new MSR
(IA32_FLUSH_CMD) which is detected by CPUID.7.EDX[28]=1 bit being set.
This new MSR "gives software a way to invalidate structures with finer
granularity than other architectual methods like WBINVD."
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1a7ed1ba4bba6c075d5ad61bb75e3fbc870840d6 upstream
The previous patch has limited swap file size so that large offsets cannot
clear bits above MAX_PA/2 in the pte and interfere with L1TF mitigation.
It assumed that offsets are encoded starting with bit 12, same as pfn. But
on x86_64, offsets are encoded starting with bit 9.
Thus the limit can be raised by 3 bits. That means 16TB with 42bit MAX_PA
and 256TB with 46bit MAX_PA.
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 56563f53d3066afa9e63d6c997bf67e76a8b05c0 upstream
The pr_warn in l1tf_select_mitigation would have used the prior pr_fmt
which was defined as "Spectre V2 : ".
Move the function to be past SSBD and also define the pr_fmt.
Fixes: 17dbca119312 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 377eeaa8e11fe815b1d07c81c4a0e2843a8c15eb upstream
For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.
Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.
The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.
In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921 upstream
For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.
Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.
To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.
Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.
It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.
For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().
For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.
[dwmw2: Backport to 4.9]
[groeck: Backport to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 upstream
L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.
- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
vulnerable to L1TF
- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits
- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
vulnerable.
Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.
[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
[ dwmw2: Backport to 4.9 (cpufeatures.h, E820) ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 10a70416e1f067f6c4efda6ffd8ea96002ac4223 upstream
The L1TF workaround doesn't make any attempt to mitigate speculate accesses
to the first physical page for zeroed PTEs. Normally it only contains some
data from the early real mode BIOS.
It's not entirely clear that the first page is reserved in all
configurations, so add an extra reservation call to make sure it is really
reserved. In most configurations (e.g. with the standard reservations)
it's likely a nop.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6b28baca9b1f0d4a42b865da7a05b1c81424bd5c upstream
When PTEs are set to PROT_NONE the kernel just clears the Present bit and
preserves the PFN, which creates attack surface for L1TF speculation
speculation attacks.
This is important inside guests, because L1TF speculation bypasses physical
page remapping. While the host has its own migitations preventing leaking
data from other VMs into the guest, this would still risk leaking the wrong
page inside the current guest.
This uses the same technique as Linus' swap entry patch: while an entry is
is in PROTNONE state invert the complete PFN part part of it. This ensures
that the the highest bit will point to non existing memory.
The invert is done by pte/pmd_modify and pfn/pmd/pud_pte for PROTNONE and
pte/pmd/pud_pfn undo it.
This assume that no code path touches the PFN part of a PTE directly
without using these primitives.
This doesn't handle the case that MMIO is on the top of the CPU physical
memory. If such an MMIO region was exposed by an unpriviledged driver for
mmap it would be possible to attack some real memory. However this
situation is all rather unlikely.
For 32bit non PAE the inversion is not done because there are really not
enough bits to protect anything.
Q: Why does the guest need to be protected when the HyperVisor already has
L1TF mitigations?
A: Here's an example:
Physical pages 1 2 get mapped into a guest as
GPA 1 -> PA 2
GPA 2 -> PA 1
through EPT.
The L1TF speculation ignores the EPT remapping.
Now the guest kernel maps GPA 1 to process A and GPA 2 to process B, and
they belong to different users and should be isolated.
A sets the GPA 1 PA 2 PTE to PROT_NONE to bypass the EPT remapping and
gets read access to the underlying physical page. Which in this case
points to PA 2, so it can read process B's data, if it happened to be in
L1, so isolation inside the guest is broken.
There's nothing the hypervisor can do about this. This mitigation has to
be done in the guest itself.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
[ dwmw2: backported to 4.9 ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f22b4cd45b67b3496f4aa4c7180a1271c6452f6 upstream
With L1 terminal fault the CPU speculates into unmapped PTEs, and resulting
side effects allow to read the memory the PTE is pointing too, if its
values are still in the L1 cache.
For swapped out pages Linux uses unmapped PTEs and stores a swap entry into
them.
To protect against L1TF it must be ensured that the swap entry is not
pointing to valid memory, which requires setting higher bits (between bit
36 and bit 45) that are inside the CPUs physical address space, but outside
any real memory.
To do this invert the offset to make sure the higher bits are always set,
as long as the swap file is not too big.
Note there is no workaround for 32bit !PAE, or on systems which have more
than MAX_PA/2 worth of memory. The later case is very unlikely to happen on
real systems.
[AK: updated description and minor tweaks by. Split out from the original
patch ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bcd11afa7adad8d720e7ba5ef58bdcd9775cf45f upstream
If pages are swapped out, the swap entry is stored in the corresponding
PTE, which has the Present bit cleared. CPUs vulnerable to L1TF speculate
on PTE entries which have the present bit set and would treat the swap
entry as phsyical address (PFN). To mitigate that the upper bits of the PTE
must be set so the PTE points to non existent memory.
The swap entry stores the type and the offset of a swapped out page in the
PTE. type is stored in bit 9-13 and offset in bit 14-63. The hardware
ignores the bits beyond the phsyical address space limit, so to make the
mitigation effective its required to start 'offset' at the lowest possible
bit so that even large swap offsets do not reach into the physical address
space limit bits.
Move offset to bit 9-58 and type to bit 59-63 which are the bits that
hardware generally doesn't care about.
That, in turn, means that if you on desktop chip with only 40 bits of
physical addressing, now that the offset starts at bit 9, there needs to be
30 bits of offset actually *in use* until bit 39 ends up being set, which
means when inverted it will again point into existing memory.
So that's 4 terabyte of swap space (because the offset is counted in pages,
so 30 bits of offset is 42 bits of actual coverage). With bigger physical
addressing, that obviously grows further, until the limit of the offset is
hit (at 50 bits of offset - 62 bits of actual swap file coverage).
This is a preparatory change for the actual swap entry inversion to protect
against L1TF.
[ AK: Updated description and minor tweaks. Split into two parts ]
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eee4818baac0f2b37848fdf90e4b16430dc536ac upstream
_PAGE_PSE is used to distinguish between a truly non-present
(_PAGE_PRESENT=0) PMD, and a PMD which is undergoing a THP split and
should be treated as present.
But _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY currently uses the _PAGE_PSE bit, which would
cause confusion between one of those PMDs undergoing a THP split, and a
soft-dirty PMD. Dropping _PAGE_PSE check in pmd_present() does not work
well, because it can hurt optimization of tlb handling in thp split.
Thus, we need to move the bit.
In the current kernel, bits 1-4 are not used in non-present format since
commit 00839ee3b299 ("x86/mm: Move swap offset/type up in PTE to work
around erratum"). So let's move _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY to bit 1. Bit 7
is used as reserved (always clear), so please don't use it for other
purpose.
[dwmw2: Pulled in to 4.9 backport to support L1TF changes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170717193955.20207-3-zi.yan@sent.com
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Zi Yan <zi.yan@cs.rutgers.edu>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Nellans <dnellans@nvidia.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ace7fab7a6cdd363a615ec537f2aa94dbc761ee2 upstream
A recent patch changed the format of a swap PTE.
The comment explaining the format of the swap PTE is wrong about
the bits used for the swap type field. Amusingly, the ASCII art
and the patch description are correct, but the comment itself
is wrong.
As I was looking at this, I also noticed that the
SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT has an off-by-one error. This does not
really hurt anything. It just wasted a bit of space in the PTE,
giving us 2^59 bytes of addressable space in our swapfiles
instead of 2^60. But, it doesn't match with the comments, and it
wastes a bit of space, so fix it.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Fixes: 00839ee3b299 ("x86/mm: Move swap offset/type up in PTE to work around erratum")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160810172325.E56AD7DA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00839ee3b299303c6a5e26a0a2485427a3afcbbf upstream
This erratum can result in Accessed/Dirty getting set by the hardware
when we do not expect them to be (on !Present PTEs).
Instead of trying to fix them up after this happens, we just
allow the bits to get set and try to ignore them. We do this by
shifting the layout of the bits we use for swap offset/type in
our 64-bit PTEs.
It looks like this:
bitnrs: | ... | 11| 10| 9|8|7|6|5| 4| 3|2|1|0|
names: | ... |SW3|SW2|SW1|G|L|D|A|CD|WT|U|W|P|
before: | OFFSET (9-63) |0|X|X| TYPE(1-5) |0|
after: | OFFSET (14-63) | TYPE (9-13) |0|X|X|X| X| X|X|X|0|
Note that D was already a don't care (X) even before. We just
move TYPE up and turn its old spot (which could be hit by the
A bit) into all don't cares.
We take 5 bits away from the offset, but that still leaves us
with 50 bits which lets us index into a 62-bit swapfile (4 EiB).
I think that's probably fine for the moment. We could
theoretically reclaim 5 of the bits (1, 2, 3, 4, 7) but it
doesn't gain us anything.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160708001911.9A3FD2B6@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 50896e180c6aa3a9c61a26ced99e15d602666a4c upstream
L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a speculation related vulnerability. The CPU
speculates on PTE entries which do not have the PRESENT bit set, if the
content of the resulting physical address is available in the L1D cache.
The OS side mitigation makes sure that a !PRESENT PTE entry points to a
physical address outside the actually existing and cachable memory
space. This is achieved by inverting the upper bits of the PTE. Due to the
address space limitations this only works for 64bit and 32bit PAE kernels,
but not for 32bit non PAE.
This mitigation applies to both host and guest kernels, but in case of a
64bit host (hypervisor) and a 32bit PAE guest, inverting the upper bits of
the PAE address space (44bit) is not enough if the host has more than 43
bits of populated memory address space, because the speculation treats the
PTE content as a physical host address bypassing EPT.
The host (hypervisor) protects itself against the guest by flushing L1D as
needed, but pages inside the guest are not protected against attacks from
other processes inside the same guest.
For the guest the inverted PTE mask has to match the host to provide the
full protection for all pages the host could possibly map into the
guest. The hosts populated address space is not known to the guest, so the
mask must cover the possible maximal host address space, i.e. 52 bit.
On 32bit PAE the maximum PTE mask is currently set to 44 bit because that
is the limit imposed by 32bit unsigned long PFNs in the VMs. This limits
the mask to be below what the host could possible use for physical pages.
The L1TF PROT_NONE protection code uses the PTE masks to determine which
bits to invert to make sure the higher bits are set for unmapped entries to
prevent L1TF speculation attacks against EPT inside guests.
In order to invert all bits that could be used by the host, increase
__PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT to 52 to match 64bit.
The real limit for a 32bit PAE kernel is still 44 bits because all Linux
PTEs are created from unsigned long PFNs, so they cannot be higher than 44
bits on a 32bit kernel. So these extra PFN bits should be never set. The
only users of this macro are using it to look at PTEs, so it's safe.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 208cbb32558907f68b3b2a081ca2337ac3744794 upstream.
It was reported that the commit d0a8d9378d16 is causing users of gcc < 4.9
to observe -Werror=missing-prototypes errors.
Indeed, it seems that:
extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void) { return 0; }
compiled with -Werror=missing-prototypes produces this warning in gcc <
4.9, but not gcc >= 4.9.
Fixes: d0a8d9378d16 ("x86/paravirt: Make native_save_fl() extern inline").
Reported-by: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Reported-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: kstewart@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: astrachan@google.com
Cc: mka@chromium.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: tstellar@redhat.com
Cc: sedat.dilek@gmail.com
Cc: David.Laight@aculab.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180803170550.164688-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ea063306eecf300fcf06d2f5917474b580f666f upstream.
Remove all %p uses in error messages in kprobes/x86.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S . Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Medhurst <tixy@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tobin C . Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/152491902310.9916.13355297638917767319.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346 upstream.
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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