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As the AEAD conversion is still ongoing, we do not yet wish to
export legacy AEAD implementations to user-space, as their calling
convention will change.
This patch actually disables all AEAD algorithms because some of
them (e.g., cryptd) will need to be modified to propagate this flag.
Subsequent patches will reenable them on an individual basis.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The bit CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL was added to stop af_alg from accessing
internal algorithms. However, af_alg itself was never modified to
actually stop that bit from being used by the user. Therefore the
user could always override it by specifying the relevant bit in the
type and/or mask.
This patch silently discards the bit in both type and mask.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch changes the RNG allocation so that we only hold a
reference to the RNG during initialisation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When seqiv is used in compatibility mode, this patch allows it
to function even when an RNG Is not available. It also changes
the RNG allocation for the new explicit seqiv interface so that
we only hold a reference to the RNG during initialisation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The RNG may not be available during early boot, e.g., the relevant
modules may not be included in the initramfs. As the RNG Is only
needed for IPsec, we should not let this prevent use of ciphers
without IV generators, e.g., for disk encryption.
This patch postpones the RNG allocation to the init function so
that one failure during early boot does not make the RNG unavailable
for all subsequent users of the same cipher.
More importantly, it lets the cipher live even if RNG allocation
fails. Of course we no longer offer IV generation and which will
fail with an error if invoked. But all other cipher capabilities
will function as usual.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The RNG may not be available during early boot, e.g., the relevant
modules may not be included in the initramfs. As the RNG Is only
needed for IPsec, we should not let this prevent use of ciphers
without IV generators, e.g., for disk encryption.
This patch postpones the RNG allocation to the init function so
that one failure during early boot does not make the RNG unavailable
for all subsequent users of the same cipher.
More importantly, it lets the cipher live even if RNG allocation
fails. Of course we no longer offer IV generation and which will
fail with an error if invoked. But all other cipher capabilities
will function as usual.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds a new crypto_user command that allows the admin to
delete the crypto system RNG. Note that this can only be done if
the RNG is currently not in use. The next time it is used a new
system RNG will be allocated.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently we free the default RNG when its use count hits zero.
This was OK when the IV generators would latch onto the RNG at
instance creation time and keep it until the instance is torn
down.
Now that IV generators only keep the RNG reference during init
time this scheme causes the default RNG to come and go at a high
frequencey. This is highly undesirable as we want to keep a single
RNG in use unless the admin wants it to be removed.
This patch changes the scheme so that the system RNG once allocated
is never removed unless a specifically requested.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently for skcipher IV generators they must provide givencrypt
as that is the whole point. We are currently replacing skcipher
IV generators with explicit IV generators. In order to maintain
backwards compatibility, we need to allow the IV generators to
still function as a normal skcipher when the RNG Is not present
(e.g., in the initramfs during boot). IOW everything but givencrypt
and givdecrypt will still work but those two will fail.
Therefore this patch assigns a default givencrypt that simply
returns an error should it be NULL.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Should be CRYPTO_AKCIPHER instead of AKCIPHER
Reported-by: Andreas Ruprecht <andreas.ruprecht@fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/arm-soc
Merge the mvebu/drivers branch of the arm-soc tree which contains
just a single patch bfa1ce5f38938cc9e6c7f2d1011f88eba2b9e2b2 ("bus:
mvebu-mbus: add mv_mbus_dram_info_nooverlap()") that happens to be
a prerequisite of the new marvell/cesa crypto driver.
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The AEAD speed test SG list setup did not correctly mark the AD,
potentially causing a crash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds a speed test for rfc4309(ccm(aes)) as mode 212.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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New test vectors for RSA algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a new rsa generic SW implementation.
This implements only cryptographic primitives.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Added select on ASN1.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add Public Key Encryption API.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Made CRYPTO_AKCIPHER invisible like other type config options.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The Poly1305 authenticator requires a unique key for each generated tag. This
implies that we can't set the key per tfm, as multiple users set individual
keys. Instead we pass a desc specific key as the first two blocks of the
message to authenticate in update().
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds rfc4106 test vectors sourced from
draft-mcgrew-gcm-test-01.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This reverts commit 9b9f9296a7b73fbafe0a0a6f2494eaadd97f9f73 as
all in-kernel implementations of GCM have been converted to the
new AEAD interface, meaning that they should now pass the updated
rfc4543 test.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch updates the rfc4543 test vectors to the new format
where the IV is part of the AD. For now these vectors are still
unused. They will be reactivated once all rfc4543 implementations
have migrated.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch converts generic gcm and its associated transforms to
the new AEAD interface. The biggest reward is in code reduction
for rfc4543 where it used to do IV stitching which is no longer
needed as the IV is already part of the AD on input.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Because the old rfc4543 implementation always injected an IV into
the AD, while the new one does not, we have to disable the test
while it is converted over to the new AEAD interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The hash-based DRBG variants all use sha256 so we need to add a
select on it.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Be more verbose and also report ->backend_cra_name when
crypto_alloc_shash() or crypto_alloc_cipher() fail in
drbg_init_hash_kernel() or drbg_init_sym_kernel()
correspondingly.
Example
DRBG: could not allocate digest TFM handle: hmac(sha256)
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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As required by SP800-90A, the DRBG implements are reseeding threshold.
This threshold is at 2**48 (64 bit) and 2**32 bit (32 bit) as
implemented in drbg_max_requests.
With the recently introduced changes, the DRBG is now always used as a
stdrng which is initialized very early in the boot cycle. To ensure that
sufficient entropy is present, the Jitter RNG is added to even provide
entropy at early boot time.
However, the 2nd seed source, the nonblocking pool, is usually
degraded at that time. Therefore, the DRBG is seeded with the Jitter RNG
(which I believe contains good entropy, which however is questioned by
others) and is seeded with a degradded nonblocking pool. This seed is
now used for quasi the lifetime of the system (2**48 requests is a lot).
The patch now changes the reseed threshold as follows: up until the time
the DRBG obtains a seed from a fully iniitialized nonblocking pool, the
reseeding threshold is lowered such that the DRBG is forced to reseed
itself resonably often. Once it obtains the seed from a fully
initialized nonblocking pool, the reseed threshold is set to the value
required by SP800-90A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can
be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way
of calling it from within the kernel.
This patch replaces it with the new callback API which does not
have this problem.
The patch also removes the entropy buffer registered with the DRBG
handle in favor of stack variables to hold the seed data.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Replace the global -O0 compiler flag from the Makefile with GCC
pragmas to mark only the functions required to be compiled without
optimizations.
This patch also adds a comment describing the rationale for the
functions chosen to be compiled without optimizations.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: LABBE Corentin <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch removes krng so that DRBG can take its place.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch creates a new invisible Kconfig option CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
that simply selects the DRBG. This new option is then selected
by the IV generators.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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As this is required by many IPsec algorithms, let's set the default
to m.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds the stdrng module alias and increases the priority
to ensure that it is loaded in preference to other RNGs.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We currently do the IV seeding on the first givencrypt call in
order to conserve entropy. However, this does not work with
DRBG which cannot be called from interrupt context. In fact,
with DRBG we don't need to conserve entropy anyway. So this
patch moves the seeding into the init function.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We currently do the IV seeding on the first givencrypt call in
order to conserve entropy. However, this does not work with
DRBG which cannot be called from interrupt context. In fact,
with DRBG we don't need to conserve entropy anyway. So this
patch moves the seeding into the init function.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We currently do the IV seeding on the first givencrypt call in
order to conserve entropy. However, this does not work with
DRBG which cannot be called from interrupt context. In fact,
with DRBG we don't need to conserve entropy anyway. So this
patch moves the seeding into the init function.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We currently do the IV seeding on the first givencrypt call in
order to conserve entropy. However, this does not work with
DRBG which cannot be called from interrupt context. In fact,
with DRBG we don't need to conserve entropy anyway. So this
patch moves the seeding into the init function.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305 defines the use of ChaCha20/Poly1305 in
ESP. It uses additional four byte key material as a salt, which is then used
with an 8 byte IV to form the ChaCha20 nonce as defined in the RFC7539.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This AEAD uses a chacha20 ablkcipher and a poly1305 ahash to construct the
ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD as defined in RFC7539. It supports both synchronous and
asynchronous operations, even if we currently have no async chacha20 or poly1305
drivers.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Poly1305 is a fast message authenticator designed by Daniel J. Bernstein.
It is further defined in RFC7539 as a building block for the ChaCha20-Poly1305
AEAD for use in IETF protocols.
This is a portable C implementation of the algorithm without architecture
specific optimizations, based on public domain code by Daniel J. Bernstein and
Andrew Moon.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We explicitly set the Initial block Counter by prepending it to the nonce in
Little Endian. The same test vector is used for both encryption and decryption,
ChaCha20 is a cipher XORing a keystream.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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ChaCha20 is a high speed 256-bit key size stream cipher algorithm designed by
Daniel J. Bernstein. It is further specified in RFC7539 for use in IETF
protocols as a building block for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD.
This is a portable C implementation without any architecture specific
optimizations. It uses a 16-byte IV, which includes the 12-byte ChaCha20 nonce
prepended by the initial block counter. Some algorithms require an explicit
counter value, for example the mentioned AEAD construction.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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On architectures where flush_dcache_page is not needed, we will
end up generating all the code up to the PageSlab call. This is
because PageSlab operates on a volatile pointer and thus cannot
be optimised away.
This patch works around this by checking whether flush_dcache_page
is needed before we call PageSlab which then allows PageSlab to be
compiled awy.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch converts cryptd to the new AEAD interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds setkey and setauthsize for cryptd AEAD.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch converts pcrypt over to the new AEAD interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds the helpers that allow the registration and removal
of multiple algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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No new code should be using the return value of crypto_unregister_alg
as it will become void soon.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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