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REQ_WRITE_SAME
commit e5db29806b99ce2b2640d2e4d4fcb983cea115c5 upstream.
Since it's possible for the discard and write same queue limits to
change while the upper level command is being sliced and diced, fix up
both of them (a) to reject IO if the special command is unsupported at
the start of the function and (b) read the limits once and let the
commands error out on their own if the status happens to change.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ab7c7bb6f4ab95dbca96fcfc4463cd69843e3e24 upstream.
__dm_destroy() must take the suspend_lock so that its presuspend and
postsuspend calls do not race with an internal suspend.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 22aa66a3ee5b61e0f4a0bfeabcaa567861109ec3 upstream.
When the snapshot target is unloaded, snapshot_dtr() waits until
pending_exceptions_count drops to zero. Then, it destroys the snapshot.
Therefore, the function that decrements pending_exceptions_count
should not touch the snapshot structure after the decrement.
pending_complete() calls free_pending_exception(), which decrements
pending_exceptions_count, and then it performs up_write(&s->lock) and it
calls retry_origin_bios() which dereferences s->origin. These two
memory accesses to the fields of the snapshot may touch the dm_snapshot
struture after it is freed.
This patch moves the call to free_pending_exception() to the end of
pending_complete(), so that the snapshot will not be destroyed while
pending_complete() is in progress.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2bec1f4a8832e74ebbe859f176d8a9cb20dd97f4 upstream.
The function dm_get_md finds a device mapper device with a given dev_t,
increases the reference count and returns the pointer.
dm_get_md calls dm_find_md, dm_find_md takes _minor_lock, finds the
device, tests that the device doesn't have DMF_DELETING or DMF_FREEING
flag, drops _minor_lock and returns pointer to the device. dm_get_md then
calls dm_get. dm_get calls BUG if the device has the DMF_FREEING flag,
otherwise it increments the reference count.
There is a possible race condition - after dm_find_md exits and before
dm_get is called, there are no locks held, so the device may disappear or
DMF_FREEING flag may be set, which results in BUG.
To fix this bug, we need to call dm_get while we hold _minor_lock. This
patch renames dm_find_md to dm_get_md and changes it so that it calls
dm_get while holding the lock.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 37527b869207ad4c208b1e13967d69b8bba1fbf9 upstream.
I created a dm-raid1 device backed by a device that supports DISCARD
and another device that does NOT support DISCARD with the following
dm configuration:
# echo '0 2048 mirror core 1 512 2 /dev/sda 0 /dev/sdb 0' | dmsetup create moo
# lsblk -D
NAME DISC-ALN DISC-GRAN DISC-MAX DISC-ZERO
sda 0 4K 1G 0
`-moo (dm-0) 0 4K 1G 0
sdb 0 0B 0B 0
`-moo (dm-0) 0 4K 1G 0
Notice that the mirror device /dev/mapper/moo advertises DISCARD
support even though one of the mirror halves doesn't.
If I issue a DISCARD request (via fstrim, mount -o discard, or ioctl
BLKDISCARD) through the mirror, kmirrord gets stuck in an infinite
loop in do_region() when it tries to issue a DISCARD request to sdb.
The problem is that when we call do_region() against sdb, num_sectors
is set to zero because q->limits.max_discard_sectors is zero.
Therefore, "remaining" never decreases and the loop never terminates.
To fix this: before entering the loop, check for the combination of
REQ_DISCARD and no discard and return -EOPNOTSUPP to avoid hanging up
the mirror device.
This bug was found by the unfortunate coincidence of pvmove and a
discard operation in the RHEL 6.5 kernel; upstream is also affected.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2ed51ac64611d717d1917820a01930174c2f236 upstream.
It may be possible that a device claims discard support but it rejects
discards with -EOPNOTSUPP. It happens when using loopback on ext2/ext3
filesystem driven by the ext4 driver. It may also happen if the
underlying devices are moved from one disk on another.
If discard error happens, we reject the bio with -EOPNOTSUPP, but we do
not degrade the array.
This patch fixes failed test shell/lvconvert-repair-transient.sh in the
lvm2 testsuite if the testsuite is extracted on an ext2 or ext3
filesystem and it is being driven by the ext4 driver.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d1901ef099c38afd11add4cfb3312c02ef21ec4a upstream.
When a drive is marked write-mostly it should only be the
target of reads if there is no other option.
This behaviour was broken by
commit 9dedf60313fa4dddfd5b9b226a0ef12a512bf9dc
md/raid1: read balance chooses idlest disk for SSD
which causes a write-mostly device to be *preferred* is some cases.
Restore correct behaviour by checking and setting
best_dist_disk and best_pending_disk rather than best_disk.
We only need to test one of these as they are both changed
from -1 or >=0 at the same time.
As we leave min_pending and best_dist unchanged, any non-write-mostly
device will appear better than the write-mostly device.
Reported-by: Tomáš Hodek <tomas.hodek@volny.cz>
Reported-by: Dark Penguin <darkpenguin@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-raid&m=135982797322422
Fixes: 9dedf60313fa4dddfd5b9b226a0ef12a512bf9dc
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 26ac107378c4742978216be1005b7291b799c7b2 upstream.
Commit a7854487cd7128a30a7f4f5259de9f67d5efb95f:
md: When RAID5 is dirty, force reconstruct-write instead of read-modify-write.
Causes an RCW cycle to be forced even when the array is degraded.
A degraded array cannot support RCW as that requires reading all data
blocks, and one may be missing.
Forcing an RCW when it is not possible causes a live-lock and the code
spins, repeatedly deciding to do something that cannot succeed.
So change the condition to only force RCW on non-degraded arrays.
Reported-by: Manibalan P <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in>
Bisected-by: Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Fixes: a7854487cd7128a30a7f4f5259de9f67d5efb95f
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 766a78882ddf79b162243649d7dfdbac1fb6fb88 upstream.
Commit 9b1cc9f251 ("dm cache: share cache-metadata object across
inactive and active DM tables") mistakenly ignored the use of ERR_PTR
returns. Restore missing IS_ERR checks and ERR_PTR returns where
appropriate.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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FAIL mode
commit 2a7eaea02b99b6e267b1e89c79acc6e9a51cee3b upstream.
You can't modify the metadata in these modes. It's better to fail these
messages immediately than let the block-manager deny write locks on
metadata blocks. Otherwise these failed metadata changes will trigger
'needs_check' to get set in the metadata superblock -- requiring repair
using the thin_check utility.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 108cef3aa41669610e1836fe638812dd067d72de upstream.
It is critical that fetch_block() and handle_stripe_dirtying()
are consistent in their analysis of what needs to be loaded.
Otherwise raid5 can wait forever for a block that won't be loaded.
Currently when writing to a RAID5 that is resyncing, to a location
beyond the resync offset, handle_stripe_dirtying chooses a
reconstruct-write cycle, but fetch_block() assumes a
read-modify-write, and a lockup can happen.
So treat that case just like RAID6, just as we do in
handle_stripe_dirtying. RAID6 always does reconstruct-write.
This bug was introduced when the behaviour of handle_stripe_dirtying
was changed in 3.7, so the patch is suitable for any kernel since,
though it will need careful merging for some versions.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.7+)
Fixes: a7854487cd7128a30a7f4f5259de9f67d5efb95f
Reported-by: Henry Cai <henryplusplus@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a59db67656021fa212e9b95a583f13c34eb67cd9 upstream.
Introduce a new variable to count the number of allocated migration
structures. The existing variable cache->nr_migrations became
overloaded. It was used to:
i) track of the number of migrations in flight for the purposes of
quiescing during suspend.
ii) to estimate the amount of background IO occuring.
Recent discard changes meant that REQ_DISCARD bios are processed with
a migration. Discards are not background IO so nr_migrations was not
incremented. However this could cause quiescing to complete early.
(i) is now handled with a new variable cache->nr_allocated_migrations.
cache->nr_migrations has been renamed cache->nr_io_migrations.
cleanup_migration() is now called free_io_migration(), since it
decrements that variable.
Also, remove the unused cache->next_migration variable that got replaced
with with prealloc_structs a while ago.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b1cc9f251affdd27f29fe46d0989ba76c33faf6 upstream.
If a DM table is reloaded with an inactive table when the device is not
suspended (normal procedure for LVM2), then there will be two dm-bufio
objects that can diverge. This can lead to a situation where the
inactive table uses bufio to read metadata at the same time the active
table writes metadata -- resulting in the inactive table having stale
metadata buffers once it is promoted to the active table slot.
Fix this by using reference counting and a global list of cache metadata
objects to ensure there is only one metadata object per metadata device.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bcf090e0040e30f8409e6a535a01e6473afb096f upstream.
this was very wrong - mempool_alloc() only guarantees success with GFP_WAIT.
bcache uses GFP_NOWAIT in various other places where we have a fallback,
circuits must've gotten crossed when writing this code or something.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Gabriel de Perthuis <g2p.code@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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are released
commit 2c43fd26e46734430122b8d2ad3024bb532df3ef upstream.
Discard bios and thin device deletion have the potential to release data
blocks. If the thin-pool is in out-of-data-space mode, and blocks were
released, transition the thin-pool back to full write mode.
The correct time to do this is just after the thin-pool metadata commit.
It cannot be done before the commit because the space maps will not
allow immediate reuse of the data blocks in case there's a rollback
following power failure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 45ec9bd0fd7abf8705e7cf12205ff69fe9d51181 upstream.
When the pool was in PM_OUT_OF_SPACE mode its process_prepared_discard
function pointer was incorrectly being set to
process_prepared_discard_passdown rather than process_prepared_discard.
This incorrect function pointer meant the discard was being passed down,
but not effecting the mapping. As such any discard that was issued, in
an attempt to reclaim blocks, would not successfully free data space.
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1c6156fe4d4577444b769d7edd5dd503e57bbc9 upstream.
This function isn't right and it causes a static checker warning:
drivers/md/dm-thin.c:3016 maybe_resize_data_dev()
error: potentially using uninitialized 'sb_data_size'.
It should set "*count" and return zero on success the same as the
sm_metadata_get_nr_blocks() function does earlier.
Fixes: 3241b1d3e0aa ('dm: add persistent data library')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1e32134a5a404e80bfb47fad8a94e9bbfcbdacc5 upstream.
If the incoming bio is a WRITE and completely covers a block then we
don't bother to do any copying for a promotion operation. Once this is
done the cache block and origin block will be different, so we need to
set it to 'dirty'.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f29a3147e251d7ae20d3194ff67f109d71e501b4 upstream.
Overwrite causes the cache block and origin blocks to diverge, which
is only allowed in writeback mode.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1a71d6ffe18c0d0f03fc8531949cc8ed41d702ee upstream.
Use memzero_explicit to cleanup sensitive data allocated on stack
to prevent the compiler from optimizing and removing memset() calls.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 445559cdcb98a141f5de415b94fd6eaccab87e6d upstream.
When dm-bufio sets out to use the bio built into a struct dm_buffer to
issue an IO, it needs to call bio_reset after it's done with the bio
so that we can free things attached to the bio such as the integrity
payload. Therefore, inject our own endio callback to take care of
the bio_reset after calling submit_io's end_io callback.
Test case:
1. modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dif=1 dix=199 ato=1 dev_size_mb=300
2. Set up a dm-bufio client, e.g. dm-verity, on the scsi_debug device
3. Repeatedly read metadata and watch kmalloc-192 leak!
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4b5060ddae2b03c5387321fafc089d242225697a upstream.
If two threads call bitmap_unplug at the same time, then
one might schedule all the writes, and the other might
decide that it doesn't need to wait. But really it does.
It rarely hurts to wait when it isn't absolutely necessary,
and the current code doesn't really focus on 'absolutely necessary'
anyway. So just wait always.
This can potentially lead to data corruption if a crash happens
at an awkward time and data was written before the bitmap was
updated. It is very unlikely, but this should go to -stable
just to be safe. Appropriate for any -stable.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 45eaf45dfa4850df16bc2e8e7903d89021137f40 upstream.
md_check_recovery will skip any recovery and also clear
MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED if MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set.
So when we clear _FROZEN, we must set _NEEDED and ensure that
md_check_recovery gets run.
Otherwise we could miss out on something that is needed.
In particular, this can make it impossible to remove a
failed device from an array is the 'recovery-needed' processing
didn't happen.
Suitable for stable kernels since 3.13.
Reported-and-tested-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@stratus.com>
Fixes: 30b8feb730f9b9b3c5de02580897da03f59b6b16
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 40d43c4b4cac4c2647bf07110d7b07d35f399a84 upstream.
The dm-raid superblock (struct dm_raid_superblock) is padded to 512
bytes and that size is being used to read it in from the metadata
device into one preallocated page.
Reading or writing this on a 512-byte sector device works fine but on
a 4096-byte sector device this fails.
Set the dm-raid superblock's size to the logical block size of the
metadata device, because IO at that size is guaranteed too work. Also
add a size check to avoid silent partial metadata loss in case the
superblock should ever grow past the logical block size or PAGE_SIZE.
[includes pointer math fix from Dan Carpenter]
Reported-by: "Liuhua Wang" <lwang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b460d3699324d570a4d4161c3741431887f102f upstream.
The walk code was using a 'ro_spine' to hold it's locked btree nodes.
But this data structure is designed for the rolling lock scheme, and
as such automatically unlocks blocks that are two steps up the call
chain. This is not suitable for the simple recursive walk algorithm,
which retraces its steps.
This code is only used by the persistent array code, which in turn is
only used by dm-cache. In order to trigger it you need to have a
mapping tree that is more than 2 levels deep; which equates to 8-16
million cache blocks. For instance a 4T ssd with a very small block
size of 32k only just triggers this bug.
The fix just places the locked blocks on the stack, and stops using
the ro_spine altogether.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9d28eb12447ee08bb5d1e8bb3195cf20e1ecd1c0 upstream.
The shrinker uses gfp flags to indicate what kind of operation can the
driver wait for. If __GFP_IO flag is present, the driver can wait for
block I/O operations, if __GFP_FS flag is present, the driver can wait on
operations involving the filesystem.
dm-bufio tested for __GFP_IO. However, dm-bufio can run on a loop block
device that makes calls into the filesystem. If __GFP_IO is present and
__GFP_FS isn't, dm-bufio could still block on filesystem operations if it
runs on a loop block device.
The change from __GFP_IO to __GFP_FS supposedly fixes one observed (though
unreproducible) deadlock involving dm-bufio and loop device.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c822ed967cba38505713d59ed40a114386ef6c01 upstream.
Avoids normal IO racing with discard.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 56ec16cb1e1ce46354de8511eef962a417c32c92 upstream.
If cn_add_callback() fails in dm_ulog_tfr_init(), it does not
deallocate prealloced memory but calls cn_del_callback().
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Brassow <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0e825862f3c04cee40e25f55680333728a4ffa9b upstream.
When __scan frees the required number of buffer entries that the
shrinker requested (nr_to_scan becomes zero) it must return. Before
this fix the __scan code exited only the inner loop and continued in the
outer loop -- which could result in reduced performance due to extra
buffers being freed (e.g. unnecessarily evicted thinp metadata needing
to be synchronously re-read into bufio's cache).
Also, move dm_bufio_cond_resched to __scan's inner loop, so that
iterating the bufio client's lru lists doesn't result in scheduling
latency.
Reported-by: Joe Thornber <thornber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eb76faf53b1ff7a77ce3f78cc98ad392ac70c2a0 upstream.
The 'last_accessed' member of the dm_buffer structure was only set when
the the buffer was created. This led to each buffer being discarded
after dm_bufio_max_age time even if it was used recently. In practice
this resulted in all thinp metadata being evicted soon after being read
-- this is particularly problematic for metadata intensive workloads
like multithreaded small random IO.
'last_accessed' is now updated each time the buffer is moved to the head
of the LRU list, so the buffer is now properly discarded if it was not
used in dm_bufio_max_age time.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8e0e99ba64c7ba46133a7c8a3e3f7de01f23bd93 upstream.
It has come to my attention (thanks Martin) that 'discard_zeroes_data'
is only a hint. Some devices in some cases don't do what it
says on the label.
The use of DISCARD in RAID5 depends on reads from discarded regions
being predictably zero. If a write to a previously discarded region
performs a read-modify-write cycle it assumes that the parity block
was consistent with the data blocks. If all were zero, this would
be the case. If some are and some aren't this would not be the case.
This could lead to data corruption after a device failure when
data needs to be reconstructed from the parity.
As we cannot trust 'discard_zeroes_data', ignore it by default
and so disallow DISCARD on all raid4/5/6 arrays.
As many devices are trustworthy, and as there are benefits to using
DISCARD, add a module parameter to over-ride this caution and cause
DISCARD to work if discard_zeroes_data is set.
If a site want to enable DISCARD on some arrays but not on others they
should select DISCARD support at the filesystem level, and set the
raid456 module parameter.
raid456.devices_handle_discard_safely=Y
As this is a data-safety issue, I believe this patch is suitable for
-stable.
DISCARD support for RAID456 was added in 3.7
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Fixes: 620125f2bf8ff0c4969b79653b54d7bcc9d40637
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f0cc9a057151892b885be21a1d19b0185568281d upstream.
r1_bio->start_next_window is not initialised in the READ
case, so allow_barrier may incorrectly decrement
conf->current_window_requests
which can cause raise_barrier() to block forever.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b8cb6b4c121e1bf1963c16ed69e7adcb1bc301cd upstream.
If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.
If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices. So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.
It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices. So fix it.
This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered. It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.
Fixes: da8840a747c0dbf49506ec906757a6b87b9741e9
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 34e97f170149bfa14979581c4c748bc9b4b79d5b upstream.
Both normal IO and resync IO can be retried with reschedule_retry()
and so be counted into ->nr_queued, but only normal IO gets counted in
->nr_pending.
Before the recent improvement to RAID1 resync there could only
possibly have been one or the other on the queue. When handling a
read failure it could only be normal IO. So when handle_read_error()
called freeze_array() the fact that freeze_array only compares
->nr_queued against ->nr_pending was safe.
But now that these two types can interleave, we can have both normal
and resync IO requests queued, so we need to count them both in
nr_pending.
This error can lead to freeze_array() hanging if there is a read
error, so it is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c2fd4c94deedb89ac1746c4a53219be499372c06 upstream.
raise_barrier() uses next_resync as part of its calculations, so it
really should be updated first, instead of afterwards.
next_resync is always used under resync_lock so update it under
resync lock to, just before it is used. That is safest.
This could cause normal IO and resync IO to interact badly so
it suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 235549605eb7f1c5a37cef8b09d12e6d412c5cd6 upstream.
next_resync is (approximately) the location for the next resync request.
However it does *not* reliably determine the earliest location
at which resync might be happening.
This is because resync requests can complete out of order, and
we only limit the number of current requests, not the distance
from the earliest pending request to the latest.
mddev->curr_resync_completed is a reliable indicator of the earliest
position at which resync could be happening. It is updated less
frequently, but is actually reliable which is more important.
So use it to determine if a write request is before the region
being resynced and so safe from conflict.
This error can allow resync IO to interfere with normal IO which
could lead to data corruption. Hence: stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f73d3c55d09ce60647b96ad2a9b539c95a530ee upstream.
The resync/recovery process for raid1 was recently changed
so that writes could happen in parallel with resync providing
they were in different regions of the device.
There is a problem though: While a write request will always
wait for conflicting resync to complete, a resync request
will *not* always wait for conflicting writes to complete.
Two changes are needed to fix this:
1/ raise_barrier (which waits until it is safe to do resync)
must wait until current_window_requests is zero
2/ wait_battier (which waits at the start of a new write request)
must update current_window_requests if the request could
possible conflict with a concurrent resync.
As concurrent writes and resync can lead to data loss,
this patch is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Cc: majianpeng <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c6d119cf1b5a778e9ed60a006e2a434fcc4471a2 upstream.
commit 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761 made
it possible for reads to happen concurrently with resync.
This means that we need to be more careful where read_balancing
is allowed during resync - we can no longer be sure that any
resync that has already started will definitely finish.
So keep read_balancing to before recovery_cp, which is conservative
but safe.
This bug makes it possible to read from a device that doesn't
have up-to-date data, so it can cause data corruption.
So it is suitable for any kernel since 3.11.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 669cc7ba77864e7b1ac39c9f2b2afb8730f341f4 upstream.
If there are outstanding writes when close_sync is called,
the change to ->start_next_window might cause them to
decrement the wrong counter when they complete. Fix this
by merging the two counters into the one that will be decremented.
Having an incorrect value in a counter can cause raise_barrier()
to hangs, so this is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d49ec52ff6ddcda178fc2476a109cf1bd1fa19ed upstream.
The DM crypt target accesses memory beyond allocated space resulting in
a crash on 32 bit x86 systems.
This bug is very old (it dates back to 2.6.25 commit 3a7f6c990ad04 "dm
crypt: use async crypto"). However, this bug was masked by the fact
that kmalloc rounds the size up to the next power of two. This bug
wasn't exposed until 3.17-rc1 commit 298a9fa08a ("dm crypt: use per-bio
data"). By switching to using per-bio data there was no longer any
padding beyond the end of a dm-crypt allocated memory block.
To minimize allocation overhead dm-crypt puts several structures into one
block allocated with kmalloc. The block holds struct ablkcipher_request,
cipher-specific scratch pad (crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc))),
struct dm_crypt_request and an initialization vector.
The variable dmreq_start is set to offset of struct dm_crypt_request
within this memory block. dm-crypt allocates the block with this size:
cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + cc->iv_size.
When accessing the initialization vector, dm-crypt uses the function
iv_of_dmreq, which performs this calculation: ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq
+ 1), crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1).
dm-crypt allocated "cc->iv_size" bytes beyond the end of dm_crypt_request
structure. However, when dm-crypt accesses the initialization vector, it
takes a pointer to the end of dm_crypt_request, aligns it, and then uses
it as the initialization vector. If the end of dm_crypt_request is not
aligned on a crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) boundary the
alignment causes the initialization vector to point beyond the allocated
space.
Fix this bug by calculating the variable iv_size_padding and adding it
to the allocated size.
Also correct the alignment of dm_crypt_request. struct dm_crypt_request
is specific to dm-crypt (it isn't used by the crypto subsystem at all),
so it is aligned on __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request).
Also align per_bio_data_size on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN, so that it is
aligned as if the block was allocated with kmalloc.
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 40aa978eccec61347cd47b97c598df49acde8be5 upstream.
When a writeback or a promotion of a block is completed, the cell of
that block is removed from the prison, the block is marked as clean, and
the clear_dirty() callback of the cache policy is called.
Unfortunately, performing those actions in this order allows an incoming
new write bio for that block to come in before clearing the dirty status
is completed and therefore possibly causing one of these two scenarios:
Scenario A:
Thread 1 Thread 2
cell_defer() .
- cell removed from prison .
- detained bios queued .
. incoming write bio
. remapped to cache
. set_dirty() called,
. but block already dirty
. => it does nothing
clear_dirty() .
- block marked clean .
- policy clear_dirty() called .
Result: Block is marked clean even though it is actually dirty. No
writeback will occur.
Scenario B:
Thread 1 Thread 2
cell_defer() .
- cell removed from prison .
- detained bios queued .
clear_dirty() .
- block marked clean .
. incoming write bio
. remapped to cache
. set_dirty() called
. - block marked dirty
. - policy set_dirty() called
- policy clear_dirty() called .
Result: Block is properly marked as dirty, but policy thinks it is clean
and therefore never asks us to writeback it.
This case is visible in "dmsetup status" dirty block count (which
normally decreases to 0 on a quiet device).
Fix these issues by calling clear_dirty() before calling cell_defer().
Incoming bios for that block will then be detained in the cell and
released only after clear_dirty() has completed, so the race will not
occur.
Found by inspecting the code after noticing spurious dirty counts
(scenario B).
Signed-off-by: Anssi Hannula <anssi.hannula@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b39685526f46976bcd13aa08c82480092befa46c upstream.
When a raid10 commences a resync/recovery/reshape it allocates
some buffer space.
When a resync/recovery completes the buffer space is freed. But not
when the reshape completes.
This can result in a small memory leak.
There is a subtle side-effect of this bug. When a RAID10 is reshaped
to a larger array (more devices), the reshape is immediately followed
by a "resync" of the new space. This "resync" will use the buffer
space which was allocated for "reshape". This can cause problems
including a "BUG" in the SCSI layer. So this is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 3ea7daa5d7fde47cd41f4d56c2deb949114da9d6
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce0b0a46955d1bb389684a2605dbcaa990ba0154 upstream.
raid10 reshape clears unwanted bits from a bio->bi_flags using
a method which, while clumsy, worked until 3.10 when BIO_OWNS_VEC
was added.
Since then it clears that bit but shouldn't. This results in a
memory leak.
So change to used the approved method of clearing unwanted bits.
As this causes a memory leak which can consume all of memory
the fix is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: a38352e0ac02dbbd4fa464dc22d1352b5fbd06fd
Reported-by: mdraid.pkoch@dfgh.net (Peter Koch)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9c4bdf697c39805078392d5ddbbba5ae5680e0dd upstream.
During recovery of a double-degraded RAID6 it is possible for
some blocks not to be recovered properly, leading to corruption.
If a write happens to one block in a stripe that would be written to a
missing device, and at the same time that stripe is recovering data
to the other missing device, then that recovered data may not be written.
This patch skips, in the double-degraded case, an optimisation that is
only safe for single-degraded arrays.
Bug was introduced in 2.6.32 and fix is suitable for any kernel since
then. In an older kernel with separate handle_stripe5() and
handle_stripe6() functions the patch must change handle_stripe6().
Fixes: 6c0069c0ae9659e3a91b68eaed06a5c6c37f45c8
Cc: Yuri Tikhonov <yur@emcraft.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reported-by: "Manibalan P" <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in>
Tested-by: "Manibalan P" <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in>
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1090423
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2446dba03f9dabe0b477a126cbeb377854785b47 upstream.
Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).
This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices). In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.
The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.
If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.
As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable. For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.
Original-from: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn>
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 44fa816bb778edbab6b6ddaaf24908dd6295937e upstream.
nr_dirty is updated without locking, causing it to drift so that it is
non-zero (either a small positive integer, or a very large one when an
underflow occurs) even when there are no actual dirty blocks. This was
due to a race between the workqueue and map function accessing nr_dirty
in parallel without proper protection.
People were seeing under runs due to a race on increment/decrement of
nr_dirty, see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/6/3/648
Fix this by using an atomic_t for nr_dirty.
Reported-by: roma1390@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anssi Hannula <anssi.hannula@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8c712ea471ce7a4fd1734ad2211adf8469ddddc upstream.
1d3d4437eae1 ("vmscan: per-node deferred work") added a flags field to
struct shrinker assuming that all shrinkers were zero filled. The dm
bufio shrinker is not zero filled, which leaves arbitrary kmalloc() data
in flags. So far the only defined flags bit is SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE.
But there are proposed patches which add other bits to shrinker.flags
(e.g. memcg awareness).
Rather than simply initializing the shrinker, this patch uses kzalloc()
when allocating the dm_bufio_client to ensure that the embedded shrinker
and any other similar structures are zeroed.
This fixes theoretical over aggressive shrinking of dm bufio objects.
If the uninitialized dm_bufio_client.shrinker.flags contains
SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE then shrink_slab() would call the dm shrinker for
each numa node rather than just once. This has been broken since 3.12.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 048e5a07f282c57815b3901d4a68a77fa131ce0a upstream.
The block size for the dm-cache's data device must remained fixed for
the life of the cache. Disallow any attempt to change the cache's data
block size.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9aec8629ec829fc9403788cd959e05dd87988bd1 upstream.
The block size for the thin-pool's data device must remained fixed for
the life of the thin-pool. Disallow any attempt to change the
thin-pool's data block size.
It should be noted that attempting to change the data block size via
thin-pool table reload will be ignored as a side-effect of the thin-pool
handover that the thin-pool target does during thin-pool table reload.
Here is an example outcome of attempting to load a thin-pool table that
reduced the thin-pool's data block size from 1024K to 512K.
Before:
kernel: device-mapper: thin: 253:4: growing the data device from 204800 to 409600 blocks
After:
kernel: device-mapper: thin metadata: changing the data block size (from 2048 to 1024) is not supported
kernel: device-mapper: table: 253:4: thin-pool: Error creating metadata object
kernel: device-mapper: ioctl: error adding target to table
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit acfe0ad74d2e1bfc81d1d7bf5e15b043985d3650 upstream.
The commit 2c140a246dc ("dm: allow remove to be deferred") introduced a
deferred removal feature for the device mapper. When this feature is
used (by passing a flag DM_DEFERRED_REMOVE to DM_DEV_REMOVE_CMD ioctl)
and the user tries to remove a device that is currently in use, the
device will be removed automatically in the future when the last user
closes it.
Device mapper used the system workqueue to perform deferred removals.
However, some targets (dm-raid1, dm-mpath, dm-stripe) flush work items
scheduled for the system workqueue from their destructor. If the
destructor itself is called from the system workqueue during deferred
removal, it introduces a possible deadlock - the workqueue tries to flush
itself.
Fix this possible deadlock by introducing a new workqueue for deferred
removals. We allocate just one workqueue for all dm targets. The
ability of dm targets to process IOs isn't dependent on deferred removal
of unused targets, so a deadlock due to shared workqueue isn't possible.
Also, cleanup local_init() to eliminate potential for returning success
on failure.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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