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commit b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d upstream.
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5f6279da3760ce48f478f2856aacebe0c59a39f3 upstream.
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering
the OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
Not especially relevant from a security perspective, since users must
have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the character device.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl() with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. A pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit signed
value provided by the user.
If a negative value is provided here, bad things can happen. For
example, pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this
request_size, which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a
negative size. The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can
result in an overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the
sglist will be smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly
large the subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high
number of pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
Prevent this value from being negative in pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough().
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Anil Ravindranath <anil_ravindranath@pmc-sierra.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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Fix a reported ppc64 driver build issue. Removed cpu_to_le32 conversion
usage for flags in struct pmcraid_ioadl_desc. This was breaking the driver build in ppc64.
drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c: In function 'pmcraid_request_sense':
drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c:2254: warning: large integer implicitly truncated
to unsigned type
Signed-off-by: Anil Ravindranath<anil_ravindranath@pmc-sierra.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
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1.Changed driver prints to use scmd_printk, sdev_printk
2.Changed dev_err calls to scmd_printk for scsi related print messages
Signed-off-by: Anil Ravindranath <anil_ravindranath@pmc-sierra.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
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Signed-off-by: Anil Ravindranath <anil_ravindranath@pmc-sierra.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
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