| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Fixes a regression caused by commit a6ce4932fbdbcd8f8e8c6df76812014351c32892
When this lock was converted to a mutex, the locks were turned into
unlocks and vice-versa.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stable Tree <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Jeff's previous patch which removed the unneeded rw/ro
parsing can cause a minor warning in dmesg (about the
unknown rw or ro mount option) at mount time. This
patch makes cifs ignore them in kernel to remove the warning
(they are already handled in the mount helper and VFS).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
The lock_kernel call moved into the fs for umount_begin
is not needed. This adds a check to make sure we don't
call umount_begin twice on the same fs.
umount_begin for cifs is probably not needed and
may eventually be able to be removed, but in
the meantime this smaller patch is safe and
gets rid of the bkl from this path which provides
some benefit.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
FreeXid() along with freeing Xid does add a cifsFYI debug message that
prints rc (return code) as well. In some code paths where we set/return
error code after calling FreeXid(), incorrect error code is being
printed when cifsFYI is enabled.
This could be misleading in few cases. For eg.
In cifs_open() if cifs_fill_filedata() returns a valid pointer to
cifsFileInfo, FreeXid() prints rc=-13 whereas 0 is actually being
returned. Fix this by setting rc before calling FreeXid().
Basically convert
FreeXid(xid); rc = -ERR;
return -ERR; => FreeXid(xid);
return rc;
[Note that Christoph would like to replace the GetXid/FreeXid
calls, which are primarily used for debugging. This seems
like a good longer term goal, but although there is an
alternative tracing facility, there are no examples yet
available that I know of that we can use (yet) to
convert this cifs function entry/exit logging, and for
creating an identifier that we can use to correlate
all dmesg log entries for a particular vfs operation
(ie identify all log entries for a particular vfs
request to cifs: e.g. a particular close or read or write
or byte range lock call ... and just using the thread id
is harder). Eventually when a replacement
for this is available (e.g. when NFS switches over and various
samples to look at in other file systems) we can remove the
GetXid/FreeXid macro but in the meantime multiple people
use this run time configurable logging all the time
for debugging, and Suresh's patch fixes a problem
which made it harder to notice some low
memory problems in the log so it is worthwhile
to fix this problem until a better logging
approach is able to be used]
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Also removes obsolete distinction between rawntlmssp and ntlmssp (in asn/SPNEGO)
since as jra noted we can always send raw ntlmssp in session setup now.
remove check for experimental runtime flag (/proc/fs/cifs/Experimental) in
ntlmssp path.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Simo Leone <simo@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
cifs: remove rw/ro options
These options are handled at the VFS layer. They only ever set the
option in the smb_vol struct. Nothing was ever done with them afterward
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
cifs: fix problems with earlier patches
cifs_show_address hasn't been introduced yet, and fix a typo that was
silently fixed by a later patch in the series.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
This patch has CIFS look for a '%' in an IPv6 address. If one is
present then it will try to treat that value as a numeric interface
index suitable for stuffing into the sin6_scope_id field.
This should allow people to mount servers on IPv6 link-local addresses.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Holder <david@erion.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Noticed this when tree connect timed out (due to Samba server crash) -
we try to send a tree disconnect for a tid that does not exist
since we don't have a valid tree id yet. This checks that the
session is valid before sending the tree disconnect to handle
this case.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Move address display into a new function and display the scopeid as part
of the address in /proc/mounts.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
...to consolidate some logic used in more than one place.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
show_options is always called with the namespace_sem held. Therefore we
don't need to worry about the vfsmount being NULL, or it vanishing while
the function is running. By the same token, there's no need to worry
about the superblock, tcon, smb or tcp sessions being NULL on entry.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Move BKL into ->put_super from the only caller. A couple of
filesystems had trivial enough ->put_super (only kfree and NULLing of
s_fs_info + stuff in there) to not get any locking: coda, cramfs, efs,
hugetlbfs, omfs, qnx4, shmem, all others got the full treatment. Most
of them probably don't need it, but I'd rather sort that out individually.
Preferably after all the other BKL pushdowns in that area.
[AV: original used to move lock_super() down as well; these changes are
removed since we don't do lock_super() at all in generic_shutdown_super()
now]
[AV: fuse, btrfs and xfs are known to need no damn BKL, exempt]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This option was never used to my knowledge. Remove it before someone
does...
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
When you look in /proc/mounts, the address of the server gets displayed
as "addr=". That's really a better option to use anyway since it's more
generic. What if we eventually want to support non-IP transports? It
also makes CIFS option consistent with the NFS option of the same name.
Begin the migration to that option name by adding an alias for ip=
called addr=.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Also update fs/cifs/CHANGES
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
We have a bit of a problem with the uid= option. The basic issue is that
it means too many things and has too many side-effects.
It's possible to allow an unprivileged user to mount a filesystem if the
user owns the mountpoint, /bin/mount is setuid root, and the mount is
set up in /etc/fstab with the "user" option.
When doing this though, /bin/mount automatically adds the "uid=" and
"gid=" options to the share. This is fortunate since the correct uid=
option is needed in order to tell the upcall what user's credcache to
use when generating the SPNEGO blob.
On a mount without unix extensions this is fine -- you generally will
want the files to be owned by the "owner" of the mount. The problem
comes in on a mount with unix extensions. With those enabled, the
uid/gid options cause the ownership of files to be overriden even though
the server is sending along the ownership info.
This means that it's not possible to have a mount by an unprivileged
user that shows the server's file ownership info. The result is also
inode permissions that have no reflection at all on the server. You
simply cannot separate ownership from the mode in this fashion.
This behavior also makes MultiuserMount option less usable. Once you
pass in the uid= option for a mount, then you can't use unix ownership
info and allow someone to share the mount.
While I'm not thrilled with it, the only solution I can see is to stop
making uid=/gid= force the overriding of ownership on mounts, and to add
new mount options that turn this behavior on.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
For IPv6 the userspace mount helper sends an address in the "ip="
option. This check fails if the length is > 35 characters. I have no
idea where the magic 35 character limit came from, but it's clearly not
enough for IPv6. Fix it by making it use the INET6_ADDRSTRLEN #define.
While we're at it, use the same #define for the address length in SPNEGO
upcalls.
Reported-by: Charles R. Anderson <cra@wpi.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Thus spake Christoph:
"But this whole set_cifs_acl function is a real mess anyway and needs
some splitting up."
With this change too, it's possible to call acl_to_uid_mode() with a
NULL inode pointer. That (or something close to it) will eventually be
necessary when cifs_get_inode_info is reorganized.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
The current cifs_iget isn't suitable for anything but the root inode.
Rename it with a more appropriate name.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
The callers primarily end up converting the args from le anyway. Also,
most of the callers end up needing to add an offset to the result. The
exception to these rules is cnvrtDosCifsTm, but there are no callers of
that function, so we might as well remove it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
...and just have the function call le64_to_cpu.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
The current default file mode is 02767 and dir mode is 0777. This is
extremely "loose". Given that CIFS is a single-user protocol, these
permissions allow anyone to use the mount -- in effect, giving anyone on
the machine access to the credentials used to mount the share.
Change this by making the default permissions restrict write access to
the default owner of the mount. Give read and execute permissions to
everyone else. These are the same permissions that VFAT mounts get by
default so there is some precedent here.
Note that this patch also removes the mandatory locking flags from the
default file_mode. After having looked at how these flags are used by
the kernel, I don't think that keeping them as the default offers any
real benefit. That flag combination makes it so that the kernel enforces
mandatory locking.
Since the server is going to do that for us anyway, I don't think we
want the client to enforce this by default on applications that just
want advisory locks. Anyone that does want this behavior can always
enable it by setting the file_mode appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
There's no reason to limit the size of a symlink that we can read to
4000 bytes. That may be nowhere near PATH_MAX if the server is sending
UCS2 strings. CIFS should be able to read in a symlink up to the size of
the buffer. The size of the header has already been accounted for when
creating the slabcache, so CIFSMaxBufSize should be the correct size to
pass in.
Fixes samba bug #6384.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Small change (mostly formatting) to limit lookup based open calls to
file create only.
After discussion yesteday on samba-technical about the posix lookup
regression, and looking at a problem with cifs posix open to one
particular Samba version, Jeff and JRA realized that Samba server's
behavior changed in this area (posix open behavior on files vs.
directories). To make this behavior consistent, JRA just made a
fix to Samba server to alter how it handles open of directories (now
returning the equivalent of EISDIR instead of success). Since we don't
know at lookup time whether the inode is a directory or file (and
thus whether posix open will succeed with most current Samba server),
this change avoids the posix open code on lookup open (just issues
posix open on creates). This gets the semantic benefits we want
(atomicity, posix byte range locks, improved write semantics on newly
created files) and file create still is fast, and we avoid the problem
that Jeff noticed yesterday with "openat" (and some open directory
calls) of non-cached directories to one version of Samba server, and
will work with future Samba versions (which include the fix jra just
pushed into Samba server). I confirmed this approach with jra
yesterday and with Shirish today.
Posix open is only called (at lookup time) for file create now.
For opens (rather than creates), because we do not know if it
is a file or directory yet, and current Samba no longer allows
us to do posix open on dirs, we could end up wasting an open call
on what turns out to be a dir. For file opens, we wait to call posix
open till cifs_open. It could be added here (lookup) in the future
but the performance tradeoff of the extra network request when EISDIR
or EACCES is returned would have to be weighed against the 50%
reduction in network traffic in the other paths.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Posix open code was not properly adding the file to the
list of open files. Fix allocating cifsFileInfo
more than once, and adding twice to flist and tlist.
Also fix mode setting to be done in one place in these
paths.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Luca Tettamanti <kronos.it@gmail.com>
|
|
This is the third respin of the patch posted yesterday to fix the error
handling in cifs_follow_symlink. It also includes a fix for a bogus NULL
pointer check in CIFSSMBQueryUnixSymLink that Jeff Moyer spotted.
It's possible for CIFSSMBQueryUnixSymLink to return without setting
target_path to a valid pointer. If that happens then the current value
to which we're initializing this pointer could cause an oops when it's
kfree'd.
This patch is a little more comprehensive than the last patches. It
reorganizes cifs_follow_link a bit for (hopefully) better readability.
It should also eliminate the uneeded allocation of full_path on servers
without unix extensions (assuming they can get to this point anyway, of
which I'm not convinced).
On a side note, I'm not sure I agree with the logic of enabling this
query even when unix extensions are disabled on the client. It seems
like that should disable this as well. But, changing that is outside the
scope of this fix, so I've left it alone for now.
Reported-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@inraded.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
cifs_strndup_from_ucs returns NULL on error, not an ERR_PTR
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Push BKL down into ->umount_begin()
Signed-off-by: Alessio Igor Bogani <abogani@texware.it>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Remove adding open file entry twice to lists in the file
Do not fill file info twice in case of posix opens and creates
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
On mount, "sec=ntlmssp" can now be specified to allow
"rawntlmssp" security to be enabled during
CIFS session establishment/authentication (ntlmssp used to
require specifying krb5 which was counterintuitive).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
We were not setting the SMB uid in NTLMSSP authenticate
request which could lead to INVALID_PARAMETER error
on 2nd session setup.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
The NTLMSSP code was removed from fs/cifs/connect.c and merged
(75% smaller, cleaner) into fs/cifs/sess.c
As with the old code it requires that cifs be built with
CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL, the /proc/fs/cifs/Experimental flag
must be set to 2, and mount must turn on extended security
(e.g. with sec=krb5).
Although NTLMSSP encapsulated in SPNEGO is not enabled yet,
"raw" ntlmssp is common and useful in some cases since it
offers more complete security negotiation, and is the
default way of negotiating security for many Windows systems.
SPNEGO encapsulated NTLMSSP will be able to reuse the same
code.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Remove dead NTLMSSP support from connect.c prior to addition of
the new code to replace it.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
When multiply mounting from the same client to the same server, with
different userids, we create a vcnum which should be unique if
possible (this is not the same as the smb uid, which is the handle
to the security context). We were not endian converting additional
(beyond the first which is zero) vcnum properly.
CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Removes two sparse CHECK_ENDIAN warnings from Jeffs earlier patch,
and removes the dead readlink code (after noting where in
findfirst we will need to add something like that in the future
to handle the newly discovered unexpected error on FindFirst of NTFS symlinks.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
