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This is the 4.4.288 stable release
Signed-off-by: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com>
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[ Upstream commit 1fcb6fcd74a222d9ead54d405842fc763bb86262 ]
When looking into another nfs xfstests report, I found acl and
default_acl in nfs3_proc_create() and nfs3_proc_mknod() error
paths are possibly leaked. Fix them in advance.
Fixes: 013cdf1088d7 ("nfs: use generic posix ACL infrastructure for v3 Posix ACLs")
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Linux 4.4.274
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commit f8849e206ef52b584cd9227255f4724f0cc900bb upstream.
Currently if __nfs4_proc_set_acl fails with NFS4ERR_BADOWNER it
re-enables the idmapper by clearing NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP before
retrying again. The NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP remains cleared even if
the retry fails. This causes problem for subsequent setattr
requests for v4 server that does not have idmapping configured.
This patch modifies nfs4_proc_set_acl to detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skips the retry, since the kernel isn't
involved in encoding the ACEs, and return -EINVAL.
Steps to reproduce the problem:
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# touch /tmp/mnt/file1
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
# nfs4_setfacl -a A::unknown.user@xyz.com:wrtncy /tmp/mnt/file1
Failed setxattr operation: Invalid argument
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
chown: changing ownership of ‘/tmp/mnt/file1’: Invalid argument
# umount /tmp/mnt
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
#
v2: detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skip retry
in nfs4_proc_set_acl.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 09226e8303beeec10f2ff844d2e46d1371dc58e0 ]
None of the callers are expecting NULL returns from nfs_get_client() so
this code will lead to an Oops. It's better to return an error
pointer. I expect that this is dead code so hopefully no one is
affected.
Fixes: 31434f496abb ("nfs: check hostname in nfs_get_client")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e67afa7ee4a59584d7253e45d7f63b9528819a13 upstream.
Since commit bdcc2cd14e4e ("NFSv4.2: handle NFS-specific llseek errors"),
nfs42_proc_llseek would return -EOPNOTSUPP rather than -ENOTSUPP when
SEEK_DATA on NFSv4.0/v4.1.
This will lead xfstests generic/285 not run on NFSv4.0/v4.1 when set the
CONFIG_NFS_V4_2, rather than run failed.
Fixes: bdcc2cd14e4e ("NFSv4.2: handle NFS-specific llseek errors")
Cc: <stable.vger.kernel.org> # 4.2
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d0ea309357dea0d85a82815f02157eb7fcda39f upstream.
The value of mirror->pg_bytes_written should only be updated after a
successful attempt to flush out the requests on the list.
Fixes: a7d42ddb3099 ("nfs: add mirroring support to pgio layer")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 769b01ea68b6c49dc3cde6adf7e53927dacbd3a8 upstream.
The "sizeof(struct nfs_fh)" is two bytes too large and could lead to
memory corruption. It should be NFS_MAXFHSIZE because that's the size
of the ->data[] buffer.
I reversed the size of the arguments to put the variable on the left.
Fixes: 16b374ca439f ("NFSv4.1: pnfs: filelayout: add driver's LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 73f5c88f521a630ea1628beb9c2d48a2e777a419 ]
Currently the client ignores the value of the sr_eof of the SEEK
operation. According to the spec, if the server didn't find the
requested extent and reached the end of the file, the server
would return sr_eof=true. In case the request for DATA and no
data was found (ie in the middle of the hole), then the lseek
expects that ENXIO would be returned.
Fixes: 1c6dcbe5ceff8 ("NFS: Implement SEEK")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925 ]
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <nlivic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9fdbfad1777cb4638f489eeb62d85432010c0031 ]
We need to use unsigned long subtraction and then convert to signed in
order to deal correcly with C overflow rules.
Fixes: f5062003465c ("NFS: Set an attribute barrier on all updates")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4f8be1f53bf615102d103c0509ffa9596f65b718 ]
The NFSv4 protocol doesn't have any notion of reomoving an attribute, so
removexattr(path,"system.nfs4_acl") doesn't make sense.
There's no documented return value. Arguably it could be EOPNOTSUPP but
I'm a little worried an application might take that to mean that we
don't support ACLs or xattrs. How about EINVAL?
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ad3dbe35c833c2d4d0bbf3f04c785d32f931e7c9 ]
CREATE requests return a post_op_fh3, rather than nfs_fh3. The
post_op_fh3 includes an extra word to indicate 'handle_follows'.
Without that additional word, create fails when full 64-byte
filehandles are in use.
Add NFS3_post_op_fh_sz, and correct the size calculation for
NFS3_createres_sz.
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a0590473c5e6c4ef17c3132ad08fbad170f72d55 ]
This follows what was done in 8c2fabc6542d9d0f8b16bd1045c2eda59bdcde13.
With the default being m, it's impossible to build the module into the
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Timo Rothenpieler <timo@rothenpieler.org>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 53cb245454df5b13d7063162afd7a785aed6ebf2 ]
An xattr 'get' handler is expected to return the length of the value on
success, yet _nfs4_get_security_label() (and consequently also
nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_label(), which is used as an xattr handler) returns
just 0 on success.
Fix this by returning label.len instead, which contains the length of
the result.
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 896567ee7f17a8a736cda8a28cc987228410a2ac upstream.
Before referencing the inode, we must ensure that the superblock can be
referenced. Otherwise, we can end up with iput() calling superblock
operations that are no longer valid or accessible.
Fixes: ea7c38fef0b7 ("NFSv4: Ensure we reference the inode for return-on-close in delegreturn")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bf701b765eaa82dd164d65edc5747ec7288bb5c3 ]
nfsiod is currently a concurrency-managed workqueue (CMWQ).
This means that workitems scheduled to nfsiod on a given CPU are queued
behind all other work items queued on any CMWQ on the same CPU. This
can introduce unexpected latency.
Occaionally nfsiod can even cause excessive latency. If the work item
to complete a CLOSE request calls the final iput() on an inode, the
address_space of that inode will be dismantled. This takes time
proportional to the number of in-memory pages, which on a large host
working on large files (e.g.. 5TB), can be a large number of pages
resulting in a noticable number of seconds.
We can avoid these latency problems by switching nfsiod to WQ_UNBOUND.
This causes each concurrent work item to gets a dedicated thread which
can be scheduled to an idle CPU.
There is precedent for this as several other filesystems use WQ_UNBOUND
workqueue for handling various async events.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Fixes: ada609ee2ac2 ("workqueue: use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM instead of WQ_RESCUER")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 05ad917561fca39a03338cb21fe9622f998b0f9c ]
Currently, the client will always ask for security_labels if the server
returns that it supports that feature regardless of any LSM modules
(such as Selinux) enforcing security policy. This adds performance
penalty to the READDIR operation.
Client adjusts superblock's support of the security_label based on
the server's support but also current client's configuration of the
LSM modules. Thus, prior to using the default bitmask in READDIR,
this patch checks the server's capabilities and then instructs
READDIR to remove FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL from the bitmask.
v5: fixing silly mistakes of the rushed v4
v4: simplifying logic
v3: changing label's initialization per Ondrej's comment
v2: dropping selinux hook and using the sb cap.
Suggested-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Fixes: 2b0143b5c986 ("VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 247db73560bc3e5aef6db50c443c3c0db115bc93 upstream.
We are generating incorrect path in case of rename retry because
we are restarting from wrong dentry. We should restart from the
dentry which was received in the call to nfs_path.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ashish Sangwan <ashishsangwan2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d33030e2ee3508d65db5644551435310df86010e ]
nfs_readdir_page_filler() iterates over entries in a directory, reusing
the same security label buffer, but does not reset the buffer's length.
This causes decode_attr_security_label() to return -ERANGE if an entry's
security label is longer than the previous one's. This error, in
nfs4_decode_dirent(), only gets passed up as -EAGAIN, which causes another
failed attempt to copy into the buffer. The second error is ignored and
the remaining entries do not show up in ls, specifically the getdents64()
syscall.
Reproduce by creating multiple files in NFS and giving one of the later
files a longer security label. ls will not see that file nor any that are
added afterwards, though they will exist on the backend.
In nfs_readdir_page_filler(), reset security label buffer length before
every reuse
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
Fixes: b4487b935452 ("nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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This is the 4.4.237 stable release
Signed-off-by: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com>
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[ Upstream commit 3d7a9520f0c3e6a68b6de8c5812fc8b6d7a52626 ]
A client should be able to handle getting an ERR_DELAY error
while doing a LOCK call to reclaim state due to delegation being
recalled. This is a transient error that can happen due to server
moving its volumes and invalidating its file location cache and
upon reference to it during the LOCK call needing to do an
expensive lookup (leading to an ERR_DELAY error on a PUTFH).
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21 ]
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
[Trond: clean up duplicate test of label->len != 0]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c4803c497fbdb37e96af614813a7cfb434b6682a ]
Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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compeletion")
commit 65caafd0d2145d1dd02072c4ced540624daeab40 upstream.
Reverting commit d03727b248d0 "NFSv4 fix CLOSE not waiting for
direct IO compeletion". This patch made it so that fput() by calling
inode_dio_done() in nfs_file_release() would wait uninterruptably
for any outstanding directIO to the file (but that wait on IO should
be killable).
The problem the patch was also trying to address was REMOVE returning
ERR_ACCESS because the file is still opened, is supposed to be resolved
by server returning ERR_FILE_OPEN and not ERR_ACCESS.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d03727b248d0dae6199569a8d7b629a681154633 upstream.
Figuring out the root case for the REMOVE/CLOSE race and
suggesting the solution was done by Neil Brown.
Currently what happens is that direct IO calls hold a reference
on the open context which is decremented as an asynchronous task
in the nfs_direct_complete(). Before reference is decremented,
control is returned to the application which is free to close the
file. When close is being processed, it decrements its reference
on the open_context but since directIO still holds one, it doesn't
sent a close on the wire. It returns control to the application
which is free to do other operations. For instance, it can delete a
file. Direct IO is finally releasing its reference and triggering
an asynchronous close. Which races with the REMOVE. On the server,
REMOVE can be processed before the CLOSE, failing the REMOVE with
EACCES as the file is still opened.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8b04013737341442ed914b336cde866b902664ae upstream.
If the mirror count changes in the new layout we pick up inside
ff_layout_pg_init_write(), then we can end up adding the
request to the wrong mirror and corrupting the mirror->pg_list.
Fixes: d600ad1f2bdb ("NFS41: pop some layoutget errors to application")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5ac7eace2d00eab5ae0e9fdee63e38aee6001f7c upstream
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Tuned for toradex_vf_4.4-next
Conflicts:
include/linux/key.h
security/keys/process_keys.c
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Suvorov <oleksandr.suvorov@toradex.com>
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commit 11476e9dec39d90fe1e9bf12abc6f3efe35a073d upstream.
At Connectathon 2016, we found that recent upstream Linux clients
would occasionally send a LOCK operation with a zero stateid. This
appeared to happen in close proximity to another thread returning
a delegation before unlinking the same file while it remained open.
Earlier, the client received a write delegation on this file and
returned the open stateid. Now, as it is getting ready to unlink the
file, it returns the write delegation. But there is still an open
file descriptor on that file, so the client must OPEN the file
again before it returns the delegation.
Since commit 24311f884189 ('NFSv4: Recovery of recalled read
delegations is broken'), nfs_open_delegation_recall() clears the
NFS_DELEGATED_STATE flag _before_ it sends the OPEN. This allows a
racing LOCK on the same inode to be put on the wire before the OPEN
operation has returned a valid open stateid.
To eliminate this race, serialize delegation return with the
acquisition of a file lock on the same file. Adopt the same approach
as is used in the unlock path.
This patch also eliminates a similar race seen when sending a LOCK
operation at the same time as returning a delegation on the same file.
Fixes: 24311f884189 ('NFSv4: Recovery of recalled read ... ')
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[Anna: Add sentence about LOCK / delegation race]
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7648f939cb919b9d15c21fff8cd9eba908d595dc upstream.
nfs3_set_acl keeps track of the acl it allocated locally to determine if an acl
needs to be released at the end. This results in a memory leak when the
function allocates an acl as well as a default acl. Fix by releasing acls
that differ from the acl originally passed into nfs3_set_acl.
Fixes: b7fa0554cf1b ("[PATCH] NFS: Add support for NFSv3 ACLs")
Reported-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 862f35c94730c9270833f3ad05bd758a29f204ed ]
If we just set the mirror count to 1 without first clearing out
the mirrors, we can leak queued up requests.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8605cf0e852af3b2c771c18417499dc4ceed03d5 ]
When dreq is allocated by nfs_direct_req_alloc(), dreq->kref is
initialized to 2. Therefore we need to call nfs_direct_req_release()
twice to release the allocated dreq. Usually it is called in
nfs_file_direct_{read, write}() and nfs_direct_complete().
However, current code only calls nfs_direct_req_relese() once if
nfs_get_lock_context() fails in nfs_file_direct_{read, write}().
So, that case would result in memory leak.
Fix this by adding the missing call.
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Array is mapped by nfs_readdir_get_array(), the further kmap is a result
of a bad merge and should be removed.
This resource leakage can be exploited for DoS by receptively reading
a content of a directory on NFS (e.g. by running ls).
Fixes: 67a56e9743171 ("NFS: Fix memory leaks and corruption in readdir")
Signed-off-by: Petr Malat <oss@malat.biz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 474c4f306eefbb21b67ebd1de802d005c7d7ecdc ]
If CONFIG_SWAP=n, it does not make much sense to offer the user the
option to enable support for swapping over NFS, as that will still fail
at run time:
# swapon /swap
swapon: /swap: swapon failed: Function not implemented
Fix this by adding a dependency on CONFIG_SWAP.
Fixes: a564b8f0398636ba ("nfs: enable swap on NFS")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 114de38225d9b300f027e2aec9afbb6e0def154b ]
When a NFS directory page cache page is removed from the page cache,
its contents are freed through a call to nfs_readdir_clear_array().
To prevent the removal of the page cache entry until after we've
finished reading it, we must take the page lock.
Fixes: 11de3b11e08c ("NFS: Fix a memory leak in nfs_readdir")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.37+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6089dd0d731028531fb1148be9fd33274ff90da4 ]
Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b310319c6a8ce708f1033d57145e2aa027a883c ]
nfs_readdir_xdr_to_array() must not exit without having initialised
the array, so that the page cache deletion routines can safely
call nfs_readdir_clear_array().
Furthermore, we should ensure that if we exit nfs_readdir_filler()
with an error, we free up any page contents to prevent a leak
if we try to fill the page again.
Fixes: 11de3b11e08c ("NFS: Fix a memory leak in nfs_readdir")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.37+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 40cc394be1aa18848b8757e03bd8ed23281f572e ]
In the rare and unsupported case of a hostname list nfs_parse_devname
will modify dev_name. There is no need to modify dev_name as the all
that is being computed is the length of the hostname, so the computed
length can just be shorted.
Fixes: dc04589827f7 ("NFS: Use common device name parsing logic for NFSv4 and NFSv2/v3")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 44f411c353bf6d98d5a34f8f1b8605d43b2e50b8 ]
Running "./nfstest_delegation --runtest recall26" uncovers that
client doesn't recover the lock when we have an appending open,
where the initial open got a write delegation.
Instead of checking for the passed in open context against
the file lock's open context. Check that the state is the same.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit be3df3dd4c70ee020587a943a31b98a0fb4b6424 ]
If the delegation is marked as being revoked, we must not use it
for cached opens.
Fixes: 869f9dfa4d6d ("NFSv4: Fix races between nfs_remove_bad_delegation() and delegation return")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1047ec868332034d1fbcb2fae19fe6d4cb869ff2 ]
Our client can issue multiple SETCLIENTID operations to the same
server in some circumstances. Ensure that calls to
nfs4_proc_setclientid() after the first one do not overwrite the
previously allocated cl_acceptor string.
unreferenced object 0xffff888461031800 (size 32):
comm "mount.nfs", pid 2227, jiffies 4294822467 (age 1407.749s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
6e 66 73 40 6b 6c 69 6d 74 2e 69 62 2e 31 30 31 nfs@klimt.ib.101
35 67 72 61 6e 67 65 72 2e 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 5granger.net....
backtrace:
[<00000000ab820188>] __kmalloc+0x128/0x176
[<00000000eeaf4ec8>] gss_stringify_acceptor+0xbd/0x1a7 [auth_rpcgss]
[<00000000e85e3382>] nfs4_proc_setclientid+0x34e/0x46c [nfsv4]
[<000000003d9cf1fa>] nfs40_discover_server_trunking+0x7a/0xed [nfsv4]
[<00000000b81c3787>] nfs4_discover_server_trunking+0x81/0x244 [nfsv4]
[<000000000801b55f>] nfs4_init_client+0x1b0/0x238 [nfsv4]
[<00000000977daf7f>] nfs4_set_client+0xfe/0x14d [nfsv4]
[<0000000053a68a2a>] nfs4_create_server+0x107/0x1db [nfsv4]
[<0000000088262019>] nfs4_remote_mount+0x2c/0x59 [nfsv4]
[<00000000e84a2fd0>] legacy_get_tree+0x2d/0x4c
[<00000000797e947c>] vfs_get_tree+0x20/0xc7
[<00000000ecabaaa8>] fc_mount+0xe/0x36
[<00000000f15fafc2>] vfs_kern_mount+0x74/0x8d
[<00000000a3ff4e26>] nfs_do_root_mount+0x8a/0xa3 [nfsv4]
[<00000000d1c2b337>] nfs4_try_mount+0x58/0xad [nfsv4]
[<000000004c9bddee>] nfs_fs_mount+0x820/0x869 [nfs]
Fixes: f11b2a1cfbf5 ("nfs4: copy acceptor name from context ... ")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2751463eaa6f9fec8fea80abbdc62dbc487b3c5 ]
In encode_attrs(), there is an if statement on line 1145 to check
whether label is NULL:
if (label && (attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL))
When label is NULL, it is used on lines 1178-1181:
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->label, label->len);
To fix these bugs, label is checked before being used.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d33d4beb522987d1c305c12500796f9be3687dee ]
Ensure we update the write result count on success, since the
RPC call itself does not do so.
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 71affe9be45a5c60b9772e1b2701710712637274 ]
If we received a reply from the server with a zero length read and
no error, then that implies we are at eof.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 17d8c5d145000070c581f2a8aa01edc7998582ab ]
Initialise the result count to 0 rather than initialising it to the
argument count. The reason is that we want to ensure we record the
I/O stats correctly in the case where an error is returned (for
instance in the layoutstats).
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 90cf500e338ab3f3c0f126ba37e36fb6a9058441 ]
Currently, we are translating RPC level errors such as timeouts,
as well as interrupts etc into EOPENSTALE, which forces a single
replay of the open attempt. What we actually want to do is
force the replay only in the cases where the returned error
indicates that the file may have changed on the server.
So the fix is to spell out the exact set of errors where we want
to return EOPENSTALE.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c77e22834ae9a11891cb613bd9a551be1b94f2bc ]
John Hubbard reports seeing the following stack trace:
nfs4_do_reclaim
rcu_read_lock /* we are now in_atomic() and must not sleep */
nfs4_purge_state_owners
nfs4_free_state_owner
nfs4_destroy_seqid_counter
rpc_destroy_wait_queue
cancel_delayed_work_sync
__cancel_work_timer
__flush_work
start_flush_work
might_sleep:
(kernel/workqueue.c:2975: BUG)
The solution is to separate out the freeing of the state owners
from nfs4_purge_state_owners(), and perform that outside the atomic
context.
Reported-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Fixes: 0aaaf5c424c7f ("NFS: Cache state owners after files are closed")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8fd1ab747d2b1ec7ec663ad0b41a32eaa35117a8 ]
If the server that does not implement NFSv4.1 persistent session
semantics reboots while we are performing an exclusive create,
then the return value of NFS4ERR_DELAY when we replay the open
during the grace period causes us to lose the verifier.
When the grace period expires, and we present a new verifier,
the server will then correctly reply NFS4ERR_EXIST.
This commit ensures that we always present the same verifier when
replaying the OPEN.
Reported-by: Tigran Mkrtchyan <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 44942b4e457beda00981f616402a1a791e8c616e upstream.
According to the open() manpage, Linux reserves the access mode 3
to mean "check for read and write permission on the file and return
a file descriptor that can't be used for reading or writing."
Currently, the NFSv4 code will ask the server to open the file,
and will use an incorrect share access mode of 0. Since it has
an incorrect share access mode, the client later forgets to send
a corresponding close, meaning it can leak stateids on the server.
Fixes: ce4ef7c0a8a05 ("NFS: Split out NFS v4 file operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.6+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f02f3755dbd14fb935d24b14650fff9ba92243b8 upstream.
stat command with soft mount never return after server is stopped.
When alloc a new client, the state of the client will be set to
NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED.
When the server is stopped, the state manager will work, and accord
the state to recover. But the state is NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED, it
will drain the slot table and lead other task to wait queue, until
the client recovered. Then the stat command is hung.
When discover server trunking, the client will renew the lease,
but check the client state, it lead the client state corruption.
So, we need to call state manager to recover it when detect server
ip trunking.
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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