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2016-05-04debugfs: Make automount point inodes permanently emptySeth Forshee
commit 87243deb88671f70def4c52dfa7ca7830707bd31 upstream. Starting with 4.1 the tracing subsystem has its own filesystem which is automounted in the tracing subdirectory of debugfs. Prior to this debugfs could be bind mounted in a cloned mount namespace, but if tracefs has been mounted under debugfs this now fails because there is a locked child mount. This creates a regression for container software which bind mounts debugfs to satisfy the assumption of some userspace software. In other pseudo filesystems such as proc and sysfs we're already creating mountpoints like this in such a way that no dirents can be created in the directories, allowing them to be exceptions to some MNT_LOCKED tests. In fact we're already do this for the tracefs mountpoint in sysfs. Do the same in debugfs_create_automount(), since the intention here is clearly to create a mountpoint. This fixes the regression, as locked child mounts on permanently empty directories do not cause a bind mount to fail. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-20Btrfs: fix file/data loss caused by fsync after rename and new inodeFilipe Manana
commit 56f23fdbb600e6087db7b009775b95ce07cc3195 upstream. If we rename an inode A (be it a file or a directory), create a new inode B with the old name of inode A and under the same parent directory, fsync inode B and then power fail, at log tree replay time we end up removing inode A completely. If inode A is a directory then all its files are gone too. Example scenarios where this happens: This is reproducible with the following steps, taken from a couple of test cases written for fstests which are going to be submitted upstream soon: # Scenario 1 mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/a/x echo "hello" > /mnt/a/x/foo echo "world" > /mnt/a/x/bar sync mv /mnt/a/x /mnt/a/y mkdir /mnt/a/x xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/a/x <power failure happens> The next time the fs is mounted, log tree replay happens and the directory "y" does not exist nor do the files "foo" and "bar" exist anywhere (neither in "y" nor in "x", nor the root nor anywhere). # Scenario 2 mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt mkdir /mnt/a echo "hello" > /mnt/a/foo sync mv /mnt/a/foo /mnt/a/bar echo "world" > /mnt/a/foo xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/a/foo <power failure happens> The next time the fs is mounted, log tree replay happens and the file "bar" does not exists anymore. A file with the name "foo" exists and it matches the second file we created. Another related problem that does not involve file/data loss is when a new inode is created with the name of a deleted snapshot and we fsync it: mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt mkdir /mnt/testdir btrfs subvolume snapshot /mnt /mnt/testdir/snap btrfs subvolume delete /mnt/testdir/snap rmdir /mnt/testdir mkdir /mnt/testdir xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/testdir # or fsync some file inside /mnt/testdir <power failure> The next time the fs is mounted the log replay procedure fails because it attempts to delete the snapshot entry (which has dir item key type of BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY) as if it were a regular (non-root) entry, resulting in the following error that causes mount to fail: [52174.510532] BTRFS info (device dm-0): failed to delete reference to snap, inode 257 parent 257 [52174.512570] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [52174.513278] WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 28024 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:3986 __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x178/0x351 [btrfs]() [52174.514681] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) [52174.515630] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod overlay crc32c_generic ppdev xor raid6_pq acpi_cpufreq parport_pc tpm_tis sg parport tpm evdev i2c_piix4 proc [52174.521568] CPU: 12 PID: 28024 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.5.0-rc6-btrfs-next-27+ #1 [52174.522805] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [52174.524053] 0000000000000000 ffff8801df2a7710 ffffffff81264e93 ffff8801df2a7758 [52174.524053] 0000000000000009 ffff8801df2a7748 ffffffff81051618 ffffffffa03591cd [52174.524053] 00000000fffffffe ffff88015e6e5000 ffff88016dbc3c88 ffff88016dbc3c88 [52174.524053] Call Trace: [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81264e93>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81051618>] warn_slowpath_common+0x99/0xb2 [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa03591cd>] ? __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x178/0x351 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81051679>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0x50 [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa03591cd>] __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x178/0x351 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8118f5e9>] ? iput+0xb0/0x284 [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa0359fe8>] btrfs_unlink_inode+0x1c/0x3d [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038631e>] check_item_in_log+0x1fe/0x29b [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa0386522>] replay_dir_deletes+0x167/0x1cf [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038739e>] fixup_inode_link_count+0x289/0x2aa [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038748a>] fixup_inode_link_counts+0xcb/0x105 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038a5ec>] btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x258/0x32c [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa03885b2>] ? replay_one_extent+0x511/0x511 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa034f288>] open_ctree+0x1dd4/0x21b9 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa032b753>] btrfs_mount+0x97e/0xaed [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8108e1b7>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8117bafa>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81193003>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa032af81>] btrfs_mount+0x1ac/0xaed [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8108e1b7>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8108c262>] ? lockdep_init_map+0xb9/0x1b3 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8117bafa>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81193003>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8119590f>] do_mount+0x8a6/0x9e8 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff811358dd>] ? strndup_user+0x3f/0x59 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81195c65>] SyS_mount+0x77/0x9f [52174.524053] [<ffffffff814935d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6b [52174.561288] ---[ end trace 6b53049efb1a3ea6 ]--- Fix this by forcing a transaction commit when such cases happen. This means we check in the commit root of the subvolume tree if there was any other inode with the same reference when the inode we are fsync'ing is a new inode (created in the current transaction). Test cases for fstests, covering all the scenarios given above, were submitted upstream for fstests: * fstests: generic test for fsync after renaming directory https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8694281/ * fstests: generic test for fsync after renaming file https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8694301/ * fstests: add btrfs test for fsync after snapshot deletion https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8670671/ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-20ext4: ignore quota mount options if the quota feature is enabledTheodore Ts'o
commit c325a67c72903e1cc30e990a15ce745bda0dbfde upstream. Previously, ext4 would fail the mount if the file system had the quota feature enabled and quota mount options (used for the older quota setups) were present. This broke xfstests, since xfs silently ignores the usrquote and grpquota mount options if they are specified. This commit changes things so that we are consistent with xfs; having the mount options specified is harmless, so no sense break users by forbidding them. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-20ext4: add lockdep annotations for i_data_semTheodore Ts'o
commit daf647d2dd58cec59570d7698a45b98e580f2076 upstream. With the internal Quota feature, mke2fs creates empty quota inodes and quota usage tracking is enabled as soon as the file system is mounted. Since quotacheck is no longer preallocating all of the blocks in the quota inode that are likely needed to be written to, we are now seeing a lockdep false positive caused by needing to allocate a quota block from inside ext4_map_blocks(), while holding i_data_sem for a data inode. This results in this complaint: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ei->i_data_sem); lock(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex); lock(&ei->i_data_sem); lock(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex); Google-Bug-Id: 27907753 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-20btrfs: fix crash/invalid memory access on fsync when using overlayfsFilipe Manana
commit de17e793b104d690e1d007dfc5cb6b4f649598ca upstream. If the lower or upper directory of an overlayfs mount belong to a btrfs file system and we fsync the file through the overlayfs' merged directory we ended up accessing an inode that didn't belong to btrfs as if it were a btrfs inode at btrfs_sync_file() resulting in a crash like the following: [ 7782.588845] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000544 [ 7782.590624] IP: [<ffffffffa030b7ab>] btrfs_sync_file+0x11b/0x3e9 [btrfs] [ 7782.591931] PGD 4d954067 PUD 1e878067 PMD 0 [ 7782.592016] Oops: 0002 [#6] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 7782.592016] Modules linked in: btrfs overlay ppdev crc32c_generic evdev xor raid6_pq psmouse pcspkr sg serio_raw acpi_cpufreq parport_pc parport tpm_tis i2c_piix4 tpm i2c_core processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix virtio_pci libata virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod e1000 floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [ 7782.592016] CPU: 10 PID: 16437 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G D 4.5.0-rc6-btrfs-next-26+ #1 [ 7782.592016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 7782.592016] task: ffff88001b8d40c0 ti: ffff880137488000 task.ti: ffff880137488000 [ 7782.592016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa030b7ab>] [<ffffffffa030b7ab>] btrfs_sync_file+0x11b/0x3e9 [btrfs] [ 7782.592016] RSP: 0018:ffff88013748be40 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 7782.592016] RAX: 0000000080000000 RBX: ffff880133b30c88 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 7782.592016] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8148fec0 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 7782.592016] RBP: ffff88013748bec0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 7782.624248] R10: ffff88013748be40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7782.624248] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000009305a0 R15: ffff880015e3be40 [ 7782.624248] FS: 00007fa83b9cb700(0000) GS:ffff88023ed40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7782.624248] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7782.624248] CR2: 0000000000000544 CR3: 00000001fa652000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 7782.624248] Stack: [ 7782.624248] ffffffff8108b5cc ffff88013748bec0 0000000000000246 ffff8800b005ded0 [ 7782.624248] ffff880133b30d60 8000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000246 [ 7782.624248] 0000000000000246 ffffffff81074f9b ffffffff8104357c ffff880015e3be40 [ 7782.624248] Call Trace: [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff8108b5cc>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff81074f9b>] ? ___might_sleep+0xce/0x217 [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff8104357c>] ? __do_page_fault+0x3c0/0x43a [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff811a2351>] vfs_fsync_range+0x8c/0x9e [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff811a237f>] vfs_fsync+0x1c/0x1e [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff811a24d6>] do_fsync+0x31/0x4a [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff811a2700>] SyS_fsync+0x10/0x14 [ 7782.624248] [<ffffffff81493617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6b [ 7782.624248] Code: 85 c0 0f 85 e2 02 00 00 48 8b 45 b0 31 f6 4c 29 e8 48 ff c0 48 89 45 a8 48 8d 83 d8 00 00 00 48 89 c7 48 89 45 a0 e8 fc 43 18 e1 <f0> 41 ff 84 24 44 05 00 00 48 8b 83 58 ff ff ff 48 c1 e8 07 83 [ 7782.624248] RIP [<ffffffffa030b7ab>] btrfs_sync_file+0x11b/0x3e9 [btrfs] [ 7782.624248] RSP <ffff88013748be40> [ 7782.624248] CR2: 0000000000000544 [ 7782.661994] ---[ end trace 721e14960eb939bc ]--- This started happening since commit 4bacc9c9234 (overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay) and even though after this change we could still access the btrfs inode through struct file->f_mapping->host or struct file->f_inode, we would end up resulting in more similar issues later on at check_parent_dirs_for_sync() because the dentry we got (from struct file->f_path.dentry) was from overlayfs and not from btrfs, that is, we had no way of getting the dentry that belonged to btrfs (we always got the dentry that belonged to overlayfs). The new patch from Miklos Szeredi, titled "vfs: add file_dentry()" and recently submitted to linux-fsdevel, adds a file_dentry() API that allows us to get the btrfs dentry from the input file and therefore being able to fsync when the upper and lower directories belong to btrfs filesystems. This issue has been reported several times by users in the mailing list and bugzilla. A test case for xfstests is being submitted as well. Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay") Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101951 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109791 Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-20nfs: use file_dentry()Miklos Szeredi
commit be62a1a8fd116f5cd9e53726601f970e16e17558 upstream. NFS may be used as lower layer of overlayfs and accessing f_path.dentry can lead to a crash. Fix by replacing direct access of file->f_path.dentry with the file_dentry() accessor, which will always return a native object. Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay") Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Tested-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-20fs: add file_dentry()Miklos Szeredi
commit d101a125954eae1d397adda94ca6319485a50493 upstream. This series fixes bugs in nfs and ext4 due to 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay"). Regular files opened on overlayfs will result in the file being opened on the underlying filesystem, while f_path points to the overlayfs mount/dentry. This confuses filesystems which get the dentry from struct file and assume it's theirs. Add a new helper, file_dentry() [*], to get the filesystem's own dentry from the file. This checks file->f_path.dentry->d_flags against DCACHE_OP_REAL, and returns file->f_path.dentry if DCACHE_OP_REAL is not set (this is the common, non-overlayfs case). In the uncommon case it will call into overlayfs's ->d_real() to get the underlying dentry, matching file_inode(file). The reason we need to check against the inode is that if the file is copied up while being open, d_real() would return the upper dentry, while the open file comes from the lower dentry. [*] If possible, it's better simply to use file_inode() instead. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Tested-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12ocfs2/dlm: fix BUG in dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_listJoseph Qi
commit be12b299a83fc807bbaccd2bcb8ec50cbb0cb55c upstream. When master handles convert request, it queues ast first and then returns status. This may happen that the ast is sent before the request status because the above two messages are sent by two threads. And right after the ast is sent, if master down, it may trigger BUG in dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list in the requested node because ast handler moves it to grant list without clear lock->convert_pending. So remove BUG_ON statement and check if the ast is processed in dlmconvert_remote. Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and recoveryJoseph Qi
commit ac7cf246dfdbec3d8fed296c7bf30e16f5099dac upstream. There is a race window between dlmconvert_remote and dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, which will cause a lock with OCFS2_LOCK_BUSY in grant list, thus system hangs. dlmconvert_remote { spin_lock(&res->spinlock); list_move_tail(&lock->list, &res->converting); lock->convert_pending = 1; spin_unlock(&res->spinlock); status = dlm_send_remote_convert_request(); >>>>>> race window, master has queued ast and return DLM_NORMAL, and then down before sending ast. this node detects master down and calls dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, which will revert the lock to grant list. Then OCFS2_LOCK_BUSY won't be cleared as new master won't send ast any more because it thinks already be authorized. spin_lock(&res->spinlock); lock->convert_pending = 0; if (status != DLM_NORMAL) dlm_revert_pending_convert(res, lock); spin_unlock(&res->spinlock); } In this case, check if res->state has DLM_LOCK_RES_RECOVERING bit set (res is still in recovering) or res master changed (new master has finished recovery), reset the status to DLM_RECOVERING, then it will retry convert. Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12writeback, cgroup: fix use of the wrong bdi_writeback which mismatches the inodeTejun Heo
commit aaf2559332ba272671bb870464a99b909b29a3a1 upstream. When cgroup writeback is in use, there can be multiple wb's (bdi_writeback's) per bdi and an inode may switch among them dynamically. In a couple places, the wrong wb was used leading to performing operations on the wrong list under the wrong lock corrupting the io lists. * writeback_single_inode() was taking @wb parameter and used it to remove the inode from io lists if it becomes clean after writeback. The callers of this function were always passing in the root wb regardless of the actual wb that the inode was associated with, which could also change while writeback is in progress. Fix it by dropping the @wb parameter and using inode_to_wb_and_lock_list() to determine and lock the associated wb. * After writeback_sb_inodes() writes out an inode, it re-locks @wb and inode to remove it from or move it to the right io list. It assumes that the inode is still associated with @wb; however, the inode may have switched to another wb while writeback was in progress. Fix it by using inode_to_wb_and_lock_list() to determine and lock the associated wb after writeback is complete. As the function requires the original @wb->list_lock locked for the next iteration, in the unlikely case where the inode has changed association, switch the locks. Kudos to Tahsin for pinpointing these subtle breakages. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Fixes: d10c80955265 ("writeback: implement foreign cgroup inode bdi_writeback switching") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CAAeU0aMYeM_39Y2+PaRvyB1nqAPYZSNngJ1eBRmrxn7gKAt2Mg@mail.gmail.com Reported-and-diagnosed-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Tested-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12writeback, cgroup: fix premature wb_put() in locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list()Tejun Heo
commit 614a4e3773148a31f58dc174bbf578ceb63510c2 upstream. locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list() wb_get()'s the wb associated with the target inode, unlocks inode, locks the wb's list_lock and verifies that the inode is still associated with the wb. To prevent the wb going away between dropping inode lock and acquiring list_lock, the wb is pinned while inode lock is held. The wb reference is put right after acquiring list_lock citing that the wb won't be dereferenced anymore. This isn't true. If the inode is still associated with the wb, the inode has reference and it's safe to return the wb; however, if inode has been switched, the wb still needs to be unlocked which is a dereference and can lead to use-after-free if it it races with wb destruction. Fix it by putting the reference after releasing list_lock. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Fixes: 87e1d789bf55 ("writeback: implement [locked_]inode_to_wb_and_lock_list()") Tested-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12nfsd: fix deadlock secinfo+readdir compoundJ. Bruce Fields
commit 2f6fc056e899bd0144a08da5cacaecbe8997cd74 upstream. nfsd_lookup_dentry exits with the parent filehandle locked. fh_put also unlocks if necessary (nfsd filehandle locking is probably too lenient), so it gets unlocked eventually, but if the following op in the compound needs to lock it again, we can deadlock. A fuzzer ran into this; normal clients don't send a secinfo followed by a readdir in the same compound. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12nfsd4: fix bad bounds checkingJ. Bruce Fields
commit 4aed9c46afb80164401143aa0fdcfe3798baa9d5 upstream. A number of spots in the xdr decoding follow a pattern like n = be32_to_cpup(p++); READ_BUF(n + 4); where n is a u32. The only bounds checking is done in READ_BUF itself, but since it's checking (n + 4), it won't catch cases where n is very large, (u32)(-4) or higher. I'm not sure exactly what the consequences are, but we've seen crashes soon after. Instead, just break these up into two READ_BUF()s. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directoriesJann Horn
commit 378c6520e7d29280f400ef2ceaf155c86f05a71a upstream. This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2. - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.) - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is true on Linux >=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by default using a distro patch.) Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules, causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process, allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with root privileges. To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12fuse: Add reference counting for fuse_io_privSeth Forshee
commit 744742d692e37ad5c20630e57d526c8f2e2fe3c9 upstream. The 'reqs' member of fuse_io_priv serves two purposes. First is to track the number of oustanding async requests to the server and to signal that the io request is completed. The second is to be a reference count on the structure to know when it can be freed. For sync io requests these purposes can be at odds. fuse_direct_IO() wants to block until the request is done, and since the signal is sent when 'reqs' reaches 0 it cannot keep a reference to the object. Yet it needs to use the object after the userspace server has completed processing requests. This leads to some handshaking and special casing that it needlessly complicated and responsible for at least one race condition. It's much cleaner and safer to maintain a separate reference count for the object lifecycle and to let 'reqs' just be a count of outstanding requests to the userspace server. Then we can know for sure when it is safe to free the object without any handshaking or special cases. The catch here is that most of the time these objects are stack allocated and should not be freed. Initializing these objects with a single reference that is never released prevents accidental attempts to free the objects. Fixes: 9d5722b7777e ("fuse: handle synchronous iocbs internally") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12fuse: do not use iocb after it may have been freedRobert Doebbelin
commit 7cabc61e01a0a8b663bd2b4c982aa53048218734 upstream. There's a race in fuse_direct_IO(), whereby is_sync_kiocb() is called on an iocb that could have been freed if async io has already completed. The fix in this case is simple and obvious: cache the result before starting io. It was discovered by KASan: kernel: ================================================================== kernel: BUG: KASan: use after free in fuse_direct_IO+0xb1a/0xcc0 at addr ffff88036c414390 Signed-off-by: Robert Doebbelin <robert@quobyte.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: bcba24ccdc82 ("fuse: enable asynchronous processing direct IO") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12xfs: fix two memory leaks in xfs_attr_list.c error pathsMateusz Guzik
commit 2e83b79b2d6c78bf1b4aa227938a214dcbddc83f upstream. This plugs 2 trivial leaks in xfs_attr_shortform_list and xfs_attr3_leaf_list_int. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12quota: Fix possible GPF due to uninitialised pointersNikolay Borisov
commit ab73ef46398e2c0159f3a71de834586422d2a44a upstream. When dqget() in __dquot_initialize() fails e.g. due to IO error, __dquot_initialize() will pass an array of uninitialized pointers to dqput_all() and thus can lead to deference of random data. Fix the problem by properly initializing the array. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12splice: handle zero nr_pages in splice_to_pipe()Rabin Vincent
commit d6785d9152147596f60234157da2b02540c3e60f upstream. Running the following command: busybox cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_pipe > /dev/null with any tracing enabled pretty very quickly leads to various NULL pointer dereferences and VM BUG_ON()s, such as these: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: [<ffffffff8119df6c>] generic_pipe_buf_release+0xc/0x40 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811c48a3>] splice_direct_to_actor+0x143/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811c42e0>] ? generic_pipe_buf_nosteal+0x10/0x10 [<ffffffff811c49cf>] do_splice_direct+0x8f/0xb0 [<ffffffff81196869>] do_sendfile+0x199/0x380 [<ffffffff81197600>] SyS_sendfile64+0x90/0xa0 [<ffffffff8192cbee>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(atomic_read(&page->_count) == 0) kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:367! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC RIP: [<ffffffff8119df9c>] generic_pipe_buf_release+0x3c/0x40 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811c48a3>] splice_direct_to_actor+0x143/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811c42e0>] ? generic_pipe_buf_nosteal+0x10/0x10 [<ffffffff811c49cf>] do_splice_direct+0x8f/0xb0 [<ffffffff81196869>] do_sendfile+0x199/0x380 [<ffffffff81197600>] SyS_sendfile64+0x90/0xa0 [<ffffffff8192cd1e>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 (busybox's cat uses sendfile(2), unlike the coreutils version) This is because tracing_splice_read_pipe() can call splice_to_pipe() with spd->nr_pages == 0. spd_pages underflows in splice_to_pipe() and we fill the page pointers and the other fields of the pipe_buffers with garbage. All other callers of splice_to_pipe() avoid calling it when nr_pages == 0, and we could make tracing_splice_read_pipe() do that too, but it seems reasonable to have splice_to_page() handle this condition gracefully. Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12vfs: show_vfsstat: do not ignore errors from show_devname methodDmitry V. Levin
commit 5f8d498d4364f544fee17125787a47553db02afa upstream. Explicitly check show_devname method return code and bail out in case of an error. This fixes regression introduced by commit 9d4d65748a5c. Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-12jbd2: fix FS corruption possibility in jbd2_journal_destroy() on umount pathOGAWA Hirofumi
commit c0a2ad9b50dd80eeccd73d9ff962234590d5ec93 upstream. On umount path, jbd2_journal_destroy() writes latest transaction ID (->j_tail_sequence) to be used at next mount. The bug is that ->j_tail_sequence is not holding latest transaction ID in some cases. So, at next mount, there is chance to conflict with remaining (not overwritten yet) transactions. mount (id=10) write transaction (id=11) write transaction (id=12) umount (id=10) <= the bug doesn't write latest ID mount (id=10) write transaction (id=11) crash mount [recovery process] transaction (id=11) transaction (id=12) <= valid transaction ID, but old commit must not replay Like above, this bug become the cause of recovery failure, or FS corruption. So why ->j_tail_sequence doesn't point latest ID? Because if checkpoint transactions was reclaimed by memory pressure (i.e. bdev_try_to_free_page()), then ->j_tail_sequence is not updated. (And another case is, __jbd2_journal_clean_checkpoint_list() is called with empty transaction.) So in above cases, ->j_tail_sequence is not pointing latest transaction ID at umount path. Plus, REQ_FLUSH for checkpoint is not done too. So, to fix this problem with minimum changes, this patch updates ->j_tail_sequence, and issue REQ_FLUSH. (With more complex changes, some optimizations would be possible to avoid unnecessary REQ_FLUSH for example though.) BTW, journal->j_tail_sequence = ++journal->j_transaction_sequence; Increment of ->j_transaction_sequence seems to be unnecessary, but ext3 does this. Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16ovl: fix getcwd() failure after unsuccessful rmdirRui Wang
commit ce9113bbcbf45a57c082d6603b9a9f342be3ef74 upstream. ovl_remove_upper() should do d_drop() only after it successfully removes the dir, otherwise a subsequent getcwd() system call will fail, breaking userspace programs. This is to fix: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110491 Signed-off-by: Rui Wang <rui.y.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16ovl: copy new uid/gid into overlayfs runtime inodeKonstantin Khlebnikov
commit b81de061fa59f17d2730aabb1b84419ef3913810 upstream. Overlayfs must update uid/gid after chown, otherwise functions like inode_owner_or_capable() will check user against stale uid. Catched by xfstests generic/087, it chowns file and calls utimes. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16userfaultfd: don't block on the last VM updates at exit timeLinus Torvalds
commit 39680f50ae54cbbb6e72ac38b8329dd3eb9105f4 upstream. The exit path will do some final updates to the VM of an exiting process to inform others of the fact that the process is going away. That happens, for example, for robust futex state cleanup, but also if the parent has asked for a TID update when the process exits (we clear the child tid field in user space). However, at the time we do those final VM accesses, we've already stopped accepting signals, so the usual "stop waiting for userfaults on signal" code in fs/userfaultfd.c no longer works, and the process can become an unkillable zombie waiting for something that will never happen. To solve this, just make handle_userfault() abort any user fault handling if we're already in the exit path past the signal handling state being dead (marked by PF_EXITING). This VM special case is pretty ugly, and it is possible that we should look at finalizing signals later (or move the VM final accesses earlier). But in the meantime this is a fairly minimally intrusive fix. Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16ovl: fix working on distributed fs as lower layerKonstantin Khlebnikov
commit b5891cfab08fe3144a616e8e734df7749fb3b7d0 upstream. This adds missing .d_select_inode into alternative dentry_operations. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Fixes: 7c03b5d45b8e ("ovl: allow distributed fs as lower layer") Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay") Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16ovl: ignore lower entries when checking purity of non-directory entriesKonstantin Khlebnikov
commit 45d11738969633ec07ca35d75d486bf2d8918df6 upstream. After rename file dentry still holds reference to lower dentry from previous location. This doesn't matter for data access because data comes from upper dentry. But this stale lower dentry taints dentry at new location and turns it into non-pure upper. Such file leaves visible whiteout entry after remove in directory which shouldn't have whiteouts at all. Overlayfs already tracks pureness of file location in oe->opaque. This patch just uses that for detecting actual path type. Comment from Vivek Goyal's patch: Here are the details of the problem. Do following. $ mkdir upper lower work merged upper/dir/ $ touch lower/test $ sudo mount -t overlay overlay -olowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir= work merged $ mv merged/test merged/dir/ $ rm merged/dir/test $ ls -l merged/dir/ /usr/bin/ls: cannot access merged/dir/test: No such file or directory total 0 c????????? ? ? ? ? ? test Basic problem seems to be that once a file has been unlinked, a whiteout has been left behind which was not needed and hence it becomes visible. Whiteout is visible because parent dir is of not type MERGE, hence od->is_real is set during ovl_dir_open(). And that means ovl_iterate() passes on iterate handling directly to underlying fs. Underlying fs does not know/filter whiteouts so it becomes visible to user. Why did we leave a whiteout to begin with when we should not have. ovl_do_remove() checks for OVL_TYPE_PURE_UPPER() and does not leave whiteout if file is pure upper. In this case file is not found to be pure upper hence whiteout is left. So why file was not PURE_UPPER in this case? I think because dentry is still carrying some leftover state which was valid before rename. For example, od->numlower was set to 1 as it was a lower file. After rename, this state is not valid anymore as there is no such file in lower. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Reported-by: Viktor Stanchev <me@viktorstanchev.com> Suggested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109611 Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16ncpfs: fix a braino in OOM handling in ncp_fill_cache()Al Viro
commit 803c00123a8012b3a283c0530910653973ef6d8f upstream. Failing to allocate an inode for child means that cache for *parent* is incompletely populated. So it's parent directory inode ('dir') that needs NCPI_DIR_CACHE flag removed, *not* the child inode ('inode', which is what we'd failed to allocate in the first place). Fucked-up-in: commit 5e993e25 ("ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense") Fucked-up-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-16jffs2: reduce the breakage on recovery from halfway failed rename()Al Viro
commit f93812846f31381d35c04c6c577d724254355e7f upstream. d_instantiate(new_dentry, old_inode) is absolutely wrong thing to do - it will oops if new_dentry used to be positive, for starters. What we need is d_invalidate() the target and be done with that. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09Fix directory hardlinks from deleted directoriesDavid Woodhouse
commit be629c62a603e5935f8177fd8a19e014100a259e upstream. When a directory is deleted, we don't take too much care about killing off all the dirents that belong to it — on the basis that on remount, the scan will conclude that the directory is dead anyway. This doesn't work though, when the deleted directory contained a child directory which was moved *out*. In the early stages of the fs build we can then end up with an apparent hard link, with the child directory appearing both in its true location, and as a child of the original directory which are this stage of the mount process we don't *yet* know is defunct. To resolve this, take out the early special-casing of the "directories shall not have hard links" rule in jffs2_build_inode_pass1(), and let the normal nlink processing happen for directories as well as other inodes. Then later in the build process we can set ic->pino_nlink to the parent inode#, as is required for directories during normal operaton, instead of the nlink. And complain only *then* about hard links which are still in evidence even after killing off all the unreachable paths. Reported-by: Liu Song <liu.song11@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09jffs2: Fix page lock / f->sem deadlockDavid Woodhouse
commit 49e91e7079febe59a20ca885a87dd1c54240d0f1 upstream. With this fix, all code paths should now be obtaining the page lock before f->sem. Reported-by: Szabó Tamás <sztomi89@gmail.com> Tested-by: Thomas Betker <thomas.betker@rohde-schwarz.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09Revert "jffs2: Fix lock acquisition order bug in jffs2_write_begin"Thomas Betker
commit 157078f64b8a9cd7011b6b900b2f2498df850748 upstream. This reverts commit 5ffd3412ae55 ("jffs2: Fix lock acquisition order bug in jffs2_write_begin"). The commit modified jffs2_write_begin() to remove a deadlock with jffs2_garbage_collect_live(), but this introduced new deadlocks found by multiple users. page_lock() actually has to be called before mutex_lock(&c->alloc_sem) or mutex_lock(&f->sem) because jffs2_write_end() and jffs2_readpage() are called with the page locked, and they acquire c->alloc_sem and f->sem, resp. In other words, the lock order in jffs2_write_begin() was correct, and it is the jffs2_garbage_collect_live() path that has to be changed. Revert the commit to get rid of the new deadlocks, and to clear the way for a better fix of the original deadlock. Reported-by: Deng Chao <deng.chao1@zte.com.cn> Reported-by: Ming Liu <liu.ming50@gmail.com> Reported-by: wangzaiwei <wangzaiwei@top-vision.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Betker <thomas.betker@rohde-schwarz.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09Btrfs: fix loading of orphan roots leading to BUG_ONFilipe Manana
commit 909c3a22da3b8d2cfd3505ca5658f0176859d400 upstream. When looking for orphan roots during mount we can end up hitting a BUG_ON() (at root-item.c:btrfs_find_orphan_roots()) if a log tree is replayed and qgroups are enabled. This is because after a log tree is replayed, a transaction commit is made, which triggers qgroup extent accounting which in turn does backref walking which ends up reading and inserting all roots in the radix tree fs_info->fs_root_radix, including orphan roots (deleted snapshots). So after the log tree is replayed, when finding orphan roots we hit the BUG_ON with the following trace: [118209.182438] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [118209.183279] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:314! [118209.184074] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [118209.185123] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod crc32c_generic ppdev xor raid6_pq evdev sg parport_pc parport acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis tpm psmouse processor i2c_piix4 serio_raw pcspkr i2c_core button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod e1000 floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [118209.186318] CPU: 14 PID: 28428 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.5.0-rc5-btrfs-next-24+ #1 [118209.186318] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [118209.186318] task: ffff8801ec131040 ti: ffff8800af34c000 task.ti: ffff8800af34c000 [118209.186318] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa04237d7>] [<ffffffffa04237d7>] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1fc/0x244 [btrfs] [118209.186318] RSP: 0018:ffff8800af34faa8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [118209.186318] RAX: 00000000ffffffef RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: 0000000000000001 [118209.186318] RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [118209.186318] RBP: ffff8800af34fb08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [118209.186318] R10: ffff8800af34f9f0 R11: 6db6db6db6db6db7 R12: ffff880171b97000 [118209.186318] R13: ffff8801ca9d65e0 R14: ffff8800afa2e000 R15: 0000160000000000 [118209.186318] FS: 00007f5bcb914840(0000) GS:ffff88023edc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [118209.186318] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [118209.186318] CR2: 00007f5bcaceb5d9 CR3: 00000000b49b5000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [118209.186318] Stack: [118209.186318] fffffbffffffffff 010230ffffffffff 0101000000000000 ff84000000000000 [118209.186318] fbffffffffffffff 30ffffffffffffff 0000000000000101 ffff880082348000 [118209.186318] 0000000000000000 ffff8800afa2e000 ffff8800afa2e000 0000000000000000 [118209.186318] Call Trace: [118209.186318] [<ffffffffa042e2db>] open_ctree+0x1e37/0x21b9 [btrfs] [118209.186318] [<ffffffffa040a753>] btrfs_mount+0x97e/0xaed [btrfs] [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8108e1c0>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8117b87e>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81192d2b>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [118209.186318] [<ffffffffa0409f81>] btrfs_mount+0x1ac/0xaed [btrfs] [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8108e1c0>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8108c26b>] ? lockdep_init_map+0xb9/0x1b3 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8117b87e>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81192d2b>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81195637>] do_mount+0x8a6/0x9e8 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8119598d>] SyS_mount+0x77/0x9f [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81493017>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6b [118209.186318] Code: 64 00 00 85 c0 89 c3 75 24 f0 41 80 4c 24 20 20 49 8b bc 24 f0 01 00 00 4c 89 e6 e8 e8 65 00 00 85 c0 89 c3 74 11 83 f8 ef 75 02 <0f> 0b 4c 89 e7 e8 da 72 00 00 eb 1c 41 83 bc 24 00 01 00 00 00 [118209.186318] RIP [<ffffffffa04237d7>] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1fc/0x244 [btrfs] [118209.186318] RSP <ffff8800af34faa8> [118209.230735] ---[ end trace 83938f987d85d477 ]--- So fix this by not treating the error -EEXIST, returned when attempting to insert a root already inserted by the backref walking code, as an error. The following test case for xfstests reproduces the bug: seq=`basename $0` seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq echo "QA output created by $seq" tmp=/tmp/$$ status=1 # failure is the default! trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15 _cleanup() { _cleanup_flakey cd / rm -f $tmp.* } # get standard environment, filters and checks . ./common/rc . ./common/filter . ./common/dmflakey # real QA test starts here _supported_fs btrfs _supported_os Linux _require_scratch _require_dm_target flakey _require_metadata_journaling $SCRATCH_DEV rm -f $seqres.full _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1 _init_flakey _mount_flakey _run_btrfs_util_prog quota enable $SCRATCH_MNT # Create 2 directories with one file in one of them. # We use these just to trigger a transaction commit later, moving the file from # directory a to directory b and doing an fsync against directory a. mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/a mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/b touch $SCRATCH_MNT/a/f sync # Create our test file with 2 4K extents. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 8K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_xfs_io # Create a snapshot and delete it. This doesn't really delete the snapshot # immediately, just makes it inaccessible and invisible to user space, the # snapshot is deleted later by a dedicated kernel thread (cleaner kthread) # which is woke up at the next transaction commit. # A root orphan item is inserted into the tree of tree roots, so that if a # power failure happens before the dedicated kernel thread does the snapshot # deletion, the next time the filesystem is mounted it resumes the snapshot # deletion. _run_btrfs_util_prog subvolume snapshot $SCRATCH_MNT $SCRATCH_MNT/snap _run_btrfs_util_prog subvolume delete $SCRATCH_MNT/snap # Now overwrite half of the extents we wrote before. Because we made a snapshpot # before, which isn't really deleted yet (since no transaction commit happened # after we did the snapshot delete request), the non overwritten extents get # referenced twice, once by the default subvolume and once by the snapshot. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 4K 8K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_xfs_io # Now move file f from directory a to directory b and fsync directory a. # The fsync on the directory a triggers a transaction commit (because a file # was moved from it to another directory) and the file fsync leaves a log tree # with file extent items to replay. mv $SCRATCH_MNT/a/f $SCRATCH_MNT/a/b $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/a $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar echo "File digest before power failure:" md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_scratch # Now simulate a power failure and mount the filesystem to replay the log tree. # After the log tree was replayed, we used to hit a BUG_ON() when processing # the root orphan item for the deleted snapshot. This is because when processing # an orphan root the code expected to be the first code inserting the root into # the fs_info->fs_root_radix radix tree, while in reallity it was the second # caller attempting to do it - the first caller was the transaction commit that # took place after replaying the log tree, when updating the qgroup counters. _flakey_drop_and_remount echo "File digest before after failure:" # Must match what he got before the power failure. md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_scratch _unmount_flakey status=0 exit Fixes: 2d9e97761087 ("Btrfs: use btrfs_get_fs_root in resolve_indirect_ref") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09writeback: flush inode cgroup wb switches instead of pinning super_blockTejun Heo
commit a1a0e23e49037c23ea84bc8cc146a03584d13577 upstream. If cgroup writeback is in use, inodes can be scheduled for asynchronous wb switching. Before 5ff8eaac1636 ("writeback: keep superblock pinned during cgroup writeback association switches"), this could race with umount leading to super_block being destroyed while inodes are pinned for wb switching. 5ff8eaac1636 fixed it by bumping s_active while wb switches are in flight; however, this allowed in-flight wb switches to make umounts asynchronous when the userland expected synchronosity - e.g. fsck immediately following umount may fail because the device is still busy. This patch removes the problematic super_block pinning and instead makes generic_shutdown_super() flush in-flight wb switches. wb switches are now executed on a dedicated isw_wq so that they can be flushed and isw_nr_in_flight keeps track of the number of in-flight wb switches so that flushing can be avoided in most cases. v2: Move cgroup_writeback_umount() further below and add MS_ACTIVE check in inode_switch_wbs() as Jan an Al suggested. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CAAeU0aNCq7LGODvVGRU-oU_o-6enii5ey0p1c26D1ZzYwkDc5A@mail.gmail.com Fixes: 5ff8eaac1636 ("writeback: keep superblock pinned during cgroup writeback association switches") Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Tested-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09Fix cifs_uniqueid_to_ino_t() function for s390xYadan Fan
commit 1ee9f4bd1a97026a7b2d7ae9f1f74b45680d0003 upstream. This issue is caused by commit 02323db17e3a7 ("cifs: fix cifs_uniqueid_to_ino_t not to ever return 0"), when BITS_PER_LONG is 64 on s390x, the corresponding cifs_uniqueid_to_ino_t() function will cast 64-bit fileid to 32-bit by using (ino_t)fileid, because ino_t (typdefed __kernel_ino_t) is int type. It's defined in arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/posix_types.h #ifndef __s390x__ typedef unsigned long __kernel_ino_t; ... #else /* __s390x__ */ typedef unsigned int __kernel_ino_t; So the #ifdef condition is wrong for s390x, we can just still use one cifs_uniqueid_to_ino_t() function with comparing sizeof(ino_t) and sizeof(u64) to choose the correct execution accordingly. Signed-off-by: Yadan Fan <ydfan@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09CIFS: Fix SMB2+ interim response processing for read requestsPavel Shilovsky
commit 6cc3b24235929b54acd5ecc987ef11a425bd209e upstream. For interim responses we only need to parse a header and update a number credits. Now it is done for all SMB2+ command except SMB2_READ which is wrong. Fix this by adding such processing. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09cifs: fix out-of-bounds access in lease parsingJustin Maggard
commit deb7deff2f00bdbbcb3d560dad2a89ef37df837d upstream. When opening a file, SMB2_open() attempts to parse the lease state from the SMB2 CREATE Response. However, the parsing code was not careful to ensure that the create contexts are not empty or invalid, which can lead to out- of-bounds memory access. This can be seen easily by trying to read a file from a OSX 10.11 SMB3 server. Here is sample crash output: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8800a1a77cc6 IP: [<ffffffff8828a734>] SMB2_open+0x804/0x960 PGD 8f77067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2876 Comm: cp Not tainted 4.5.0-rc3.x86_64.1+ #14 Hardware name: NETGEAR ReadyNAS 314 /ReadyNAS 314 , BIOS 4.6.5 10/11/2012 task: ffff880073cdc080 ti: ffff88005b31c000 task.ti: ffff88005b31c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8828a734>] [<ffffffff8828a734>] SMB2_open+0x804/0x960 RSP: 0018:ffff88005b31fa08 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000015 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff88007eb8c8b0 RBP: ffff88005b31fad8 R08: 666666203d206363 R09: 6131613030383866 R10: 3030383866666666 R11: 00000000000002b0 R12: ffff8800660fd800 R13: ffff8800a1a77cc2 R14: 00000000424d53fe R15: ffff88005f5a28c0 FS: 00007f7c8a2897c0(0000) GS:ffff88007eb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: ffff8800a1a77cc6 CR3: 000000005b281000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff88005b31fa70 ffffffff88278789 00000000000001d3 ffff88005f5a2a80 ffffffff00000003 ffff88005d029d00 ffff88006fde05a0 0000000000000000 ffff88005b31fc78 ffff88006fde0780 ffff88005b31fb2f 0000000100000fe0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff88278789>] ? cifsConvertToUTF16+0x159/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8828cf68>] smb2_open_file+0x98/0x210 [<ffffffff8811e80c>] ? __kmalloc+0x1c/0xe0 [<ffffffff882685f4>] cifs_open+0x2a4/0x720 [<ffffffff88122cef>] do_dentry_open+0x1ff/0x310 [<ffffffff88268350>] ? cifsFileInfo_get+0x30/0x30 [<ffffffff88123d92>] vfs_open+0x52/0x60 [<ffffffff88131dd0>] path_openat+0x170/0xf70 [<ffffffff88097d48>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x48/0x50 [<ffffffff88133a29>] do_filp_open+0x79/0xd0 [<ffffffff8813f2ca>] ? __alloc_fd+0x3a/0x170 [<ffffffff881240c4>] do_sys_open+0x114/0x1e0 [<ffffffff881241a9>] SyS_open+0x19/0x20 [<ffffffff8896e257>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a Code: 4d 8d 6c 07 04 31 c0 4c 89 ee e8 47 6f e5 ff 31 c9 41 89 ce 44 89 f1 48 c7 c7 28 b1 bd 88 31 c0 49 01 cd 4c 89 ee e8 2b 6f e5 ff <45> 0f b7 75 04 48 c7 c7 31 b1 bd 88 31 c0 4d 01 ee 4c 89 f6 e8 RIP [<ffffffff8828a734>] SMB2_open+0x804/0x960 RSP <ffff88005b31fa08> CR2: ffff8800a1a77cc6 ---[ end trace d9f69ba64feee469 ]--- Signed-off-by: Justin Maggard <jmaggard@netgear.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09btrfs: async-thread: Fix a use-after-free error for traceQu Wenruo
commit 0a95b851370b84a4b9d92ee6d1fa0926901d0454 upstream. Parameter of trace_btrfs_work_queued() can be freed in its workqueue. So no one use use that pointer after queue_work(). Fix the user-after-free bug by move the trace line before queue_work(). Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09btrfs: Fix no_space in write and rm loopZhao Lei
commit e1746e8381cd2af421f75557b5cae3604fc18b35 upstream. I see no_space in v4.4-rc1 again in xfstests generic/102. It happened randomly in some node only. (one of 4 phy-node, and a kvm with non-virtio block driver) By bisect, we can found the first-bad is: commit bdced438acd8 ("block: setup bi_phys_segments after splitting")' But above patch only triggered the bug by making bio operation faster(or slower). Main reason is in our space_allocating code, we need to commit page writeback before wait it complish, this patch fixed above bug. BTW, there is another reason for generic/102 fail, caused by disable default mixed-blockgroup, I'll fix it in xfstests. Signed-off-by: Zhao Lei <zhaolei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09Btrfs: fix deadlock running delayed iputs at transaction commit timeFilipe Manana
commit c2d6cb1636d235257086f939a8194ef0bf93af6e upstream. While running a stress test I ran into a deadlock when running the delayed iputs at transaction time, which produced the following report and trace: [ 886.399989] ============================================= [ 886.400871] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 886.401663] 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 Not tainted [ 886.402384] --------------------------------------------- [ 886.403182] fio/8277 is trying to acquire lock: [ 886.403568] (&fs_info->delayed_iput_sem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffffa0538823>] btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x36/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] but task is already holding lock: [ 886.403568] (&fs_info->delayed_iput_sem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffffa0538823>] btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x36/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] other info that might help us debug this: [ 886.403568] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] CPU0 [ 886.403568] ---- [ 886.403568] lock(&fs_info->delayed_iput_sem); [ 886.403568] lock(&fs_info->delayed_iput_sem); [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] 3 locks held by fio/8277: [ 886.403568] #0: (sb_writers#11){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81174c4c>] __sb_start_write+0x5f/0xb0 [ 886.403568] #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa054620d>] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x73/0x408 [btrfs] [ 886.403568] #2: (&fs_info->delayed_iput_sem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffffa0538823>] btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x36/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.403568] [ 886.403568] stack backtrace: [ 886.403568] CPU: 6 PID: 8277 Comm: fio Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [ 886.403568] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 886.403568] 0000000000000000 ffff88009f80f770 ffffffff8125d4fd ffffffff82af1fc0 [ 886.403568] ffff88009f80f830 ffffffff8108e5f9 0000000200000000 ffff88009fd92290 [ 886.403568] 0000000000000000 ffffffff82af1fc0 ffffffff829cfb01 00042b216d008804 [ 886.403568] Call Trace: [ 886.403568] [<ffffffff8125d4fd>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x79 [ 886.403568] [<ffffffff8108e5f9>] __lock_acquire+0xd42/0xf0b [ 886.403568] [<ffffffff810c22db>] ? __module_address+0xdf/0x108 [ 886.403568] [<ffffffff8108eb77>] lock_acquire+0x10d/0x194 [ 886.403568] [<ffffffff8108eb77>] ? lock_acquire+0x10d/0x194 [ 886.403568] [<ffffffffa0538823>] ? btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x36/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff8148556b>] down_read+0x3e/0x4d [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0538823>] ? btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x36/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0538823>] btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x36/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0533953>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8f5/0x96e [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0521d7a>] flush_space+0x435/0x44a [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa052218b>] ? reserve_metadata_bytes+0x26a/0x384 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa05221ae>] reserve_metadata_bytes+0x28d/0x384 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa052256c>] ? btrfs_block_rsv_refill+0x58/0x96 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0522584>] btrfs_block_rsv_refill+0x70/0x96 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa053d747>] btrfs_evict_inode+0x394/0x55a [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff81188e31>] evict+0xa7/0x15c [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff81189878>] iput+0x1d3/0x266 [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa053887c>] btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x8f/0xbf [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0533953>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8f5/0x96e [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff81085096>] ? signal_pending_state+0x31/0x31 [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0521191>] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x1d7/0x288 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa0521282>] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x40/0x59 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa05228f5>] btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x1e/0x4e [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa053620a>] btrfs_direct_IO+0x10c/0x27e [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff8111d9a1>] generic_file_direct_write+0xb3/0x128 [ 886.489542] [<ffffffffa05463c3>] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x229/0x408 [btrfs] [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff8108ae38>] ? __lock_is_held+0x38/0x50 [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff8117279e>] __vfs_write+0x7c/0xa5 [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff81172cda>] vfs_write+0xa0/0xe4 [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff811734cc>] SyS_write+0x50/0x7e [ 886.489542] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [ 1081.852335] INFO: task fio:8244 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1081.854348] Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [ 1081.857560] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1081.863227] fio D ffff880213f9bb28 0 8244 8240 0x00000000 [ 1081.868719] ffff880213f9bb28 00ffffff810fc6b0 ffffffff0000000a ffff88023ed55240 [ 1081.872499] ffff880206b5d400 ffff880213f9c000 ffff88020a4d5318 ffff880206b5d400 [ 1081.876834] ffffffff00000001 ffff880206b5d400 ffff880213f9bb40 ffffffff81482ba4 [ 1081.880782] Call Trace: [ 1081.881793] [<ffffffff81482ba4>] schedule+0x7f/0x97 [ 1081.883340] [<ffffffff81485eb5>] rwsem_down_write_failed+0x2d5/0x325 [ 1081.895525] [<ffffffff8108d48d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x1ab [ 1081.897419] [<ffffffff81269723>] call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x13/0x20 [ 1081.899251] [<ffffffff81269723>] ? call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x13/0x20 [ 1081.901063] [<ffffffff81089fae>] ? __down_write_nested.isra.0+0x1f/0x21 [ 1081.902365] [<ffffffff814855bd>] down_write+0x43/0x57 [ 1081.903846] [<ffffffffa05211b0>] ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x1f6/0x288 [btrfs] [ 1081.906078] [<ffffffffa05211b0>] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x1f6/0x288 [btrfs] [ 1081.908846] [<ffffffff8108d461>] ? mark_held_locks+0x56/0x6c [ 1081.910409] [<ffffffffa0521282>] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x40/0x59 [btrfs] [ 1081.912482] [<ffffffffa05228f5>] btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x1e/0x4e [btrfs] [ 1081.914597] [<ffffffffa053620a>] btrfs_direct_IO+0x10c/0x27e [btrfs] [ 1081.919037] [<ffffffff8111d9a1>] generic_file_direct_write+0xb3/0x128 [ 1081.920754] [<ffffffffa05463c3>] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x229/0x408 [btrfs] [ 1081.922496] [<ffffffff8108ae38>] ? __lock_is_held+0x38/0x50 [ 1081.923922] [<ffffffff8117279e>] __vfs_write+0x7c/0xa5 [ 1081.925275] [<ffffffff81172cda>] vfs_write+0xa0/0xe4 [ 1081.926584] [<ffffffff811734cc>] SyS_write+0x50/0x7e [ 1081.927968] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [ 1081.985293] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 1081.986132] INFO: task fio:8249 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1081.987434] Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [ 1081.988534] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1081.990147] fio D ffff880218febbb8 0 8249 8240 0x00000000 [ 1081.991626] ffff880218febbb8 00ffffff81486b8e ffff88020000000b ffff88023ed75240 [ 1081.993258] ffff8802120a9a00 ffff880218fec000 ffff88020a4d5318 ffff8802120a9a00 [ 1081.994850] ffffffff00000001 ffff8802120a9a00 ffff880218febbd0 ffffffff81482ba4 [ 1081.996485] Call Trace: [ 1081.997037] [<ffffffff81482ba4>] schedule+0x7f/0x97 [ 1081.998017] [<ffffffff81485eb5>] rwsem_down_write_failed+0x2d5/0x325 [ 1081.999241] [<ffffffff810852a5>] ? finish_wait+0x6d/0x76 [ 1082.000306] [<ffffffff81269723>] call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x13/0x20 [ 1082.001533] [<ffffffff81269723>] ? call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x13/0x20 [ 1082.002776] [<ffffffff81089fae>] ? __down_write_nested.isra.0+0x1f/0x21 [ 1082.003995] [<ffffffff814855bd>] down_write+0x43/0x57 [ 1082.005000] [<ffffffffa05211b0>] ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x1f6/0x288 [btrfs] [ 1082.007403] [<ffffffffa05211b0>] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x1f6/0x288 [btrfs] [ 1082.008988] [<ffffffffa0545064>] btrfs_fallocate+0x7c1/0xc2f [btrfs] [ 1082.010193] [<ffffffff8108a1ba>] ? percpu_down_read+0x4e/0x77 [ 1082.011280] [<ffffffff81174c4c>] ? __sb_start_write+0x5f/0xb0 [ 1082.012265] [<ffffffff81174c4c>] ? __sb_start_write+0x5f/0xb0 [ 1082.013021] [<ffffffff811712e4>] vfs_fallocate+0x170/0x1ff [ 1082.013738] [<ffffffff81181ebb>] ioctl_preallocate+0x89/0x9b [ 1082.014778] [<ffffffff811822d7>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x40a/0x4ea [ 1082.015778] [<ffffffff81176ea7>] ? SYSC_newfstat+0x25/0x2e [ 1082.016806] [<ffffffff8118b4de>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x71 [ 1082.017789] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [ 1082.018706] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f This happens because we can recursively acquire the semaphore fs_info->delayed_iput_sem when attempting to allocate space to satisfy a file write request as shown in the first trace above - when committing a transaction we acquire (down_read) the semaphore before running the delayed iputs, and when running a delayed iput() we can end up calling an inode's eviction handler, which in turn commits another transaction and attempts to acquire (down_read) again the semaphore to run more delayed iput operations. This results in a deadlock because if a task acquires multiple times a semaphore it should invoke down_read_nested() with a different lockdep class for each level of recursion. Fix this by simplifying the implementation and use a mutex instead that is acquired by the cleaner kthread before it runs the delayed iputs instead of always acquiring a semaphore before delayed references are run from anywhere. Fixes: d7c151717a1e (btrfs: Fix NO_SPACE bug caused by delayed-iput) Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-09use ->d_seq to get coherency between ->d_inode and ->d_flagsAl Viro
commit a528aca7f359f4b0b1d72ae406097e491a5ba9ea upstream. Games with ordering and barriers are way too brittle. Just bump ->d_seq before and after updating ->d_inode and ->d_flags type bits, so that verifying ->d_seq would guarantee they are coherent. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03hpfs: don't truncate the file when delete failsMikulas Patocka
commit b6853f78e763d42c7a158d8de3549c9827c604ab upstream. The delete opration can allocate additional space on the HPFS filesystem due to btree split. The HPFS driver checks in advance if there is available space, so that it won't corrupt the btree if we run out of space during splitting. If there is not enough available space, the HPFS driver attempted to truncate the file, but this results in a deadlock since the commit 7dd29d8d865efdb00c0542a5d2c87af8c52ea6c7 ("HPFS: Introduce a global mutex and lock it on every callback from VFS"). This patch removes the code that tries to truncate the file and -ENOSPC is returned instead. If the user hits -ENOSPC on delete, he should try to delete other files (that are stored in a leaf btree node), so that the delete operation will make some space for deleting the file stored in non-leaf btree node. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03do_last(): ELOOP failure exit should be done after leaving RCU modeAl Viro
commit 5129fa482b16615fd4464d2f5d23acb1b7056c66 upstream. ... or we risk seeing a bogus value of d_is_symlink() there. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03should_follow_link(): validate ->d_seq after having decided to followAl Viro
commit a7f775428b8f5808815c0e3004020cedb94cbe3b upstream. ... otherwise d_is_symlink() above might have nothing to do with the inode value we've got. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03do_last(): don't let a bogus return value from ->open() et.al. to confuse usAl Viro
commit c80567c82ae4814a41287618e315a60ecf513be6 upstream. ... into returning a positive to path_openat(), which would interpret that as "symlink had been encountered" and proceed to corrupt memory, etc. It can only happen due to a bug in some ->open() instance or in some LSM hook, etc., so we report any such event *and* make sure it doesn't trick us into further unpleasantness. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03NFSv4: Fix a dentry leak on alias useBenjamin Coddington
commit d9dfd8d741683347ee159d25f5b50c346a0df557 upstream. In the case where d_add_unique() finds an appropriate alias to use it will have already incremented the reference count. An additional dget() to swap the open context's dentry is unnecessary and will leak a reference. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Fixes: 275bb307865a3 ("NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-...") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03block: fix use-after-free in dio_bio_completeMike Krinkin
commit 7ddc971f86aa0a4cee9f6886c356a052461957ae upstream. kasan reported the following error when i ran xfstest: [ 701.826854] ================================================================== [ 701.826864] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dio_bio_complete+0x41a/0x600 at addr ffff880080b95f94 [ 701.826870] Read of size 4 by task loop2/3874 [ 701.826879] page:ffffea000202e540 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 [ 701.826890] flags: 0x100000000000000() [ 701.826895] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 701.826904] CPU: 3 PID: 3874 Comm: loop2 Tainted: G B W L 4.5.0-rc1-next-20160129 #83 [ 701.826910] Hardware name: LENOVO 23205NG/23205NG, BIOS G2ET95WW (2.55 ) 07/09/2013 [ 701.826917] ffff88008fadf800 ffff88008fadf758 ffffffff81ca67bb 0000000041b58ab3 [ 701.826941] ffffffff830d1e74 ffffffff81ca6724 ffff88008fadf748 ffffffff8161c05c [ 701.826963] 0000000000000282 ffff88008fadf800 ffffed0010172bf2 ffffea000202e540 [ 701.826987] Call Trace: [ 701.826997] [<ffffffff81ca67bb>] dump_stack+0x97/0xdc [ 701.827005] [<ffffffff81ca6724>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4 [ 701.827014] [<ffffffff8161c05c>] ? __dump_page+0x32c/0x490 [ 701.827023] [<ffffffff816b0d03>] kasan_report_error+0x5f3/0x8b0 [ 701.827033] [<ffffffff817c302a>] ? dio_bio_complete+0x41a/0x600 [ 701.827040] [<ffffffff816b1119>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x59/0x80 [ 701.827048] [<ffffffff817c302a>] ? dio_bio_complete+0x41a/0x600 [ 701.827053] [<ffffffff817c302a>] dio_bio_complete+0x41a/0x600 [ 701.827057] [<ffffffff81bd19c8>] ? blk_queue_exit+0x108/0x270 [ 701.827060] [<ffffffff817c32b0>] dio_bio_end_aio+0xa0/0x4d0 [ 701.827063] [<ffffffff817c3210>] ? dio_bio_complete+0x600/0x600 [ 701.827067] [<ffffffff81bd2806>] ? blk_account_io_completion+0x316/0x5d0 [ 701.827070] [<ffffffff81bafe89>] bio_endio+0x79/0x200 [ 701.827074] [<ffffffff81bd2c9f>] blk_update_request+0x1df/0xc50 [ 701.827078] [<ffffffff81c02c27>] blk_mq_end_request+0x57/0x120 [ 701.827081] [<ffffffff81c03670>] __blk_mq_complete_request+0x310/0x590 [ 701.827084] [<ffffffff812348d8>] ? set_next_entity+0x2f8/0x2ed0 [ 701.827088] [<ffffffff8124b34d>] ? put_prev_entity+0x22d/0x2a70 [ 701.827091] [<ffffffff81c0394b>] blk_mq_complete_request+0x5b/0x80 [ 701.827094] [<ffffffff821e2a33>] loop_queue_work+0x273/0x19d0 [ 701.827098] [<ffffffff811f6578>] ? finish_task_switch+0x1c8/0x8e0 [ 701.827101] [<ffffffff8129d058>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x18/0x6c0 [ 701.827104] [<ffffffff821e27c0>] ? lo_read_simple+0x890/0x890 [ 701.827108] [<ffffffff8129dd60>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x350/0x350 [ 701.827111] [<ffffffff811f63b0>] ? __hrtick_start+0x130/0x130 [ 701.827115] [<ffffffff82a0c8f6>] ? __schedule+0x936/0x20b0 [ 701.827118] [<ffffffff811dd6bd>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x3ed/0x8d0 [ 701.827121] [<ffffffff811dd4ed>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x21d/0x8d0 [ 701.827125] [<ffffffff8129d058>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x18/0x6c0 [ 701.827128] [<ffffffff811dd57f>] kthread_worker_fn+0x2af/0x8d0 [ 701.827132] [<ffffffff811dd2d0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x170/0x170 [ 701.827135] [<ffffffff82a1ea46>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x60 [ 701.827138] [<ffffffff811dd2d0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x170/0x170 [ 701.827141] [<ffffffff811dd2d0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x170/0x170 [ 701.827144] [<ffffffff811dd00b>] kthread+0x24b/0x3a0 [ 701.827148] [<ffffffff811dcdc0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 701.827151] [<ffffffff8129d70d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 701.827155] [<ffffffff8116d41d>] ? do_group_exit+0xdd/0x350 [ 701.827158] [<ffffffff811dcdc0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 701.827161] [<ffffffff82a1f52f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 701.827165] [<ffffffff811dcdc0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 701.827167] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 701.827170] ffff880080b95e80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 701.827172] ffff880080b95f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 701.827175] >ffff880080b95f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 701.827177] ^ [ 701.827179] ffff880080b96000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 701.827182] ffff880080b96080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 701.827183] ================================================================== The problem is that bio_check_pages_dirty calls bio_put, so we must not access bio fields after bio_check_pages_dirty. Fixes: 9b81c842355ac96097ba ("block: don't access bio->bi_error after bio_put()"). Signed-off-by: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03writeback: keep superblock pinned during cgroup writeback association switchesTejun Heo
commit 5ff8eaac1636bf6deae86491f4818c4c69d1a9ac upstream. If cgroup writeback is in use, an inode is associated with a cgroup for writeback. If the inode's main dirtier changes to another cgroup, the association gets updated asynchronously. Nothing was pinning the superblock while such switches are in progress and superblock could go away while async switching is pending or in progress leading to crashes like the following. kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:319! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC CPU: 1 PID: 29158 Comm: kworker/1:10 Not tainted 4.5.0-rc3 #51 Hardware name: Google Google, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events inode_switch_wbs_work_fn task: ffff880213dbbd40 ti: ffff880209264000 task.ti: ffff880209264000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff803e6922>] [<ffffffff803e6922>] start_this_handle+0x382/0x3e0 RSP: 0018:ffff880209267c30 EFLAGS: 00010202 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff803e6be4>] jbd2__journal_start+0xf4/0x190 [<ffffffff803cfc7e>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x4e/0x70 [<ffffffff803b31ec>] ext4_evict_inode+0x12c/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8035338b>] evict+0xbb/0x190 [<ffffffff80354190>] iput+0x130/0x190 [<ffffffff80360223>] inode_switch_wbs_work_fn+0x343/0x4c0 [<ffffffff80279819>] process_one_work+0x129/0x300 [<ffffffff80279b16>] worker_thread+0x126/0x480 [<ffffffff8027ed14>] kthread+0xc4/0xe0 [<ffffffff809771df>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 Fix it by bumping s_active while cgroup association switching is in flight. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-and-tested-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CAAeU0aNCq7LGODvVGRU-oU_o-6enii5ey0p1c26D1ZzYwkDc5A@mail.gmail.com Fixes: d10c80955265 ("writeback: implement foreign cgroup inode bdi_writeback switching") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03namei: ->d_inode of a pinned dentry is stable only for positivesAl Viro
commit d4565649b6d6923369112758212b851adc407f0c upstream. both do_last() and walk_component() risk picking a NULL inode out of dentry about to become positive, *then* checking its flags and seeing that it's not negative anymore and using (already stale by then) value they'd fetched earlier. Usually ends up oopsing soon after that... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03locks: fix unlock when fcntl_setlk races with a closeJeff Layton
commit 7f3697e24dc3820b10f445a4a7d914fc356012d1 upstream. Dmitry reported that he was able to reproduce the WARN_ON_ONCE that fires in locks_free_lock_context when the flc_posix list isn't empty. The problem turns out to be that we're basically rebuilding the file_lock from scratch in fcntl_setlk when we discover that the setlk has raced with a close. If the l_whence field is SEEK_CUR or SEEK_END, then we may end up with fl_start and fl_end values that differ from when the lock was initially set, if the file position or length of the file has changed in the interim. Fix this by just reusing the same lock request structure, and simply override fl_type value with F_UNLCK as appropriate. That ensures that we really are unlocking the lock that was initially set. While we're there, make sure that we do pop a WARN_ON_ONCE if the removal ever fails. Also return -EBADF in this event, since that's what we would have returned if the close had happened earlier. Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: c293621bbf67 (stale POSIX lock handling) Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03uml: fix hostfs mknod()Vegard Nossum
commit 9f2dfda2f2f1c6181c3732c16b85c59ab2d195e0 upstream. An inverted return value check in hostfs_mknod() caused the function to return success after handling it as an error (and cleaning up). It resulted in the following segfault when trying to bind() a named unix socket: Pid: 198, comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4 RIP: 0033:[<0000000061077df6>] RSP: 00000000daae5d60 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000006092a460 RCX: 00000000dfc54208 RDX: 0000000061073ef1 RSI: 0000000000000070 RDI: 00000000e027d600 RBP: 00000000daae5de0 R08: 00000000da980ac0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 00007fb1ae08f72a R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000006092a460 R14: 00000000daaa97c0 R15: 00000000daaa9a88 Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x40, ip 0x61077df6 CPU: 0 PID: 198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4 #1 Stack: e027d620 dfc54208 0000006f da981398 61bee000 0000c1ed daae5de0 0000006e e027d620 dfcd4208 00000005 6092a460 Call Trace: [<60dedc67>] SyS_bind+0xf7/0x110 [<600587be>] handle_syscall+0x7e/0x80 [<60066ad7>] userspace+0x3e7/0x4e0 [<6006321f>] ? save_registers+0x1f/0x40 [<6006c88e>] ? arch_prctl+0x1be/0x1f0 [<60054985>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90 Let's also get rid of the "cosmic ray protection" while we're at it. Fixes: e9193059b1b3 "hostfs: fix races in dentry_name() and inode_name()" Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.0.4) at 2025-01-16 01:07:53 +0000