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bpf_async_cb structures.
The following kmemleak splat:
[ 8.105530] kmemleak: Trying to color unknown object at 0xff11000100e918c0 as Black
[ 8.106521] Call Trace:
[ 8.106521] <TASK>
[ 8.106521] dump_stack_lvl+0x4b/0x70
[ 8.106521] kvfree_call_rcu+0xcb/0x3b0
[ 8.106521] ? hrtimer_cancel+0x21/0x40
[ 8.106521] bpf_obj_free_fields+0x193/0x200
[ 8.106521] htab_map_update_elem+0x29c/0x410
[ 8.106521] bpf_prog_cfc8cd0f42c04044_overwrite_cb+0x47/0x4b
[ 8.106521] bpf_prog_8c30cd7c4db2e963_overwrite_timer+0x65/0x86
[ 8.106521] bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0xe1/0x2a0
happens due to the combination of features and fixes, but mainly due to
commit 6d78b4473cdb ("bpf: Tell memcg to use allow_spinning=false path in bpf_timer_init()")
It's using __GFP_HIGH, which instructs slub/kmemleak internals to skip
kmemleak_alloc_recursive() on allocation, so subsequent kfree_rcu()->
kvfree_call_rcu()->kmemleak_ignore() complains with the above splat.
To fix this imbalance, replace bpf_map_kmalloc_node() with
kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_rcu() with call_rcu() + kfree_nolock() to
make sure that the objects allocated with kmalloc_nolock() are freed
with kfree_nolock() rather than the implicit kfree() that kfree_rcu()
uses internally.
Note, the kmalloc_nolock() happens under bpf_spin_lock_irqsave(), so
it will always fail in PREEMPT_RT. This is not an issue at the moment,
since bpf_timers are disabled in PREEMPT_RT. In the future
bpf_spin_lock will be replaced with state machine similar to
bpf_task_work.
Fixes: 6d78b4473cdb ("bpf: Tell memcg to use allow_spinning=false path in bpf_timer_init()")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251015000700.28988-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Yinhao et al. recently reported:
Our fuzzer tool discovered an uninitialized pointer issue in the
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() function within the Linux kernel's BPF subsystem.
This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when a BPF program attempts to
deference the txq member of struct xdp_buff object.
The test initializes two programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: progA acts as the
entry point for bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() and its expected_attach_type can
neither be of be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP nor BPF_XDP_CPUMAP. progA calls into a slot
of a tailcall map it owns. progB's expected_attach_type must be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP
to pass xdp_is_valid_access() validation. The program returns struct xdp_md's
egress_ifindex, and the latter is only allowed to be accessed under mentioned
expected_attach_type. progB is then inserted into the tailcall which progA
calls.
The underlying issue goes beyond XDP though. Another example are programs
of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR. sock_addr_is_valid_access() as well
as sock_addr_func_proto() have different logic depending on the programs'
expected_attach_type. Similarly, a program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME
should not be allowed doing a tailcall into a program which calls bpf_bind()
out of BPF which is only enabled for BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT.
In short, specifying expected_attach_type allows to open up additional
functionality or restrictions beyond what the basic bpf_prog_type enables.
The use of tailcalls must not violate these constraints. Fix it by enforcing
expected_attach_type in __bpf_prog_map_compatible().
Note that we only enforce this for tailcall maps, but not for BPF devmaps or
cpumaps: There, the programs are invoked through dev_map_bpf_prog_run*() and
cpu_map_bpf_prog_run*() which set up a new environment / context and therefore
these situations are not prone to this issue.
Fixes: 5e43f899b03a ("bpf: Check attach type at prog load time")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250926171201.188490-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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./include/linux/bpf.h: crypto/sha2.h is included more than once.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=25501
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250926095240.3397539-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The stacktrace map can be easily full, which will lead to failure in
obtaining the stack. In addition to increasing the size of the map,
another solution is to delete the stack_id after looking it up from
the user, so extend the existing bpf_map_lookup_and_delete_elem()
functionality to stacktrace map types.
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250925175030.1615837-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
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Currently uprobe (BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) program can't write to the
context registers data. While this makes sense for kprobe attachments,
for uprobe attachment it might make sense to be able to change user
space registers to alter application execution.
Since uprobe and kprobe programs share the same type (BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE),
we can't deny write access to context during the program load. We need
to check on it during program attachment to see if it's going to be
kprobe or uprobe.
Storing the program's write attempt to context and checking on it
during the attachment.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250916215301.664963-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, functions with 'union' arguments cannot be traced with
fentry/fexit:
bpftrace -e 'fentry:release_pages { exit(); }' -v
The function release_pages arg0 type UNION is unsupported.
The type of the 'release_pages' arg0 is defined as:
typedef union {
struct page **pages;
struct folio **folios;
struct encoded_page **encoded_pages;
} release_pages_arg __attribute__ ((__transparent_union__));
This patch relaxes the restriction by allowing function arguments of type
'union' to be traced in verifier.
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919044110.23729-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch adds necessary plumbing in verifier, syscall and maps to
support handling new kfunc bpf_task_work_schedule and kernel structure
bpf_task_work. The idea is similar to how we already handle bpf_wq and
bpf_timer.
verifier changes validate calls to bpf_task_work_schedule to make sure
it is safe and expected invariants hold.
btf part is required to detect bpf_task_work structure inside map value
and store its offset, which will be used in the next patch to calculate
key and value addresses.
arraymap and hashtab changes are needed to handle freeing of the
bpf_task_work: run code needed to deinitialize it, for example cancel
task_work callback if possible.
The use of bpf_task_work and proper implementation for kfuncs are
introduced in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250923112404.668720-6-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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No functional changes, except for the addition of the headers for the
kfuncs so that they can be used for signature verification.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-8-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently only array maps are supported, but the implementation can be
extended for other maps and objects. The hash is memoized only for
exclusive and frozen maps as their content is stable until the exclusive
program modifies the map.
This is required for BPF signing, enabling a trusted loader program to
verify a map's integrity. The loader retrieves
the map's runtime hash from the kernel and compares it against an
expected hash computed at build time.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-7-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Exclusive maps allow maps to only be accessed by program with a
program with a matching hash which is specified in the excl_prog_hash
attr.
For the signing use-case, this allows the trusted loader program
to load the map and verify the integrity
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-3-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Exclusive maps restrict map access to specific programs using a hash.
The current hash used for this is SHA1, which is prone to collisions.
This patch uses SHA256, which is more resilient against
collisions. This new hash is stored in bpf_prog and used by the verifier
to determine if a program can access a given exclusive map.
The original 64-bit tags are kept, as they are used by users as a short,
possibly colliding program identifier for non-security purposes.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Begin reporting arena page faults and the faulting address to BPF
program's stderr, this patch adds support in the arm64 and x86-64 JITs,
support for other archs can be added later.
The fault handlers receive the 32 bit address in the arena region so
the upper 32 bits of user_vm_start is added to it before printing the
address. This is what the user would expect to see as this is what is
printed by bpf_printk() is you pass it an address returned by
bpf_arena_alloc_pages();
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250911145808.58042-4-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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BPF streams are only valid for the main programs, to make it easier to
access streams from subprogs, introduce main_prog_aux in struct
bpf_prog_aux.
prog->aux->main_prog_aux = prog->aux, for main programs and
prog->aux->main_prog_aux = main_prog->aux, for subprograms.
Make bpf_prog_find_from_stack() use the added main_prog_aux to return
the mainprog when a subprog is found on the stack.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250911145808.58042-3-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Merge 'skb-meta-dynptr' branch into 'master' branch. No conflict.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Add a dynptr type, similar to skb dynptr, but for the skb metadata access.
The dynptr provides an alternative to __sk_buff->data_meta for accessing
the custom metadata area allocated using the bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() helper.
More importantly, it abstracts away the fact where the storage for the
custom metadata lives, which opens up the way to persist the metadata by
relocating it as the skb travels through the network stack layers.
Writes to skb metadata invalidate any existing skb payload and metadata
slices. While this is more restrictive that needed at the moment, it leaves
the door open to reallocating the metadata on writes, and should be only a
minor inconvenience to the users.
Only the program types which can access __sk_buff->data_meta today are
allowed to create a dynptr for skb metadata at the moment. We need to
modify the network stack to persist the metadata across layers before
opening up access to other BPF hooks.
Once more BPF hooks gain access to skb_meta dynptr, we will also need to
add a read-only variant of the helper similar to
bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly.
skb_meta dynptr ops are stubbed out and implemented by subsequent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jbrandeburg@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250814-skb-metadata-thru-dynptr-v7-1-8a39e636e0fb@cloudflare.com
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Add bpf_struct_ops_id() to enable struct_ops implementors to use
struct_ops map id as the unique id of a struct_ops in their subsystem.
A subsystem that wishes to create a mapping between id and struct_ops
instance pointer can update the mapping accordingly during
bpf_struct_ops::reg(), unreg(), and update().
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250806162540.681679-2-ameryhung@gmail.com
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Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage
can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a
cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program
doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of
the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context
the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the
BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program
uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the
runtime context:
ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx);
storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype];
if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED)
ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0];
else
ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf);
For the second program which was called from the originally attached
one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former
program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result
in an unintended out-of-bounds access.
To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of
storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original
program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or
ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not
using any of the cgroup local storage maps.
Fixes: 7d9c3427894f ("bpf: Make cgroup storages shared between programs on the same cgroup")
Reported-by: Lonial Con <kongln9170@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Move them into bpf.h given we also need them in core code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Given this is only relevant for BPF tail call maps, it is adding up space
and penalizing other map types. We also need to extend this with further
objects to track / compare to. Therefore, lets move this out into a separate
structure and dynamically allocate it only for BPF tail call maps.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add a cookie to BPF maps to uniquely identify BPF maps for the timespan
when the node is up. This is different to comparing a pointer or BPF map
id which could get rolled over and reused.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The 'commit 35f96de04127 ("bpf: Introduce BPF token object")' added
BPF token as a new kind of BPF kernel object. And BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
already used to get BPF object info, so we can also get token info with
this cmd.
One usage scenario, when program runs failed with token, because of
the permission failure, we can report what BPF token is allowing with
this API for debugging.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250716134654.1162635-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Use attach_type in bpf_link, and remove it in bpf_tracing_link.
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250710032038.888700-7-chen.dylane@linux.dev
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Attach_type will be set when a link is created by user. It is better to
record attach_type in bpf_link generically and have it available
universally for all link types. So add the attach_type field in bpf_link
and move the sleepable field to avoid unnecessary gap padding.
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250710032038.888700-2-chen.dylane@linux.dev
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Introduce a kernel function which is the analogue of dump_stack()
printing some useful information and the stack trace. This is not
exposed to BPF programs yet, but can be made available in the future.
When we have a program counter for a BPF program in the stack trace,
also additionally output the filename and line number to make the trace
helpful. The rest of the trace can be passed into ./decode_stacktrace.sh
to obtain the line numbers for kernel symbols.
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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In preparation of figuring out the closest program that led to the
current point in the kernel, implement a function that scans through the
stack trace and finds out the closest BPF program when walking down the
stack trace.
Special care needs to be taken to skip over kernel and BPF subprog
frames. We basically scan until we find a BPF main prog frame. The
assumption is that if a program calls into us transitively, we'll
hit it along the way. If not, we end up returning NULL.
Contextually the function will be used in places where we know the
program may have called into us.
Due to reliance on arch_bpf_stack_walk(), this function only works on
x86 with CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC, arm64, and s390. Remove the warning from
arch_bpf_stack_walk as well since we call it outside bpf_throw()
context.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Prepare a function for use in future patches that can extract the file
info, line info, and the source line number for a given BPF program
provided it's program counter.
Only the basename of the file path is provided, given it can be
excessively long in some cases.
This will be used in later patches to print source info to the BPF
stream.
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add support for a stream API to the kernel and expose related kfuncs to
BPF programs. Two streams are exposed, BPF_STDOUT and BPF_STDERR. These
can be used for printing messages that can be consumed from user space,
thus it's similar in spirit to existing trace_pipe interface.
The kernel will use the BPF_STDERR stream to notify the program of any
errors encountered at runtime. BPF programs themselves may use both
streams for writing debug messages. BPF library-like code may use
BPF_STDERR to print warnings or errors on misuse at runtime.
The implementation of a stream is as follows. Everytime a message is
emitted from the kernel (directly, or through a BPF program), a record
is allocated by bump allocating from per-cpu region backed by a page
obtained using alloc_pages_nolock(). This ensures that we can allocate
memory from any context. The eventual plan is to discard this scheme in
favor of Alexei's kmalloc_nolock() [0].
This record is then locklessly inserted into a list (llist_add()) so
that the printing side doesn't require holding any locks, and works in
any context. Each stream has a maximum capacity of 4MB of text, and each
printed message is accounted against this limit.
Messages from a program are emitted using the bpf_stream_vprintk kfunc,
which takes a stream_id argument in addition to working otherwise
similar to bpf_trace_vprintk.
The bprintf buffer helpers are extracted out to be reused for printing
the string into them before copying it into the stream, so that we can
(with the defined max limit) format a string and know its true length
before performing allocations of the stream element.
For consuming elements from a stream, we expose a bpf(2) syscall command
named BPF_PROG_STREAM_READ_BY_FD, which allows reading data from the
stream of a given prog_fd into a user space buffer. The main logic is
implemented in bpf_stream_read(). The log messages are queued in
bpf_stream::log by the bpf_stream_vprintk kfunc, and then pulled and
ordered correctly in the stream backlog.
For this purpose, we hold a lock around bpf_stream_backlog_peek(), as
llist_del_first() (if we maintained a second lockless list for the
backlog) wouldn't be safe from multiple threads anyway. Then, if we
fail to find something in the backlog log, we splice out everything from
the lockless log, and place it in the backlog log, and then return the
head of the backlog. Once the full length of the element is consumed, we
will pop it and free it.
The lockless list bpf_stream::log is a LIFO stack. Elements obtained
using a llist_del_all() operation are in LIFO order, thus would break
the chronological ordering if printed directly. Hence, this batch of
messages is first reversed. Then, it is stashed into a separate list in
the stream, i.e. the backlog_log. The head of this list is the actual
message that should always be returned to the caller. All of this is
done in bpf_stream_backlog_fill().
From the kernel side, the writing into the stream will be a bit more
involved than the typical printk. First, the kernel typically may print
a collection of messages into the stream, and parallel writers into the
stream may suffer from interleaving of messages. To ensure each group of
messages is visible atomically, we can lift the advantage of using a
lockless list for pushing in messages.
To enable this, we add a bpf_stream_stage() macro, and require kernel
users to use bpf_stream_printk statements for the passed expression to
write into the stream. Underneath the macro, we have a message staging
API, where a bpf_stream_stage object on the stack accumulates the
messages being printed into a local llist_head, and then a commit
operation splices the whole batch into the stream's lockless log list.
This is especially pertinent for rqspinlock deadlock messages printed to
program streams. After this change, we see each deadlock invocation as a
non-interleaving contiguous message without any confusion on the
reader's part, improving their user experience in debugging the fault.
While programs cannot benefit from this staged stream writing API, they
could just as well hold an rqspinlock around their print statements to
serialize messages, hence this is kept kernel-internal for now.
Overall, this infrastructure provides NMI-safe any context printing of
messages to two dedicated streams.
Later patches will add support for printing splats in case of BPF arena
page faults, rqspinlock deadlocks, and cond_break timeouts, and
integration of this facility into bpftool for dumping messages to user
space.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250501032718.65476-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Refactor code to be able to get and put bprintf buffers and use
bpf_printf_prepare independently. This will be used in the next patch to
implement BPF streams support, particularly as a staging buffer for
strings that need to be formatted and then allocated and pushed into a
stream.
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Alexei suggested, 'link_type' can be more precise and differentiate
for human in fdinfo. In fact BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI includes
kretprobe_multi type, the same as BPF_LINK_TYPE_UPROBE_MULTI, so we
can show it more concretely.
link_type: kprobe_multi
link_id: 1
prog_tag: d2b307e915f0dd37
...
link_type: kretprobe_multi
link_id: 2
prog_tag: ab9ea0545870781d
...
link_type: uprobe_multi
link_id: 9
prog_tag: e729f789e34a8eca
...
link_type: uretprobe_multi
link_id: 10
prog_tag: 7db356c03e61a4d4
Co-developed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250702153958.639852-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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JITs can set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() if they want the verifier to
skip analysis/patching for the respective vulnerability. For v4, this
will reduce the number of barriers the verifier inserts. For v1, it
allows more programs to be accepted.
The primary motivation for this is to not regress unpriv BPF's
performance on ARM64 in a future commit where BPF_NOSPEC is also used
against Spectre v1.
This has the user-visible change that v1-induced rejections on
non-vulnerable PowerPC CPUs are avoided.
For now, this does not change the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC. It is still a
v4-only barrier and must not be implemented if bypass_spec_v4 is always
true for the arch. Changing it to a v1 AND v4-barrier is done in a
future commit.
As an alternative to bypass_spec_v1/v4, one could introduce NOSPEC_V1
AND NOSPEC_V4 instructions and allow backends to skip their lowering as
suggested by commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction
for mitigating Spectre v4"). Adding bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() was
found to be preferable for the following reason:
* bypass_spec_v1/v4 benefits non-vulnerable CPUs: Always performing the
same analysis (not taking into account whether the current CPU is
vulnerable), needlessly restricts users of CPUs that are not
vulnerable. The only use case for this would be portability-testing,
but this can later be added easily when needed by allowing users to
force bypass_spec_v1/v4 to false.
* Portability is still acceptable: Directly disabling the analysis
instead of skipping the lowering of BPF_NOSPEC(_V1/V4) might allow
programs on non-vulnerable CPUs to be accepted while the program will
be rejected on vulnerable CPUs. With the fallback to speculation
barriers for Spectre v1 implemented in a future commit, this will only
affect programs that do variable stack-accesses or are very complex.
For PowerPC, the SEC_FTR checking in bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4() is based
on the check that was previously located in the BPF_NOSPEC case.
For LoongArch, it would likely be safe to set both
bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1() and _v4() according to
commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode"). This is omitted here as I am unable to do any testing
for LoongArch.
Hari's ack concerns the PowerPC part only.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211318.337474-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Throughout the verifier's logic, there are multiple checks for
inconsistent states that should never happen and would indicate a
verifier bug. These bugs are typically logged in the verifier logs and
sometimes preceded by a WARN_ONCE.
This patch reworks these checks to consistently emit a verifier log AND
a warning when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled. The consistent use of
WARN_ONCE should help fuzzers (ex. syzkaller) expose any situation
where they are actually able to reach one of those buggy verifier
states.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aCs1nYvNNMq8dAWP@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Make bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, bpf_dynptr_check_off_len and
__bpf_dynptr_write available outside of the helpers.c by
adding their prototypes into linux/include/bpf.h.
bpf_dynptr_check_off_len() implementation is moved to header and made
inline explicitly, as small function should typically be inlined.
These functions are going to be used from bpf_trace.c in the next
patch of this series.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250512205348.191079-2-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf try_alloc_pages() support from Alexei Starovoitov:
"The pull includes work from Sebastian, Vlastimil and myself with a lot
of help from Michal and Shakeel.
This is a first step towards making kmalloc reentrant to get rid of
slab wrappers: bpf_mem_alloc, kretprobe's objpool, etc. These patches
make page allocator safe from any context.
Vlastimil kicked off this effort at LSFMM 2024:
https://lwn.net/Articles/974138/
and we continued at LSFMM 2025:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAADnVQKfkGxudNUkcPJgwe3nTZ=xohnRshx9kLZBTmR_E1DFEg@mail.gmail.com/
Why:
SLAB wrappers bind memory to a particular subsystem making it
unavailable to the rest of the kernel. Some BPF maps in production
consume Gbytes of preallocated memory. Top 5 in Meta: 1.5G, 1.2G,
1.1G, 300M, 200M. Once we have kmalloc that works in any context BPF
map preallocation won't be necessary.
How:
Synchronous kmalloc/page alloc stack has multiple stages going from
fast to slow: cmpxchg16 -> slab_alloc -> new_slab -> alloc_pages ->
rmqueue_pcplist -> __rmqueue, where rmqueue_pcplist was already
relying on trylock.
This set changes rmqueue_bulk/rmqueue_buddy to attempt a trylock and
return ENOMEM if alloc_flags & ALLOC_TRYLOCK. It then wraps this
functionality into try_alloc_pages() helper. We make sure that the
logic is sane in PREEMPT_RT.
End result: try_alloc_pages()/free_pages_nolock() are safe to call
from any context.
try_kmalloc() for any context with similar trylock approach will
follow. It will use try_alloc_pages() when slab needs a new page.
Though such try_kmalloc/page_alloc() is an opportunistic allocator,
this design ensures that the probability of successful allocation of
small objects (up to one page in size) is high.
Even before we have try_kmalloc(), we already use try_alloc_pages() in
BPF arena implementation and it's going to be used more extensively in
BPF"
* tag 'bpf_try_alloc_pages' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
mm: Fix the flipped condition in gfpflags_allow_spinning()
bpf: Use try_alloc_pages() to allocate pages for bpf needs.
mm, bpf: Use memcg in try_alloc_pages().
memcg: Use trylock to access memcg stock_lock.
mm, bpf: Introduce free_pages_nolock()
mm, bpf: Introduce try_alloc_pages() for opportunistic page allocation
locking/local_lock: Introduce localtry_lock_t
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf relisient spinlock support from Alexei Starovoitov:
"This patch set introduces Resilient Queued Spin Lock (or rqspinlock
with res_spin_lock() and res_spin_unlock() APIs).
This is a qspinlock variant which recovers the kernel from a stalled
state when the lock acquisition path cannot make forward progress.
This can occur when a lock acquisition attempt enters a deadlock
situation (e.g. AA, or ABBA), or more generally, when the owner of the
lock (which we’re trying to acquire) isn’t making forward progress.
Deadlock detection is the main mechanism used to provide instant
recovery, with the timeout mechanism acting as a final line of
defense. Detection is triggered immediately when beginning the waiting
loop of a lock slow path.
Additionally, BPF programs attached to different parts of the kernel
can introduce new control flow into the kernel, which increases the
likelihood of deadlocks in code not written to handle reentrancy.
There have been multiple syzbot reports surfacing deadlocks in
internal kernel code due to the diverse ways in which BPF programs can
be attached to different parts of the kernel. By switching the BPF
subsystem’s lock usage to rqspinlock, all of these issues are
mitigated at runtime.
This spin lock implementation allows BPF maps to become safer and
remove mechanisms that have fallen short in assuring safety when
nesting programs in arbitrary ways in the same context or across
different contexts.
We run benchmarks that stress locking scalability and perform
comparison against the baseline (qspinlock). For the rqspinlock case,
we replace the default qspinlock with it in the kernel, such that all
spin locks in the kernel use the rqspinlock slow path. As such,
benchmarks that stress kernel spin locks end up exercising rqspinlock.
More details in the cover letter in commit 6ffb9017e932 ("Merge branch
'resilient-queued-spin-lock'")"
* tag 'bpf_res_spin_lock' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (24 commits)
selftests/bpf: Add tests for rqspinlock
bpf: Maintain FIFO property for rqspinlock unlock
bpf: Implement verifier support for rqspinlock
bpf: Introduce rqspinlock kfuncs
bpf: Convert lpm_trie.c to rqspinlock
bpf: Convert percpu_freelist.c to rqspinlock
bpf: Convert hashtab.c to rqspinlock
rqspinlock: Add locktorture support
rqspinlock: Add entry to Makefile, MAINTAINERS
rqspinlock: Add macros for rqspinlock usage
rqspinlock: Add basic support for CONFIG_PARAVIRT
rqspinlock: Add a test-and-set fallback
rqspinlock: Add deadlock detection and recovery
rqspinlock: Protect waiters in trylock fallback from stalls
rqspinlock: Protect waiters in queue from stalls
rqspinlock: Protect pending bit owners from stalls
rqspinlock: Hardcode cond_acquire loops for arm64
rqspinlock: Add support for timeouts
rqspinlock: Drop PV and virtualization support
rqspinlock: Add rqspinlock.h header
...
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This patch adds struct_ops context information to struct bpf_prog_aux.
This context information will be used in the kfunc filter.
Currently the added context information includes struct_ops member
offset and a pointer to struct bpf_struct_ops.
Signed-off-by: Juntong Deng <juntong.deng@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250319215358.2287371-2-ameryhung@gmail.com
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Introduce verifier-side support for rqspinlock kfuncs. The first step is
allowing bpf_res_spin_lock type to be defined in map values and
allocated objects, so BTF-side is updated with a new BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK
field to recognize and validate.
Any object cannot have both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_res_spin_lock, only
one of them (and at most one of them per-object, like before) must be
present. The bpf_res_spin_lock can also be used to protect objects that
require lock protection for their kfuncs, like BPF rbtree and linked
list.
The verifier plumbing to simulate success and failure cases when calling
the kfuncs is done by pushing a new verifier state to the verifier state
stack which will verify the failure case upon calling the kfunc. The
path where success is indicated creates all lock reference state and IRQ
state (if necessary for irqsave variants). In the case of failure, the
state clears the registers r0-r5, sets the return value, and skips kfunc
processing, proceeding to the next instruction.
When marking the return value for success case, the value is marked as
0, and for the failure case as [-MAX_ERRNO, -1]. Then, in the program,
whenever user checks the return value as 'if (ret)' or 'if (ret < 0)'
the verifier never traverses such branches for success cases, and would
be aware that the lock is not held in such cases.
We push the kfunc state in check_kfunc_call whenever rqspinlock kfuncs
are invoked. We introduce a kfunc_class state to avoid mixing lock
irqrestore kfuncs with IRQ state created by bpf_local_irq_save.
With all this infrastructure, these kfuncs become usable in programs
while satisfying all safety properties required by the kernel.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250316040541.108729-24-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Introduce four new kfuncs, bpf_res_spin_lock, and bpf_res_spin_unlock,
and their irqsave/irqrestore variants, which wrap the rqspinlock APIs.
bpf_res_spin_lock returns a conditional result, depending on whether the
lock was acquired (NULL is returned when lock acquisition succeeds,
non-NULL upon failure). The memory pointed to by the returned pointer
upon failure can be dereferenced after the NULL check to obtain the
error code.
Instead of using the old bpf_spin_lock type, introduce a new type with
the same layout, and the same alignment, but a different name to avoid
type confusion.
Preemption is disabled upon successful lock acquisition, however IRQs
are not. Special kfuncs can be introduced later to allow disabling IRQs
when taking a spin lock. Resilient locks are safe against AA deadlocks,
hence not disabling IRQs currently does not allow violation of kernel
safety.
__irq_flag annotation is used to accept IRQ flags for the IRQ-variants,
with the same semantics as existing bpf_local_irq_{save, restore}.
These kfuncs will require additional verifier-side support in subsequent
commits, to allow programs to hold multiple locks at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250316040541.108729-23-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The perf_event_read_event_output helper is currently only available to
tracing protrams, but is useful for other BPF programs like sched_ext
schedulers. When the helper is available, provide its bpf_func_proto
directly from the bpf base_proto.
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis (Meta) <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318030753.10949-1-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Introduce BPF instructions with load-acquire and store-release
semantics, as discussed in [1]. Define 2 new flags:
#define BPF_LOAD_ACQ 0x100
#define BPF_STORE_REL 0x110
A "load-acquire" is a BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC instruction with the 'imm'
field set to BPF_LOAD_ACQ (0x100).
Similarly, a "store-release" is a BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC instruction with
the 'imm' field set to BPF_STORE_REL (0x110).
Unlike existing atomic read-modify-write operations that only support
BPF_W (32-bit) and BPF_DW (64-bit) size modifiers, load-acquires and
store-releases also support BPF_B (8-bit) and BPF_H (16-bit). As an
exception, however, 64-bit load-acquires/store-releases are not
supported on 32-bit architectures (to fix a build error reported by the
kernel test robot).
An 8- or 16-bit load-acquire zero-extends the value before writing it to
a 32-bit register, just like ARM64 instruction LDARH and friends.
Similar to existing atomic read-modify-write operations, misaligned
load-acquires/store-releases are not allowed (even if
BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT is set).
As an example, consider the following 64-bit load-acquire BPF
instruction (assuming little-endian):
db 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 r0 = load_acquire((u64 *)(r1 + 0x0))
opcode (0xdb): BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW | BPF_STX
imm (0x00000100): BPF_LOAD_ACQ
Similarly, a 16-bit BPF store-release:
cb 21 00 00 10 01 00 00 store_release((u16 *)(r1 + 0x0), w2)
opcode (0xcb): BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_H | BPF_STX
imm (0x00000110): BPF_STORE_REL
In arch/{arm64,s390,x86}/net/bpf_jit_comp.c, have
bpf_jit_supports_insn(..., /*in_arena=*/true) return false for the new
instructions, until the corresponding JIT compiler supports them in
arena.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240729183246.4110549-1-yepeilin@google.com/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a217f46f0e445fbd573a1a024be5c6bf1d5fe716.1741049567.git.yepeilin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Implement support in the verifier for replacing may_goto implementation
from a counter-based approach to one which samples time on the local CPU
to have a bigger loop bound.
We implement it by maintaining 16-bytes per-stack frame, and using 8
bytes for maintaining the count for amortizing time sampling, and 8
bytes for the starting timestamp. To minimize overhead, we need to avoid
spilling and filling of registers around this sequence, so we push this
cost into the time sampling function 'arch_bpf_timed_may_goto'. This is
a JIT-specific wrapper around bpf_check_timed_may_goto which returns us
the count to store into the stack through BPF_REG_AX. All caller-saved
registers (r0-r5) are guaranteed to remain untouched.
The loop can be broken by returning count as 0, otherwise we dispatch
into the function when the count drops to 0, and the runtime chooses to
refresh it (by returning count as BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS) or returning 0
and aborting the loop on next iteration.
Since the check for 0 is done right after loading the count from the
stack, all subsequent cond_break sequences should immediately break as
well, of the same loop or subsequent loops in the program.
We pass in the stack_depth of the count (and thus the timestamp, by
adding 8 to it) to the arch_bpf_timed_may_goto call so that it can be
passed in to bpf_check_timed_may_goto as an argument after r1 is saved,
by adding the offset to r10/fp. This adjustment will be arch specific,
and the next patch will introduce support for x86.
Note that depending on loop complexity, time spent in the loop can be
more than the current limit (250 ms), but imposing an upper bound on
program runtime is an orthogonal problem which will be addressed when
program cancellations are supported.
The current time afforded by cond_break may not be enough for cases
where BPF programs want to implement locking algorithms inline, and use
cond_break as a promise to the verifier that they will eventually
terminate.
Below are some benchmarking numbers on the time taken per-iteration for
an empty loop that counts the number of iterations until cond_break
fires. For comparison, we compare it against bpf_for/bpf_repeat which is
another way to achieve the same number of spins (BPF_MAX_LOOPS). The
hardware used for benchmarking was a Sapphire Rapids Intel server with
performance governor enabled, mitigations were enabled.
+-----------------------------+--------------+--------------+------------------+
| Loop type | Iterations | Time (ms) | Time/iter (ns) |
+-----------------------------|--------------+--------------+------------------+
| may_goto | 8388608 | 3 | 0.36 |
| timed_may_goto (count=65535)| 589674932 | 250 | 0.42 |
| bpf_for | 8388608 | 10 | 1.19 |
+-----------------------------+--------------+--------------+------------------+
This gives a good approximation at low overhead while staying close to
the current implementation.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304003239.2390751-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The verifier currently does not permit global subprog calls when a lock
is held, preemption is disabled, or when IRQs are disabled. This is
because we don't know whether the global subprog calls sleepable
functions or not.
In case of locks, there's an additional reason: functions called by the
global subprog may hold additional locks etc. The verifier won't know
while verifying the global subprog whether it was called in context
where a spin lock is already held by the program.
Perform summarization of the sleepable nature of a global subprog just
like changes_pkt_data and then allow calls to global subprogs for
non-sleepable ones from atomic context.
While making this change, I noticed that RCU read sections had no
protection against sleepable global subprog calls, include it in the
checks and fix this while we're at it.
Care needs to be taken to not allow global subprog calls when regular
bpf_spin_lock is held. When resilient spin locks is held, we want to
potentially have this check relaxed, but not for now.
Also make sure extensions freplacing global functions cannot do so
in case the target is non-sleepable, but the extension is. The other
combination is ok.
Tests are included in the next patch to handle all special conditions.
Fixes: 9bb00b2895cb ("bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock()")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250301151846.1552362-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Use try_alloc_pages() and free_pages_nolock() for BPF needs
when context doesn't allow using normal alloc_pages.
This is a prerequisite for further work.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250222024427.30294-7-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Allows struct_ops programs to acqurie referenced kptrs from arguments
by directly reading the argument.
The verifier will acquire a reference for struct_ops a argument tagged
with "__ref" in the stub function in the beginning of the main program.
The user will be able to access the referenced kptr directly by reading
the context as long as it has not been released by the program.
This new mechanism to acquire referenced kptr (compared to the existing
"kfunc with KF_ACQUIRE") is introduced for ergonomic and semantic reasons.
In the first use case, Qdisc_ops, an skb is passed to .enqueue in the
first argument. This mechanism provides a natural way for users to get a
referenced kptr in the .enqueue struct_ops programs and makes sure that a
qdisc will always enqueue or drop the skb.
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <amery.hung@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217190640.1748177-3-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, ctx_arg_info is read-only in the view of the verifier since
it is shared among programs of the same attach type. Make each program
have their own copy of ctx_arg_info so that we can use it to store
program specific information.
In the next patch where we support acquiring a referenced kptr through a
struct_ops argument tagged with "__ref", ctx_arg_info->ref_obj_id will
be used to store the unique reference object id of the argument. This
avoids creating a requirement in the verifier that "__ref" tagged
arguments must be the first set of references acquired [0].
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241220195619.2022866-2-amery.hung@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217190640.1748177-2-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"A smaller than usual release cycle.
The main changes are:
- Prepare selftest to run with GCC-BPF backend (Ihor Solodrai)
In addition to LLVM-BPF runs the BPF CI now runs GCC-BPF in compile
only mode. Half of the tests are failing, since support for
btf_decl_tag is still WIP, but this is a great milestone.
- Convert various samples/bpf to selftests/bpf/test_progs format
(Alexis Lothoré and Bastien Curutchet)
- Teach verifier to recognize that array lookup with constant
in-range index will always succeed (Daniel Xu)
- Cleanup migrate disable scope in BPF maps (Hou Tao)
- Fix bpf_timer destroy path in PREEMPT_RT (Hou Tao)
- Always use bpf_mem_alloc in bpf_local_storage in PREEMPT_RT (Martin
KaFai Lau)
- Refactor verifier lock support (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)
This is a prerequisite for upcoming resilient spin lock.
- Remove excessive 'may_goto +0' instructions in the verifier that
LLVM leaves when unrolls the loops (Yonghong Song)
- Remove unhelpful bpf_probe_write_user() warning message (Marco
Elver)
- Add fd_array_cnt attribute for prog_load command (Anton Protopopov)
This is a prerequisite for upcoming support for static_branch"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (125 commits)
selftests/bpf: Add some tests related to 'may_goto 0' insns
bpf: Remove 'may_goto 0' instruction in opt_remove_nops()
bpf: Allow 'may_goto 0' instruction in verifier
selftests/bpf: Add test case for the freeing of bpf_timer
bpf: Cancel the running bpf_timer through kworker for PREEMPT_RT
bpf: Free element after unlock in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem()
bpf: Bail out early in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem()
bpf: Free special fields after unlock in htab_lru_map_delete_node()
tools: Sync if_xdp.h uapi tooling header
libbpf: Work around kernel inconsistently stripping '.llvm.' suffix
bpf: selftests: verifier: Add nullness elision tests
bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
bpf: verifier: Refactor helper access type tracking
bpf: tcp: Mark bpf_load_hdr_opt() arg2 as read-write
bpf: verifier: Add missing newline on verbose() call
selftests/bpf: Add distilled BTF test about marking BTF_IS_EMBEDDED
libbpf: Fix incorrect traversal end type ID when marking BTF_IS_EMBEDDED
libbpf: Fix return zero when elf_begin failed
selftests/bpf: Fix btf leak on new btf alloc failure in btf_distill test
veristat: Load struct_ops programs only once
...
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.13-rc4).
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/rswitch.h
32fd46f5b69e ("net: renesas: rswitch: remove speed from gwca structure")
922b4b955a03 ("net: renesas: rswitch: rework ts tags management")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge bpf fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes in:
Auto-merging include/linux/bpf.h
Auto-merging include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/btf.c
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Auto-merging kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
Auto-merging tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch reverts commit
cb4158ce8ec8 ("bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL"). The
patch was well-intended and meant to be as a stop-gap fixing branch
prediction when the pointer may actually be NULL at runtime. Eventually,
it was supposed to be replaced by an automated script or compiler pass
detecting possibly NULL arguments and marking them accordingly.
However, it caused two main issues observed for production programs and
failed to preserve backwards compatibility. First, programs relied on
the verifier not exploring == NULL branch when pointer is not NULL, thus
they started failing with a 'dereference of scalar' error. Next,
allowing raw_tp arguments to be modified surfaced the warning in the
verifier that warns against reg->off when PTR_MAYBE_NULL is set.
More information, context, and discusson on both problems is available
in [0]. Overall, this approach had several shortcomings, and the fixes
would further complicate the verifier's logic, and the entire masking
scheme would have to be removed eventually anyway.
Hence, revert the patch in preparation of a better fix avoiding these
issues to replace this commit.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241206161053.809580-1-memxor@gmail.com
Reported-by: Manu Bretelle <chantra@meta.com>
Fixes: cb4158ce8ec8 ("bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213221929.3495062-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add a new helper to get a pointer to a struct btf from a file
descriptor. This helper doesn't increase a refcnt. Add a comment
explaining this and pointing to a corresponding function which
does take a reference.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241213130934.1087929-2-aspsk@isovalent.com
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Currently, the pointer stored in call->prog_array is loaded in
__uprobe_perf_func(), with no RCU annotation and no immediately visible
RCU protection, so it looks as if the loaded pointer can immediately be
dangling.
Later, bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe() starts a RCU-trace read-side critical
section, but this is too late. It then uses rcu_dereference_check(), but
this use of rcu_dereference_check() does not actually dereference anything.
Fix it by aligning the semantics to bpf_prog_run_array(): Let the caller
provide rcu_read_lock_trace() protection and then load call->prog_array
with rcu_dereference_check().
This issue seems to be theoretical: I don't know of any way to reach this
code without having handle_swbp() further up the stack, which is already
holding a rcu_read_lock_trace() lock, so where we take
rcu_read_lock_trace() in __uprobe_perf_func()/bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe()
doesn't actually have any effect.
Fixes: 8c7dcb84e3b7 ("bpf: implement sleepable uprobes by chaining gps")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241210-bpf-fix-uprobe-uaf-v4-1-5fc8959b2b74@google.com
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