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These function are no longer needed replace them with their more useful equivalents.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers
- Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel
internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed.
* Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel
internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today,
leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test.
- Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map
These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added
if a mapping does not exist.
- Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping.
Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids
still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't
have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid
and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid
and gid mapping.
Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies
the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing
the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the
slight weirdness worth it.
- Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global
uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping
but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar
to what we do with jiffies.
- Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and
gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once
and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are
trivial but a little atypical.
Performance:
In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to
stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same.
The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where
all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and
kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop
with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache.
My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else
was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping
through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the
individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times
where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were
not in the processors cache. My results:
v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled)
All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests
that ran in the cpu cache.
So in summary the performance impact is:
1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out.
8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple
kuid_t, kgid_t pair.
In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of
a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check.
This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping
functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators
uid and gid as 0.
- Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns.
All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free
and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context
so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Modify alloc_uid to take a kuid and make the user hash table global.
Stop holding a reference to the user namespace in struct user_struct.
This simplifies the code and makes the per user accounting not
care about which user namespace a uid happens to appear in.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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I am about to remove the struct user_namespace reference from struct user_struct.
So keep an explicit track of the parent user namespace.
Take advantage of this new reference and replace instances of user_ns->creator->user_ns
with user_ns->parent.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Currently on 64-bit arch the user_namespace is 2096 and when being
kmalloc-ed it resides on a 4k slab wasting 2003 bytes.
If we allocate a separate cache for it and reduce the hash size from 128
to 64 chains the packaging becomes *much* better - the struct is 1072
bytes and the hole between is 98 bytes.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/__initcall/module_init/]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Define what happens when a we view a uid from one user_namespace
in another user_namepece.
- If the user namespaces are the same no mapping is necessary.
- For most cases of difference use overflowuid and overflowgid,
the uid and gid currently used for 16bit apis when we have a 32bit uid
that does fit in 16bits. Effectively the situation is the same,
we want to return a uid or gid that is not assigned to any user.
- For the case when we happen to be mapping the uid or gid of the
creator of the target user namespace use uid 0 and gid as confusing
that user with root is not a problem.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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free_uid() and free_user_ns() are corecursive when CONFIG_USER_SCHED=n,
but free_user_ns() is called from free_uid() by way of uid_hash_remove(),
which requires uidhash_lock to be held. free_user_ns() then calls
free_uid() to complete the destruction.
Fix this by deferring the destruction of the user_namespace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.
Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.
User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).
When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.
This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:
>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David
>Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
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Surprisingly, but (spotted by Alexey Dobriyan) the uid hash still uses
list_heads, thus occupying twice as much place as it could. Convert it to
hlist_heads.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When a CONFIG_USER_NS=n and a user tries to unshare some namespace other
than the user namespace, the dummy copy_user_ns returns NULL rather than
the old_ns.
This value then gets assigned to task->nsproxy->user_ns, so that a
subsequent setuid, which uses task->nsproxy->user_ns, causes a NULL
pointer deref.
Fix this by returning old_ns.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch enables the unshare of user namespaces.
It adds a new clone flag CLONE_NEWUSER and implements copy_user_ns() which
resets the current user_struct and adds a new root user (uid == 0)
For now, unsharing the user namespace allows a process to reset its
user_struct accounting and uid 0 in the new user namespace should be contained
using appropriate means, for instance selinux
The plan, when the full support is complete (all uid checks covered), is to
keep the original user's rights in the original namespace, and let a process
become uid 0 in the new namespace, with full capabilities to the new
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <agm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table,
resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated
accounting.
A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation.
Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges
should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?)
The unshare is not included in this patch.
Changes since [try #4]:
- Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and
get_user_ns to return the namespace.
Changes since [try #3]:
- moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h}
Changes since [try #2]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
Changes since [try #1]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
- added a root_user per user namespace
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <agm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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