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There is nothing mm specific in that and including mm.h can cause header
recursion hell.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.778457951@linutronix.de
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There is no point to have this as a function which just inlines
enter_from_user_mode(). The function call overhead is larger than the
function itself.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.715309918@linutronix.de
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Open code the only user in the x86 syscall code and reduce the zoo of
functions.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.652839989@linutronix.de
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Clean up the include ordering, kernel-doc and other trivialities before
making further changes.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.590338411@linutronix.de
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In preparation for a major rewrite of this code, provide a data structure
for rseq management.
Put all the rseq related data into it (except for the debug part), which
allows to simplify fork/execve by using memset() and memcpy() instead of
adding new fields to initialize over and over.
Create a storage struct for event management as well and put the
sched_switch event and a indicator for RSEQ on a task into it as a
start. That uses a union, which allows to mask and clear the whole lot
efficiently.
The indicators are explicitly not a bit field. Bit fields generate abysmal
code.
The boolean members are defined as u8 as that actually guarantees that it
fits. There seem to be strange architecture ABIs which need more than 8
bits for a boolean.
The has_rseq member is redundant vs. task::rseq, but it turns out that
boolean operations and quick checks on the union generate better code than
fiddling with separate entities and data types.
This struct will be extended over time to carry more information.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.527086690@linutronix.de
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Hypervisors invoke resume_user_mode_work() before entering the guest, which
clears TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. The @regs argument is NULL as there is no user
space context available to them, so the rseq notify handler skips
inspecting the critical section, but updates the CPU/MM CID values
unconditionally so that the eventual pending rseq event is not lost on the
way to user space.
This is a pointless exercise as the task might be rescheduled before
actually returning to user space and it creates unnecessary work in the
vcpu_run() loops.
It's way more efficient to ignore that invocation based on @regs == NULL
and let the hypervisors re-raise TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME after returning from the
vcpu_run() loop before returning from the ioctl().
This ensures that a pending RSEQ update is not lost and the IDs are updated
before returning to user space.
Once the RSEQ handling is decoupled from TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME, this turns into
a NOOP.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.399495855@linutronix.de
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Since commit 0190e4198e47 ("rseq: Deprecate RSEQ_CS_FLAG_NO_RESTART_ON_*
flags") the bits in task::rseq_event_mask are meaningless and just extra
work in terms of setting them individually.
Aside of that the only relevant point where an event has to be raised is
context switch. Neither the CPU nor MM CID can change without going through
a context switch.
Collapse them all into a single boolean which simplifies the code a lot and
remove the pointless invocations which have been sprinkled all over the
place for no value.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.336978188@linutronix.de
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There is no point for this being visible in the resume_to_user_mode()
handling.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.211520245@linutronix.de
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Scrolling over tons of pointless
{
}
lines to find the actual code is annoying at best.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.085971048@linutronix.de
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The RSEQ critical section mechanism only clears the event mask when a
critical section is registered, otherwise it is stale and collects
bits.
That means once a critical section is installed the first invocation of
that code when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is set will abort the critical section,
even when the TIF bit was not raised by the rseq preempt/migrate/signal
helpers.
This also has a performance implication because TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is a
multiplexing TIF bit, which is utilized by quite some infrastructure. That
means every invocation of __rseq_notify_resume() goes unconditionally
through the heavy lifting of user space access and consistency checks even
if there is no reason to do so.
Keeping the stale event mask around when exiting to user space also
prevents it from being utilized by the upcoming time slice extension
mechanism.
Avoid this by reading and clearing the event mask before doing the user
space critical section access with interrupts or preemption disabled, which
ensures that the read and clear operation is CPU local atomic versus
scheduling and the membarrier IPI.
This is correct as after re-enabling interrupts/preemption any relevant
event will set the bit again and raise TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME, which makes the
user space exit code take another round of TIF bit clearing.
If the event mask was non-zero, invoke the slow path. On debug kernels the
slow path is invoked unconditionally and the result of the event mask
evaluation is handed in.
Add a exit path check after the TIF bit loop, which validates on debug
kernels that the event mask is zero before exiting to user space.
While at it reword the convoluted comment why the pt_regs pointer can be
NULL under certain circumstances.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027084306.022571576@linutronix.de
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Provide convenience wrappers around scoped user access similar to
put/get_user(), which reduce the usage sites to:
if (!get_user_inline(val, ptr))
return -EFAULT;
Should only be used if there is a demonstrable performance benefit.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027083745.609031602@linutronix.de
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User space access regions are tedious and require similar code patterns all
over the place:
if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from)))
return -EFAULT;
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
user_read_access_end();
return 0;
Efault:
user_read_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
This got worse with the recent addition of masked user access, which
optimizes the speculation prevention:
if (can_do_masked_user_access())
from = masked_user_read_access_begin((from));
else if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from)))
return -EFAULT;
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
user_read_access_end();
return 0;
Efault:
user_read_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
There have been issues with using the wrong user_*_access_end() variant in
the error path and other typical Copy&Pasta problems, e.g. using the wrong
fault label in the user accessor which ends up using the wrong accesss end
variant.
These patterns beg for scopes with automatic cleanup. The resulting outcome
is:
scoped_user_read_access(from, Efault)
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
return 0;
Efault:
return -EFAULT;
The scope guarantees the proper cleanup for the access mode is invoked both
in the success and the failure (fault) path.
The scoped_user_$MODE_access() macros are implemented as self terminating
nested for() loops. Thanks to Andrew Cooper for pointing me at them. The
scope can therefore be left with 'break', 'goto' and 'return'. Even
'continue' "works" due to the self termination mechanism. Both GCC and
clang optimize all the convoluted macro maze out and the above results with
clang in:
b80: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
b84: 48 b8 ef cd ab 89 67 45 23 01 movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%rax
b8e: 48 39 c7 cmp %rax,%rdi
b91: 48 0f 47 f8 cmova %rax,%rdi
b95: 90 nop
b96: 90 nop
b97: 90 nop
b98: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
b9a: 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%eax
b9c: 89 06 mov %eax,(%rsi)
b9e: 85 c9 test %ecx,%ecx
ba0: 0f 94 c0 sete %al
ba3: 90 nop
ba4: 90 nop
ba5: 90 nop
ba6: c3 ret
Which looks as compact as it gets. The NOPs are placeholder for STAC/CLAC.
GCC emits the fault path seperately:
bf0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
bf4: 48 b8 ef cd ab 89 67 45 23 01 movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%rax
bfe: 48 39 c7 cmp %rax,%rdi
c01: 48 0f 47 f8 cmova %rax,%rdi
c05: 90 nop
c06: 90 nop
c07: 90 nop
c08: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
c0a: 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%eax
c0c: 89 06 mov %eax,(%rsi)
c0e: 85 d2 test %edx,%edx
c10: 75 09 jne c1b <afoo+0x2b>
c12: 90 nop
c13: 90 nop
c14: 90 nop
c15: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax
c1a: c3 ret
c1b: 90 nop
c1c: 90 nop
c1d: 90 nop
c1e: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
c20: c3 ret
The fault labels for the scoped*() macros and the fault labels for the
actual user space accessors can be shared and must be placed outside of the
scope.
If masked user access is enabled on an architecture, then the pointer
handed in to scoped_user_$MODE_access() can be modified to point to a
guaranteed faulting user address. This modification is only scope local as
the pointer is aliased inside the scope. When the scope is left the alias
is not longer in effect. IOW the original pointer value is preserved so it
can be used e.g. for fixup or diagnostic purposes in the fault path.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027083745.546420421@linutronix.de
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Given that the platform TSM owns IDE Stream ID allocation, report the
active streams via the TSM class device. Establish a symlink from the
class device to the PCI endpoint device consuming the stream, named by
the Stream ID.
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-10-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The limited number of link-encryption (IDE) streams that a given set of
host bridges supports is a platform specific detail. Provide
pci_ide_init_nr_streams() as a generic facility for either platform TSM
drivers, or PCI core native IDE, to report the number available streams.
After invoking pci_ide_init_nr_streams() an "available_secure_streams"
attribute appears in PCI host bridge sysfs to convey that count.
Introduce a device-type, @pci_host_bridge_type, now that both a release
method and sysfs attribute groups are being specified for all 'struct
pci_host_bridge' instances.
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-9-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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There are two components to establishing an encrypted link, provisioning
the stream in Partner Port config-space, and programming the keys into
the link layer via IDE_KM (IDE Key Management). This new library,
drivers/pci/ide.c, enables the former. IDE_KM, via a TSM low-level
driver, is saved for later.
With the platform TSM implementations of SEV-TIO and TDX Connect in mind
this library abstracts small differences in those implementations. For
example, TDX Connect handles Root Port register setup while SEV-TIO
expects System Software to update the Root Port registers. This is the
rationale for fine-grained 'setup' + 'enable' verbs.
The other design detail for TSM-coordinated IDE establishment is that
the TSM may manage allocation of Stream IDs, this is why the Stream ID
value is passed in to pci_ide_stream_setup().
The flow is:
pci_ide_stream_alloc():
Allocate a Selective IDE Stream Register Block in each Partner Port
(Endpoint + Root Port), and reserve a host bridge / platform stream
slot. Gather Partner Port specific stream settings like Requester ID.
pci_ide_stream_register():
Publish the stream in sysfs after allocating a Stream ID. In the TSM
case the TSM allocates the Stream ID for the Partner Port pair.
pci_ide_stream_setup():
Program the stream settings to a Partner Port. Caller is responsible
for optionally calling this for the Root Port as well if the TSM
implementation requires it.
pci_ide_stream_enable():
Enable the stream after IDE_KM.
In support of system administrators auditing where platform, Root Port,
and Endpoint IDE stream resources are being spent, the allocated stream
is reflected as a symlink from the host bridge to the endpoint with the
name:
stream%d.%d.%d
Where the tuple of integers reflects the allocated platform, Root Port,
and Endpoint stream index (Selective IDE Stream Register Block) values.
Thanks to Wu Hao for a draft implementation of this infrastructure.
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>
Co-developed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-8-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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PCIe r7.0 Section 7.7.9 Device 3 Extended Capability Structure, defines the
canonical location for determining the Flit Mode of a device. This status
is a dependency for PCIe IDE enabling. Add a new fm_enabled flag to 'struct
pci_dev'.
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-6-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The PCIe 7.0 specification, section 11, defines the Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) Device Interface Security Protocol (TDISP). This
protocol definition builds upon Component Measurement and Authentication
(CMA), and link Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE). It adds support for
assigning devices (PCI physical or virtual function) to a confidential VM
such that the assigned device is enabled to access guest private memory
protected by technologies like Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, RISCV COVE, or ARM
CCA.
The "TSM" (TEE Security Manager) is a concept in the TDISP specification
of an agent that mediates between a "DSM" (Device Security Manager) and
system software in both a VMM and a confidential VM. A VMM uses TSM ABIs
to setup link security and assign devices. A confidential VM uses TSM
ABIs to transition an assigned device into the TDISP "RUN" state and
validate its configuration. From a Linux perspective the TSM abstracts
many of the details of TDISP, IDE, and CMA. Some of those details leak
through at times, but for the most part TDISP is an internal
implementation detail of the TSM.
CONFIG_PCI_TSM adds an "authenticated" attribute and "tsm/" subdirectory
to pci-sysfs. Consider that the TSM driver may itself be a PCI driver.
Userspace can watch for the arrival of a "TSM" device,
/sys/class/tsm/tsm0/uevent KOBJ_CHANGE, to know when the PCI core has
initialized TSM services.
The operations that can be executed against a PCI device are split into
two mutually exclusive operation sets, "Link" and "Security" (struct
pci_tsm_{link,security}_ops). The "Link" operations manage physical link
security properties and communication with the device's Device Security
Manager firmware. These are the host side operations in TDISP. The
"Security" operations coordinate the security state of the assigned
virtual device (TDI). These are the guest side operations in TDISP.
Only "link" (Secure Session and physical Link Encryption) operations are
defined at this stage. There are placeholders for the device security
(Trusted Computing Base entry / exit) operations.
The locking allows for multiple devices to be executing commands
simultaneously, one outstanding command per-device and an rwsem
synchronizes the implementation relative to TSM registration/unregistration
events.
Thanks to Wu Hao for his work on an early draft of this support.
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-5-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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PCI/TSM, the PCI core functionality for the PCIe TEE Device Interface
Security Protocol (TDISP), has a need to walk all subordinate functions of
a Device Security Manager (DSM) to setup a device security context. A DSM
is physical function 0 of multi-function or SR-IOV device endpoint, or it
is an upstream switch port.
In error scenarios or when a TEE Security Manager (TSM) device is removed
it needs to unwind all established DSM contexts.
Introduce reverse versions of PCI device iteration helpers to mirror the
setup path and ensure that dependent children are handled before parents.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-4-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Link encryption is a new PCIe feature enumerated by "PCIe r7.0 section
7.9.26 IDE Extended Capability".
It is both a standalone port + endpoint capability, and a building block
for the security protocol defined by "PCIe r7.0 section 11 TEE Device
Interface Security Protocol (TDISP)". That protocol coordinates device
security setup between a platform TSM (TEE Security Manager) and a
device DSM (Device Security Manager). While the platform TSM can
allocate resources like Stream ID and manage keys, it still requires
system software to manage the IDE capability register block.
Add register definitions and basic enumeration in preparation for
Selective IDE Stream establishment. A follow on change selects the new
CONFIG_PCI_IDE symbol. Note that while the IDE specification defines
both a point-to-point "Link Stream" and a Root Port to endpoint
"Selective Stream", only "Selective Stream" is considered for Linux as
that is the predominant mode expected by Trusted Execution Environment
Security Managers (TSMs), and it is the security model that limits the
number of PCI components within the TCB in a PCIe topology with
switches.
Co-developed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-3-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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A "TSM" is a platform component that provides an API for securely
provisioning resources for a confidential guest (TVM) to consume. The
name originates from the PCI specification for platform agent that
carries out operations for PCIe TDISP (TEE Device Interface Security
Protocol).
Instances of this core device are parented by a device representing the
platform security function like CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP or
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST.
This device interface is a frontend to the aspects of a TSM and TEE I/O
that are cross-architecture common. This includes mechanisms like
enumerating available platform TEE I/O capabilities and provisioning
connections between the platform TSM and device DSMs (Device Security
Manager (TDISP)).
For now this is just the scaffolding for registering a TSM device sysfs
interface.
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Co-developed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-2-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add the ubwc configuration for Kaanapali chipset. This chipset brings
support for UBWC v6 version. The rest of the configurations remains
as usual.
Signed-off-by: Akhil P Oommen <akhilpo@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250930-kaana-gpu-support-v1-1-73530b0700ed@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
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Introduce the userspace entry point for PHY MSE diagnostics via
ethtool netlink. This exposes the core API added previously and
returns both capability information and one or more snapshots.
Userspace sends ETHTOOL_MSG_MSE_GET. The reply carries:
- ETHTOOL_A_MSE_CAPABILITIES: scale limits and timing information
- ETHTOOL_A_MSE_CHANNEL_* nests: one or more snapshots (per-channel
if available, otherwise WORST, otherwise LINK)
Link down returns -ENETDOWN.
Changes:
- YAML: add attribute sets (mse, mse-capabilities, mse-snapshot)
and the mse-get operation
- UAPI (generated): add ETHTOOL_A_MSE_* enums and message IDs,
ETHTOOL_MSG_MSE_GET/REPLY
- ethtool core: add net/ethtool/mse.c implementing the request,
register genl op, and hook into ethnl dispatch
- docs: document MSE_GET in ethtool-netlink.rst
The include/uapi/linux/ethtool_netlink_generated.h is generated
from Documentation/netlink/specs/ethtool.yaml.
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027122801.982364-3-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Add the base infrastructure for Mean Square Error (MSE) diagnostics,
as proposed by the OPEN Alliance "Advanced diagnostic features for
100BASE-T1 automotive Ethernet PHYs" [1] specification.
The OPEN Alliance spec defines only average MSE and average peak MSE
over a fixed number of symbols. However, other PHYs, such as the
KSZ9131, additionally expose a worst-peak MSE value latched since the
last channel capture. This API accounts for such vendor extensions by
adding a distinct capability bit and snapshot field.
Channel-to-pair mapping is normally straightforward, but in some cases
(e.g. 100BASE-TX with MDI-X resolution unknown) the mapping is ambiguous.
If hardware does not expose MDI-X status, the exact pair cannot be
determined. To avoid returning misleading per-channel data in this case,
a LINK selector is defined for aggregate MSE measurements.
All investigated devices differ in MSE capabilities, such
as sample rate, number of analyzed symbols, and scaling factors.
For example, the KSZ9131 uses different scaling for MSE and pMSE.
To make this visible to callers, scale limits and timing information
are returned via get_mse_capability().
Some PHYs sample very few symbols at high frequency (e.g. 2 us update
rate). To cover such cases and allow for future high-speed PHYs with
even shorter intervals, the refresh rate is reported as u64 in
picoseconds.
This patch introduces the internal PHY API for Mean Square Error
diagnostics. It defines new kernel-side data types and driver hooks:
- struct phy_mse_capability: describes supported metrics, scale
limits, update interval, and sampling length.
- struct phy_mse_snapshot: holds one correlated measurement set.
- New phy_driver ops: `get_mse_capability()` and `get_mse_snapshot()`.
These definitions form the core kernel API. No user-visible interfaces
are added in this commit.
Standardization notes:
OPEN Alliance defines presence and interpretation of some metrics but does
not fix numeric scales or sampling internals:
- SQI (3-bit, 0..7) is mandatory; correlation to SNR/BER is informative
(OA 100BASE-T1 TC1 v1.0 6.1.2; OA 1000BASE-T1 TC12 v2.2 6.1.2).
- MSE is optional; OA recommends 2^16 symbols and scaling to 0..511,
with a worst-case latch since last read (OA 100BASE-T1 TC1 v1.0 6.1.1; OA
1000BASE-T1 TC12 v2.2 6.1.1). Refresh is recommended (~0.8-2.0 ms for
100BASE-T1; ~80-200 us for 1000BASE-T1). Exact scaling/time windows
are vendor-specific.
- Peak MSE (pMSE) is defined only for 100BASE-T1 as optional, e.g.
128-symbol sliding window with 8-bit range and worst-case latch (OA
100BASE-T1 TC1 v1.0 6.1.3).
Therefore this API exposes which measures and selectors a PHY supports,
and documents where behavior is standard-referenced vs vendor-specific.
[1] <https://opensig.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/
Advanced_PHY_features_for_automotive_Ethernet_V1.0.pdf>
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027122801.982364-2-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Add a new state NAPI_STATE_THREADED_BUSY_POLL to the NAPI state enum to
enable and disable threaded busy polling.
When threaded busy polling is enabled for a NAPI, enable
NAPI_STATE_THREADED also.
When the threaded NAPI is scheduled, set NAPI_STATE_IN_BUSY_POLL to
signal napi_complete_done not to rearm interrupts.
Whenever NAPI_STATE_THREADED_BUSY_POLL is unset, the
NAPI_STATE_IN_BUSY_POLL will be unset, napi_complete_done unsets the
NAPI_STATE_SCHED_THREADED bit also, which in turn will make the kthread
go to sleep.
Signed-off-by: Samiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Martin Karsten <mkarsten@uwaterloo.ca>
Tested-by: Martin Karsten <mkarsten@uwaterloo.ca>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251028203007.575686-2-skhawaja@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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|
MPLS (re)uses RTNL to protect net->mpls.platform_label,
but the lock does not need to be RTNL at all.
Let's protect net->mpls.platform_label with a dedicated
per-netns mutex.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029173344.2934622-13-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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|
rcu_dereference_rtnl() does not clearly tell whether the caller
is under RCU or RTNL.
Let's add in6_dev_rcu() to make it easy to remove __in6_dev_get()
in the future.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029173344.2934622-5-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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|
into clk-for-6.19
Merge Kaanapali RPMh, TCSR and global clock controllers through a topic
branch, so they can be made available in the DeviceTree branch as well.
|
|
Add device tree bindings for the global clock controller on Qualcomm
Kaanapali platform.
Signed-off-by: Jingyi Wang <jingyi.wang@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Taniya Das <taniya.das@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251030-gcc_kaanapali-v2-v2-3-a774a587af6f@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
|
|
Add unique ID for Qualcomm QCS6490 SoC.
Signed-off-by: Komal Bajaj <komal.bajaj@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251103-qcs6490_soc_id-v1-1-c139dd1e32c8@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
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|
Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
finish_task_switch()
sched_ext_free() was called from __put_task_struct() when the last reference
to the task is dropped, which could be long after the task has finished
running. This causes cgroup-related problems:
- ops.init_task() can be called on a cgroup which didn't get ops.cgroup_init()'d
during scheduler load, because the cgroup might be destroyed/unlinked
while the zombie or dead task is still lingering on the scx_tasks list.
- ops.cgroup_exit() could be called before ops.exit_task() is called on all
member tasks, leading to incorrect exit ordering.
Fix by moving it to finish_task_switch() to be called right after the final
context switch away from the dying task, matching when sched_class->task_dead()
is called. Rename it to sched_ext_dead() to match the new calling context.
By calling sched_ext_dead() before cgroup_task_dead(), we ensure that:
- Tasks visible on scx_tasks list have valid cgroups during scheduler load,
as cgroup_mutex prevents cgroup destruction while the task is still linked.
- All member tasks have ops.exit_task() called and are removed from scx_tasks
before the cgroup can be destroyed and trigger ops.cgroup_exit().
This fix is made possible by the cgroup_task_dead() split in the previous patch.
This also makes more sense resource-wise as there's no point in keeping
scheduler side resources around for dead tasks.
Reported-by: Dan Schatzberg <dschatzberg@meta.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup into for-6.19
Pull cgroup/for-6.19 to receive:
16dad7801aad ("cgroup: Rename cgroup lifecycle hooks to cgroup_task_*()")
260fbcb92bbe ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()")
d245698d727a ("cgroup: Defer task cgroup unlink until after the task is done switching out")
These are needed for the sched_ext cgroup exit ordering fix.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
When a task exits, css_set_move_task(tsk, cset, NULL, false) unlinks the task
from its cgroup. From the cgroup's perspective, the task is now gone. If this
makes the cgroup empty, it can be removed, triggering ->css_offline() callbacks
that notify controllers the cgroup is going offline resource-wise.
However, the exiting task can still run, perform memory operations, and schedule
until the final context switch in finish_task_switch(). This creates a confusing
situation where controllers are told a cgroup is offline while resource
activities are still happening in it. While this hasn't broken existing
controllers, it has caused direct confusion for sched_ext schedulers.
Split cgroup_task_exit() into two functions. cgroup_task_exit() now only calls
the subsystem exit callbacks and continues to be called from do_exit(). The
css_set cleanup is moved to the new cgroup_task_dead() which is called from
finish_task_switch() after the final context switch, so that the cgroup only
appears empty after the task is truly done running.
This also reorders operations so that subsys->exit() is now called before
unlinking from the cgroup, which shouldn't break anything.
Cc: Dan Schatzberg <dschatzberg@meta.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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The current names cgroup_exit(), cgroup_release(), and cgroup_free() are
confusing because they look like they're operating on cgroups themselves when
they're actually task lifecycle hooks. For example, cgroup_init() initializes
the cgroup subsystem while cgroup_exit() is a task exit notification to
cgroup. Rename them to cgroup_task_exit(), cgroup_task_release(), and
cgroup_task_free() to make it clear that these operate on tasks.
Cc: Dan Schatzberg <dschatzberg@meta.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Add the listns() system call to all architectures.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-20-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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|
Add a new listns() system call that allows userspace to iterate through
namespaces in the system. This provides a programmatic interface to
discover and inspect namespaces, enhancing existing namespace apis.
Currently, there is no direct way for userspace to enumerate namespaces
in the system. Applications must resort to scanning /proc/<pid>/ns/
across all processes, which is:
1. Inefficient - requires iterating over all processes
2. Incomplete - misses inactive namespaces that aren't attached to any
running process but are kept alive by file descriptors, bind mounts,
or parent namespace references
3. Permission-heavy - requires access to /proc for many processes
4. No ordering or ownership.
5. No filtering per namespace type: Must always iterate and check all
namespaces.
The list goes on. The listns() system call solves these problems by
providing direct kernel-level enumeration of namespaces. It is similar
to listmount() but obviously tailored to namespaces.
/*
* @req: Pointer to struct ns_id_req specifying search parameters
* @ns_ids: User buffer to receive namespace IDs
* @nr_ns_ids: Size of ns_ids buffer (maximum number of IDs to return)
* @flags: Reserved for future use (must be 0)
*/
ssize_t listns(const struct ns_id_req *req, u64 *ns_ids,
size_t nr_ns_ids, unsigned int flags);
Returns:
- On success: Number of namespace IDs written to ns_ids
- On error: Negative error code
/*
* @size: Structure size
* @ns_id: Starting point for iteration; use 0 for first call, then
* use the last returned ID for subsequent calls to paginate
* @ns_type: Bitmask of namespace types to include (from enum ns_type):
* 0: Return all namespace types
* MNT_NS: Mount namespaces
* NET_NS: Network namespaces
* USER_NS: User namespaces
* etc. Can be OR'd together
* @user_ns_id: Filter results to namespaces owned by this user namespace:
* 0: Return all namespaces (subject to permission checks)
* LISTNS_CURRENT_USER: Namespaces owned by caller's user namespace
* Other value: Namespaces owned by the specified user namespace ID
*/
struct ns_id_req {
__u32 size; /* sizeof(struct ns_id_req) */
__u32 spare; /* Reserved, must be 0 */
__u64 ns_id; /* Last seen namespace ID (for pagination) */
__u32 ns_type; /* Filter by namespace type(s) */
__u32 spare2; /* Reserved, must be 0 */
__u64 user_ns_id; /* Filter by owning user namespace */
};
Example 1: List all namespaces
void list_all_namespaces(void)
{
struct ns_id_req req = {
.size = sizeof(req),
.ns_id = 0, /* Start from beginning */
.ns_type = 0, /* All types */
.user_ns_id = 0, /* All user namespaces */
};
uint64_t ids[100];
ssize_t ret;
printf("All namespaces in the system:\n");
do {
ret = listns(&req, ids, 100, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("listns");
break;
}
for (ssize_t i = 0; i < ret; i++)
printf(" Namespace ID: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)ids[i]);
/* Continue from last seen ID */
if (ret > 0)
req.ns_id = ids[ret - 1];
} while (ret == 100); /* Buffer was full, more may exist */
}
Example 2: List network namespaces only
void list_network_namespaces(void)
{
struct ns_id_req req = {
.size = sizeof(req),
.ns_id = 0,
.ns_type = NET_NS, /* Only network namespaces */
.user_ns_id = 0,
};
uint64_t ids[100];
ssize_t ret;
ret = listns(&req, ids, 100, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("listns");
return;
}
printf("Network namespaces: %zd found\n", ret);
for (ssize_t i = 0; i < ret; i++)
printf(" netns ID: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)ids[i]);
}
Example 3: List namespaces owned by current user namespace
void list_owned_namespaces(void)
{
struct ns_id_req req = {
.size = sizeof(req),
.ns_id = 0,
.ns_type = 0, /* All types */
.user_ns_id = LISTNS_CURRENT_USER, /* Current userns */
};
uint64_t ids[100];
ssize_t ret;
ret = listns(&req, ids, 100, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("listns");
return;
}
printf("Namespaces owned by my user namespace: %zd\n", ret);
for (ssize_t i = 0; i < ret; i++)
printf(" ns ID: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)ids[i]);
}
Example 4: List multiple namespace types
void list_network_and_mount_namespaces(void)
{
struct ns_id_req req = {
.size = sizeof(req),
.ns_id = 0,
.ns_type = NET_NS | MNT_NS, /* Network and mount */
.user_ns_id = 0,
};
uint64_t ids[100];
ssize_t ret;
ret = listns(&req, ids, 100, 0);
printf("Network and mount namespaces: %zd found\n", ret);
}
Example 5: Pagination through large namespace sets
void list_all_with_pagination(void)
{
struct ns_id_req req = {
.size = sizeof(req),
.ns_id = 0,
.ns_type = 0,
.user_ns_id = 0,
};
uint64_t ids[50];
size_t total = 0;
ssize_t ret;
printf("Enumerating all namespaces with pagination:\n");
while (1) {
ret = listns(&req, ids, 50, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("listns");
break;
}
if (ret == 0)
break; /* No more namespaces */
total += ret;
printf(" Batch: %zd namespaces\n", ret);
/* Last ID in this batch becomes start of next batch */
req.ns_id = ids[ret - 1];
if (ret < 50)
break; /* Partial batch = end of results */
}
printf("Total: %zu namespaces\n", total);
}
Permission Model
listns() respects namespace isolation and capabilities:
(1) Global listing (user_ns_id = 0):
- Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the namespace's owning user namespace
- OR the namespace must be in the caller's namespace context (e.g.,
a namespace the caller is currently using)
- User namespaces additionally allow listing if the caller has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in that user namespace itself
(2) Owner-filtered listing (user_ns_id != 0):
- Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the specified owner user namespace
- OR the namespace must be in the caller's namespace context
- This allows unprivileged processes to enumerate namespaces they own
(3) Visibility:
- Only "active" namespaces are listed
- A namespace is active if it has a non-zero __ns_ref_active count
- This includes namespaces used by running processes, held by open
file descriptors, or kept active by bind mounts
- Inactive namespaces (kept alive only by internal kernel
references) are not visible via listns()
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-19-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Allow to walk the unified namespace list completely locklessly.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-18-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
The namespace tree doesn't express the ownership concept of namespace
appropriately. Maintain a list of directly owned namespaces per user
namespace. This will allow userspace and the kernel to use the listns()
system call to walk the namespace tree by owning user namespace. The
rbtree is used to find the relevant namespace entry point which allows
to continue iteration and the owner list can be used to walk the tree
completely lock free.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-16-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
The initial set of namespace comes with fixed inode numbers making it
easy for userspace to identify them solely based on that information.
This has long preceeded anything here.
Similarly, let's assign fixed namespace ids for the initial namespaces.
Kill the cookie and use a sequentially increasing number. This has the
nice side-effect that the owning user namespace will always have a
namespace id that is smaller than any of it's descendant namespaces.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-15-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
This will allow userspace to lookup and stat a namespace simply by its
identifier without having to know what type of namespace it is.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-13-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Make it easier to spot that they belong together conceptually.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-12-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
The namespace tree is, among other things, currently used to support
file handles for namespaces. When a namespace is created it is placed on
the namespace trees and when it is destroyed it is removed from the
namespace trees.
While a namespace is on the namespace trees with a valid reference count
it is possible to reopen it through a namespace file handle. This is all
fine but has some issues that should be addressed.
On current kernels a namespace is visible to userspace in the
following cases:
(1) The namespace is in use by a task.
(2) The namespace is persisted through a VFS object (namespace file
descriptor or bind-mount).
Note that (2) only cares about direct persistence of the namespace
itself not indirectly via e.g., file->f_cred file references or
similar.
(3) The namespace is a hierarchical namespace type and is the parent of
a single or multiple child namespaces.
Case (3) is interesting because it is possible that a parent namespace
might not fulfill any of (1) or (2), i.e., is invisible to userspace but
it may still be resurrected through the NS_GET_PARENT ioctl().
Currently namespace file handles allow much broader access to namespaces
than what is currently possible via (1)-(3). The reason is that
namespaces may remain pinned for completely internal reasons yet are
inaccessible to userspace.
For example, a user namespace my remain pinned by get_cred() calls to
stash the opener's credentials into file->f_cred. As it stands file
handles allow to resurrect such a users namespace even though this
should not be possible via (1)-(3). This is a fundamental uapi change
that we shouldn't do if we don't have to.
Consider the following insane case: Various architectures support the
CONFIG_MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT option which uses lazy TLB destruction.
When this option is set a userspace task's struct mm_struct may be used
for kernel threads such as the idle task and will only be destroyed once
the cpu's runqueue switches back to another task. But because of ptrace()
permission checks struct mm_struct stashes the user namespace of the
task that struct mm_struct originally belonged to. The kernel thread
will take a reference on the struct mm_struct and thus pin it.
So on an idle system user namespaces can be persisted for arbitrary
amounts of time which also means that they can be resurrected using
namespace file handles. That makes no sense whatsoever. The problem is
of course excarabted on large systems with a huge number of cpus.
To handle this nicely we introduce an active reference count which
tracks (1)-(3). This is easy to do as all of these things are already
managed centrally. Only (1)-(3) will count towards the active reference
count and only namespaces which are active may be opened via namespace
file handles.
The problem is that namespaces may be resurrected. Which means that they
can become temporarily inactive and will be reactived some time later.
Currently the only example of this is the SIOGCSKNS socket ioctl. The
SIOCGSKNS ioctl allows to open a network namespace file descriptor based
on a socket file descriptor.
If a socket is tied to a network namespace that subsequently becomes
inactive but that socket is persisted by another process in another
network namespace (e.g., via SCM_RIGHTS of pidfd_getfd()) then the
SIOCGSKNS ioctl will resurrect this network namespace.
So calls to open_related_ns() and open_namespace() will end up
resurrecting the corresponding namespace tree.
Note that the active reference count does not regulate the lifetime of
the namespace itself. This is still done by the normal reference count.
The active reference count can only be elevated if the regular reference
count is elevated.
The active reference count also doesn't regulate the presence of a
namespace on the namespace trees. It only regulates its visiblity to
namespace file handles (and in later patches to listns()).
A namespace remains on the namespace trees from creation until its
actual destruction. This will allow the kernel to always reach any
namespace trivially and it will also enable subsystems like bpf to walk
the namespace lists on the system for tracing or general introspection
purposes.
Note that different namespaces have different visibility lifetimes on
current kernels. While most namespace are immediately released when the
last task using them exits, the user- and pid namespace are persisted
and thus both remain accessible via /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns_type>.
The user namespace lifetime is aliged with struct cred and is only
released through exit_creds(). However, it becomes inaccessible to
userspace once the last task using it is reaped, i.e., when
release_task() is called and all proc entries are flushed. Similarly,
the pid namespace is also visible until the last task using it has been
reaped and the associated pid numbers are freed.
The active reference counts of the user- and pid namespace are
decremented once the task is reaped.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-11-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
The current naming is very misleading as this really isn't exiting all
of the task's namespaces. It is only exiting the namespaces that hang of
off nsproxy. Reflect that in the name.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-10-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Implement ns_ref_read() the same way as ns_ref_{get,put}().
No point in making that any more special or different from the other
helpers.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-9-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Make sure that the list is always initialized for initial namespaces.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029-work-namespace-nstree-listns-v4-8-2e6f823ebdc0@kernel.org
Fixes: 885fc8ac0a4d ("nstree: make iterator generic")
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Add an initializer that can be used for the ns common initialization for
static namespace such as most init namespaces.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/87ecqhy2y5.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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I authored the files a short while ago.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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There is a better way to handle the problem IORING_REGISTER_ZCRX_REFILL
solves. The uapi can also be slightly adjusted to accommodate future
extensions. Remove the feature for now, it'll be reworked for the next
release.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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io_uring task work dispatch makes an indirect call to struct io_kiocb's
io_task_work.func field to allow running arbitrary task work functions.
In the uring_cmd case, this calls io_uring_cmd_work(), which immediately
makes another indirect call to struct io_uring_cmd's task_work_cb field.
Change the uring_cmd task work callbacks to functions whose signatures
match io_req_tw_func_t. Add a function io_uring_cmd_from_tw() to convert
from the task work's struct io_tw_req argument to struct io_uring_cmd *.
Define a constant IO_URING_CMD_TASK_WORK_ISSUE_FLAGS to avoid
manufacturing issue_flags in the uring_cmd task work callbacks. Now
uring_cmd task work dispatch makes a single indirect call to the
uring_cmd implementation's callback. This also allows removing the
task_work_cb field from struct io_uring_cmd, freeing up 8 bytes for
future storage.
Since fuse_uring_send_in_task() now has access to the io_tw_token_t,
check its cancel field directly instead of relying on the
IO_URING_F_TASK_DEAD issue flag.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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In preparation for uring_cmd implementations to implement functions
with the io_req_tw_func_t signature, introduce a wrapper struct
io_tw_req to hide the struct io_kiocb * argument. The intention is for
only the io_uring core to access the inner struct io_kiocb *. uring_cmd
implementations should instead call a helper from io_uring/cmd.h to
convert struct io_tw_req to struct io_uring_cmd *.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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