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commit 988a35f8da1dec5a8cd2788054d1e717be61bf25 upstream.
I noticed that there is a possibility that printk_safe_log_store() causes
kernel oops because "args" parameter is passed to vsnprintf() again when
atomic_cmpxchg() detected that we raced. Fix this by using va_copy().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201805112002.GIF21216.OFVHFOMLJtQFSO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Cc: fengguang.wu@intel.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 42a0bb3f71383b45 ("printk/nmi: generic solution for safe printk in NMI")
Cc: 4.7+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3febfc8a219a036633b57a34c6678e21b6a0580d ]
Since the grub_reclaim() function can be made static, make it so.
Silences the following GCC warning (W=1):
kernel/sched/deadline.c:1120:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘grub_reclaim’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180516200902.959-1-malat@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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kernel/sched/sched.h
[ Upstream commit f6a3463063f42d9fb2c78f386437a822e0ad1792 ]
In the following commit:
6b55c9654fcc ("sched/debug: Move print_cfs_rq() declaration to kernel/sched/sched.h")
the print_cfs_rq() prototype was added to <kernel/sched/sched.h>,
right next to the prototypes for print_cfs_stats(), print_rt_stats()
and print_dl_stats().
Finish this previous commit and also move related prototypes for
print_rt_rq() and print_dl_rq().
Remove existing extern declarations now that they not needed anymore.
Silences the following GCC warning, triggered by W=1:
kernel/sched/debug.c:573:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘print_rt_rq’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
kernel/sched/debug.c:603:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘print_dl_rq’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180516195348.30426-1-malat@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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RWSEM_OWNER_UNKNOWN
[ Upstream commit 5a817641f68a6399a5fac8b7d2da67a73698ffed ]
The filesystem freezing code needs to transfer ownership of a rwsem
embedded in a percpu-rwsem from the task that does the freezing to
another one that does the thawing by calling percpu_rwsem_release()
after freezing and percpu_rwsem_acquire() before thawing.
However, the new rwsem debug code runs afoul with this scheme by warning
that the task that releases the rwsem isn't the one that acquires it,
as reported by Amir Goldstein:
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(sem->owner != get_current())
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1401 at /home/amir/build/src/linux/kernel/locking/rwsem.c:133 up_write+0x59/0x79
Call Trace:
percpu_up_write+0x1f/0x28
thaw_super_locked+0xdf/0x120
do_vfs_ioctl+0x270/0x5f1
ksys_ioctl+0x52/0x71
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x19
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x167
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
To work properly with the rwsem debug code, we need to annotate that the
rwsem ownership is unknown during the tranfer period until a brave soul
comes forward to acquire the ownership. During that period, optimistic
spinning will be disabled.
Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1526420991-21213-3-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d7d760efad70c7a030725499bf9f342f04af24dd ]
There are use cases where a rwsem can be acquired by one task, but
released by another task. In thess cases, optimistic spinning may need
to be disabled. One example will be the filesystem freeze/thaw code
where the task that freezes the filesystem will acquire a write lock
on a rwsem and then un-owns it before returning to userspace. Later on,
another task will come along, acquire the ownership, thaw the filesystem
and release the rwsem.
Bit 0 of the owner field was used to designate that it is a reader
owned rwsem. It is now repurposed to mean that the owner of the rwsem
is not known. If only bit 0 is set, the rwsem is reader owned. If bit
0 and other bits are set, it is writer owned with an unknown owner.
One such value for the latter case is (-1L). So we can set owner to 1 for
reader-owned, -1 for writer-owned. The owner is unknown in both cases.
To handle transfer of rwsem ownership, the higher level code should
set the owner field to -1 to indicate a write-locked rwsem with unknown
owner. Optimistic spinning will be disabled in this case.
Once the higher level code figures who the new owner is, it can then
set the owner field accordingly.
Tested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1526420991-21213-2-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ae646f0b9ca135b87bc73ff606ef996c3029780a ]
load_module() creates W+X mappings via __vmalloc_node_range() (from
layout_and_allocate()->move_module()->module_alloc()) by using
PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC. These mappings are later cleaned up via
"call_rcu_sched(&freeinit->rcu, do_free_init)" from do_init_module().
This is a problem because call_rcu_sched() queues work, which can be run
after debug_checkwx() is run, resulting in a race condition. If hit,
the race results in a nasty splat about insecure W+X mappings, which
results in a poor user experience as these are not the mappings that
debug_checkwx() is intended to catch.
This issue is observed on multiple arm64 platforms, and has been
artificially triggered on an x86 platform.
Address the race by flushing the queued work before running the
arch-defined mark_rodata_ro() which then calls debug_checkwx().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1525103946-29526-1-git-send-email-jhugo@codeaurora.org
Fixes: e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@codeaurora.org>
Reported-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org>
Reported-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@caviumnetworks.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b5bf9a90bbebffba888c9144c5a8a10317b04064 ]
Gaurav reported a perceived problem with TASK_PARKED, which turned out
to be a broken wait-loop pattern in __kthread_parkme(), but the
reported issue can (and does) in fact happen for states that do not do
condition based sleeps.
When the 'current->state = TASK_RUNNING' store of a previous
(concurrent) try_to_wake_up() collides with the setting of a 'special'
sleep state, we can loose the sleep state.
Normal condition based wait-loops are immune to this problem, but for
sleep states that are not condition based are subject to this problem.
There already is a fix for TASK_DEAD. Abstract that and also apply it
to TASK_STOPPED and TASK_TRACED, both of which are also without
condition based wait-loop.
Reported-by: Gaurav Kohli <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 741a76b350897604c48fb12beff1c9b77724dc96 ]
Gaurav reported a problem with __kthread_parkme() where a concurrent
try_to_wake_up() could result in competing stores to ->state which,
when the TASK_PARKED store got lost bad things would happen.
The comment near set_current_state() actually mentions this competing
store, but only mentions the case against TASK_RUNNING. This same
store, with different timing, can happen against a subsequent !RUNNING
store.
This normally is not a problem, because as per that same comment, the
!RUNNING state store is inside a condition based wait-loop:
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!need_sleep)
break;
schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
If we loose the (first) TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE store to a previous
(concurrent) wakeup, the schedule() will NO-OP and we'll go around the
loop once more.
The problem here is that the TASK_PARKED store is not inside the
KTHREAD_SHOULD_PARK condition wait-loop.
There is a genuine issue with sleeps that do not have a condition;
this is addressed in a subsequent patch.
Reported-by: Gaurav Kohli <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0b26351b910fb8fe6a056f8a1bbccabe50c0e19f ]
Matt reported the following deadlock:
CPU0 CPU1
schedule(.prev=migrate/0) <fault>
pick_next_task() ...
idle_balance() migrate_swap()
active_balance() stop_two_cpus()
spin_lock(stopper0->lock)
spin_lock(stopper1->lock)
ttwu(migrate/0)
smp_cond_load_acquire() -- waits for schedule()
stop_one_cpu(1)
spin_lock(stopper1->lock) -- waits for stopper lock
Fix this deadlock by taking the wakeups out from under stopper->lock.
This allows the active_balance() to queue the stop work and finish the
context switch, which in turn allows the wakeup from migrate_swap() to
observe the context and complete the wakeup.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420095005.GH4064@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2824f5033248600673e3e126a4d135363cbfd9ac upstream.
The snapshot trigger currently only affects the main ring buffer, even when
it is used by the instances. This can be confusing as the snapshot trigger
is listed in the instance.
> # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
> # mkdir instances/foo
> # echo snapshot > instances/foo/events/syscalls/sys_enter_fchownat/trigger
> # echo top buffer > trace_marker
> # echo foo buffer > instances/foo/trace_marker
> # touch /tmp/bar
> # chown rostedt /tmp/bar
> # cat instances/foo/snapshot
# tracer: nop
#
#
# * Snapshot is freed *
#
# Snapshot commands:
# echo 0 > snapshot : Clears and frees snapshot buffer
# echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated.
# Takes a snapshot of the main buffer.
# echo 2 > snapshot : Clears snapshot buffer (but does not allocate or free)
# (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that
# is not a '0' or '1')
> # cat snapshot
# tracer: nop
#
# _-----=> irqs-off
# / _----=> need-resched
# | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
# || / _--=> preempt-depth
# ||| / delay
# TASK-PID CPU# |||| TIMESTAMP FUNCTION
# | | | |||| | |
bash-1189 [000] .... 111.488323: tracing_mark_write: top buffer
Not only did the snapshot occur in the top level buffer, but the instance
snapshot buffer should have been allocated, and it is still free.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85f2b08268c01 ("tracing: Add basic event trigger framework")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 86b389ff22bd6ad8fd3cb98e41cd271886c6d023 upstream.
If a instance has an event trigger enabled when it is freed, it could cause
an access of free memory. Here's the case that crashes:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# mkdir instances/foo
# echo snapshot > instances/foo/events/initcall/initcall_start/trigger
# rmdir instances/foo
Would produce:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
Modules linked in: tun bridge ...
CPU: 5 PID: 6203 Comm: rmdir Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc4-test+ #933
Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016
RIP: 0010:clear_event_triggers+0x3b/0x70
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003783de0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b2b RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800c7130ba0
RBP: ffffc90003783e00 R08: ffff8801131993f8 R09: 0000000100230016
R10: ffffc90003783d80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800c7130ba0
R13: ffff8800c7130bd8 R14: ffff8800cc093768 R15: 00000000ffffff9c
FS: 00007f6f4aa86700(0000) GS:ffff88011eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6f4a5aed60 CR3: 00000000cd552001 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
event_trace_del_tracer+0x2a/0xc5
instance_rmdir+0x15c/0x200
tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x52/0x90
vfs_rmdir+0xdb/0x160
do_rmdir+0x16d/0x1c0
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
This was due to the call the clears out the triggers when an instance is
being deleted not removing the trigger from the link list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85f2b08268c01 ("tracing: Add basic event trigger framework")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1e0ce03bf142454f38a5fc050bf4fd698d2d36d8 ]
The "mdr" command should repeat (continue) when only Enter/Return
is pressed, so make it do so.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3caa973b7a260e7a2a69edc94c300ab9c65148c3 ]
When RCU stall warning triggers, it can print out a lot of messages
while holding spinlocks. If the console device is slow (e.g. an
actual or IPMI serial console), it may end up triggering NMI hard
lockup watchdog like the following.
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[ Upstream commit 23138ead270045f1b3e912e667967b6094244999 ]
If there is a memory allocation error when trying to change an audit
kernel feature value, the ignored allocation error will trigger a NULL
pointer dereference oops on subsequent use of that pointer. Return
instead.
Passes audit-testsuite.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/76
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: not necessary (other funcs check for NULL), but a good practice]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9e5b127d6f33468143d90c8a45ca12410e4c3fa7 ]
Mark reported his arm64 perf fuzzer runs sometimes splat like:
armv8pmu_read_counter+0x1e8/0x2d8
armpmu_event_update+0x8c/0x188
armpmu_read+0xc/0x18
perf_output_read+0x550/0x11e8
perf_event_read_event+0x1d0/0x248
perf_event_exit_task+0x468/0xbb8
do_exit+0x690/0x1310
do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2b0
get_signal+0x2e8/0x17a8
do_signal+0x144/0x4f8
do_notify_resume+0x148/0x1e8
work_pending+0x8/0x14
which asserts that we only call pmu::read() on ACTIVE events.
The above callchain does:
perf_event_exit_task()
perf_event_exit_task_context()
task_ctx_sched_out() // INACTIVE
perf_event_exit_event()
perf_event_set_state(EXIT) // EXIT
sync_child_event()
perf_event_read_event()
perf_output_read()
perf_output_read_group()
leader->pmu->read()
Which results in doing a pmu::read() on an !ACTIVE event.
I _think_ this is 'new' since we added attr.inherit_stat, which added
the perf_event_read_event() to the exit path, without that
perf_event_read_output() would only trigger from samples and for
@event to trigger a sample, it's leader _must_ be ACTIVE too.
Still, adding this check makes it consistent with the @sub case for
the siblings.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 33801b94741d6c3be9713c10aa627477216c21e2 ]
There's two problems when installing cgroup events on CPUs: firstly
list_update_cgroup_event() only tries to set cpuctx->cgrp for the
first event, if that mismatches on @cgrp we'll not try again for later
additions.
Secondly, when we install a cgroup event into an active context, only
issue an event reprogram when the event matches the current cgroup
context. This avoids a pointless event reprogramming.
Signed-off-by: leilei.lin <leilei.lin@alibaba-inc.com>
[ Improved the changelog and comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com
Cc: eranian@gmail.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: yang_oliver@hotmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306093637.28247-1-linxiulei@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d29a20645d5e929aa7e8616f28e5d8e1c49263ec ]
While running rt-tests' pi_stress program I got the following splat:
rq->clock_update_flags < RQCF_ACT_SKIP
WARNING: CPU: 27 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/sched.h:960 assert_clock_updated.isra.38.part.39+0x13/0x20
[...]
<IRQ>
enqueue_top_rt_rq+0xf4/0x150
? cpufreq_dbs_governor_start+0x170/0x170
sched_rt_rq_enqueue+0x65/0x80
sched_rt_period_timer+0x156/0x360
? sched_rt_rq_enqueue+0x80/0x80
__hrtimer_run_queues+0xfa/0x260
hrtimer_interrupt+0xcb/0x220
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x62/0x120
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
</IRQ>
[...]
do_idle+0x183/0x1e0
cpu_startup_entry+0x5f/0x70
start_secondary+0x192/0x1d0
secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0
We can get rid of it be the "traditional" means of adding an
update_rq_clock() call after acquiring the rq->lock in
do_sched_rt_period_timer().
The case for the RT task throttling (which this workload also hits)
can be ignored in that the skip_update call is actually bogus and
quite the contrary (the request bits are removed/reverted).
By setting RQCF_UPDATED we really don't care if the skip is happening
or not and will therefore make the assert_clock_updated() check happy.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180402164954.16255-1-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c917e0f259908e75bd2a65877e25f9d90c22c848 ]
When a perf_event is attached to parent cgroup, it should count events
for all children cgroups:
parent_group <---- perf_event
\
- child_group <---- process(es)
However, in our tests, we found this perf_event cannot report reliable
results. Here is an example case:
# create cgroups
mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/p/c
# start perf for parent group
perf stat -e instructions -G "p"
# on another console, run test process in child cgroup:
stressapptest -s 2 -M 1000 & echo $! > /sys/fs/cgroup/p/c/cgroup.procs
# after the test process is done, stop perf in the first console shows
<not counted> instructions p
The instruction should not be "not counted" as the process runs in the
child cgroup.
We found this is because perf_event->cgrp and cpuctx->cgrp are not
identical, thus perf_event->cgrp are not updated properly.
This patch fixes this by updating perf_cgroup properly for ancestor
cgroup(s).
Reported-by: Ephraim Park <ephiepark@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <kernel-team@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180312165943.1057894-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 537f4146c53c95aac977852b371bafb9c6755ee1 ]
Never directly free @dev after calling device_register(), even
if it returned an error! Always use put_device() to give up the
reference initialized in this function instead.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 88913bd8ea2a75d7e460a4bed5f75e1c32660d7e ]
chan->n_subbufs is set by the user and relay_create_buf() does a kmalloc()
of chan->n_subbufs * sizeof(size_t *).
kmalloc_slab() will generate a warning when this fails if
chan->subbufs * sizeof(size_t *) > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE.
Limit chan->n_subbufs to the maximum allowed kmalloc() size.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1802061216100.122576@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Fixes: f6302f1bcd75 ("relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open()")
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 23d6aef74da86a33fa6bb75f79565e0a16ee97c2 upstream.
`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to
kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8bf37d8c067bb7eb8e7c381bdadf9bd89182b6bc upstream
The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it
avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an
explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require
even more workarounds.
Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp
code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide
which mitigations are relevant for seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00a02d0c502a06d15e07b857f8ff921e3e402675 upstream
If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when
adding filters.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b849a812f7eb92e96d1c8239b06581b2cfd8b275 upstream
Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE in seccomp() because seccomp does not allow to
widen restrictions.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c3070890d06ff82eecb808d02d2ca39169533ef upstream
When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp
will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp
indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7bbf1373e228840bb0295a2ca26d548ef37f448e upstream
Adjust arch_prctl_get/set_spec_ctrl() to operate on tasks other than
current.
This is needed both for /proc/$pid/status queries and for seccomp (since
thread-syncing can trigger seccomp in non-current threads).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5596fe34495cf0f645f417eb928ef224df3e3cb4 upstream.
for_each_cpu() unintuitively reports CPU0 as set independent of the actual
cpumask content on UP kernels. This causes an unexpected PIT interrupt
storm on a UP kernel running in an SMP virtual machine on Hyper-V, and as
a result, the virtual machine can suffer from a strange random delay of 1~20
minutes during boot-up, and sometimes it can hang forever.
Protect if by checking whether the cpumask is empty before entering the
for_each_cpu() loop.
[ tglx: Use !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) instead of #ifdeffery ]
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com>
Cc: "Michael Kelley (EOSG)" <Michael.H.Kelley@microsoft.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/KL1P15301MB000678289FE55BA365B3279ABF990@KL1P15301MB0006.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/KL1P15301MB0006FA63BC22BEB64902EAA0BF930@KL1P15301MB0006.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4411ec1d1993e8dbff2898390e3fed280d88e446 upstream.
> kernel/events/ring_buffer.c:871 perf_mmap_to_page() warn: potential spectre issue 'rb->aux_pages'
Userspace controls @pgoff through the fault address. Sanitize the
array index before doing the array dereference.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 50268a3d266ecfdd6c5873d62b2758d9732fc598 upstream.
Fix string fetch function to terminate with NUL.
It is OK to drop the rest of string.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Fixes: 5baaa59ef09e ("tracing/probes: Implement 'memory' fetch method for uprobes")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 354d7793070611b4df5a79fbb0f12752d0ed0cc5 upstream.
> kernel/sched/autogroup.c:230 proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice() warn: potential spectre issue 'sched_prio_to_weight'
Userspace controls @nice, sanitize the array index.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 97739501f207efe33145b918817f305b822987f8 upstream.
If the next_freq field of struct sugov_policy is set to UINT_MAX,
it shouldn't be used for updating the CPU frequency (this is a
special "invalid" value), but after commit b7eaf1aab9f8 (cpufreq:
schedutil: Avoid reducing frequency of busy CPUs prematurely) it
may be passed as the new frequency to sugov_update_commit() in
sugov_update_single().
Fix that by adding an extra check for the special UINT_MAX value
of next_freq to sugov_update_single().
Fixes: b7eaf1aab9f8 (cpufreq: schedutil: Avoid reducing frequency of busy CPUs prematurely)
Reported-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: 4.12+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dc432c3d7f9bceb3de6f5b44fb9c657c9810ed6d upstream.
The regex match function regex_match_front() in the tracing filter logic,
was fixed to test just the pattern length from testing the entire test
string. That is, it went from strncmp(str, r->pattern, len) to
strcmp(str, r->pattern, r->len).
The issue is that str is not guaranteed to be nul terminated, and if r->len
is greater than the length of str, it can access more memory than is
allocated.
The solution is to add a simple test if (len < r->len) return 0.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 285caad415f45 ("tracing/filters: Fix MATCH_FRONT_ONLY filter matching")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0a0b98734479aa5b3c671d5190e86273372cab95 upstream.
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bfb3d7b8b906b66551424d7636182126e1d134c8 upstream.
If the get_callchain_buffers fails to allocate the buffer it will
decrease the nr_callchain_events right away.
There's no point of checking the allocation error for
nr_callchain_events > 1. Removing that check.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-3-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0c92c7a3c5d416f47b32c5f20a611dfeca5d5f2e upstream.
As Miklos reported and suggested:
This pattern repeats two times in trace_uprobe.c and in
kernel/events/core.c as well:
ret = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (ret)
goto fail_address_parse;
inode = igrab(d_inode(path.dentry));
path_put(&path);
And it's wrong. You can only hold a reference to the inode if you
have an active ref to the superblock as well (which is normally
through path.mnt) or holding s_umount.
This way unmounting the containing filesystem while the tracepoint is
active will give you the "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount..." message
and a crash when the inode is finally put.
Solution: store path instead of inode.
This patch fixes two instances in trace_uprobe.c. struct path is added to
struct trace_uprobe to keep the inode and containing mount point
referenced.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423172135.4050588-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Fixes: f3f096cfedf8 ("tracing: Provide trace events interface for uprobes")
Fixes: 33ea4b24277b ("perf/core: Implement the 'perf_uprobe' PMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Howard McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@fb.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d66a270be3310d7aa132fec0cea77d3d32a0ff75 upstream.
Tracepoint should only warn when a kernel API user does not respect the
required preconditions (e.g. same tracepoint enabled twice, or called
to remove a tracepoint that does not exist).
Silence warning in out-of-memory conditions, given that the error is
returned to the caller.
This ensures that out-of-memory error-injection testing does not trigger
warnings in tracepoint.c, which were seen by syzbot.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/001a114465e241a8720567419a72@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/001a1140e0de15fc910567464190@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180315124424.32319-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
CC: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
CC: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
CC: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: de7b2973903c6 ("tracepoint: Use struct pointer instead of name hash for reg/unreg tracepoints")
Reported-by: syzbot+9c0d616860575a73166a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+4e9ae7fa46233396f64d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1f71addd34f4c442bec7d7c749acc1beb58126f2 upstream.
Kaike reported that in tests rdma hrtimers occasionaly stopped working. He
did great debugging, which provided enough context to decode the problem.
CPU 3 CPU 2
idle
start sched_timer expires = 712171000000
queue->next = sched_timer
start rdmavt timer. expires = 712172915662
lock(baseof(CPU3))
tick_nohz_stop_tick()
tick = 716767000000 timerqueue_add(tmr)
hrtimer_set_expires(sched_timer, tick);
sched_timer->expires = 716767000000 <---- FAIL
if (tmr->expires < queue->next->expires)
hrtimer_start(sched_timer) queue->next = tmr;
lock(baseof(CPU3))
unlock(baseof(CPU3))
timerqueue_remove()
timerqueue_add()
ts->sched_timer is queued and queue->next is pointing to it, but then
ts->sched_timer.expires is modified.
This not only corrupts the ordering of the timerqueue RB tree, it also
makes CPU2 see the new expiry time of timerqueue->next->expires when
checking whether timerqueue->next needs to be updated. So CPU2 sees that
the rdma timer is earlier than timerqueue->next and sets the rdma timer as
new next.
Depending on whether it had also seen the new time at RB tree enqueue, it
might have queued the rdma timer at the wrong place and then after removing
the sched_timer the RB tree is completely hosed.
The problem was introduced with a commit which tried to solve inconsistency
between the hrtimer in the tick_sched data and the underlying hardware
clockevent. It split out hrtimer_set_expires() to store the new tick time
in both the NOHZ and the NOHZ + HIGHRES case, but missed the fact that in
the NOHZ + HIGHRES case the hrtimer might still be queued.
Use hrtimer_start(timer, tick...) for the NOHZ + HIGHRES case which sets
timer->expires after canceling the timer and move the hrtimer_set_expires()
invocation into the NOHZ only code path which is not affected as it merily
uses the hrtimer as next event storage so code pathes can be shared with
the NOHZ + HIGHRES case.
Fixes: d4af6d933ccf ("nohz: Fix spurious warning when hrtimer and clockevent get out of sync")
Reported-by: "Wan Kaike" <kaike.wan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "Marciniszyn Mike" <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Dalessandro Dennis" <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Cc: "Fleck John" <john.fleck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: "Weiny Ira" <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org"
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804241637390.1679@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804242119210.1597@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 9a0fd675304d410f3a9586e1b333e16f4658d56c upstream.
It's been missing for a while but no one is touching that up. Fix it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180315060639.9578-1-peterx@redhat.com
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b2c86250122d ("tracing: Add NMI tracing in hwlat detector")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 78b562fbfa2cf0a9fcb23c3154756b690f4905c1 upstream.
Return immediately when we find issue in the user stack checks. The
error value could get overwritten by following check for
PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 60e2364e60e8 ("perf: Add ability to sample machine state on interrupt")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5af44ca53d019de47efe6dbc4003dd518e5197ed upstream.
The syzbot hit KASAN bug in perf_callchain_store having the entry stored
behind the allocated bounds [1].
We miss the sample_max_stack check for the initial event that allocates
callchain buffers. This missing check allows to create an event with
sample_max_stack value bigger than the global sysctl maximum:
# sysctl -a | grep perf_event_max_stack
kernel.perf_event_max_stack = 127
# perf record -vv -C 1 -e cycles/max-stack=256/ kill
...
perf_event_attr:
size 112
...
sample_max_stack 256
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid -1 cpu 1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 4
Note the '-C 1', which forces perf record to create just single event.
Otherwise it opens event for every cpu, then the sample_max_stack check
fails on the second event and all's fine.
The fix is to run the sample_max_stack check also for the first event
with callchains.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152352732920874&w=2
Reported-by: syzbot+7c449856228b63ac951e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 97c79a38cd45 ("perf core: Per event callchain limit")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bd03143007eb9b03a7f2316c677780561b68ba2a upstream.
syszbot reported the following debugobjects splat:
ODEBUG: object is on stack, but not annotated
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4185 at lib/debugobjects.c:328
RIP: 0010:debug_object_is_on_stack lib/debugobjects.c:327 [inline]
debug_object_init+0x17/0x20 lib/debugobjects.c:391
debug_hrtimer_init kernel/time/hrtimer.c:410 [inline]
debug_init kernel/time/hrtimer.c:458 [inline]
hrtimer_init+0x8c/0x410 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1259
alarm_init kernel/time/alarmtimer.c:339 [inline]
alarm_timer_nsleep+0x164/0x4d0 kernel/time/alarmtimer.c:787
SYSC_clock_nanosleep kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1226 [inline]
SyS_clock_nanosleep+0x235/0x330 kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1204
do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
This happens because the hrtimer for the alarm nanosleep is on stack, but
the code does not use the proper debug objects initialization.
Split out the code for the allocated use cases and invoke
hrtimer_init_on_stack() for the nanosleep related functions.
Reported-by: syzbot+a3e0726462b2e346a31d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1803261528270.1585@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 11dc13224c975efcec96647a4768a6f1bb7a19a8 ]
When queuing on the qspinlock, the count field for the current CPU's head
node is incremented. This needn't be atomic because locking in e.g. IRQ
context is balanced and so an IRQ will return with node->count as it
found it.
However, the compiler could in theory reorder the initialisation of
node[idx] before the increment of the head node->count, causing an
IRQ to overwrite the initialised node and potentially corrupt the lock
state.
Avoid the potential for this harmful compiler reordering by placing a
barrier() between the increment of the head node->count and the subsequent
node initialisation.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518528177-19169-3-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d9e952697de89b53227f06d4241f275eb99cfc4 ]
When a program is attached to a map we increment the program refcnt
to ensure that the program is not removed while it is potentially
being referenced from sockmap side. However, if this same program
also references the map (this is a reasonably common pattern in
my programs) then the verifier will also increment the maps refcnt
from the verifier. This is to ensure the map doesn't get garbage
collected while the program has a reference to it.
So we are left in a state where the map holds the refcnt on the
program stopping it from being removed and releasing the map refcnt.
And vice versa the program holds a refcnt on the map stopping it
from releasing the refcnt on the prog.
All this is fine as long as users detach the program while the
map fd is still around. But, if the user omits this detach command
we are left with a dangling map we can no longer release.
To resolve this when the map fd is released decrement the program
references and remove any reference from the map to the program.
This fixes the issue with possibly dangling map and creates a
user side API constraint. That is, the map fd must be held open
for programs to be attached to a map.
Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 328008a72d38b5bde6491e463405c34a81a65d3e ]
The declaration for swsusp_arch_resume marks it as 'asmlinkage', but the
definition in x86-32 does not, and it fails to include the header with the
declaration. This leads to a warning when building with
link-time-optimizations:
kernel/power/power.h:108:23: error: type of 'swsusp_arch_resume' does not match original declaration [-Werror=lto-type-mismatch]
extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void);
^
arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c:148:0: note: 'swsusp_arch_resume' was previously declared here
int swsusp_arch_resume(void)
This moves the declaration into a globally visible header file and fixes up
both x86 definitions to match it.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202145634.200291-2-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2a872fa4e9c8adc79c830e4009e1cc0c013a9d8a upstream.
The ring buffer is made up of a link list of pages. When making the ring
buffer bigger, it will allocate all the pages it needs before adding to the
ring buffer, and if it fails, it frees them and returns an error. This makes
increasing the ring buffer size an all or nothing action. When this was
first created, the pages were allocated with "NORETRY". This was to not
cause any Out-Of-Memory (OOM) actions from allocating the ring buffer. But
NORETRY was too strict, as the ring buffer would fail to expand even when
there's memory available, but was taken up in the page cache.
Commit 848618857d253 ("tracing/ring_buffer: Try harder to allocate") changed
the allocating from NORETRY to RETRY_MAYFAIL. The RETRY_MAYFAIL would
allocate from the page cache, but if there was no memory available, it would
simple fail the allocation and not trigger an OOM.
This worked fine, but had one problem. As the ring buffer would allocate one
page at a time, it could take up all memory in the system before it failed
to allocate and free that memory. If the allocation is happening and the
ring buffer allocates all memory and then tries to take more than available,
its allocation will not trigger an OOM, but if there's any allocation that
happens someplace else, that could trigger an OOM, even though once the ring
buffer's allocation fails, it would free up all the previous memory it tried
to allocate, and allow other memory allocations to succeed.
Commit d02bd27bd33dd ("mm/page_alloc.c: calculate 'available' memory in a
separate function") separated out si_mem_availble() as a separate function
that could be used to see how much memory is available in the system. Using
this function to make sure that the ring buffer could be allocated before it
tries to allocate pages we can avoid allocating all memory in the system and
making it vulnerable to OOMs if other allocations are taking place.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522320104-6573-1-git-send-email-zhaoyang.huang@spreadtrum.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Fixes: 848618857d253 ("tracing/ring_buffer: Try harder to allocate")
Requires: d02bd27bd33dd ("mm/page_alloc.c: calculate 'available' memory in a separate function")
Reported-by: Zhaoyang Huang <huangzhaoyang@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 60bb83b81169820c691fbfa33a6a4aef32aa4b0b upstream.
We've got a bug report indicating a kernel panic at booting on an x86-32
system, and it turned out to be the invalid PCI resource assigned after
reallocation. __find_resource() first aligns the resource start address
and resets the end address with start+size-1 accordingly, then checks
whether it's contained. Here the end address may overflow the integer,
although resource_contains() still returns true because the function
validates only start and end address. So this ends up with returning an
invalid resource (start > end).
There was already an attempt to cover such a problem in the commit
47ea91b4052d ("Resource: fix wrong resource window calculation"), but
this case is an overseen one.
This patch adds the validity check of the newly calculated resource for
avoiding the integer overflow problem.
Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1086739
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/s5hpo37d5l8.wl-tiwai@suse.de
Fixes: 23c570a67448 ("resource: ability to resize an allocated resource")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Reported-by: Michael Henders <hendersm@shaw.ca>
Tested-by: Michael Henders <hendersm@shaw.ca>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 621b6d2ea297d0fb6030452c5bcd221f12165fcf upstream.
A use-after-free bug was caught by KASAN while running usdt related
code (BCC project. bcc/tests/python/test_usdt2.py):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uprobe_perf_close+0x222/0x3b0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff880384f9b4a4 by task test_usdt2.py/870
CPU: 4 PID: 870 Comm: test_usdt2.py Tainted: G W 4.16.0-next-20180409 #215
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xc7/0x15b
? show_regs_print_info+0x5/0x5
? printk+0x9c/0xc3
? kmsg_dump_rewind_nolock+0x6e/0x6e
? uprobe_perf_close+0x222/0x3b0
print_address_description+0x83/0x3a0
? uprobe_perf_close+0x222/0x3b0
kasan_report+0x1dd/0x460
? uprobe_perf_close+0x222/0x3b0
uprobe_perf_close+0x222/0x3b0
? probes_open+0x180/0x180
? free_filters_list+0x290/0x290
trace_uprobe_register+0x1bb/0x500
? perf_event_attach_bpf_prog+0x310/0x310
? probe_event_disable+0x4e0/0x4e0
perf_uprobe_destroy+0x63/0xd0
_free_event+0x2bc/0xbd0
? lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x100/0x100
? ring_buffer_attach+0x550/0x550
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x1a/0x30
? perf_event_release_kernel+0x3e4/0xc00
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x12e/0x540
? wait_for_completion+0x430/0x430
? lock_downgrade+0x3c0/0x3c0
? lock_release+0x980/0x980
? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x118/0x150
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x121/0x210
? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x150/0x150
perf_event_release_kernel+0x5d4/0xc00
? put_event+0x30/0x30
? fsnotify+0xd2d/0xea0
? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1a0
? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags.part.0+0x1b0/0x1b0
? pvclock_clocksource_read+0x152/0x2b0
? pvclock_read_flags+0x80/0x80
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x1a/0x30
? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1a0
? pvclock_clocksource_read+0x152/0x2b0
? locks_remove_file+0xec/0x470
? pvclock_read_flags+0x80/0x80
? fcntl_setlk+0x880/0x880
? ima_file_free+0x8d/0x390
? lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x100/0x100
? ima_file_check+0x110/0x110
? fsnotify+0xea0/0xea0
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x1a/0x30
? rcu_note_context_switch+0x600/0x600
perf_release+0x21/0x40
__fput+0x264/0x620
? fput+0xf0/0xf0
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x121/0x210
? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x150/0x150
? SyS_fchdir+0x100/0x100
? fsnotify+0xea0/0xea0
task_work_run+0x14b/0x1e0
? task_work_cancel+0x1c0/0x1c0
? copy_fd_bitmaps+0x150/0x150
? vfs_read+0xe5/0x260
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x17b/0x1b0
? trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit+0x1a0/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x3f6/0x490
? syscall_return_slowpath+0x2c0/0x2c0
? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1f/0xaa
? syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a3/0x2c0
? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1f/0xaa
? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x11c/0x1e0
? enter_from_user_mode+0x30/0x30
random: crng init done
? __put_user_4+0x1c/0x30
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x7f41d95f9340
RSP: 002b:00007fffe71e4268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007f41d95f9340
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000002401 RDI: 000000000000000d
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007f41ca8ff700 R09: 00007f41d996dd1f
R10: 00007fffe71e41e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fffe71e4330
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffffc R15: 00007fffe71e4290
Allocated by task 870:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x11a/0x430
copy_process.part.19+0x11a0/0x41c0
_do_fork+0x1be/0xa20
do_syscall_64+0x198/0x490
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
Freed by task 0:
__kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
kmem_cache_free+0x102/0x4d0
free_task+0xfe/0x160
__put_task_struct+0x189/0x290
delayed_put_task_struct+0x119/0x250
rcu_process_callbacks+0xa6c/0x1b60
__do_softirq+0x238/0x7ae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880384f9b480
which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 12928
It occurs because task_struct is freed before perf_event which refers
to the task and task flags are checked while teardown of the event.
perf_event_alloc() assigns task_struct to hw.target of perf_event,
but there is no reference counting for it.
As a fix we get_task_struct() in perf_event_alloc() at above mentioned
assignment and put_task_struct() in _free_event().
Signed-off-by: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 63b6da39bb38e8f1a1ef3180d32a39d6 ("perf: Fix perf_event_exit_task() race")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180409100346.6416-1-bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f67b15037a7a50c57f72e69a6d59941ad90a0f0f upstream.
Annoyingly, modify_user_hw_breakpoint() unnecessarily complicates the
modification of a breakpoint - simplify it and remove the pointless
local variables.
Also update the stale Docbook while at it.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0fa4fe85f4724fff89b09741c437cbee9cf8b008 upstream.
The current check statement in BPF syscall will do a capability check
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN before checking sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This
code path will trigger unnecessary security hooks on capability checking
and cause false alarms on unprivileged process trying to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN
access. This can be resolved by simply switch the order of the statement
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not required anyway if unprivileged bpf syscall is
allowed.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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