| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
[This does not correspond to any specific patch in the upstream tree as it was
fixed accidentally by rewriting the code in the 3.1 release]
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=740121
1. Luke Macken triggered WARN_ON(!(group_stop & GROUP_STOP_SIGMASK))
in do_signal_stop().
This is because do_signal_stop() clears GROUP_STOP_SIGMASK part
unconditionally but doesn't update it if task_is_stopped().
2. Looking at this problem I noticed that WARN_ON_ONCE(!ptrace) is
not right, a stopped-but-resumed tracee can clone the untraced
thread in the SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED group, the new thread can start
another group-stop.
Remove this warning, we need more fixes to make it true.
Reported-by: Luke Macken <lmacken@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 9bab0b7fbaceec47d32db51cd9e59c82fb071f5a upstream.
This adds a mechanism to resume selected IRQs during syscore_resume
instead of dpm_resume_noirq.
Under Xen we need to resume IRQs associated with IPIs early enough
that the resched IPI is unmasked and we can therefore schedule
ourselves out of the stop_machine where the suspend/resume takes
place.
This issue was introduced by 676dc3cf5bc3 "xen: Use IRQF_FORCE_RESUME".
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <Jeremy.Fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1318713254.11016.52.camel@dagon.hellion.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 436fc280261dcfce5af38f08b89287750dc91cd2 upstream.
The trace_pipe_raw handler holds a cached page from the time the file
is opened to the time it is closed. The cached page is used to handle
the case of the user space buffer being smaller than what was read from
the ring buffer. The left over buffer is held in the cache so that the
next read will continue where the data left off.
After EOF is returned (no more data in the buffer), the index of
the cached page is set to zero. If a user app reads the page again
after EOF, the check in the buffer will see that the cached page
is less than page size and will return the cached page again. This
will cause reading the trace_pipe_raw again after EOF to return
duplicate data, making the output look like the time went backwards
but instead data is just repeated.
The fix is to not reset the index right after all data is read
from the cache, but to reset it after all data is read and more
data exists in the ring buffer.
Reported-by: Jeremy Eder <jeder@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit cbbc719fccdb8cbd87350a05c0d33167c9b79365 upstream.
The parameter's origin type is long. On an i386 architecture, it can
easily be larger than 0x80000000, causing this function to convert it
to a sign-extended u64 type.
Change the type to unsigned long so we get the correct result.
Signed-off-by: hank <pyu@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
[ build fix ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 37252db6aa576c34fd794a5a54fb32d7a8b3a07a upstream.
Due to post-increment in condition of kmod_loop_msg in __request_module(),
the system log can be spammed by much more than 5 instances of the 'runaway
loop' message if the number of events triggering it makes the kmod_loop_msg
to overflow.
Fix that by making sure we never increment it past the threshold.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit bcd5cff7216f9b2de0a148cc355eac199dc6f1cf upstream.
There's a lock inversion between the cputimer->lock and rq->lock;
notably the two callchains involved are:
update_rlimit_cpu()
sighand->siglock
set_process_cpu_timer()
cpu_timer_sample_group()
thread_group_cputimer()
cputimer->lock
thread_group_cputime()
task_sched_runtime()
->pi_lock
rq->lock
scheduler_tick()
rq->lock
task_tick_fair()
update_curr()
account_group_exec()
cputimer->lock
Where the first one is enabling a CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID timer, and
the second one is keeping up-to-date.
This problem was introduced by e8abccb7193 ("posix-cpu-timers: Cure
SMP accounting oddities").
Cure the problem by removing the cputimer->lock and rq->lock nesting,
this leaves concurrent enablers doing duplicate work, but the time
wasted should be on the same order otherwise wasted spinning on the
lock and the greater-than assignment filter should ensure we preserve
monotonicity.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Simon Kirby <sim@hostway.ca>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1318928713.21167.4.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit a84a79e4d369a73c0130b5858199e949432da4c6 upstream.
The size is always valid, but variable-length arrays generate worse code
for no good reason (unless the function happens to be inlined and the
compiler sees the length for the simple constant it is).
Also, there seems to be some code generation problem on POWER, where
Henrik Bakken reports that register r28 can get corrupted under some
subtle circumstances (interrupt happening at the wrong time?). That all
indicates some seriously broken compiler issues, but since variable
length arrays are bad regardless, there's little point in trying to
chase it down.
"Just don't do that, then".
Reported-by: Henrik Grindal Bakken <henribak@cisco.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit f7bc8b61f65726ff98f52e286b28e294499d7a08 upstream.
Enabling function tracer to trace all functions, then load a module and
then disable function tracing will cause ftrace to fail.
This can also happen by enabling function tracing on the command line:
ftrace=function
and during boot up, modules are loaded, then you disable function tracing
with 'echo nop > current_tracer' you will trigger a bug in ftrace that
will shut itself down.
The reason is, the new ftrace code keeps ref counts of all ftrace_ops that
are registered for tracing. When one or more ftrace_ops are registered,
all the records that represent the functions that the ftrace_ops will
trace have a ref count incremented. If this ref count is not zero,
when the code modification runs, that function will be enabled for tracing.
If the ref count is zero, that function will be disabled from tracing.
To make sure the accounting was working, FTRACE_WARN_ON()s were added
to updating of the ref counts.
If the ref count hits its max (> 2^30 ftrace_ops added), or if
the ref count goes below zero, a FTRACE_WARN_ON() is triggered which
disables all modification of code.
Since it is common for ftrace_ops to trace all functions in the kernel,
instead of creating > 20,000 hash items for the ftrace_ops, the hash
count is just set to zero, and it represents that the ftrace_ops is
to trace all functions. This is where the issues arrise.
If you enable function tracing to trace all functions, and then add
a module, the modules function records do not get the ref count updated.
When the function tracer is disabled, all function records ref counts
are subtracted. Since the modules never had their ref counts incremented,
they go below zero and the FTRACE_WARN_ON() is triggered.
The solution to this is rather simple. When modules are loaded, and
their functions are added to the the ftrace pool, look to see if any
ftrace_ops are registered that trace all functions. And for those,
update the ref count for the module function records.
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
commit 43dd61c9a09bd413e837df829e6bfb42159be52a upstream.
The new code that allows different utilities to pick and choose
what functions they trace broke the :mod: hook that allows users
to trace only functions of a particular module.
The reason is that the :mod: hook bypasses the hash that is setup
to allow individual users to trace their own functions and uses
the global hash directly. But if the global hash has not been
set up, it will cause a bug:
echo '*:mod:radeon' > /sys/kernel/debug/set_ftrace_filter
produces:
[drm:drm_mode_getfb] *ERROR* invalid framebuffer id
[drm:radeon_crtc_page_flip] *ERROR* failed to reserve new rbo buffer before flip
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff8160ec90
IP: [<ffffffff810d9136>] add_hash_entry+0x66/0xd0
PGD 1a05067 PUD 1a09063 PMD 80000000016001e1
Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP Jul 7 04:02:28 phyllis kernel: [55303.858604] CPU 1
Modules linked in: cryptd aes_x86_64 aes_generic binfmt_misc rfcomm bnep ip6table_filter hid radeon r8169 ahci libahci mii ttm drm_kms_helper drm video i2c_algo_bit intel_agp intel_gtt
Pid: 10344, comm: bash Tainted: G WC 3.0.0-rc5 #1 Dell Inc. Inspiron N5010/0YXXJJ
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d9136>] [<ffffffff810d9136>] add_hash_entry+0x66/0xd0
RSP: 0018:ffff88003a96bda8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff8801301735c0 RBX: ffffffff8160ec80 RCX: 0000000000306ee0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff880137c92940
RBP: ffff88003a96bdb8 R08: ffff880137c95680 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff81c9df78
R13: ffff8801153d1000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f329c18a700(0000) GS:ffff880137c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffff8160ec90 CR3: 000000003002b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process bash (pid: 10344, threadinfo ffff88003a96a000, task ffff88012fcfc470)
Stack:
0000000000000fd0 00000000000000fc ffff88003a96be38 ffffffff810d92f5
ffff88011c4c4e00 ffff880000000000 000000000b69f4d0 ffffffff8160ec80
ffff8800300e6f06 0000000081130295 0000000000000282 ffff8800300e6f00
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810d92f5>] match_records+0x155/0x1b0
[<ffffffff810d940c>] ftrace_mod_callback+0xbc/0x100
[<ffffffff810dafdf>] ftrace_regex_write+0x16f/0x210
[<ffffffff810db09f>] ftrace_filter_write+0xf/0x20
[<ffffffff81166e48>] vfs_write+0xc8/0x190
[<ffffffff81167001>] sys_write+0x51/0x90
[<ffffffff815c7e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8b 33 31 d2 48 85 f6 75 33 49 89 d4 4c 03 63 08 49 8b 14 24 48 85 d2 48 89 10 74 04 48 89 42 08 49 89 04 24 4c 89 60 08 31 d2
RIP [<ffffffff810d9136>] add_hash_entry+0x66/0xd0
RSP <ffff88003a96bda8>
CR2: ffffffff8160ec90
---[ end trace a5d031828efdd88e ]---
Reported-by: Brian Marete <marete@toshnix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit d670ec13178d0fd8680e6742a2bc6e04f28f87d8 upstream.
David reported:
Attached below is a watered-down version of rt/tst-cpuclock2.c from
GLIBC. Just build it with "gcc -o test test.c -lpthread -lrt" or
similar.
Run it several times, and you will see cases where the main thread
will measure a process clock difference before and after the nanosleep
which is smaller than the cpu-burner thread's individual thread clock
difference. This doesn't make any sense since the cpu-burner thread
is part of the top-level process's thread group.
I've reproduced this on both x86-64 and sparc64 (using both 32-bit and
64-bit binaries).
For example:
[davem@boricha build-x86_64-linux]$ ./test
process: before(0.001221967) after(0.498624371) diff(497402404)
thread: before(0.000081692) after(0.498316431) diff(498234739)
self: before(0.001223521) after(0.001240219) diff(16698)
[davem@boricha build-x86_64-linux]$
The diff of 'process' should always be >= the diff of 'thread'.
I make sure to wrap the 'thread' clock measurements the most tightly
around the nanosleep() call, and that the 'process' clock measurements
are the outer-most ones.
---
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pthread.h>
static pthread_barrier_t barrier;
static void *chew_cpu(void *arg)
{
pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
while (1)
__asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory");
return NULL;
}
int main(void)
{
clockid_t process_clock, my_thread_clock, th_clock;
struct timespec process_before, process_after;
struct timespec me_before, me_after;
struct timespec th_before, th_after;
struct timespec sleeptime;
unsigned long diff;
pthread_t th;
int err;
err = clock_getcpuclockid(0, &process_clock);
if (err)
return 1;
err = pthread_getcpuclockid(pthread_self(), &my_thread_clock);
if (err)
return 1;
pthread_barrier_init(&barrier, NULL, 2);
err = pthread_create(&th, NULL, chew_cpu, NULL);
if (err)
return 1;
err = pthread_getcpuclockid(th, &th_clock);
if (err)
return 1;
pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
err = clock_gettime(process_clock, &process_before);
if (err)
return 1;
err = clock_gettime(my_thread_clock, &me_before);
if (err)
return 1;
err = clock_gettime(th_clock, &th_before);
if (err)
return 1;
sleeptime.tv_sec = 0;
sleeptime.tv_nsec = 500000000;
nanosleep(&sleeptime, NULL);
err = clock_gettime(th_clock, &th_after);
if (err)
return 1;
err = clock_gettime(my_thread_clock, &me_after);
if (err)
return 1;
err = clock_gettime(process_clock, &process_after);
if (err)
return 1;
diff = process_after.tv_nsec - process_before.tv_nsec;
printf("process: before(%lu.%.9lu) after(%lu.%.9lu) diff(%lu)\n",
process_before.tv_sec, process_before.tv_nsec,
process_after.tv_sec, process_after.tv_nsec, diff);
diff = th_after.tv_nsec - th_before.tv_nsec;
printf("thread: before(%lu.%.9lu) after(%lu.%.9lu) diff(%lu)\n",
th_before.tv_sec, th_before.tv_nsec,
th_after.tv_sec, th_after.tv_nsec, diff);
diff = me_after.tv_nsec - me_before.tv_nsec;
printf("self: before(%lu.%.9lu) after(%lu.%.9lu) diff(%lu)\n",
me_before.tv_sec, me_before.tv_nsec,
me_after.tv_sec, me_after.tv_nsec, diff);
return 0;
}
This is due to us using p->se.sum_exec_runtime in
thread_group_cputime() where we iterate the thread group and sum all
data. This does not take time since the last schedule operation (tick
or otherwise) into account. We can cure this by using
task_sched_runtime() at the cost of having to take locks.
This also means we can (and must) do away with
thread_group_sched_runtime() since the modified thread_group_cputime()
is now more accurate and would deadlock when called from
thread_group_sched_runtime().
Aside of that it makes the function safe on 32 bit systems. The old
code added t->se.sum_exec_runtime unprotected. sum_exec_runtime is a
64bit value and could be changed on another cpu at the same time.
Reported-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1314874459.7945.22.camel@twins
Tested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 6ebbe7a07b3bc40b168d2afc569a6543c020d2e3 upstream.
Commit c259e01a1ec ("sched: Separate the scheduler entry for
preemption") contained a boo-boo wrecking wchan output. It forgot to
put the new schedule() function in the __sched section and thereby
doesn't get properly ignored for things like wchan.
Tested-by: Simon Kirby <sim@hostway.ca>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110923000346.GA25425@hostway.ca
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 3be209a8e22cedafc1b6945608b7bb8d9887ab61 upstream.
Commit 43fa5460fe60dea5c610490a1d263415419c60f6 ("sched: Try not to
migrate higher priority RT tasks") also introduced a change in behavior
which keeps RT tasks on the same CPU if there is an equal priority RT
task currently running even if there are empty CPUs available.
This can cause unnecessary wakeup latencies, and can prevent the
scheduler from balancing all RT tasks across available CPUs.
This change causes an RT task to search for a new CPU if an equal
priority RT task is already running on wakeup. Lower priority tasks
will still have to wait on higher priority tasks, but the system should
still balance out because there is always the possibility that if there
are both a high and low priority RT tasks on a given CPU that the high
priority task could wakeup while the low priority task is running and
force it to search for a better runqueue.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1315837684-18733-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit fa2563e41c3d6d6e8af437643981ed28ae0cb56d upstream.
Take cwq->gcwq->lock to avoid racing between drain_workqueue checking to
make sure the workqueues are empty and cwq_dec_nr_in_flight decrementing
and then incrementing nr_active when it activates a delayed work.
We discovered this when a corner case in one of our drivers resulted in
us trying to destroy a workqueue in which the remaining work would
always requeue itself again in the same workqueue. We would hit this
race condition and trip the BUG_ON on workqueue.c:3080.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Tuttle <ttuttle@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit ed585a651681e822089087b426e6ebfb6d3d9873 upstream.
If an irq_chip provides .irq_shutdown(), but neither of .irq_disable() or
.irq_mask(), free_irq() crashes when jumping to NULL.
Fix this by only trying .irq_disable() and .irq_mask() if there's no
.irq_shutdown() provided.
This revives the symmetry with irq_startup(), which tries .irq_startup(),
.irq_enable(), and irq_unmask(), and makes it consistent with the comment for
irq_chip.irq_shutdown() in <linux/irq.h>, which says:
* @irq_shutdown: shut down the interrupt (defaults to ->disable if NULL)
This is also how __free_irq() behaved before the big overhaul, cfr. e.g.
3b56f0585fd4c02d047dc406668cb40159b2d340 ("genirq: Remove bogus conditional"),
where the core interrupt code always overrode .irq_shutdown() to
.irq_disable() if .irq_shutdown() was NULL.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1315742394-16036-2-git-send-email-geert@linux-m68k.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit feff8fa0075bdfd43c841e9d689ed81adda988d6 upstream.
This patch fixes the following memory leak:
unreferenced object 0xffff880107266800 (size 512):
comm "sched-powersave", pid 3718, jiffies 4323097853 (age 27495.450s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81133940>] create_object+0x187/0x28b
[<ffffffff814ac103>] kmemleak_alloc+0x73/0x98
[<ffffffff811232ba>] __kmalloc_node+0x104/0x159
[<ffffffff81044b98>] kzalloc_node.clone.97+0x15/0x17
[<ffffffff8104cb90>] build_sched_domains+0xb7/0x7f3
[<ffffffff8104d4df>] partition_sched_domains+0x1db/0x24a
[<ffffffff8109ee4a>] do_rebuild_sched_domains+0x3b/0x47
[<ffffffff810a00c7>] rebuild_sched_domains+0x10/0x12
[<ffffffff8104d5ba>] sched_power_savings_store+0x6c/0x7b
[<ffffffff8104d5df>] sched_mc_power_savings_store+0x16/0x18
[<ffffffff8131322c>] sysdev_class_store+0x20/0x22
[<ffffffff81193876>] sysfs_write_file+0x108/0x144
[<ffffffff81135b10>] vfs_write+0xaf/0x102
[<ffffffff81135d23>] sys_write+0x4d/0x74
[<ffffffff814c8a42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1313671017-4112-1-git-send-email-amwang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 9c40cef2b799f9b5e7fa5de4d2ad3a0168ba118c upstream.
There is no real reason to run blk_schedule_flush_plug() with
interrupts and preemption disabled.
Move it into schedule() and call it when the task is going voluntarily
to sleep. There might be false positives when the task is woken
between that call and actually scheduling, but that's not really
different from being woken immediately after switching away.
This fixes a deadlock in the scheduler where the
blk_schedule_flush_plug() callchain enables interrupts and thereby
allows a wakeup to happen of the task that's going to sleep.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-dwfxtra7yg1b5r65m32ywtct@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit c259e01a1ec90063042f758e409cd26b2a0963c8 upstream.
Block-IO and workqueues call into notifier functions from the
scheduler core code with interrupts and preemption disabled. These
calls should be made before entering the scheduler core.
To simplify this, separate the scheduler core code into
__schedule(). __schedule() is directly called from the places which
set PREEMPT_ACTIVE and from schedule(). This allows us to add the work
checks into schedule(), so they are only called when a task voluntary
goes to sleep.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110622174918.813258321@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 6af7e471e5a7746b8024d70b4363d3dfe41d36b8 upstream.
Its possible to jam up the alarm timers by setting very small interval
timers, which will cause the alarmtimer subsystem to spend all of its time
firing and restarting timers. This can effectivly lock up a box.
A deeper fix is needed, closely mimicking the hrtimer code, but for now
just cap the interval to 100us to avoid userland hanging the system.
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit ea7802f630d356acaf66b3c0b28c00a945fc35dc upstream.
Following common_timer_get, zero out the itimerspec passed in.
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 971c90bfa2f0b4fe52d6d9002178d547706f1343 upstream.
We don't check if old_setting is non null before assigning it, so
correct this.
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 4c30c6f566c0989ddaee3407da44751e340a63ed upstream.
It seems that 7bf693951a8e ("console: allow to retain boot console via
boot option keep_bootcon") doesn't always achieve what it aims, as when
printk_late_init() runs it unconditionally turns off all boot consoles.
With this patch, I am able to see more messages on the boot console in
KVM guests than I can without, when keep_bootcon is specified.
I think it is appropriate for the relevant -stable trees. However, it's
more of an annoyance than a serious bug (ideally you don't need to keep
the boot console around as console handover should be working -- I was
encountering a situation where the console handover wasn't working and
not having the boot console available meant I couldn't see why).
Signed-off-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de>
Acked-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <fdinitto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit be27425dcc516fd08245b047ea57f83b8f6f0903 upstream.
I ran into a couple of programs which broke with the new Linux 3.0
version. Some of those were binary only. I tried to use LD_PRELOAD to
work around it, but it was quite difficult and in one case impossible
because of a mix of 32bit and 64bit executables.
For example, all kind of management software from HP doesnt work, unless
we pretend to run a 2.6 kernel.
$ uname -a
Linux svivoipvnx001 3.0.0-08107-g97cd98f #1062 SMP Fri Aug 12 18:11:45 CEST 2011 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux
$ hpacucli ctrl all show
Error: No controllers detected.
$ rpm -qf /usr/sbin/hpacucli
hpacucli-8.75-12.0
Another notable case is that Python now reports "linux3" from
sys.platform(); which in turn can break things that were checking
sys.platform() == "linux2":
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=664564
It seems pretty clear to me though it's a bug in the apps that are using
'==' instead of .startswith(), but this allows us to unbreak broken
programs.
This patch adds a UNAME26 personality that makes the kernel report a
2.6.40+x version number instead. The x is the x in 3.x.
I know this is somewhat ugly, but I didn't find a better workaround, and
compatibility to existing programs is important.
Some programs also read /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease. This can be worked
around in user space with mount --bind (and a mount namespace)
To use:
wget ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/ak/uname26/uname26.c
gcc -o uname26 uname26.c
./uname26 program
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 6d3321e8e2b3bf6a5892e2ef673c7bf536e3f904 upstream.
MTRR rendezvous sequence using stop_one_cpu_nowait() can potentially
happen in parallel with another system wide rendezvous using
stop_machine(). This can lead to deadlock (The order in which
works are queued can be different on different cpu's. Some cpu's
will be running the first rendezvous handler and others will be running
the second rendezvous handler. Each set waiting for the other set to join
for the system wide rendezvous, leading to a deadlock).
MTRR rendezvous sequence is not implemented using stop_machine() as this
gets called both from the process context aswell as the cpu online paths
(where the cpu has not come online and the interrupts are disabled etc).
stop_machine() works with only online cpus.
For now, take the stop_machine mutex in the MTRR rendezvous sequence that
gets called from an online cpu (here we are in the process context
and can potentially sleep while taking the mutex). And the MTRR rendezvous
that gets triggered during cpu online doesn't need to take this stop_machine
lock (as the stop_machine() already ensures that there is no cpu hotplug
going on in parallel by doing get_online_cpus())
TBD: Pursue a cleaner solution of extending the stop_machine()
infrastructure to handle the case where the calling cpu is
still not online and use this for MTRR rendezvous sequence.
fixes: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=672008
Reported-by: Vadim Kotelnikov <vadimuzzz@inbox.ru>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110623182056.807230326@sbsiddha-MOBL3.sc.intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 1dd75f91ae713049eb6baaa640078f3a6549e522 upstream.
(!msk & 0x01) should be !(msk & 0x01)
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi <jhbird.choi@samsung.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1311229754-6003-1-git-send-email-jhbird.choi@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 9ea71503a8ed9184d2d0b8ccc4d269d05f7940ae upstream.
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 2efaca927f5cd7ecd0f1554b8f9b6a9a2c329c03 upstream.
I haven't reproduced it myself but the fail scenario is that on such
machines (notably ARM and some embedded powerpc), if you manage to hit
that futex path on a writable page whose dirty bit has gone from the PTE,
you'll livelock inside the kernel from what I can tell.
It will go in a loop of trying the atomic access, failing, trying gup to
"fix it up", getting succcess from gup, go back to the atomic access,
failing again because dirty wasn't fixed etc...
So I think you essentially hang in the kernel.
The scenario is probably rare'ish because affected architecture are
embedded and tend to not swap much (if at all) so we probably rarely hit
the case where dirty is missing or young is missing, but I think Shan has
a piece of SW that can reliably reproduce it using a shared writable
mapping & fork or something like that.
On archs who use SW tracking of dirty & young, a page without dirty is
effectively mapped read-only and a page without young unaccessible in the
PTE.
Additionally, some architectures might lazily flush the TLB when relaxing
write protection (by doing only a local flush), and expect a fault to
invalidate the stale entry if it's still present on another processor.
The futex code assumes that if the "in_atomic()" access -EFAULT's, it can
"fix it up" by causing get_user_pages() which would then be equivalent to
taking the fault.
However that isn't the case. get_user_pages() will not call
handle_mm_fault() in the case where the PTE seems to have the right
permissions, regardless of the dirty and young state. It will eventually
update those bits ... in the struct page, but not in the PTE.
Additionally, it will not handle the lazy TLB flushing that can be
required by some architectures in the fault case.
Basically, gup is the wrong interface for the job. The patch provides a
more appropriate one which boils down to just calling handle_mm_fault()
since what we are trying to do is simulate a real page fault.
The futex code currently attempts to write to user memory within a
pagefault disabled section, and if that fails, tries to fix it up using
get_user_pages().
This doesn't work on archs where the dirty and young bits are maintained
by software, since they will gate access permission in the TLB, and will
not be updated by gup().
In addition, there's an expectation on some archs that a spurious write
fault triggers a local TLB flush, and that is missing from the picture as
well.
I decided that adding those "features" to gup() would be too much for this
already too complex function, and instead added a new simpler
fixup_user_fault() which is essentially a wrapper around handle_mm_fault()
which the futex code can call.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix some nits Darren saw, fiddle comment layout]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Reported-by: Shan Hai <haishan.bai@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Shan Hai <haishan.bai@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren.hart@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 40ee4dffff061399eb9358e0c8fcfbaf8de4c8fe upstream.
The "enable" file for the event system can be removed when a module
is unloaded and the event system only has events from that module.
As the event system nr_events count goes to zero, it may be freed
if its ref_count is also set to zero.
Like the "filter" file, the "enable" file may be opened by a task and
referenced later, after a module has been unloaded and the events for
that event system have been removed.
Although the "filter" file referenced the event system structure,
the "enable" file only references a pointer to the event system
name. Since the name is freed when the event system is removed,
it is possible that an access to the "enable" file may reference
a freed pointer.
Update the "enable" file to use the subsystem_open() routine that
the "filter" file uses, to keep a reference to the event system
structure while the "enable" file is opened.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit e9dbfae53eeb9fc3d4bb7da3df87fa9875f5da02 upstream.
The event system is freed when its nr_events is set to zero. This happens
when a module created an event system and then later the module is
removed. Modules may share systems, so the system is allocated when
it is created and freed when the modules are unloaded and all the
events under the system are removed (nr_events set to zero).
The problem arises when a task opened the "filter" file for the
system. If the module is unloaded and it removed the last event for
that system, the system structure is freed. If the task that opened
the filter file accesses the "filter" file after the system has
been freed, the system will access an invalid pointer.
By adding a ref_count, and using it to keep track of what
is using the event system, we can free it after all users
are finished with the event system.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
The below patch is for -stable only, upstream has a much larger patch
that contains the below hunk in commit a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
Vince found that under certain circumstances software event overflows
go wrong and deadlock. Avoid trying to delete a timer from the timer
callback.
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vweaver1@eecs.utk.edu>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
signal: align __lock_task_sighand() irq disabling and RCU
softirq,rcu: Inform RCU of irq_exit() activity
sched: Add irq_{enter,exit}() to scheduler_ipi()
rcu: protect __rcu_read_unlock() against scheduler-using irq handlers
rcu: Streamline code produced by __rcu_read_unlock()
rcu: Fix RCU_BOOST race handling current->rcu_read_unlock_special
rcu: decrease rcu_report_exp_rnp coupling with scheduler
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-2.6-rcu into core/urgent
|
|
The __lock_task_sighand() function calls rcu_read_lock() with interrupts
and preemption enabled, but later calls rcu_read_unlock() with interrupts
disabled. It is therefore possible that this RCU read-side critical
section will be preempted and later RCU priority boosted, which means that
rcu_read_unlock() will call rt_mutex_unlock() in order to deboost itself, but
with interrupts disabled. This results in lockdep splats, so this commit
nests the RCU read-side critical section within the interrupt-disabled
region of code. This prevents the RCU read-side critical section from
being preempted, and thus prevents the attempt to deboost with interrupts
disabled.
It is quite possible that a better long-term fix is to make rt_mutex_unlock()
disable irqs when acquiring the rt_mutex structure's ->wait_lock.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paul.mckenney@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
The rcu_read_unlock_special() function relies on in_irq() to exclude
scheduler activity from interrupt level. This fails because exit_irq()
can invoke the scheduler after clearing the preempt_count() bits that
in_irq() uses to determine that it is at interrupt level. This situation
can result in failures as follows:
$task IRQ SoftIRQ
rcu_read_lock()
/* do stuff */
<preempt> |= UNLOCK_BLOCKED
rcu_read_unlock()
--t->rcu_read_lock_nesting
irq_enter();
/* do stuff, don't use RCU */
irq_exit();
sub_preempt_count(IRQ_EXIT_OFFSET);
invoke_softirq()
ttwu();
spin_lock_irq(&pi->lock)
rcu_read_lock();
/* do stuff */
rcu_read_unlock();
rcu_read_unlock_special()
rcu_report_exp_rnp()
ttwu()
spin_lock_irq(&pi->lock) /* deadlock */
rcu_read_unlock_special(t);
Ed can simply trigger this 'easy' because invoke_softirq() immediately
does a ttwu() of ksoftirqd/# instead of doing the in-place softirq stuff
first, but even without that the above happens.
Cure this by also excluding softirqs from the
rcu_read_unlock_special() handler and ensuring the force_irqthreads
ksoftirqd/# wakeup is done from full softirq context.
[ Alternatively, delaying the ->rcu_read_lock_nesting decrement
until after the special handling would make the thing more robust
in the face of interrupts as well. And there is a separate patch
for that. ]
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reported-and-tested-by: Ed Tomlinson <edt@aei.ca>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Ensure scheduler_ipi() calls irq_{enter,exit} when it does some actual
work. Traditionally we never did any actual work from the resched IPI
and all magic happened in the return from interrupt path.
Now that we do do some work, we need to ensure irq_{enter,exit} are
called so that we don't confuse things.
This affects things like timekeeping, NO_HZ and RCU, basically
everything with a hook in irq_enter/exit.
Explicit examples of things going wrong are:
sched_clock_cpu() -- has a callback when leaving NO_HZ state to take
a new reading from GTOD and TSC. Without this
callback, time is stuck in the past.
RCU -- needs in_irq() to work in order to avoid some nasty deadlocks
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
The addition of RCU read-side critical sections within runqueue and
priority-inheritance lock critical sections introduced some deadlock
cycles, for example, involving interrupts from __rcu_read_unlock()
where the interrupt handlers call wake_up(). This situation can cause
the instance of __rcu_read_unlock() invoked from interrupt to do some
of the processing that would otherwise have been carried out by the
task-level instance of __rcu_read_unlock(). When the interrupt-level
instance of __rcu_read_unlock() is called with a scheduler lock held
from interrupt-entry/exit situations where in_irq() returns false,
deadlock can result.
This commit resolves these deadlocks by using negative values of
the per-task ->rcu_read_lock_nesting counter to indicate that an
instance of __rcu_read_unlock() is in flight, which in turn prevents
instances from interrupt handlers from doing any special processing.
This patch is inspired by Steven Rostedt's earlier patch that similarly
made __rcu_read_unlock() guard against interrupt-mediated recursion
(see https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/7/15/326), but this commit refines
Steven's approach to avoid the need for preemption disabling on the
__rcu_read_unlock() fastpath and to also avoid the need for manipulating
a separate per-CPU variable.
This patch avoids need for preempt_disable() by instead using negative
values of the per-task ->rcu_read_lock_nesting counter. Note that nested
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pairs are still permitted, but they will
never see ->rcu_read_lock_nesting go to zero, and will therefore never
invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(), thus preventing them from seeing the
RCU_READ_UNLOCK_BLOCKED bit should it be set in ->rcu_read_unlock_special.
This patch also adds a check for ->rcu_read_unlock_special being negative
in rcu_check_callbacks(), thus preventing the RCU_READ_UNLOCK_NEED_QS
bit from being set should a scheduling-clock interrupt occur while
__rcu_read_unlock() is exiting from an outermost RCU read-side critical
section.
Of course, __rcu_read_unlock() can be preempted during the time that
->rcu_read_lock_nesting is negative. This could result in the setting
of the RCU_READ_UNLOCK_BLOCKED bit after __rcu_read_unlock() checks it,
and would also result it this task being queued on the corresponding
rcu_node structure's blkd_tasks list. Therefore, some later RCU read-side
critical section would enter rcu_read_unlock_special() to clean up --
which could result in deadlock if that critical section happened to be in
the scheduler where the runqueue or priority-inheritance locks were held.
This situation is dealt with by making rcu_preempt_note_context_switch()
check for negative ->rcu_read_lock_nesting, thus refraining from
queuing the task (and from setting RCU_READ_UNLOCK_BLOCKED) if we are
already exiting from the outermost RCU read-side critical section (in
other words, we really are no longer actually in that RCU read-side
critical section). In addition, rcu_preempt_note_context_switch()
invokes rcu_read_unlock_special() to carry out the cleanup in this case,
which clears out the ->rcu_read_unlock_special bits and dequeues the task
(if necessary), in turn avoiding needless delay of the current RCU grace
period and needless RCU priority boosting.
It is still illegal to call rcu_read_unlock() while holding a scheduler
lock if the prior RCU read-side critical section has ever had either
preemption or irqs enabled. However, the common use case is legal,
namely where then entire RCU read-side critical section executes with
irqs disabled, for example, when the scheduler lock is held across the
entire lifetime of the RCU read-side critical section.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paul.mckenney@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
When creating sched_domains, stop when we've covered the entire
target span instead of continuing to create domains, only to
later find they're redundant and throw them away again.
This avoids single node systems from touching funny NUMA
sched_domain creation code and reduces the risks of the new
SD_OVERLAP code.
Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1311180177.29152.57.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
Allow for sched_domain spans that overlap by giving such domains their
own sched_group list instead of sharing the sched_groups amongst
each-other.
This is needed for machines with more than 16 nodes, because
sched_domain_node_span() will generate a node mask from the
16 nearest nodes without regard if these masks have any overlap.
Currently sched_domains have a sched_group that maps to their child
sched_domain span, and since there is no overlap we share the
sched_group between the sched_domains of the various CPUs. If however
there is overlap, we would need to link the sched_group list in
different ways for each cpu, and hence sharing isn't possible.
In order to solve this, allocate private sched_groups for each CPU's
sched_domain but have the sched_groups share a sched_group_power
structure such that we can uniquely track the power.
Reported-and-tested-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-08bxqw9wis3qti9u5inifh3y@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
In order to prepare for non-unique sched_groups per domain, we need to
carry the cpu_power elsewhere, so put a level of indirection in.
Reported-and-tested-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-qkho2byuhe4482fuknss40ad@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
Given some common flag combinations, particularly -Os, gcc will inline
rcu_read_unlock_special() despite its being in an unlikely() clause.
Use noinline to prohibit this misoptimization.
In addition, move the second barrier() in __rcu_read_unlock() so that
it is not on the common-case code path. This will allow the compiler to
generate better code for the common-case path through __rcu_read_unlock().
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
|
|
The RCU_BOOST commits for TREE_PREEMPT_RCU introduced an other-task
write to a new RCU_READ_UNLOCK_BOOSTED bit in the task_struct structure's
->rcu_read_unlock_special field, but, as noted by Steven Rostedt, without
correctly synchronizing all accesses to ->rcu_read_unlock_special.
This could result in bits in ->rcu_read_unlock_special being spuriously
set and cleared due to conflicting accesses, which in turn could result
in deadlocks between the rcu_node structure's ->lock and the scheduler's
rq and pi locks. These deadlocks would result from RCU incorrectly
believing that the just-ended RCU read-side critical section had been
preempted and/or boosted. If that RCU read-side critical section was
executed with either rq or pi locks held, RCU's ensuing (incorrect)
calls to the scheduler would cause the scheduler to attempt to once
again acquire the rq and pi locks, resulting in deadlock. More complex
deadlock cycles are also possible, involving multiple rq and pi locks
as well as locks from multiple rcu_node structures.
This commit fixes synchronization by creating ->rcu_boosted field in
task_struct that is accessed and modified only when holding the ->lock
in the rcu_node structure on which the task is queued (on that rcu_node
structure's ->blkd_tasks list). This results in tasks accessing only
their own current->rcu_read_unlock_special fields, making unsynchronized
access once again legal, and keeping the rcu_read_unlock() fastpath free
of atomic instructions and memory barriers.
The reason that the rcu_read_unlock() fastpath does not need to access
the new current->rcu_boosted field is that this new field cannot
be non-zero unless the RCU_READ_UNLOCK_BLOCKED bit is set in the
current->rcu_read_unlock_special field. Therefore, rcu_read_unlock()
need only test current->rcu_read_unlock_special: if that is zero, then
current->rcu_boosted must also be zero.
This bug does not affect TINY_PREEMPT_RCU because this implementation
of RCU accesses current->rcu_read_unlock_special with irqs disabled,
thus preventing races on the !SMP systems that TINY_PREEMPT_RCU runs on.
Maybe-reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Maybe-reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paul.mckenney@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
PREEMPT_RCU read-side critical sections blocking an expedited grace
period invoke rcu_report_exp_rnp(). When the last such critical section
has completed, rcu_report_exp_rnp() invokes the scheduler to wake up the
task that invoked synchronize_rcu_expedited() -- needlessly holding the
root rcu_node structure's lock while doing so, thus needlessly providing
a way for RCU and the scheduler to deadlock.
This commit therefore releases the root rcu_node structure's lock before
calling wake_up().
Reported-by: Ed Tomlinson <edt@aei.ca>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-2.6-rcu
* 'rcu/urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-2.6-rcu:
rcu: Prevent RCU callbacks from executing before scheduler initialized
|
|
Commit 3fe1698b7fe0 ("sched: Deal with non-atomic min_vruntime reads
on 32bit") forgot to initialize min_vruntime_copy which could lead to
an infinite while loop in task_waking_fair() under some circumstances
(early boot, lucky timing).
[ This bug was also reported by others that blamed it on the RCU
initialization problems ]
Reported-and-tested-by: Bruno Wolff III <bruno@wolff.to>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Under some rare but real combinations of configuration parameters, RCU
callbacks are posted during early boot that use kernel facilities that
are not yet initialized. Therefore, when these callbacks are invoked,
hard hangs and crashes ensue. This commit therefore prevents RCU
callbacks from being invoked until after the scheduler is fully up and
running, as in after multiple tasks have been spawned.
It might well turn out that a better approach is to identify the specific
RCU callbacks that are causing this problem, but that discussion will
wait until such time as someone really needs an RCU callback to be invoked
(as opposed to merely registered) during early boot.
Reported-by: julie Sullivan <kernelmail.jms@gmail.com>
Reported-by: RKK <kulkarni.ravi4@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: julie Sullivan <kernelmail.jms@gmail.com>
Tested-by: RKK <kulkarni.ravi4@gmail.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/linux-arm-soc
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/linux-arm-soc:
pcmcia: pxa2xx/vpac270: free gpios on exist rather than requesting
ARM: pxa/raumfeld: fix device name for codec ak4104
ARM: pxa/raumfeld: display initialisation fixes
ARM: pxa/raumfeld: adapt to upcoming hardware change
ARM: pxa: fix gpio_to_chip() clash with gpiolib namespace
genirq: replace irq_gc_ack() with {set,clr}_bit variants (fwd)
arm: mach-vt8500: add forgotten irq_data conversion
ARM: pxa168: correct nand pmu setting
ARM: pxa910: correct nand pmu setting
ARM: pxa: fix PGSR register address calculation
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/suspend-2.6
* 'pm-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/suspend-2.6:
PM / Hibernate: Fix free_unnecessary_pages()
|
|
'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
debugobjects: Fix boot crash when kmemleak and debugobjects enabled
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
jump_label: Fix jump_label update for modules
oprofile, x86: Fix race in nmi handler while starting counters
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
sched: Disable (revert) SCHED_LOAD_SCALE increase
sched, cgroups: Fix MIN_SHARES on 64-bit boxen
|
|
This fixes a regression introduced by e59347a "arm: orion:
Use generic irq chip".
Depending on the device, interrupts acknowledgement is done by setting
or by clearing a dedicated register. Replace irq_gc_ack() with some
{set,clr}_bit variants allows to handle both cases.
Note that this patch affects the following SoCs: Davinci, Samsung and
Orion. Except for this last, the change is minor: irq_gc_ack() is just
renamed into irq_gc_ack_set_bit().
For the Orion SoCs, the edge GPIO interrupts support is currently
broken. irq_gc_ack() try to acknowledge a such interrupt by setting
the corresponding cause register bit. The Orion GPIO device expect the
opposite. To fix this issue, the irq_gc_ack_clr_bit() variant is used.
Tested on Network Space v2.
Reported-by: Joey Oravec <joravec@drewtech.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon Guinot <sguinot@lacie.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
There is a bug in free_unnecessary_pages() that causes it to
attempt to free too many pages in some cases, which triggers the
BUG_ON() in memory_bm_clear_bit() for copy_bm. Namely, if
count_data_pages() is initially greater than alloc_normal, we get
to_free_normal equal to 0 and "save" greater from 0. In that case,
if the sum of "save" and count_highmem_pages() is greater than
alloc_highmem, we subtract a positive number from to_free_normal.
Hence, since to_free_normal was 0 before the subtraction and is
an unsigned int, the result is converted to a huge positive number
that is used as the number of pages to free.
Fix this bug by checking if to_free_normal is actually greater
than or equal to the number we're going to subtract from it.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
Provides the ability to resize a resource that is already allocated.
This functionality is put in place to support reallocation needs of
pci resources.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
