| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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commit 4965f5667f36a95b41cda6638875bc992bd7d18b upstream.
Using a recursive call add a non-conflicting region in
__reserve_region_with_split() could result in a stack overflow in the case
that the recursive calls are too deep. Convert the recursive calls to an
iterative loop to avoid the problem.
Tested on a machine containing 135 regions. The kernel no longer panicked
with stack overflow.
Also tested with code arbitrarily adding regions with no conflict,
embedding two consecutive conflicts and embedding two non-consecutive
conflicts.
Signed-off-by: T Makphaibulchoke <tmac@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@gmail.com>
Cc: Wei Yang <weiyang@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aa7f67304d1a03180f463258aa6f15a8b434e77d upstream.
When the system has multiple domains do_sched_rt_period_timer()
can run on any CPU and may iterate over all rt_rq in
cpu_online_mask. This means when balance_runtime() is run for a
given rt_rq that rt_rq may be in a different rd than the current
processor. Thus if we use smp_processor_id() to get rd in
do_balance_runtime() we may borrow runtime from a rt_rq that is
not part of our rd.
This changes do_balance_runtime to get the rd from the passed in
rt_rq ensuring that we borrow runtime only from the correct rd
for the given rt_rq.
This fixes a BUG at kernel/sched/rt.c:687! in __disable_runtime
when we try reclaim runtime lent to other rt_rq but runtime has
been lent to a rt_rq in another rd.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358186131-29494-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f44310b98ddb7f0d06550d73ed67df5865e3eda5 upstream.
I get the following warning every day with v3.7, once or
twice a day:
[ 2235.186027] WARNING: at /mnt/sda7/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c:109 default_send_IPI_mask_logical+0x2f/0xb8()
As explained by Linus as well:
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| Once we've done the "list_add_rcu()" to add it to the
| queue, we can have (another) IPI to the target CPU that can
| now see it and clear the mask.
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| So by the time we get to actually send the IPI, the mask might
| have been cleared by another IPI.
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This patch also fixes a system hang problem, if the data->cpumask
gets cleared after passing this point:
if (WARN_ONCE(!mask, "empty IPI mask"))
return;
then the problem in commit 83d349f35e1a ("x86: don't send an IPI to
the empty set of CPU's") will happen again.
Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: mina86@mina86.org
Cc: srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130126075357.GA3205@udknight
[ Tidied up the changelog and the comment in the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9067ac85d533651b98c2ff903182a20cbb361fcb upstream.
wake_up_process() should never wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task.
Change it to use TASK_NORMAL and add the WARN_ON().
TASK_ALL has no other users, probably can be killed.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9899d11f654474d2d54ea52ceaa2a1f4db3abd68 upstream.
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 910ffdb18a6408e14febbb6e4b6840fd2c928c82 upstream.
Cleanup and preparation for the next change.
signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers
actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the
necessary mask.
Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce
signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up()
which adds __TASK_TRACED.
This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request()
even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1bf08ac26e92122faab9f6c32ea8aba94612dae upstream.
If some other kernel subsystem has a module notifier, and adds a kprobe
to a ftrace mcount point (now that kprobes work on ftrace points),
when the ftrace notifier runs it will fail and disable ftrace, as well
as kprobes that are attached to ftrace points.
Here's the error:
WARNING: at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:1618 ftrace_bug+0x239/0x280()
Hardware name: Bochs
Modules linked in: fat(+) stap_56d28a51b3fe546293ca0700b10bcb29__8059(F) nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs dns_resolver fscache xt_nat iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack lockd sunrpc ppdev parport_pc parport microcode virtio_net i2c_piix4 drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core [last unloaded: bid_shared]
Pid: 8068, comm: modprobe Tainted: GF 3.7.0-0.rc8.git0.1.fc19.x86_64 #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105e70f>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0xc0
[<ffffffff81134106>] ? __probe_kernel_read+0x46/0x70
[<ffffffffa0180000>] ? 0xffffffffa017ffff
[<ffffffffa0180000>] ? 0xffffffffa017ffff
[<ffffffff8105e76a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[<ffffffff810fd189>] ftrace_bug+0x239/0x280
[<ffffffff810fd626>] ftrace_process_locs+0x376/0x520
[<ffffffff810fefb7>] ftrace_module_notify+0x47/0x50
[<ffffffff8163912d>] notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70
[<ffffffff810882f8>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0x80
[<ffffffff81088336>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
[<ffffffff810c2a23>] sys_init_module+0x73/0x220
[<ffffffff8163d719>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
---[ end trace 9ef46351e53bbf80 ]---
ftrace failed to modify [<ffffffffa0180000>] init_once+0x0/0x20 [fat]
actual: cc:bb:d2:4b:e1
A kprobe was added to the init_once() function in the fat module on load.
But this happened before ftrace could have touched the code. As ftrace
didn't run yet, the kprobe system had no idea it was a ftrace point and
simply added a breakpoint to the code (0xcc in the cc:bb:d2:4b:e1).
Then when ftrace went to modify the location from a call to mcount/fentry
into a nop, it didn't see a call op, but instead it saw the breakpoint op
and not knowing what to do with it, ftrace shut itself down.
The solution is to simply give the ftrace module notifier the max priority.
This should have been done regardless, as the core code ftrace modification
also happens very early on in boot up. This makes the module modification
closer to core modification.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130107140333.593683061@goodmis.org
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Reported-by: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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commit 9366c1ba13fbc41bdb57702e75ca4382f209c82f upstream.
The function rb_check_pages() was added to make sure the ring buffer's
pages were sane. This check is done when the ring buffer size is modified
as well as when the iterator is released (closing the "trace" file),
as that was considered a non fast path and a good place to do a sanity
check.
The problem is that the check does not have any locks around it.
If one process were to read the trace file, and another were to read
the raw binary file, the check could happen while the reader is reading
the file.
The issues with this is that the check requires to clear the HEAD page
before doing the full check and it restores it afterward. But readers
require the HEAD page to exist before it can read the buffer, otherwise
it gives a nasty warning and disables the buffer.
By adding the reader lock around the check, this keeps the race from
happening.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 175431635ec09b1d1bba04979b006b99e8305a83 upstream.
cgroup_create_dir() does weird dancing with dentry refcnt. On
success, it gets and then puts it achieving nothing. On failure, it
puts but there isn't no matching get anywhere leading to the following
oops if cgroup_create_file() fails for whatever reason.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at /work/os/work/fs/dcache.c:552!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in:
CPU 2
Pid: 697, comm: mkdir Not tainted 3.7.0-rc4-work+ #3 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811d9c0c>] [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001a3ebef8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000e5b1ef8 RCX: 0000000000000403
RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 2000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000e5b1f58
RBP: ffff88001a3ebf18 R08: ffffffff82c76960 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff880015022080 R11: ffd9bed70f48a041 R12: 00000000ffffffea
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88000e5b1f58 R15: 00007fff57656d60
FS: 00007ff05fcb3800(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004046f0 CR3: 000000001315f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process mkdir (pid: 697, threadinfo ffff88001a3ea000, task ffff880015022080)
Stack:
ffff88001a3ebf48 00000000ffffffea 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
ffff88001a3ebf38 ffffffff811cc889 0000000000000001 ffff88000e5b1ef8
ffff88001a3ebf68 ffffffff811d1fc9 ffff8800198d7f18 ffff880019106ef8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811cc889>] done_path_create+0x19/0x50
[<ffffffff811d1fc9>] sys_mkdirat+0x59/0x80
[<ffffffff811d2009>] sys_mkdir+0x19/0x20
[<ffffffff81be1e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 00 48 8d 90 18 01 00 00 48 89 93 c0 00 00 00 4c 89 a0 18 01 00 00 48 8b 83 a0 00 00 00 83 80 28 01 00 00 01 e8 e6 6f a0 00 eb 92 <0f> 0b 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41
RIP [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0
RSP <ffff88001a3ebef8>
---[ end trace 1277bcfd9561ddb0 ]---
Fix it by dropping the unnecessary dget/dput() pair.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04aa530ec04f61875b99c12721162e2964e3318c upstream.
Sankara reported that the genirq core code fails to adjust the
affinity of an interrupt thread in several cases:
1) On request/setup_irq() the call to setup_affinity() happens before
the new action is registered, so the new thread is not notified.
2) For secondary shared interrupts nothing notifies the new thread to
change its affinity.
3) Interrupts which have the IRQ_NO_BALANCE flag set are not moving
the thread either.
Fix this by setting the thread affinity flag right on thread creation
time. This ensures that under all circumstances the thread moves to
the right place. Requires a check in irq_thread_check_affinity for an
existing affinity mask (CONFIG_CPU_MASK_OFFSTACK=y)
Reported-and-tested-by: Sankara Muthukrishnan <sankara.m@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1209041738200.2754@ionos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 878d7439d0f45a95869e417576774673d1fa243f upstream.
Commit 29c00b4a1d9e27 (rcu: Add event-tracing for RCU callback
invocation) added a regression in rcu_do_batch()
Under stress, RCU is supposed to allow to process all items in queue,
instead of a batch of 10 items (blimit), but an integer overflow makes
the effective limit being 1. So, unless there is frequent idle periods
(during which RCU ignores batch limits), RCU can be forced into a
state where it cannot keep up with the callback-generation rate,
eventually resulting in OOM.
This commit therefore converts a few variables in rcu_do_batch() from
int to long to fix this problem, along with the module parameters
controlling the batch limits.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 70f77b3f7ec010ff9624c1f2e39a81babc9e2429 upstream.
There is a typo here where '&' is used instead of '|' and it turns the
statement into a noop. The original code is equivalent to:
iter->flags &= ~((1 << 2) & (1 << 4));
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120609161027.GD6488@elgon.mountain
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc4b514f2727f74a4587c31db87e0e93465518c3 upstream.
8852aac25e ("workqueue: mod_delayed_work_on() shouldn't queue timer on
0 delay") unexpectedly uncovered a very nasty abuse of delayed_work in
megaraid - it allocated work_struct, casted it to delayed_work and
then pass that into queue_delayed_work().
Previously, this was okay because 0 @delay short-circuited to
queue_work() before doing anything with delayed_work. 8852aac25e
moved 0 @delay test into __queue_delayed_work() after sanity check on
delayed_work making megaraid trigger BUG_ON().
Although megaraid is already fixed by c1d390d8e6 ("megaraid: fix
BUG_ON() from incorrect use of delayed work"), this patch converts
BUG_ON()s in __queue_delayed_work() to WARN_ON_ONCE()s so that such
abusers, if there are more, trigger warning but don't crash the
machine.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiaotian Feng <xtfeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuah.khan@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fd8ef11730f1d03d5d6555aa53126e9e34f52f12 upstream.
This reverts commit 800d4d30c8f20bd728e5741a3b77c4859a613f7c.
Between commits 8323f26ce342 ("sched: Fix race in task_group()") and
800d4d30c8f2 ("sched, autogroup: Stop going ahead if autogroup is
disabled"), autogroup is a wreck.
With both applied, all you have to do to crash a box is disable
autogroup during boot up, then reboot.. boom, NULL pointer dereference
due to commit 800d4d30c8f2 not allowing autogroup to move things, and
commit 8323f26ce342 making that the only way to switch runqueues:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff81063ac0>] effective_load.isra.43+0x50/0x90
Pid: 7047, comm: systemd-user-se Not tainted 3.6.8-smp #7 MEDIONPC MS-7502/MS-7502
RIP: effective_load.isra.43+0x50/0x90
Process systemd-user-se (pid: 7047, threadinfo ffff880221dde000, task ffff88022618b3a0)
Call Trace:
select_task_rq_fair+0x255/0x780
try_to_wake_up+0x156/0x2c0
wake_up_state+0xb/0x10
signal_wake_up+0x28/0x40
complete_signal+0x1d6/0x250
__send_signal+0x170/0x310
send_signal+0x40/0x80
do_send_sig_info+0x47/0x90
group_send_sig_info+0x4a/0x70
kill_pid_info+0x3a/0x60
sys_kill+0x97/0x1a0
? vfs_read+0x120/0x160
? sys_read+0x45/0x90
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 49 0f af 41 50 31 d2 49 f7 f0 48 83 f8 01 48 0f 46 c6 48 2b 07 48 8b bf 40 01 00 00 48 85 ff 74 3a 45 31 c0 48 8b 8f 50 01 00 00 <48> 8b 11 4c 8b 89 80 00 00 00 49 89 d2 48 01 d0 45 8b 59 58 4c
RIP [<ffffffff81063ac0>] effective_load.isra.43+0x50/0x90
RSP <ffff880221ddfbd8>
CR2: 0000000000000000
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 412d32e6c98527078779e5b515823b2810e40324 upstream.
A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling
off, never to be seen again. In the case where this occurred, an exiting
thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex,
bringing the box to its knees.
PID: 18105 TASK: ffff8807fd412180 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kdmflush"
#0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489
#1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs]
#2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14
#3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs]
#4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2
#5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41
#6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a
#7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88
#8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850
#9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f
[exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper]
RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0 RSP: ffff8808157e7f58 RFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8107af60 RDI: ffff8803ee491d18
RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b3900cd409466c0070b234d941650685ad0c791 upstream.
We fixed a bunch of integer overflows in timekeeping code during the 3.6
cycle. I did an audit based on that and found this potential overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20121009071823.GA19159@elgon.mountain
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[ herton: adapt for 3.5, timekeeper instead of tk pointer ]
Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8ffeb9b0e6369135bf03a073514f571ef10606b9 upstream.
In get_sample_period(), unsigned long is not enough:
watchdog_thresh * 2 * (NSEC_PER_SEC / 5)
case1:
watchdog_thresh is 10 by default, the sample value will be: 0xEE6B2800
case2:
set watchdog_thresh is 20, the sample value will be: 0x1 DCD6 5000
In case2, we need use u64 to express the sample period. Otherwise,
changing the threshold thru proc often can not be successful.
Signed-off-by: liu chuansheng <chuansheng.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuah.khan@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aa10990e028cac3d5e255711fb9fb47e00700e35 upstream.
Dave Jones reported a bug with futex_lock_pi() that his trinity test
exposed. Sometime between queue_me() and taking the q.lock_ptr, the
lock_ptr became NULL, resulting in a crash.
While futex_wake() is careful to not call wake_futex() on futex_q's with
a pi_state or an rt_waiter (which are either waiting for a
futex_unlock_pi() or a PI futex_requeue()), futex_wake_op() and
futex_requeue() do not perform the same test.
Update futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() to test for q.pi_state and
q.rt_waiter and abort with -EINVAL if detected. To ensure any future
breakage is caught, add a WARN() to wake_futex() if the same condition
is true.
This fix has seen 3 hours of testing with "trinity -c futex" on an
x86_64 VM with 4 CPUS.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy up the WARN()]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 59ef28b1f14899b10d6b2682c7057ca00a9a3f47 upstream.
Masaki found and patched a kallsyms issue: the last symbol in a
module's symtab wasn't transferred. This is because we manually copy
the zero'th entry (which is always empty) then copy the rest in a loop
starting at 1, though from src[0]. His fix was minimal, I prefer to
rewrite the loops in more standard form.
There are two loops: one to get the size, and one to copy. Make these
identical: always count entry 0 and any defined symbol in an allocated
non-init section.
This bug exists since the following commit was introduced.
module: reduce symbol table for loaded modules (v2)
commit: 4a4962263f07d14660849ec134ee42b63e95ea9a
LKML: http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/10/24/27
Reported-by: Masaki Kimura <masaki.kimura.kz@hitachi.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 59fa6245192159ab5e1e17b8e31f15afa9cff4bf upstream.
Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the
owner died and provided a workaround.
See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076
The detailed problem analysis shows:
Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and
PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes.
T1 lock_futex_pi(F);
T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
--> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
to T1.
T1 exits
--> exit_robust_list() runs
--> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.
T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
--> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0
--> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
userspace TID field of futex F
--> returns to user space
T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
--> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via
rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)
T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the
pi_state
--> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
userspace TID field of futex F
--> returns to user space
T3 --> observes inconsistent state
This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible
kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that
certain configurations are more likely to expose it.
So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit:
if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the
futex unconditionally if that's true.
AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner
case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale.
Now the proposed change
- if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
+ if (unlikely(ownerdied ||
+ !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) {
solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the
"stale WAITERS bit" case.
What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked
on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which
in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3
to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via
pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved!
Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem
because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it
returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to
return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set.
Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the
user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available
pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3
blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the
rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the
user space futex.
lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to
find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that
fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available
nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with
the hash bucket lock held.
So the above scenario changes to:
T1 lock_futex_pi(F);
T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
--> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
to T1.
T1 exits
--> exit_robust_list() runs
--> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.
T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
--> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex
T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
--> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via
rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)
T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state
--> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
userspace TID field of futex F
--> returns to user space
This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between
T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It
also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over.
Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less
dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the
possible wreckage which might be inflicted.
As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts
so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of
avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip
out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as
user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking
about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should
nevertheless :)
Reported-and-tested-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionos
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9bb71308b8133d643648776243e4d5599b1c193d upstream.
This reverts commit 7e381b0eb1e1a9805c37335562e8dc02e7d7848c.
The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed
threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for
synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead
of explicitly grabbing task_lock().
threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as
opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it
wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup
locks.
Revert the incorrect optimization.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Bitterly-Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d87838321124061f6c935069d97f37010fa417e6 upstream.
This reverts commit 7e3aa30ac8c904a706518b725c451bb486daaae9.
The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed
threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for
synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead
of explicitly grabbing task_lock().
threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as
opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it
wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup
locks.
Revert the incorrect optimization.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1f5320d5972aa50d3e8d2b227b636b370e608359 upstream.
notify_on_release must be triggered when the last process in a cgroup is
move to another. But if the first(and only) process in a cgroup is moved to
another, notify_on_release is not triggered.
# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/SRC
# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/DST
#
# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/notify_on_release
# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/notify_on_release
#
# sleep 300 &
[1] 8629
#
# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/tasks
# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/tasks
-> notify_on_release for /SRC must be triggered at this point,
but it isn't.
This is because put_css_set() is called before setting CGRP_RELEASABLE
in cgroup_task_migrate(), and is a regression introduce by the
commit:74a1166d(cgroups: make procs file writable), which was merged
into v3.0.
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Ben Blum <bblum@andrew.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 31fd84b95eb211d5db460a1dda85e004800a7b52 upstream.
The min/max call needed to have explicit types on some architectures
(e.g. mn10300). Use clamp_t instead to avoid the warning:
kernel/sys.c: In function 'override_release':
kernel/sys.c:1287:10: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e upstream.
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 17b572e82032bc246324ce136696656b66d4e3f1 upstream.
It is possible to miss data when using the kdb pager. The kdb pager
does not pay attention to the maximum column constraint of the screen
or serial terminal. This result is not incrementing the shown lines
correctly and the pager will print more lines that fit on the screen.
Obviously that is less than useful when using a VGA console where you
cannot scroll back.
The pager will now look at the kdb_buffer string to see how many
characters are printed. It might not be perfect considering you can
output ASCII that might move the cursor position, but it is a
substantially better approximation for viewing dmesg and trace logs.
This also means that the vt screen needs to set the kdb COLUMNS
variable.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 26cff4e2aa4d666dc6a120ea34336b5057e3e187 upstream.
Adding two (or more) timers with large values for "expires" (they have
to reside within tv5 in the same list) leads to endless looping
between cascade() and internal_add_timer() in case CONFIG_BASE_SMALL
is one and jiffies are crossing the value 1 << 18. The bug was
introduced between 2.6.11 and 2.6.12 (and survived for quite some
time).
This patch ensures that when cascade() is called timers within tv5 are
not added endlessly to their own list again, instead they are added to
the next lower tv level tv4 (as expected).
Signed-off-by: Christian Hildner <christian.hildner@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/98673C87CB31274881CFFE0B65ECC87B0F5FC1963E@DEFTHW99EA4MSX.ww902.siemens.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c99af3752bb52ba3aece5315279a57a477edfaf1 upstream.
Cloudlinux have a product called lve that includes a kernel module. This
was previously GPLed but is now under a proprietary license, but the
module continues to declare MODULE_LICENSE("GPL") and makes use of some
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL symbols. Forcibly taint it in order to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Alex Lyashkov <umka@cloudlinux.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8f6189684eb4e85e6c593cd710693f09c944450a upstream.
Make stop scheduler class do the same accounting as other classes,
Migration threads can be caught in the act while doing exec balancing,
leading to the below due to use of unmaintained ->se.exec_start. The
load that triggered this particular instance was an apparently out of
control heavily threaded application that does system monitoring in
what equated to an exec bomb, with one of the VERY frequently migrated
tasks being ps.
%CPU PID USER CMD
99.3 45 root [migration/10]
97.7 53 root [migration/12]
97.0 57 root [migration/13]
90.1 49 root [migration/11]
89.6 65 root [migration/15]
88.7 17 root [migration/3]
80.4 37 root [migration/8]
78.1 41 root [migration/9]
44.2 13 root [migration/2]
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344051854.6739.19.camel@marge.simpson.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d35be8bab9b0ce44bed4b9453f86ebf64062721e upstream.
In the event of CPU hotplug, the kernel modifies the cpusets' cpus_allowed
masks as and when necessary to ensure that the tasks belonging to the cpusets
have some place (online CPUs) to run on. And regular CPU hotplug is
destructive in the sense that the kernel doesn't remember the original cpuset
configurations set by the user, across hotplug operations.
However, suspend/resume (which uses CPU hotplug) is a special case in which
the kernel has the responsibility to restore the system (during resume), to
exactly the same state it was in before suspend.
In order to achieve that, do the following:
1. Don't modify cpusets during suspend/resume. At all.
In particular, don't move the tasks from one cpuset to another, and
don't modify any cpuset's cpus_allowed mask. So, simply ignore cpusets
during the CPU hotplug operations that are carried out in the
suspend/resume path.
2. However, cpusets and sched domains are related. We just want to avoid
altering cpusets alone. So, to keep the sched domains updated, build
a single sched domain (containing all active cpus) during each of the
CPU hotplug operations carried out in s/r path, effectively ignoring
the cpusets' cpus_allowed masks.
(Since userspace is frozen while doing all this, it will go unnoticed.)
3. During the last CPU online operation during resume, build the sched
domains by looking up the (unaltered) cpusets' cpus_allowed masks.
That will bring back the system to the same original state as it was in
before suspend.
Ultimately, this will not only solve the cpuset problem related to suspend
resume (ie., restores the cpusets to exactly what it was before suspend, by
not touching it at all) but also speeds up suspend/resume because we avoid
running cpuset update code for every CPU being offlined/onlined.
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120524141611.3692.20155.stgit@srivatsabhat.in.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Preeti U Murthy <preeti@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a10d206ef1a83121ab7430cb196e0376a7145b22 upstream.
Each grace period is supposed to have at least one callback waiting
for that grace period to complete. However, if CONFIG_NO_HZ=n, an
extra callback-free grace period is no big problem -- it will chew up
a tiny bit of CPU time, but it will complete normally. In contrast,
CONFIG_NO_HZ=y kernels have the potential for all the CPUs to go to
sleep indefinitely, in turn indefinitely delaying completion of the
callback-free grace period. Given that nothing is waiting on this grace
period, this is also not a problem.
That is, unless RCU CPU stall warnings are also enabled, as they are
in recent kernels. In this case, if a CPU wakes up after at least one
minute of inactivity, an RCU CPU stall warning will result. The reason
that no one noticed until quite recently is that most systems have enough
OS noise that they will never remain absolutely idle for a full minute.
But there are some embedded systems with cut-down userspace configurations
that consistently get into this situation.
All this begs the question of exactly how a callback-free grace period
gets started in the first place. This can happen due to the fact that
CPUs do not necessarily agree on which grace period is in progress.
If a CPU still believes that the grace period that just completed is
still ongoing, it will believe that it has callbacks that need to wait for
another grace period, never mind the fact that the grace period that they
were waiting for just completed. This CPU can therefore erroneously
decide to start a new grace period. Note that this can happen in
TREE_RCU and TREE_PREEMPT_RCU even on a single-CPU system: Deadlock
considerations mean that the CPU that detected the end of the grace
period is not necessarily officially informed of this fact for some time.
Once this CPU notices that the earlier grace period completed, it will
invoke its callbacks. It then won't have any callbacks left. If no
other CPU has any callbacks, we now have a callback-free grace period.
This commit therefore makes CPUs check more carefully before starting a
new grace period. This new check relies on an array of tail pointers
into each CPU's list of callbacks. If the CPU is up to date on which
grace periods have completed, it checks to see if any callbacks follow
the RCU_DONE_TAIL segment, otherwise it checks to see if any callbacks
follow the RCU_WAIT_TAIL segment. The reason that this works is that
the RCU_WAIT_TAIL segment will be promoted to the RCU_DONE_TAIL segment
as soon as the CPU is officially notified that the old grace period
has ended.
This change is to cpu_needs_another_gp(), which is called in a number
of places. The only one that really matters is in rcu_start_gp(), where
the root rcu_node structure's ->lock is held, which prevents any
other CPU from starting or completing a grace period, so that the
comparison that determines whether the CPU is missing the completion
of a grace period is stable.
Reported-by: Becky Bruce <bgillbruce@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Subodh Nijsure <snijsure@grid-net.com>
Reported-by: Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paul.mckenney@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 959d1af8cffc8fd38ed53e8be1cf4ab8782f9c00 upstream.
WORK_STRUCT_PENDING is used to claim ownership of a work item and
process_one_work() releases it before starting execution. When
someone else grabs PENDING, all pre-release updates to the work item
should be visible and all updates made by the new owner should happen
afterwards.
Grabbing PENDING uses test_and_set_bit() and thus has a full barrier;
however, clearing doesn't have a matching wmb. Given the preceding
spin_unlock and use of clear_bit, I don't believe this can be a
problem on an actual machine and there hasn't been any related report
but it still is theretically possible for clear_pending to permeate
upwards and happen before work->entry update.
Add an explicit smp_wmb() before work_clear_pending().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f96972f2dc6365421cf2366ebd61ee4cf060c8d5 upstream.
As kernel_power_off() calls disable_nonboot_cpus(), we may also want to
have kernel_restart() call disable_nonboot_cpus(). Doing so can help
machines that require boot cpu be the last alive cpu during reboot to
survive with kernel restart.
This fixes one reboot issue seen on imx6q (Cortex-A9 Quad). The machine
requires that the restart routine be run on the primary cpu rather than
secondary ones. Otherwise, the secondary core running the restart
routine will fail to come to online after reboot.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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item being executed
commit 46f3d976213452350f9d10b0c2780c2681f7075b upstream.
kthread_worker provides minimalistic workqueue-like interface for
users which need a dedicated worker thread (e.g. for realtime
priority). It has basic queue, flush_work, flush_worker operations
which mostly match the workqueue counterparts; however, due to the way
flush_work() is implemented, it has a noticeable difference of not
allowing work items to be freed while being executed.
While the current users of kthread_worker are okay with the current
behavior, the restriction does impede some valid use cases. Also,
removing this difference isn't difficult and actually makes the code
easier to understand.
This patch reimplements flush_kthread_work() such that it uses a
flush_work item instead of queue/done sequence numbers.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9a2e03d8ed518a61154f18d83d6466628e519f94 upstream.
Make the following two non-functional changes.
* Separate out insert_kthread_work() from queue_kthread_work().
* Relocate struct kthread_flush_work and kthread_flush_work_fn()
definitions above flush_kthread_work().
v2: Added lockdep_assert_held() in insert_kthread_work() as suggested
by Andy Walls.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andy Walls <awalls@md.metrocast.net>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cee58483cf56e0ba355fdd97ff5e8925329aa936 upstream
Andreas Bombe reported that the added ktime_t overflow checking added to
timespec_valid in commit 4e8b14526ca7 ("time: Improve sanity checking of
timekeeping inputs") was causing problems with X.org because it caused
timeouts larger then KTIME_T to be invalid.
Previously, these large timeouts would be clamped to KTIME_MAX and would
never expire, which is valid.
This patch splits the ktime_t overflow checking into a new
timespec_valid_strict function, and converts the timekeeping codes
internal checking to use this more strict function.
Reported-and-tested-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
Cc: Zhouping Liu <zliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bf2ac312195155511a0f79325515cbb61929898a upstream.
If update_wall_time() is called and the current offset isn't large
enough to accumulate, avoid re-calling timekeeping_adjust which may
change the clock freq and can cause 1ns inconsistencies with
CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE/CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1345595449-34965-5-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4e8b14526ca7fb046a81c94002c1c43b6fdf0e9b upstream.
Unexpected behavior could occur if the time is set to a value large
enough to overflow a 64bit ktime_t (which is something larger then the
year 2262).
Also unexpected behavior could occur if large negative offsets are
injected via adjtimex.
So this patch improves the sanity check timekeeping inputs by
improving the timespec_valid() check, and then makes better use of
timespec_valid() to make sure we don't set the time to an invalid
negative value or one that overflows ktime_t.
Note: This does not protect from setting the time close to overflowing
ktime_t and then letting natural accumulation cause the overflow.
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Zhouping Liu <zliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344454580-17031-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8323f26ce3425460769605a6aece7a174edaa7d1 upstream.
Stefan reported a crash on a kernel before a3e5d1091c1 ("sched:
Don't call task_group() too many times in set_task_rq()"), he
found the reason to be that the multiple task_group()
invocations in set_task_rq() returned different values.
Looking at all that I found a lack of serialization and plain
wrong comments.
The below tries to fix it using an extra pointer which is
updated under the appropriate scheduler locks. Its not pretty,
but I can't really see another way given how all the cgroup
stuff works.
Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340364965.18025.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[Fixed upstream by commits 2955b47d2c1983998a8c5915cb96884e67f7cb53 and
a4683487f90bfe3049686fc5c566bdc1ad03ace6 from Dan Williams, but they are much
more intrusive than this tiny fix, according to Andrew - gregkh]
This patch tries to fix a dead loop in async_synchronize_full(), which
could be seen when preemption is disabled on a single cpu machine.
void async_synchronize_full(void)
{
do {
async_synchronize_cookie(next_cookie);
} while (!list_empty(&async_running) || !
list_empty(&async_pending));
}
async_synchronize_cookie() calls async_synchronize_cookie_domain() with
&async_running as the default domain to synchronize.
However, there might be some works in the async_pending list from other
domains. On a single cpu system, without preemption, there is no chance
for the other works to finish, so async_synchronize_full() enters a dead
loop.
It seems async_synchronize_full() wants to synchronize all entries in
all running lists(domains), so maybe we could just check the entry_count
to know whether all works are finished.
Currently, async_synchronize_cookie_domain() expects a non-NULL running
list ( if NULL, there would be NULL pointer dereference ), so maybe a
NULL pointer could be used as an indication for the functions to
synchronize all works in all domains.
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 96e65306b81351b656835c15931d1d237b252f27 upstream.
The compiler may compile the following code into TWO write/modify
instructions.
worker->flags &= ~WORKER_UNBOUND;
worker->flags |= WORKER_REBIND;
so the other CPU may temporarily see worker->flags which doesn't have
either WORKER_UNBOUND or WORKER_REBIND set and perform local wakeup
prematurely.
Fix it by using single explicit assignment via ACCESS_ONCE().
Because idle workers have another WORKER_NOT_RUNNING flag, this bug
doesn't exist for them; however, update it to use the same pattern for
consistency.
tj: Applied the change to idle workers too and updated comments and
patch description a bit.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 749c8814f08f12baa4a9c2812a7c6ede7d69507d upstream.
Azat Khuzhin reported high loadavg in Linux v3.6
After checking the upstream scheduler code, I found Peter's commit:
5167e8d5417b sched/nohz: Rewrite and fix load-avg computation -- again
not fully applied, missing the call to calc_load_exit_idle().
After that idle exit in sampling window will always be calculated
to non-idle, and the load will be higher than normal.
This patch adds the missing call to calc_load_exit_idle().
Signed-off-by: Charles Wang <muming.wq@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1345449754-27130-1-git-send-email-muming.wq@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6fa941d94b411bbd2b6421ffbde6db3c93e65ab upstream.
Don't mess with file refcounts (or keep a reference to file, for
that matter) in perf_event. Use explicit refcount of its own
instead. Deal with the race between the final reference to event
going away and new children getting created for it by use of
atomic_long_inc_not_zero() in inherit_event(); just have the
latter free what it had allocated and return NULL, that works
out just fine (children of siblings of something doomed are
created as singletons, same as if the child of leader had been
created and immediately killed).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120820135925.GG23464@ZenIV.linux.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ed48ece27cd3d5ee0354c32bbaec0f3e1d4715c3 upstream.
The existing work_on_cpu() implementation is hugely inefficient. It
creates a new kthread, execute that single function and then let the
kthread die on each invocation.
Now that system_wq can handle concurrent executions, there's no
advantage of doing this. Reimplement work_on_cpu() using system_wq
which makes it simpler and way more efficient.
stable: While this isn't a fix in itself, it's needed to fix a
workqueue related bug in cpufreq/powernow-k8. AFAICS, this
shouldn't break other existing users.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bea6832cc8c4a0a9a65dd17da6aaa657fe27bc3e upstream.
On architectures where cputime_t is 64 bit type, is possible to trigger
divide by zero on do_div(temp, (__force u32) total) line, if total is a
non zero number but has lower 32 bit's zeroed. Removing casting is not
a good solution since some do_div() implementations do cast to u32
internally.
This problem can be triggered in practice on very long lived processes:
PID: 2331 TASK: ffff880472814b00 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "oraagent.bin"
#0 [ffff880472a51b70] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103214b
#1 [ffff880472a51bd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b91c2
#2 [ffff880472a51ca0] oops_end at ffffffff814f0b00
#3 [ffff880472a51cd0] die at ffffffff8100f26b
#4 [ffff880472a51d00] do_trap at ffffffff814f03f4
#5 [ffff880472a51d60] do_divide_error at ffffffff8100cfff
#6 [ffff880472a51e00] divide_error at ffffffff8100be7b
[exception RIP: thread_group_times+0x56]
RIP: ffffffff81056a16 RSP: ffff880472a51eb8 RFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: bc3572c9fe12d194 RBX: ffff880874150800 RCX: 0000000110266fad
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880472a51eb8 RDI: 001038ae7d9633dc
RBP: ffff880472a51ef8 R8: 00000000b10a3a64 R9: ffff880874150800
R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: ffff880472a51f08
R13: ffff880472a51f10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffff880472a51f00] do_sys_times at ffffffff8108845d
#8 [ffff880472a51f40] sys_times at ffffffff81088524
#9 [ffff880472a51f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8100b0f2
RIP: 0000003808caac3a RSP: 00007fcba27ab6d8 RFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000064 RBX: ffffffff8100b0f2 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RSI: 000000000076d58e RDI: 00007fcba27ab6e0
RBP: 00007fcba27ab700 R8: 0000000000000020 R9: 000000000000091b
R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff9ca41940
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcba27ac9c0 R15: 00007fff9ca41940
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000064 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120808092714.GA3580@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 35cf4e50b16331def6cfcbee11e49270b6db07f5 upstream.
With multiple instances of task_groups, for_each_rt_rq() is a noop,
no task groups having been added to the rt.c list instance. This
renders __enable/disable_runtime() and print_rt_stats() noop, the
user (non) visible effect being that rt task groups are missing in
/proc/sched_debug.
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344308413.6846.7.camel@marge.simpson.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a2140fc0cb0325bb6384e788edd27b9a568714e2 upstream.
Refcounting of fsnotify_mark in audit tree is broken. E.g:
refcount
create_chunk
alloc_chunk 1
fsnotify_add_mark 2
untag_chunk
fsnotify_get_mark 3
fsnotify_destroy_mark
audit_tree_freeing_mark 2
fsnotify_put_mark 1
fsnotify_put_mark 0
via destroy_list
fsnotify_mark_destroy -1
This was reported by various people as triggering Oops when stopping auditd.
We could just remove the put_mark from audit_tree_freeing_mark() but that would
break freeing via inode destruction. So this patch simply omits a put_mark
after calling destroy_mark or adds a get_mark before.
The additional get_mark is necessary where there's no other put_mark after
fsnotify_destroy_mark() since it assumes that the caller is holding a reference
(or the inode is keeping the mark pinned, not the case here AFAICS).
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Valentin Avram <aval13@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0fe33aae0e94b4097dd433c9399e16e17d638cd8 upstream.
Don't do free_chunk() after fsnotify_add_mark(). That one does a delayed unref
via the destroy list and this results in use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream.
With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.
[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
rand_initialize_irq() ]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.
We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.
This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.
(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)
Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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