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strcpy() is deprecated; use memcpy() instead.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/88
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson (RISCstar) <danielt@kernel.org>
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strcpy() is deprecated; use strscpy() instead.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/88
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson (RISCstar) <danielt@kernel.org>
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sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.
During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.
A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().
For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.
This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.
Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/1477863998-3298-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net/
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/119
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syzbot managed to trigger the following race:
T1 T2
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_do_wait()
schedule()
futex_requeue()
futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
requeue_pi_wake_futex()
futex_requeue_pi_complete()
/* preempt */
* timeout/ signal wakes T1 *
futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() // Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED
futex_hash_put()
// back to userland, on stack futex_q is garbage
/* back */
wake_up_state(q->task, TASK_NORMAL);
In this scenario futex_wait_requeue_pi() is able to leave without using
futex_q::lock_ptr for synchronization.
This can be prevented by reading futex_q::task before updating the
futex_q::requeue_state. A reference on the task_struct is not needed
because requeue_pi_wake_futex() is invoked with a spinlock_t held which
implies a RCU read section.
Even if T1 terminates immediately after, the task_struct will remain valid
during T2's wake_up_state(). A READ_ONCE on futex_q::task before
futex_requeue_pi_complete() is enough because it ensures that the variable
is read before the state is updated.
Read futex_q::task before updating the requeue state, use it for the
following wakeup.
Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT")
Reported-by: syzbot+034246a838a10d181e78@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68b75989.050a0220.3db4df.01dd.GAE@google.com/
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The commit c6366739804f ("cpuset: refactor cpus_allowed_validate_change")
inadvertently removed the error return when cpus_allowed_validate_change()
fails. This patch restores the proper error handling by returning retval
when the validation check fails.
Fixes: c6366739804f ("cpuset: refactor cpus_allowed_validate_change")
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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A previous patch fixed a bug where new_prs should be assigned before
checking housekeeping conflicts. This patch addresses another potential
issue: the nocpu error check currently uses the xcpus which is not updated.
Although no issue has been observed so far, the check should be performed
using the new effective exclusive cpus.
The comment has been removed because the function returns an error if
nocpu checking fails, which is unrelated to the parent.
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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The 'isolcpus' parameter specified at boot time can be assigned to an
isolated partition. While it is valid put the 'isolcpus' in an isolated
partition, attempting to change a member cpuset to an isolated partition
will fail if the cpuset contains any 'isolcpus'.
For example, the system boots with 'isolcpus=9', and the following
configuration works correctly:
# cd /sys/fs/cgroup/
# mkdir test
# echo 1 > test/cpuset.cpus
# echo isolated > test/cpuset.cpus.partition
# cat test/cpuset.cpus.partition
isolated
# echo 9 > test/cpuset.cpus
# cat test/cpuset.cpus.partition
isolated
# cat test/cpuset.cpus
9
However, the following steps to convert a member cpuset to an isolated
partition will fail:
# cd /sys/fs/cgroup/
# mkdir test
# echo 9 > test/cpuset.cpus
# echo isolated > test/cpuset.cpus.partition
# cat test/cpuset.cpus.partition
isolated invalid (partition config conflicts with housekeeping setup)
The issue occurs because the new partition state (new_prs) is used for
validation against housekeeping constraints before it has been properly
updated. To resolve this, move the assignment of new_prs before the
housekeeping validation check when enabling a root partition.
Fixes: 4a74e418881f ("cgroup/cpuset: Check partition conflict with housekeeping setup")
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Converting bpf_insn_successors() to use lookup table makes it ~1.5
times faster.
Also remove unnecessary conditionals:
- `idx + 1 < prog->len` is unnecessary because after check_cfg() all
jump targets are guaranteed to be within a program;
- `i == 0 || succ[0] != dst` is unnecessary because any client of
bpf_insn_successors() can handle duplicate edges:
- compute_live_registers()
- compute_scc()
Moving bpf_insn_successors() to liveness.c allows its inlining in
liveness.c:__update_stack_liveness().
Such inlining speeds up __update_stack_liveness() by ~40%.
bpf_insn_successors() is used in both verifier.c and liveness.c.
perf shows such move does not negatively impact users in verifier.c,
as these are executed only once before main varification pass.
Unlike __update_stack_liveness() which can be triggered multiple
times.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-10-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Remove register chain based liveness tracking:
- struct bpf_reg_state->{parent,live} fields are no longer needed;
- REG_LIVE_WRITTEN marks are superseded by bpf_mark_stack_write()
calls;
- mark_reg_read() calls are superseded by bpf_mark_stack_read();
- log.c:print_liveness() is superseded by logging in liveness.c;
- propagate_liveness() is superseded by bpf_update_live_stack();
- no need to establish register chains in is_state_visited() anymore;
- fix a bunch of tests expecting "_w" suffixes in verifier log
messages.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-9-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Unlike the new algorithm, register chain based liveness tracking is
fully path sensitive, and thus should be strictly more accurate.
Validate the new algorithm by signaling an error whenever it considers
a stack slot dead while the old algorithm considers it alive.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-8-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Allocate analysis instance:
- Add bpf_stack_liveness_{init,free}() calls to bpf_check().
Notify the instance about any stack reads and writes:
- Add bpf_mark_stack_write() call at every location where
REG_LIVE_WRITTEN is recorded for a stack slot.
- Add bpf_mark_stack_read() call at every location mark_reg_read() is
called.
- Both bpf_mark_stack_{read,write}() rely on
env->liveness->cur_instance callchain being in sync with
env->cur_state. It is possible to update env->liveness->cur_instance
every time a mark read/write is called, but that costs a hash table
lookup and is noticeable in the performance profile. Hence, manually
reset env->liveness->cur_instance whenever the verifier changes
env->cur_state call stack:
- call bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain() when the verifier enters a
subprogram;
- call bpf_update_live_stack() when the verifier exits a subprogram
(it implies the reset).
Make sure bpf_update_live_stack() is called for a callchain before
issuing liveness queries. And make sure that bpf_update_live_stack()
is called for any callee callchain first:
- Add bpf_update_live_stack() call at every location that processes
BPF_EXIT:
- exit from a subprogram;
- before pop_stack() call.
This makes sure that bpf_update_live_stack() is called for callee
callchains before caller callchains.
Make sure must_write marks are set to zero for instructions that
do not always access the stack:
- Wrap do_check_insn() with bpf_reset_stack_write_marks() /
bpf_commit_stack_write_marks() calls.
Any calls to bpf_mark_stack_write() are accumulated between this
pair of calls. If no bpf_mark_stack_write() calls were made
it means that the instruction does not access stack (at-least
on the current verification path) and it is important to record
this fact.
Finally, use bpf_live_stack_query_init() / bpf_stack_slot_alive()
to query stack liveness info.
The manual tracking of the correct order for callee/caller
bpf_update_live_stack() calls is a bit convoluted and may warrant some
automation in future revisions.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-7-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This commit adds a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, path-insensitive
data flow analysis for live stack slots:
- flow-sensitive: uses program control flow graph to compute data flow
values;
- context-sensitive: collects data flow values for each possible call
chain in a program;
- path-insensitive: does not distinguish between separate control flow
graph paths reaching the same instruction.
Compared to the current path-sensitive analysis, this approach trades
some precision for not having to enumerate every path in the program.
This gives a theoretical capability to run the analysis before main
verification pass. See cover letter for motivation.
The basic idea is as follows:
- Data flow values indicate stack slots that might be read and stack
slots that are definitely written.
- Data flow values are collected for each
(call chain, instruction number) combination in the program.
- Within a subprogram, data flow values are propagated using control
flow graph.
- Data flow values are transferred from entry instructions of callee
subprograms to call sites in caller subprograms.
In other words, a tree of all possible call chains is constructed.
Each node of this tree represents a subprogram. Read and write marks
are collected for each instruction of each node. Live stack slots are
first computed for lower level nodes. Then, information about outer
stack slots that might be read or are definitely written by a
subprogram is propagated one level up, to the corresponding call
instructions of the upper nodes. Procedure repeats until root node is
processed.
In the absence of value range analysis, stack read/write marks are
collected during main verification pass, and data flow computation is
triggered each time verifier.c:states_equal() needs to query the
information.
Implementation details are documented in kernel/bpf/liveness.c.
Quantitative data about verification performance changes and memory
consumption is in the cover letter.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-6-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The next patch would require doing postorder traversal of individual
subprograms. Facilitate this by moving env->cfg.insn_postorder
computation from check_cfg() to a separate pass, as check_cfg()
descends into called subprograms (and it needs to, because of
merge_callee_effects() logic).
env->cfg.insn_postorder is used only by compute_live_registers(),
this function does not track cross subprogram dependencies,
thus the change does not affect it's operation.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-5-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Namely, rename the following functions and add prototypes to
bpf_verifier.h:
- find_containing_subprog -> bpf_find_containing_subprog
- insn_successors -> bpf_insn_successors
- calls_callback -> bpf_calls_callback
- fmt_stack_mask -> bpf_fmt_stack_mask
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-4-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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stacksafe() is called in exact == NOT_EXACT mode only for states that
had been porcessed by clean_verifier_states(). The latter replaces
dead stack spills with a series of STACK_INVALID masks. Such masks are
already handled by stacksafe().
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-3-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Prepare for bpf_reg_state->live field removal by leveraging
insn_aux_data->live_regs_before instead of bpf_reg_state->live in
compute_live_registers(). This is similar to logic in
func_states_equal(). No changes in verification performance for
selftests or sched_ext.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-2-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Prepare for bpf_reg_state->live field removal by introducing a
separate flag to track if clean_verifier_state() had been applied to
the state. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-1-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Just use the common helper we have.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Make it easier to grep and rename to ns_count.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Stop accessing ns.count directly.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Stop accessing ns.count directly.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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And drop ns_free_inum(). Anything common that can be wasted centrally
should be wasted in the new common helper.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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There's a lot of information that namespace implementers don't need to
know about at all. Encapsulate this all in the initialization helper.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Assign the reserved MNT_NS_ANON_INO sentinel to anonymous mount
namespaces and cleanup the initial mount ns allocation. This is just a
preparatory patch and the ns->inum check in ns_common_init() will be
dropped in the next patch.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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It's really awkward spilling the ns common infrastructure into multiple
headers. Move it to a separate file.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Every namespace type has a container_of(ns, <ns_type>, ns) static inline
function that is currently not exposed in the header. So we have a bunch
of places that open-code it via container_of(). Move it to the headers
so we can use it directly.
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Support the generic ns lookup infrastructure to support file handles for
namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Support the generic ns lookup infrastructure to support file handles for
namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Support the generic ns lookup infrastructure to support file handles for
namespaces.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Support the generic ns lookup infrastructure to support file handles for
namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Support the generic ns lookup infrastructure to support file handles for
namespaces.
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Bring in the fix for removing a mount namespace from the mount namespace
rbtree and list.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Move the namespace iteration infrastructure originally introduced for
mount namespaces into a generic library usable by all namespace types.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Don't cargo-cult the same thing over and over.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Don't cargo-cult the same thing over and over.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Don't cargo-cult the same thing over and over.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Don't cargo-cult the same thing over and over.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Don't cargo-cult the same thing over and over.
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used
to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a
violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit
message was being generated.
The denial audit message can either lead to the capability being
unnecessarily allowed in a security policy, or being silenced potentially
masking a legitimate capability check at a later point in time.
Similar to commit d6169b0206db ("net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when
determining net sysctl permissions")
Fixes: 7863dcc72d0f ("pid: allow pid_max to be set per pid namespace")
CC: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
CC: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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No functional changes, except for the addition of the headers for the
kfuncs so that they can be used for signature verification.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-8-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently only array maps are supported, but the implementation can be
extended for other maps and objects. The hash is memoized only for
exclusive and frozen maps as their content is stable until the exclusive
program modifies the map.
This is required for BPF signing, enabling a trusted loader program to
verify a map's integrity. The loader retrieves
the map's runtime hash from the kernel and compares it against an
expected hash computed at build time.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-7-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Exclusive maps allow maps to only be accessed by program with a
program with a matching hash which is specified in the excl_prog_hash
attr.
For the signing use-case, this allows the trusted loader program
to load the map and verify the integrity
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-3-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Exclusive maps restrict map access to specific programs using a hash.
The current hash used for this is SHA1, which is prone to collisions.
This patch uses SHA256, which is more resilient against
collisions. This new hash is stored in bpf_prog and used by the verifier
to determine if a program can access a given exclusive map.
The original 64-bit tags are kept, as they are used by users as a short,
possibly colliding program identifier for non-security purposes.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250914215141.15144-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, KF_RCU_PROTECTED only applies to iterator APIs and that too
in a convoluted fashion: the presence of this flag on the kfunc is used
to set MEM_RCU in iterator type, and the lack of RCU protection results
in an error only later, once next() or destroy() methods are invoked on
the iterator. While there is no bug, this is certainly a bit
unintuitive, and makes the enforcement of the flag iterator specific.
In the interest of making this flag useful for other upcoming kfuncs,
e.g. scx_bpf_cpu_curr() [0][1], add enforcement for invoking the kfunc
in an RCU critical section in general.
This would also mean that iterator APIs using KF_RCU_PROTECTED will
error out earlier, instead of throwing an error for lack of RCU CS
protection when next() or destroy() methods are invoked.
In addition to this, if the kfuncs tagged KF_RCU_PROTECTED return a
pointer value, ensure that this pointer value is only usable in an RCU
critical section. There might be edge cases where the return value is
special and doesn't need to imply MEM_RCU semantics, but in general, the
assumption should hold for the majority of kfuncs, and we can revisit
things if necessary later.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250903212311.369697-3-christian.loehle@arm.com
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250909195709.92669-1-arighi@nvidia.com
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250917032755.4068726-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull runtime verifier fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix build in some RISC-V flavours
Some system calls only are available for the 64bit RISC-V machines.
#ifdef out the cases of clock_nanosleep and futex in the sleep
monitor if they are not supported by the architecture.
- Fix wrong cast, obsolete after refactoring
Use container_of() to get to the rv_monitor structure from the
enable_monitors_next() 'p' pointer. The assignment worked only
because the list field used happened to be the first field of the
structure.
- Remove redundant include files
Some include files were listed twice. Remove the extra ones and sort
the includes.
- Fix missing unlock on failure
There was an error path that exited the rv_register_monitor()
function without releasing a lock. Change that to goto the lock
release.
- Add Gabriele Monaco to be Runtime Verifier maintainer
Gabriele is doing most of the work on RV as well as collecting
patches. Add him to the maintainers file for Runtime Verification.
* tag 'trace-rv-v6.17-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
rv: Add Gabriele Monaco as maintainer for Runtime Verification
rv: Fix missing mutex unlock in rv_register_monitor()
include/linux/rv.h: remove redundant include file
rv: Fix wrong type cast in enabled_monitors_next()
rv: Support systems with time64-only syscalls
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The smp_call_function_many() kerneldoc comment got out of sync with the
function definition (bool parameter "wait" is incorrectly described as a
bitmask in it), so fix it up by copying the "wait" description from the
smp_call_function() kerneldoc and add information regarding the handling
of the local CPU to it.
Fixes: 49b3bd213a9f ("smp: Fix all kernel-doc warnings")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Include the task's migration-disabled counter when dumping task state
during an error exit.
This can help diagnose cases where tasks can get stuck, because they're
unable to migrate elsewhere.
tj: s/nomig/no_mig/ for readability and consistency with other keys.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.17-rc7).
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h
9536fbe10c9d ("net/mlx5e: Add PSP steering in local NIC RX")
7601a0a46216 ("net/mlx5e: Add a miss level for ipsec crypto offload")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull probe fix from Masami Hiramatsu:
- kprobe-event: Fix null-ptr-deref in trace_kprobe_create_internal(),
by handling NULL return of kmemdup() correctly
* tag 'probes-fixes-v6.17-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
tracing: kprobe-event: Fix null-ptr-deref in trace_kprobe_create_internal()
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A crash was observed with the following output:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2899 Comm: syz.2.399 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5+ #5 PREEMPT(none)
RIP: 0010:trace_kprobe_create_internal+0x3fc/0x1440 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:911
Call Trace:
<TASK>
trace_kprobe_create_cb+0xa2/0xf0 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:1089
trace_probe_create+0xf1/0x110 kernel/trace/trace_probe.c:2246
dyn_event_create+0x45/0x70 kernel/trace/trace_dynevent.c:128
create_or_delete_trace_kprobe+0x5e/0xc0 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:1107
trace_parse_run_command+0x1a5/0x330 kernel/trace/trace.c:10785
vfs_write+0x2b6/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_write+0x129/0x240 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x2d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
</TASK>
Function kmemdup() may return NULL in trace_kprobe_create_internal(), add
check for it's return value.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250916075816.3181175-1-wangliang74@huawei.com/
Fixes: 33b4e38baa03 ("tracing: kprobe-event: Allocate string buffers from heap")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
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