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Some stacks apparently send packets with SYN|URG set. Linux accepts
these packets, so TCP conntrack should to.
Pointed out by Martijn Posthuma <posthuma@sangine.com>.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Check that status flags are available in the netlink message received
to create a new conntrack.
Fixes a crash in ctnetlink_create_conntrack when the CTA_STATUS attribute
is not present.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Hello, Just discussed this Patrick...
We have two users of trie_leaf_remove, fn_trie_flush and fn_trie_delete
both are holding RTNL. So there shouldn't be need for this preempt stuff.
This is assumed to a leftover from an older RCU-take.
> Mhh .. I think I just remembered something - me incorrectly suggesting
> to add it there while we were talking about this at OLS :) IIRC the
> idea was to make sure tnode_free (which at that time didn't use
> call_rcu) wouldn't free memory while still in use in a rcu read-side
> critical section. It should have been synchronize_rcu of course,
> but with tnode_free using call_rcu it seems to be completely
> unnecessary. So I guess we can simply remove it.
Signed-off-by: Robert Olsson <robert.olsson@its.uu.se>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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On 2/28/07, KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@balabit.hu> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> While reading TCP minisock code I've found this suspiciously looking
> code fragment:
>
> - 8< -
> struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> struct sock *newsk = inet_csk_clone(sk, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
>
> if (newsk != NULL) {
> const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
> struct tcp_request_sock *treq = tcp_rsk(req);
> struct inet_connection_sock *newicsk = inet_csk(sk);
> struct tcp_sock *newtp;
> - 8< -
>
> The above code initializes newicsk to inet_csk(sk), isn't that supposed
> to be inet_csk(newsk)? As far as I can tell this might leave
> icsk_ack.last_seg_size zero even if we do have received data.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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The header may have moved when trimming.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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TCP may advertize up to 16-bits window in SYN packets (no window
scaling allowed). At the same time, TCP may have rcv_wnd
(32-bits) that does not fit to 16-bits without window scaling
resulting in pseudo garbage into advertized window from the
low-order bits of rcv_wnd. This can happen at least when
mss <= (1<<wscale) (see tcp_select_initial_window). This patch
fixes the handling of SYN advertized windows (compile tested
only).
In worst case (which is unlikely to occur though), the receiver
advertized window could be just couple of bytes. I'm not sure
that such situation would be handled very well at all by the
receiver!? Fortunately, the situation normalizes after the
first non-SYN ACK is received because it has the correct,
scaled window.
Alternatively, tcp_select_initial_window could be changed to
prevent too large rcv_wnd in the first place.
[ tcp_make_synack() has the same bug, and I've added a fix for
that to this patch -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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add_grhead() allocates memory with GFP_ATOMIC and in at least two places skb
from it passed to skb_put() without checking.
Adrian Bunk:
backported to 2.6.16
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Some of the instances of tcp_sack_block are host-endian, some - net-endian.
Define struct tcp_sack_block_wire identical to struct tcp_sack_block
with u32 replaced with __be32; annotate uses of tcp_sack_block replacing
net-endian ones with tcp_sack_block_wire. Change is obviously safe since
for cc(1) __be32 is typedefed to u32.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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The TCP reset packet is copied from the original. This
includes all the GSO bits which do not apply to the new
packet. So we should clear those bits.
Spotted by Patrick McHardy.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Signed-off-by: John Heffner <jheffner@psc.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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I encountered a kernel panic with my test program, which is a very
simple IPv6 client-server program.
The server side sets IPV6_RECVPKTINFO on a listening socket, and the
client side just sends a message to the server. Then the kernel panic
occurs on the server. (If you need the test program, please let me
know. I can provide it.)
This problem happens because a skb is forcibly freed in
tcp_rcv_state_process().
When a socket in listening state(TCP_LISTEN) receives a syn packet,
then tcp_v6_conn_request() will be called from
tcp_rcv_state_process(). If the tcp_v6_conn_request() successfully
returns, the skb would be discarded by __kfree_skb().
However, in case of a listening socket which was already set
IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, an address of the skb will be stored in
treq->pktopts and a ref count of the skb will be incremented in
tcp_v6_conn_request(). But, even if the skb is still in use, the skb
will be freed. Then someone still using the freed skb will cause the
kernel panic.
I suggest to use kfree_skb() instead of __kfree_skb().
Signed-off-by: Masayuki Nakagawa <nakagawa.msy@ncos.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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The sorting of SACK blocks actually munges them rather than sort,
causing the TCP stack to ignore some SACK information and breaking the
assumption of ordered SACK blocks after sorting.
The sort takes the data from a second buffer which isn't moved causing
subsequent data moves to occur from the wrong location. The fix is to
use a temporary buffer as a normal sort does.
Signed-off-By: Baruch Even <baruch@ev-en.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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The whole idea with the NOTRACK netfilter target is that
you can force the netfilter code to avoid connection
tracking, and all costs assosciated with it, by making
traffic match a NOTRACK rule.
But this is totally broken by the fact that we do a checksum
calculation over the packet before we do the NOTRACK bypass
check, which is very expensive. People setup NOTRACK rules
explicitly to avoid all of these kinds of costs.
This patch from Patrick, already in Linus's tree, fixes the
bug.
Move the check for ip_conntrack_untracked before the call to
skb_checksum_help to fix NOTRACK excemptions from NAT. Pre-2.6.19
NAT code breaks TSO by invalidating hardware checksums for every
packet, even if explicitly excluded from NAT through NOTRACK.
2.6.19 includes a fix that makes NAT and TSO live in harmony,
but the performance degradation caused by this deserves making
at least the workaround work properly in -stable.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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This changes the microsecond RTT sampling so that samples are taken in
the same way that RTT samples are taken for the RTO calculator: on the
last segment acknowledged, and only when the segment hasn't been
retransmitted.
Signed-off-by: John Heffner <jheffner@psc.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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It is important that we only assign dev->ip{,6}_ptr
only after all portions of the inet{,6} are setup.
Otherwise we can receive packets before the multicast
spinlocks et al. are initialized.
Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Otherwise we could compute an inaccurate hash due to the
random seed changing.
Noticed by Zach Brown and patch is based upon some feedback
from Herbert Xu.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Found in 2.4 by Yixin Pan <yxpan@hotmail.com>.
> When I read fib_semantics.c of Linux-2.4.32, write_lock(&fib_info_lock) =
> is used in fib_release_info() instead of write_lock_bh(&fib_info_lock). =
> Is the following case possible: a BH interrupts fib_release_info() while =
> holding the write lock, and calls ip_check_fib_default() which calls =
> read_lock(&fib_info_lock), and spin forever.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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We grab a reference to the route's inetpeer entry but
forget to release it in xfrm4_dst_destroy().
Bug discovered by Kazunori MIYAZAWA <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Currently the behaviour of disable_xfrm is inconsistent between
locally generated and forwarded packets. For locally generated
packets disable_xfrm disables the policy lookup if it is set on
the output device, for forwarded traffic however it looks at the
input device. This makes it impossible to disable xfrm on all
devices but a dummy device and use normal routing to direct
traffic to that device.
Always use the output device when checking disable_xfrm.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Spotted by Thomas Voegtle.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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sbi->s_group_desc is an array of pointers to buffer_head. memcpy() of
buffer size from address of buffer_head is a bad idea - it will generate
junk in any case, may oops if buffer_head is close to the end of slab
page and next page is not mapped and isn't what was intended there.
IOW, ->b_data is missing in that call. Fortunately, result doesn't go
into the primary on-disk data structures, so only backup ones get crap
written to them; that had allowed this bug to remain unnoticed until
now.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Make udp_encap_rcv use pskb_may_pull
IPsec with NAT-T breaks on some notebooks using the latest e1000 chipset,
when header split is enabled. When receiving sufficiently large packets, the
driver puts everything up to and including the UDP header into the header
portion of the skb, and the rest goes into the paged part. udp_encap_rcv
forgets to use pskb_may_pull, and fails to decapsulate it. Instead, it
passes it up it to the IKE daemon.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Kirch <okir@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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This patch removes consideration of high memory when determining TCP
hash table sizes. Taking into account high memory results in tcp_mem
values that are too large.
Signed-off-by: John Heffner <jheffner@psc.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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During OpenVZ stress testing we found that UDP traffic with random src
can generate too much excessive rt hash growing leading finally to OOM
and kernel panics.
It was found that for 4GB i686 system (having 1048576 total pages and
225280 normal zone pages) kernel allocates the following route hash:
syslog: IP route cache hash table entries: 262144 (order: 8, 1048576
bytes) => ip_rt_max_size = 4194304 entries, i.e. max rt size is
4194304 * 256b = 1Gb of RAM > normal_zone
Attached the patch which removes HASH_HIGHMEM flag from
alloc_large_system_hash() call.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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memcpy 4 bytes to address of auto unsigned long variable followed
by comparison with u32 is a bloody bad idea.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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table->private might change because of ruleset changes, don't use it without
holding the lock.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Fix kernel panic on various SMP machines. The culprit is a null
ub->skb in ulog_send(). If ulog_timer() has already been scheduled on
one CPU and is spinning on the lock, and ipt_ulog_packet() flushes the
queue on another CPU by calling ulog_send() right before it exits,
there will be no skbuff when ulog_timer() acquires the lock and calls
ulog_send(). Cancelling the timer in ulog_send() doesn't help because
it has already been scheduled and is running on the first CPU.
Similar problem exists in ebt_ulog.c and nfnetlink_log.c.
Signed-off-by: Mark Huang <mlhuang@cs.princeton.edu>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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chunks [CVE-2006-2934]
When a packet without any chunks is received, the newconntrack variable
in sctp_packet contains an out of bounds value that is used to look up an
pointer from the array of timeouts, which is then dereferenced, resulting
in a crash. Make sure at least a single chunk is present.
Problem noticed by George A. Theall <theall@tenablesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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It appears that sockaddr_in.sin_zero is not zeroed during
getsockopt(...SO_ORIGINAL_DST...) operation. This can lead
to an information leak (CVE-2006-1343).
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
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CVE-2006-2444 - Potential remote DoS in SNMP NAT helper.
Fix memory corruption caused by snmp_trap_decode:
- When snmp_trap_decode fails before the id and address are allocated,
the pointers contain random memory, but are freed by the caller
(snmp_parse_mangle).
- When snmp_trap_decode fails after allocating just the ID, it tries
to free both address and ID, but the address pointer still contains
random memory. The caller frees both ID and random memory again.
- When snmp_trap_decode fails after allocating both, it frees both,
and the callers frees both again.
The corruption can be triggered remotely when the ip_nat_snmp_basic
module is loaded and traffic on port 161 or 162 is NATed.
Found by multiple testcases of the trap-app and trap-enc groups of the
PROTOS c06-snmpv1 testsuite.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
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(CVE-2006-0039)
Solar Designer found a race condition in do_add_counters(). The beginning
of paddc is supposed to be the same as tmp which was sanity-checked
above, but it might not be the same in reality. In case the integer
overflow and/or the race condition are triggered, paddc->num_counters
might not match the allocation size for paddc. If the check below
(t->private->number != paddc->num_counters) nevertheless passes (perhaps
this requires the race condition to be triggered), IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE()
would read kernel memory beyond the allocation size, potentially causing
an oops or leaking sensitive data (e.g., passwords from host system or
from another VPS) via counter increments. This requires CAP_NET_ADMIN.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=191698
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
(chrisw: rebase of Kirill's patch to 2.6.16.16)
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[NETFILTER]: SCTP conntrack: fix infinite loop
fix infinite loop in the SCTP-netfilter code: check SCTP chunk size to
guarantee progress of for_each_sctp_chunk(). (all other uses of
for_each_sctp_chunk() are preceded by do_basic_checks(), so this fix
should be complete.)
Based on patch from Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[TCP]: Fix truesize underflow
There is a problem with the TSO packet trimming code. The cause of
this lies in the tcp_fragment() function.
When we allocate a fragment for a completely non-linear packet the
truesize is calculated for a payload length of zero. This means that
truesize could in fact be less than the real payload length.
When that happens the TSO packet trimming can cause truesize to become
negative. This in turn can cause sk_forward_alloc to be -n * PAGE_SIZE
which would trigger the warning.
I've copied the code DaveM used in tso_fragment which should work here.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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This fixes http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6388
The bug is caused by ip_route_input dereferencing skb->nh.protocol of
the dummy skb passed dow from inet_rtm_getroute (Thanks Thomas for seeing
it). It only happens if the route requested is for a multicast IP
address.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[NETFILTER]: Fix fragmentation issues with bridge netfilter
The conntrack code doesn't do re-fragmentation of defragmented packets
anymore but relies on fragmentation in the IP layer. Purely bridged
packets don't pass through the IP layer, so the bridge netfilter code
needs to take care of fragmentation itself.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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Please apply to 2.6.{14,15,16} -stable, thanks a lot.
From: Robert Olsson <robert.olsson@its.uu.se>
[FIB_TRIE]: Fix leaf freeing.
Seems like leaf (end-nodes) has been freed by __tnode_free_rcu and not
by __leaf_free_rcu. This fixes the problem. Only tnode_free is now
used which checks for appropriate node type. free_leaf can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Robert Olsson <robert.olsson@its.uu.se>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[NETFILTER]: {ip,nf}_conntrack_netlink: fix expectation notifier unregistration
This patch fixes expectation notifier unregistration on module unload to
use ip_conntrack_expect_unregister_notifier(). This bug causes a soft
lockup at the first expectation created after a rmmod ; insmod of this
module.
Should go into -stable as well.
Signed-off-by: Martin Josefsson <gandalf@wlug.westbo.se>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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(CVE-2006-1242)
The problem is in ip_push_pending_frames(), which uses:
if (!df) {
__ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->u.dst, 0);
} else {
iph->id = htons(inet->id++);
}
instead of ip_select_ident().
Right now I think the code is a nonsense. Most likely, I copied it from
old ip_build_xmit(), where it was really special, we had to decide
whether to generate unique ID when generating the first (well, the last)
fragment.
In ip_push_pending_frames() it does not make sense, it should use plain
ip_select_ident() instead.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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The check is wrong and lets NULL-ptrs slip through since !IS_ERR(NULL)
is true.
Coverity #190
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When ufo_append_data fails err is uninitialized, but returned back.
Strangely gcc doesn't notice it.
Coverity #901 and #902
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Covertiy #547
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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That's >= a full sized TSO frame, so we should always
return 0 in that case.
Based upon a report and initial patch from Lachlan
Andrew, final patch suggested by Herbert Xu.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The size of the skb carrying the netlink message is not
equivalent to the length of the actual netlink message
due to padding. ip_queue matches the length of the payload
against the original packet size to determine if packet
mangling is desired, due to the above wrong assumption
arbitary packets may not be mangled depening on their
original size.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The nfnetlink_log infrastructure changes broke compatiblity of the LOG
targets. They currently use whatever log backend was registered first,
which means that if ipt_ULOG was loaded first, no messages will be printed
to the ring buffer anymore.
Restore compatiblity by using the old log functions by default and only use
the nf_log backend if the user explicitly said so.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the
potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which
we ought to do.
However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the
checksums without using this post_input stuff at all. The crucial
point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered
when adjusting checksums. What's more, the checksum adjustment
comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums.
We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :)
When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum
is currently unused. All we have to do is to make that the checksum
adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures!
I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately
woven into the sec_path stuff. We can kill them later too.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We used to keep sg on the stack which is why the extra block was useful.
We've long since stopped doing that so let's kill the block and save
some indentation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We should use the TOS because it's one of the routing keys. It also
means that we update the correct routing cache entry when PMTU occurs.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When garbage collecting route cache entries of multipath routes
in rt_garbage_collect(), entries were deleted from the hash bucket
'i' while holding a spin lock on bucket 'k' resulting in a system
hang. Delete entries, if any, from bucket 'k' instead.
Signed-off-by: Suresh Bhogavilli <sbhogavilli@verisign.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When redirecting an outgoing packet to loopback, it keeps the original
conntrack reference and information from the outgoing path, which
falsely triggers the check for DNAT on input and the dst_entry is
released to trigger rerouting. ip_route_input refuses to route the
packet because it has a local source address and it is dropped.
Look at the packet itself to dermine if it was NATed. Also fix a
missing inversion that causes unneccesary xfrm lookups.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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