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commit 7c7fedd51c02f4418e8b2eed64bdab601f882aa4 upstream.
When handling inbound packets, the two halves of the sequence number
stored on the skb are already in network order.
Fixes: 7021b2e1cddd ("esp4: Switch to new AEAD interface")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f4180439109aa720774baafdd798b3234ab1a0d2 upstream.
When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path:
xfrm_output() -> xfrm_output_gso() -> skb_gso_segment()
where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb->protocol to function properly.
This patch sets skb->protocol to ETH_P_IP before dst_output() is called,
fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through a sit tunnel are dropped
when xfrm is involved.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0eab121ef8750a5c8637d51534d5e9143fb0633f ]
Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there
was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header,
and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the
iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is
EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem
prior to v3.19.
This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761
CVE-2016-8399
Reported-by: Qidan He <i@flanker017.me>
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3 ]
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 969447f226b451c453ddc83cac6144eaeac6f2e3 ]
In v2.6, ip_rt_redirect() calls arp_bind_neighbour() which returns 0
and then the state of the neigh for the new_gw is checked. If the state
isn't valid then the redirected route is deleted. This behavior is
maintained up to v3.5.7 by check_peer_redirect() because rt->rt_gateway
is assigned to peer->redirect_learned.a4 before calling
ipv4_neigh_lookup().
After commit 5943634fc559 ("ipv4: Maintain redirect and PMTU info in
struct rtable again."), ipv4_neigh_lookup() is performed without the
rt_gateway assigned to the new_gw. In the case when rt_gateway (old_gw)
isn't zero, the function uses it as the key. The neigh is most likely
valid since the old_gw is the one that sends the ICMP redirect message.
Then the new_gw is assigned to fib_nh_exception. The problem is: the
new_gw ARP may never gets resolved and the traffic is blackholed.
So, use the new_gw for neigh lookup.
Changes from v1:
- use __ipv4_neigh_lookup instead (per Eric Dumazet).
Fixes: 5943634fc559 ("ipv4: Maintain redirect and PMTU info in struct rtable again.")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra Lin <ssurya@ieee.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fd0285a39b1cb496f60210a9a00ad33a815603e7 ]
The display of /proc/net/route has had a couple issues due to the fact that
when I originally rewrote most of fib_trie I made it so that the iterator
was tracking the next value to use instead of the current.
In addition it had an off by 1 error where I was tracking the first piece
of data as position 0, even though in reality that belonged to the
SEQ_START_TOKEN.
This patch updates the code so the iterator tracks the last reported
position and key instead of the next expected position and key. In
addition it shifts things so that all of the leaves start at 1 instead of
trying to report leaves starting with offset 0 as being valid. With these
two issues addressed this should resolve any off by one errors that were
present in the display of /proc/net/route.
Fixes: 25b97c016b26 ("ipv4: off-by-one in continuation handling in /proc/net/route")
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ac9e70b17ecd7c6e933ff2eaf7ab37429e71bf4d ]
Imagine initial value of max_skb_frags is 17, and last
skb in write queue has 15 frags.
Then max_skb_frags is lowered to 14 or smaller value.
tcp_sendmsg() will then be allowed to add additional page frags
and eventually go past MAX_SKB_FRAGS, overflowing struct
skb_shared_info.
Fixes: 5f74f82ea34c ("net:Add sysctl_max_skb_frags")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com>
Cc: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ce6dd23329b1ee6a794acf5f7e40f8e89b8317ee ]
If a congestion control module doesn't provide .undo_cwnd function,
tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction() will set cwnd to
tp->snd_cwnd = max(tp->snd_cwnd, tp->snd_ssthresh << 1);
... which makes sense for reno (it sets ssthresh to half the current cwnd),
but it makes no sense for dctcp, which sets ssthresh based on the current
congestion estimate.
This can cause severe growth of cwnd (eventually overflowing u32).
Fix this by saving last cwnd on loss and restore cwnd based on that,
similar to cubic and other algorithms.
Fixes: e3118e8359bb7c ("net: tcp: add DCTCP congestion control algorithm")
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Cc: Andrew Shewmaker <agshew@gmail.com>
Cc: Glenn Judd <glenn.judd@morganstanley.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10df8e6152c6c400a563a673e9956320bfce1871 ]
First bug was added in commit ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to
ip_cmsg_recv") : Tom missed that ipv4 udp messages could be received on
AF_INET6 socket. ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb) should have been replaced by
ip_cmsg_recv_offset(msg, skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
Then commit e6afc8ace6dd ("udp: remove headers from UDP packets before
queueing") forgot to adjust the offsets now UDP headers are pulled
before skb are put in receive queue.
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Fixes: e6afc8ace6dd ("udp: remove headers from UDP packets before queueing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Sam Kumar <samanthakumar@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Tested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 396a30cce15d084b2b1a395aa6d515c3d559c674 ]
This reverts commit a681574c99be23e4d20b769bf0e543239c364af5
("ipv4: disable BH in set_ping_group_range()") because we never
read ping_group_range in BH context (unlike local_port_range).
Then, since we already have a lock for ping_group_range, those
using ip_local_ports.lock for ping_group_range are clearly typos.
We might consider to share a same lock for both ping_group_range
and local_port_range w.r.t. space saving, but that should be for
net-next.
Fixes: a681574c99be ("ipv4: disable BH in set_ping_group_range()")
Fixes: ba6b918ab234 ("ping: move ping_group_range out of CONFIG_SYSCTL")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Eric Salo <salo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a681574c99be23e4d20b769bf0e543239c364af5 ]
In commit 4ee3bd4a8c746 ("ipv4: disable BH when changing ip local port
range") Cong added BH protection in set_local_port_range() but missed
that same fix was needed in set_ping_group_range()
Fixes: b8f1a55639e6 ("udp: Add function to make source port for UDP tunnels")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Eric Salo <salo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fcd91dd449867c6bfe56a81cabba76b829fd05cd ]
Currently, GRO can do unlimited recursion through the gro_receive
handlers. This was fixed for tunneling protocols by limiting tunnel GRO
to one level with encap_mark, but both VLAN and TEB still have this
problem. Thus, the kernel is vulnerable to a stack overflow, if we
receive a packet composed entirely of VLAN headers.
This patch adds a recursion counter to the GRO layer to prevent stack
overflow. When a gro_receive function hits the recursion limit, GRO is
aborted for this skb and it is processed normally. This recursion
counter is put in the GRO CB, but could be turned into a percpu counter
if we run out of space in the CB.
Thanks to Vladimír Beneš <vbenes@redhat.com> for the initial bug report.
Fixes: CVE-2016-7039
Fixes: 9b174d88c257 ("net: Add Transparent Ethernet Bridging GRO support.")
Fixes: 66e5133f19e9 ("vlan: Add GRO support for non hardware accelerated vlan")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2cf750704bb6d7ed8c7d732e071dd1bc890ea5e8 ]
Since the commit below the ipmr/ip6mr rtnl_unicast() code uses the portid
instead of the previous dst_pid which was copied from in_skb's portid.
Since the skb is new the portid is 0 at that point so the packets are sent
to the kernel and we get scheduling while atomic or a deadlock (depending
on where it happens) by trying to acquire rtnl two times.
Also since this is RTM_GETROUTE, it can be triggered by a normal user.
Here's the sleeping while atomic trace:
[ 7858.212557] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
[ 7858.212748] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
[ 7858.212881] 2 locks held by swapper/0/0:
[ 7858.213013] #0: (((&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350
[ 7858.213422] #1: (mfc_unres_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8161e005>] ipmr_expire_process+0x25/0x130
[ 7858.213807] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc7+ #179
[ 7858.213934] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 7858.214108] 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403c50 ffffffff813a7804 0000000000000000
[ 7858.214412] ffffffff81a1338e ffff88005b403c78 ffffffff810a4a72 ffffffff81a1338e
[ 7858.214716] 000000000000026c 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403ca8 ffffffff810a4b9f
[ 7858.215251] Call Trace:
[ 7858.215412] <IRQ> [<ffffffff813a7804>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc1
[ 7858.215662] [<ffffffff810a4a72>] ___might_sleep+0x192/0x250
[ 7858.215868] [<ffffffff810a4b9f>] __might_sleep+0x6f/0x100
[ 7858.216072] [<ffffffff8165bea3>] mutex_lock_nested+0x33/0x4d0
[ 7858.216279] [<ffffffff815a7a5f>] ? netlink_lookup+0x25f/0x460
[ 7858.216487] [<ffffffff8157474b>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1b/0x40
[ 7858.216687] [<ffffffff815a9a0c>] netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x260
[ 7858.216900] [<ffffffff81573c70>] rtnl_unicast+0x20/0x30
[ 7858.217128] [<ffffffff8161cd39>] ipmr_destroy_unres+0xa9/0xf0
[ 7858.217351] [<ffffffff8161e06f>] ipmr_expire_process+0x8f/0x130
[ 7858.217581] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.217785] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.217990] [<ffffffff810fbc95>] call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x350
[ 7858.218192] [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350
[ 7858.218415] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180
[ 7858.218656] [<ffffffff810fde10>] run_timer_softirq+0x260/0x640
[ 7858.218865] [<ffffffff8166379b>] ? __do_softirq+0xbb/0x54f
[ 7858.219068] [<ffffffff816637c8>] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x54f
[ 7858.219269] [<ffffffff8107a948>] irq_exit+0xb8/0xc0
[ 7858.219463] [<ffffffff81663452>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x50
[ 7858.219678] [<ffffffff816625bc>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0
[ 7858.219897] <EOI> [<ffffffff81055f16>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10
[ 7858.220165] [<ffffffff810d64dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 7858.220373] [<ffffffff810298e3>] default_idle+0x23/0x190
[ 7858.220574] [<ffffffff8102a20f>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20
[ 7858.220790] [<ffffffff810c9f8c>] default_idle_call+0x4c/0x60
[ 7858.221016] [<ffffffff810ca33b>] cpu_startup_entry+0x39b/0x4d0
[ 7858.221257] [<ffffffff8164f995>] rest_init+0x135/0x140
[ 7858.221469] [<ffffffff81f83014>] start_kernel+0x50e/0x51b
[ 7858.221670] [<ffffffff81f82120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
[ 7858.221894] [<ffffffff81f8243f>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[ 7858.222113] [<ffffffff81f8257c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x13b/0x14a
Fixes: 2942e9005056 ("[RTNETLINK]: Use rtnl_unicast() for rtnetlink unicasts")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 019b1c9fe32a2a32c1153e31375f87ec3e591273 ]
If DBGUNDO() is enabled (FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 1), a compile
error will happen, since inet6_sk(sk)->daddr became sk->sk_v6_daddr
Fixes: efe4208f47f9 ("ipv6: make lookups simpler and faster")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2fe664f1fcf7c4da6891f95708a7a56d3c024354 ]
With TCP MTU probing enabled and offload TX checksumming disabled,
tcp_mtu_probe() calculated the wrong checksum when a fragment being copied
into the probe's SKB had an odd length. This was caused by the direct use
of skb_copy_and_csum_bits() to calculate the checksum, as it pads the
fragment being copied, if needed. When this fragment was not the last, a
subsequent call used the previous checksum without considering this
padding.
The effect was a stale connection in one way, as even retransmissions
wouldn't solve the problem, because the checksum was never recalculated for
the full SKB length.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Caetano dos Santos <douglascs@taghos.com.br>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ffb4d6c8508657824bcef68a36b2a0f9d8c09d10 ]
If a TCP socket gets a large write queue, an overflow can happen
in a test in __tcp_retransmit_skb() preventing all retransmits.
The flow then stalls and resets after timeouts.
Tested:
sysctl -w net.core.wmem_max=1000000000
netperf -H dest -- -s 1000000000
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a09a4c8dd1ec7f830e1fb9e59eb72bddc965d168 upstream.
If a packet is either locally encapsulated or processed through GRO
it is marked with the offloads that it requires. However, when it is
decapsulated these tunnel offload indications are not removed. This
means that if we receive an encapsulated TCP packet, aggregate it with
GRO, decapsulate, and retransmit the resulting frame on a NIC that does
not support encapsulation, we won't be able to take advantage of hardware
offloads even though it is just a simple TCP packet at this point.
This fixes the problem by stripping off encapsulation offload indications
when packets are decapsulated.
The performance impacts of this bug are significant. In a test where a
Geneve encapsulated TCP stream is sent to a hypervisor, GRO'ed, decapsulated,
and bridged to a VM performance is improved by 60% (5Gbps->8Gbps) as a
result of avoiding unnecessary segmentation at the VM tap interface.
Reported-by: Ramu Ramamurthy <sramamur@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes: 68c33163 ("v4 GRE: Add TCP segmentation offload for GRE")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(backported from commit a09a4c8dd1ec7f830e1fb9e59eb72bddc965d168)
[adapt iptunnel_pull_header arguments, avoid 7f290c9]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 upstream.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b8cba75bdf6a48ea4811bbefb11a94a5c7281b68 upstream.
ipip encapsulated packets can be merged together by GRO but the result
does not have the proper GSO type set or even marked as being
encapsulated at all. Later retransmission of these packets will likely
fail if the device does not support ipip offloads. This is similar to
the issue resolved in IPv6 sit in feec0cb3
("ipv6: gro: support sit protocol").
Reported-by: Patrick Boutilier <boutilpj@ednet.ns.ca>
Fixes: 9667e9bb ("ipip: Add gro callbacks to ipip offload")
Tested-by: Patrick Boutilier <boutilpj@ednet.ns.ca>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a5d0dc810abf3d6b241777467ee1d6efb02575fc ]
When executing the script included below, the netns delete operation
hangs with the following message (repeated at 10 second intervals):
kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
This occurs because a reference to the lo interface in the "secure" netns
is still held by a dst entry in the xfrm bundle cache in the init netns.
Address this problem by garbage collecting the tunnel netns flow cache
when a cross-namespace vti interface receives a NETDEV_DOWN notification.
A more detailed description of the problem scenario (referencing commands
in the script below):
(1) ip link add vti_test type vti local 1.1.1.1 remote 1.1.1.2 key 1
The vti_test interface is created in the init namespace. vti_tunnel_init()
attaches a struct ip_tunnel to the vti interface's netdev_priv(dev),
setting the tunnel net to &init_net.
(2) ip link set vti_test netns secure
The vti_test interface is moved to the "secure" netns. Note that
the associated struct ip_tunnel still has tunnel->net set to &init_net.
(3) ip netns exec secure ping -c 4 -i 0.02 -I 192.168.100.1 192.168.200.1
The first packet sent using the vti device causes xfrm_lookup() to be
called as follows:
dst = xfrm_lookup(tunnel->net, skb_dst(skb), fl, NULL, 0);
Note that tunnel->net is the init namespace, while skb_dst(skb) references
the vti_test interface in the "secure" namespace. The returned dst
references an interface in the init namespace.
Also note that the first parameter to xfrm_lookup() determines which flow
cache is used to store the computed xfrm bundle, so after xfrm_lookup()
returns there will be a cached bundle in the init namespace flow cache
with a dst referencing a device in the "secure" namespace.
(4) ip netns del secure
Kernel begins to delete the "secure" namespace. At some point the
vti_test interface is deleted, at which point dst_ifdown() changes
the dst->dev in the cached xfrm bundle flow from vti_test to lo (still
in the "secure" namespace however).
Since nothing has happened to cause the init namespace's flow cache
to be garbage collected, this dst remains attached to the flow cache,
so the kernel loops waiting for the last reference to lo to go away.
<Begin script>
ip link add br1 type bridge
ip link set dev br1 up
ip addr add dev br1 1.1.1.1/8
ip netns add secure
ip link add vti_test type vti local 1.1.1.1 remote 1.1.1.2 key 1
ip link set vti_test netns secure
ip netns exec secure ip link set vti_test up
ip netns exec secure ip link s lo up
ip netns exec secure ip addr add dev lo 192.168.100.1/24
ip netns exec secure ip route add 192.168.200.0/24 dev vti_test
ip xfrm policy flush
ip xfrm state flush
ip xfrm policy add dir out tmpl src 1.1.1.1 dst 1.1.1.2 \
proto esp mode tunnel mark 1
ip xfrm policy add dir in tmpl src 1.1.1.2 dst 1.1.1.1 \
proto esp mode tunnel mark 1
ip xfrm state add src 1.1.1.1 dst 1.1.1.2 proto esp spi 1 \
mode tunnel enc des3_ede 0x112233445566778811223344556677881122334455667788
ip xfrm state add src 1.1.1.2 dst 1.1.1.1 proto esp spi 1 \
mode tunnel enc des3_ede 0x112233445566778811223344556677881122334455667788
ip netns exec secure ping -c 4 -i 0.02 -I 192.168.100.1 192.168.200.1
ip netns del secure
<End script>
Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <haliu@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lance Richardson <lrichard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 20a2b49fc538540819a0c552877086548cff8d8d ]
When sending an ack in SYN_RECV state, we must scale the offered
window if wscale option was negotiated and accepted.
Tested:
Following packetdrill test demonstrates the issue :
0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+0 listen(3, 1) = 0
// Establish a connection.
+0 < S 0:0(0) win 20000 <mss 1000,sackOK,wscale 7, nop, TS val 100 ecr 0>
+0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 28960 <mss 1460,sackOK, TS val 100 ecr 100, nop, wscale 7>
+0 < . 1:11(10) ack 1 win 156 <nop,nop,TS val 99 ecr 100>
// check that window is properly scaled !
+0 > . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 226 <nop,nop,TS val 200 ecr 100>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
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[ Upstream commit db7196a0d0984b933ccf2cd6a60e26abf466e8a3 ]
Commit 76174004a0f19785a328f40388e87e982bbf69b9
(tcp: do not slow start when cwnd equals ssthresh )
introduced regression in TCP YeAH. Using 100ms delay 1% loss virtual
ethernet link kernel 4.2 shows bandwidth ~500KB/s for single TCP
connection and kernel 4.3 and above (including 4.8-rc4) shows bandwidth
~100KB/s.
That is caused by stalled cwnd when cwnd equals ssthresh. This patch
fixes it by proper increasing cwnd in this case.
Signed-off-by: Artem Germanov <agermanov@anchorfree.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Adamushko <d.adamushko@anchorfree.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
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[ Upstream commit 94d9f1c5906b20053efe375b6d66610bca4b8b64 ]
Panic occurs when issuing "cat /proc/net/route" whilst
populating FIB with > 1M routes.
Use of cached node pointer in fib_route_get_idx is unsafe.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90001630024
IP: [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0
PGD 11b08d067 PUD 11b08e067 PMD dac4b067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscac
snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep virti
acpi_cpufreq button parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd
tio_ring virtio floppy uhci_hcd ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common libata scsi_mod
CPU: 1 PID: 785 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.2.0-rc8+ #4
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
task: ffff8800da1c0bc0 ti: ffff88011a05c000 task.ti: ffff88011a05c000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814cf6a0>] [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0
RSP: 0018:ffff88011a05fda0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff8800d8a40c00 RBX: ffff8800da4af940 RCX: ffff88011a05ff20
RDX: ffffc90001630020 RSI: 0000000001013531 RDI: ffff8800da4af950
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8800da1f9a00 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8800db45b7e4 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff8800da4af950
R13: ffff8800d97a74c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800d97a7480
FS: 00007fd3970e0700(0000) GS:ffff88011fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: ffffc90001630024 CR3: 000000011a7e4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffffffff814d00d3 0000000000000000 ffff88011a05ff20 ffff8800da1f9a00
ffffffff811dd8b9 0000000000000800 0000000000020000 00007fd396f35000
ffffffff811f8714 0000000000003431 ffffffff8138dce0 0000000000000f80
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff814d00d3>] ? fib_route_seq_start+0x93/0xc0
[<ffffffff811dd8b9>] ? seq_read+0x149/0x380
[<ffffffff811f8714>] ? fsnotify+0x3b4/0x500
[<ffffffff8138dce0>] ? process_echoes+0x70/0x70
[<ffffffff8121cfa7>] ? proc_reg_read+0x47/0x70
[<ffffffff811bb823>] ? __vfs_read+0x23/0xd0
[<ffffffff811bbd42>] ? rw_verify_area+0x52/0xf0
[<ffffffff811bbe61>] ? vfs_read+0x81/0x120
[<ffffffff811bcbc2>] ? SyS_read+0x42/0xa0
[<ffffffff81549ab2>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Code: 48 85 c0 75 d8 f3 c3 31 c0 c3 f3 c3 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00
a 04 89 f0 33 02 44 89 c9 48 d3 e8 0f b6 4a 05 49 89
RIP [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0
RSP <ffff88011a05fda0>
CR2: ffffc90001630024
Signed-off-by: Dave Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
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[ Upstream commit 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 ]
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f626300a3e776ccc9671b0dd94698fb3aa315966 ]
tcp_select_initial_window() intends to advertise a window
scaling for the maximum possible window size. To do so,
it considers the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and
net.core.rmem_max as the only possible upper-bounds.
However, users with CAP_NET_ADMIN can use SO_RCVBUFFORCE
to set the socket's receive buffer size to values
larger than net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and net.core.rmem_max.
Thus, SO_RCVBUFFORCE is effectively ignored by
tcp_select_initial_window().
To fix this, consider the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2],
net.core.rmem_max and socket's initial buffer space.
Fixes: b0573dea1fb3 ("[NET]: Introduce SO_{SND,RCV}BUFFORCE socket options")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Suggested-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 80610229ef7b26615dbb6cb6e873709a60bacc9f ]
Vegard Nossum is reporting for a crash in fib_dump_info
when nh_dev = NULL and fib_nhs == 1:
Pid: 50, comm: netlink.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+
RIP: 0033:[<00000000602b3d18>]
RSP: 0000000062623890 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000006261b800 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 000000006245ba00
RBP: 00000000626238f0 R08: 000000000000029c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000062468038 R11: 000000006245ba00 R12: 000000006245ba00
R13: 00000000625f96c0 R14: 00000000601e16f0 R15: 0000000000000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x2e0, ip 0x602b3d18
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: netlink.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #581
Stack:
626238f0 960226a02 00000400 000000fe
62623910 600afca7 62623970 62623a48
62468038 00000018 00000000 00000000
Call Trace:
[<602b3e93>] rtmsg_fib+0xd3/0x190
[<602b6680>] fib_table_insert+0x260/0x500
[<602b0e5d>] inet_rtm_newroute+0x4d/0x60
[<60250def>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x8f/0x270
[<60267079>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc9/0xe0
[<60250d4b>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x3b/0x50
[<60265400>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x2c0
[<60265e47>] netlink_sendmsg+0x3f7/0x470
[<6021dc9a>] sock_sendmsg+0x3a/0x90
[<6021e0d0>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x300/0x360
[<6021fa64>] __sys_sendmsg+0x54/0xa0
[<6021fac0>] SyS_sendmsg+0x10/0x20
[<6001ea68>] handle_syscall+0x88/0x90
[<600295fd>] userspace+0x3fd/0x500
[<6001ac55>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90
$ addr2line -e vmlinux -i 0x602b3d18
include/linux/inetdevice.h:222
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1264
Problem happens when RTNH_F_LINKDOWN is provided from user space
when creating routes that do not use the flag, catched with
netlink fuzzer.
Currently, the kernel allows user space to set both flags
to nh_flags and fib_flags but this is not intentional, the
assumption was that they are not set. Fix this by rejecting
both flags with EINVAL.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Fixes: 0eeb075fad73 ("net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Cc: Dinesh Dutt <ddutt@cumulusnetworks.com>
Cc: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 083ae308280d13d187512b9babe3454342a7987e ]
The per-socket rate limit for 'challenge acks' was introduced in the
context of limiting ack loops:
commit f2b2c582e824 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
And I think it can be extended to rate limit all 'challenge acks' on a
per-socket basis.
Since we have the global tcp_challenge_ack_limit, this patch allows for
tcp_challenge_ack_limit to be set to a large value and effectively rely on
the per-socket limit, or set tcp_challenge_ack_limit to a lower value and
still prevents a single connections from consuming the entire challenge ack
quota.
It further moves in the direction of eliminating the global limit at some
point, as Eric Dumazet has suggested. This a follow-up to:
Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 70a0dec45174c976c64b4c8c1d0898581f759948 ]
This fixes wrong-interface signaling on 32-bit platforms for entries
created when jiffies > 2^31 + MFC_ASSERT_THRESH.
Signed-off-by: Tom Goff <thomas.goff@ll.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 962fcef33b03395051367181a0549d29d109d9a4 ]
Blair Steven noticed that ESN in conjunction with UDP encapsulation
is broken because we set the temporary ESP header to the wrong spot.
This patch fixes this by first of all using the right spot, i.e.,
4 bytes off the real ESP header, and then saving this information
so that after encryption we can restore it properly.
Fixes: 7021b2e1cddd ("esp4: Switch to new AEAD interface")
Reported-by: Blair Steven <Blair.Steven@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce upstream.
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a
helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 09d9686047dbbe1cf4faa558d3ecc4aae2046054 upstream.
This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix.
Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few
sanity tests that are done in the normal path.
For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies.
While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more
copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as
e->target_offset differs in the compat case.
Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two
places need to be checked and kept in sync.
At a high level 32 bit compat works like this:
1- initial pass over blob:
validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking
lookup all matches and targets
do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures
assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel
implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.)
2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to
contain the translated ruleset
3- second pass over original blob:
for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated
memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g.
adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc).
4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps)
5-first pass over translated blob:
call the checkentry function of all matches and targets.
The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the
compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step
rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement.
In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel
representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name .
This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit
iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the
'native' sanity checks.
This has two drawbacks:
1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even
though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets.
2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target.
THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations
provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code.
iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form
-A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002
-A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003
shows no noticeable differences in restore times:
old: 0m30.796s
new: 0m31.521s
64bit: 0m25.674s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0188346f21e6546498c2a0f84888797ad4063fc5 upstream.
Always returned 0.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7d3f843eed29222254c9feab481f55175a1afcc9 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8dddd32756f6fe8e4e82a63361119b7e2384e02f upstream.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c upstream.
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc1221b3a163d1386d1052184202d5dc50d302d1 upstream.
32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once
more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject
well-formed 32bit rulesets.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aa412ba225dd3bc36d404c28cdc3d674850d80d0 upstream.
Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it
becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob
or a normal one.
Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry,
compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current
incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7d35812c3214afa5b37a675113555259cfd67b98 upstream.
Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that
the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and
that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule.
Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient.
To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current
checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 36472341017529e2b12573093cc0f68719300997 upstream.
When we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of
a rule (an ipt_entry).
The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases.
300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain:
[ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]:
Before:
real 0m24.874s
user 0m7.532s
sys 0m16.076s
After:
real 0m27.464s
user 0m7.436s
sys 0m18.840s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f24e230d257af1ad7476c6e81a8dc3127a74204e upstream.
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Base chains enforce absolute verdict.
User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return,
xtables userspace adds them automatically.
But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 upstream.
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91 upstream.
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 upstream.
We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7e059158d57b79159eaf1f504825d19866ef2c42 ]
Prior to 4.3, openvswitch tunnel vports (vxlan, gre and geneve) could
transmit vxlan packets of any size, constrained only by the ability to
send out the resulting packets. 4.3 introduced netdevs corresponding
to tunnel vports. These netdevs have an MTU, which limits the size of
a packet that can be successfully encapsulated. The default MTU
values are low (1500 or less), which is awkwardly small in the context
of physical networks supporting jumbo frames, and leads to a
conspicuous change in behaviour for userspace.
Instead, set the MTU on openvswitch-created netdevs to be the relevant
maximum (i.e. the maximum IP packet size minus any relevant overhead),
effectively restoring the behaviour prior to 4.3.
Signed-off-by: David Wragg <david@weave.works>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e5aed006be918af163eb397e45aa5ea6cefd5e01 ]
In case we find a socket with encapsulation enabled we should call
the encap_recv function even if just a udp header without payload is
available. The callbacks are responsible for correctly verifying and
dropping the packets.
Also, in case the header validation fails for geneve and vxlan we
shouldn't put the skb back into the socket queue, no one will pick
them up there. Instead we can simply discard them in the respective
encap_recv functions.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 626abd59e51d4d8c6367e03aae252a8aa759ac78 ]
Currently, when creating or updating a route, no check is performed
in both ipv4 and ipv6 code to the hoplimit value.
The caller can i.e. set hoplimit to 256, and when such route will
be used, packets will be sent with hoplimit/ttl equal to 0.
This commit adds checks for the RTAX_HOPLIMIT value, in both ipv4
ipv6 route code, substituting any value greater than 255 with 255.
This is consistent with what is currently done for ADVMSS and MTU
in the ipv4 code.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10a81980fc47e64ffac26a073139813d3f697b64 ]
In the very unlikely case __tcp_retransmit_skb() can not use the cloning
done in tcp_transmit_skb(), we need to refresh skb_mstamp before doing
the copy and transmit, otherwise TCP TS val will be an exact copy of
original transmit.
Fixes: 7faee5c0d514 ("tcp: remove TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b7f8fe251e4609e2a437bd2c2dea01e61db6849c ]
iptunnel_pull_header expects that IP header was already pulled; with this
expectation, it pulls the tunnel header. This is not true in gre_err.
Furthermore, ipv4_update_pmtu and ipv4_redirect expect that skb->data points
to the IP header.
We cannot pull the tunnel header in this path. It's just a matter of not
calling iptunnel_pull_header - we don't need any of its effects.
Fixes: bda7bb463436 ("gre: Allow multiple protocol listener for gre protocol.")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 391a20333b8393ef2e13014e6e59d192c5594471 ]
After commit fbd40ea0180a ("ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work
during inetdev destroy.") when deleting an interface,
fib_del_ifaddr() can be executed without any primary address
present on the dead interface.
The above is safe, but triggers some "bug: prim == NULL" warnings.
This commit avoids warning if the in_dev is dead
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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