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2008-01-20[AF_KEY]: Fix skb leak on pfkey_send_migrate() errorPatrick McHardy
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-19[IPSEC]: Avoid undefined shift operation when testing algorithm IDHerbert Xu
The aalgos/ealgos fields are only 32 bits wide. However, af_key tries to test them with the expression 1 << id where id can be as large as 253. This produces different behaviour on different architectures. The following patch explicitly checks whether ID is greater than 31 and fails the check if that's the case. We cannot easily extend the mask to be longer than 32 bits due to exposure to user-space. Besides, this whole interface is obsolete anyway in favour of the xfrm_user interface which doesn't use this bit mask in templates (well not within the kernel anyway). Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-26[IPSEC]: Temporarily remove locks around copying of non-atomic fieldsHerbert Xu
The change 050f009e16f908932070313c1745d09dc69fd62b [IPSEC]: Lock state when copying non-atomic fields to user-space caused a regression. Ingo Molnar reports that it causes a potential dead-lock found by the lock validator as it tries to take x->lock within xfrm_state_lock while numerous other sites take the locks in opposite order. For 2.6.24, the best fix is to simply remove the added locks as that puts us back in the same state as we've been in for years. For later kernels a proper fix would be to reverse the locking order for every xfrm state user such that if x->lock is taken together with xfrm_state_lock then it is to be taken within it. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-11-22[PFKEY]: Sending an SADB_GET responds with an SADB_GETCharles Hardin
From: Charles Hardin <chardin@2wire.com> Kernel needs to respond to an SADB_GET with the same message type to conform to the RFC 2367 Section 3.1.5 Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-11-01[NET]: Forget the zero_it argument of sk_alloc()Pavel Emelyanov
Finally, the zero_it argument can be completely removed from the callers and from the function prototype. Besides, fix the checkpatch.pl warnings about using the assignments inside if-s. This patch is rather big, and it is a part of the previous one. I splitted it wishing to make the patches more readable. Hope this particular split helped. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-30[AF_KEY]: suppress a warning for 64k pages.Stephen Rothwell
On PowerPC allmodconfig build we get this: net/key/af_key.c:400: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10[IPSEC]: Lock state when copying non-atomic fields to user-spaceHerbert Xu
This patch adds locking so that when we're copying non-atomic fields such as life-time or coaddr to user-space we don't get a partial result. For af_key I've changed every instance of pfkey_xfrm_state2msg apart from expiration notification to include the keys and life-times. This is in-line with XFRM behaviour. The actual cases affected are: * pfkey_getspi: No change as we don't have any keys to copy. * key_notify_sa: + ADD/UPD: This wouldn't work otherwise. + DEL: It can't hurt. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10[IPSEC]: Move common code into xfrm_alloc_spiHerbert Xu
This patch moves some common code that conceptually belongs to the xfrm core from af_key/xfrm_user into xfrm_alloc_spi. In particular, the spin lock on the state is now taken inside xfrm_alloc_spi. Previously it also protected the construction of the response PF_KEY/XFRM messages to user-space. This is inconsistent as other identical constructions are not protected by the state lock. This is bad because they in fact should be protected but only in certain spots (so as not to hold the lock for too long which may cause packet drops). The SPI byte order conversion has also been moved. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10[NET]: Make socket creation namespace safe.Eric W. Biederman
This patch passes in the namespace a new socket should be created in and has the socket code do the appropriate reference counting. By virtue of this all socket create methods are touched. In addition the socket create methods are modified so that they will fail if you attempt to create a socket in a non-default network namespace. Failing if we attempt to create a socket outside of the default network namespace ensures that as we incrementally make the network stack network namespace aware we will not export functionality that someone has not audited and made certain is network namespace safe. Allowing us to partially enable network namespaces before all of the exotic protocols are supported. Any protocol layers I have missed will fail to compile because I now pass an extra parameter into the socket creation code. [ Integrated AF_IUCV build fixes from Andrew Morton... -DaveM ] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10[NET]: Make /proc/net per network namespaceEric W. Biederman
This patch makes /proc/net per network namespace. It modifies the global variables proc_net and proc_net_stat to be per network namespace. The proc_net file helpers are modified to take a network namespace argument, and all of their callers are fixed to pass &init_net for that argument. This ensures that all of the /proc/net files are only visible and usable in the initial network namespace until the code behind them has been updated to be handle multiple network namespaces. Making /proc/net per namespace is necessary as at least some files in /proc/net depend upon the set of network devices which is per network namespace, and even more files in /proc/net have contents that are relevant to a single network namespace. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10[XFRM]: xfrm audit callsJoy Latten
This patch modifies the current ipsec audit layer by breaking it up into purpose driven audit calls. So far, the only audit calls made are when add/delete an SA/policy. It had been discussed to give each key manager it's own calls to do this, but I found there to be much redundnacy since they did the exact same things, except for how they got auid and sid, so I combined them. The below audit calls can be made by any key manager. Hopefully, this is ok. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10[NET] Cleanup: DIV_ROUND_UPIlpo Järvinen
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-02[PF_KEY]: Fix ipsec not working in 2.6.23-rc1-git10Joy Latten
Although an ipsec SA was established, kernel couldn't seem to find it. I think since we are now using "x->sel.family" instead of "family" in the xfrm_selector_match() called in xfrm_state_find(), af_key needs to set this field too, just as xfrm_user. In af_key.c, x->sel.family only gets set when there's an ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY-1] which I think is for tunnel. I think pfkey needs to also set the x->sel.family field when it is 0. Tested with below patch, and ipsec worked when using pfkey. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-07-26net/* misc endianness annotationsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-07xfrm: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPDJoy Latten
Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete()) However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks patch. This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and SPD. It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial. If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error without removing anything. This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the entire database. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-05-19[IPSEC] pfkey: Load specific algorithm in pfkey_add rather than allHerbert Xu
This is a natural extension of the changeset [XFRM]: Probe selected algorithm only. which only removed the probe call for xfrm_user. This patch does exactly the same thing for af_key. In other words, we load the algorithm requested by the user rather than everything when adding xfrm states in af_key. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25[NET]: cleanup extra semicolonsStephen Hemminger
Spring cleaning time... There seems to be a lot of places in the network code that have extra bogus semicolons after conditionals. Most commonly is a bogus semicolon after: switch() { } Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25[SK_BUFF]: Introduce skb_reset_transport_header(skb)Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
For the common, open coded 'skb->h.raw = skb->data' operation, so that we can later turn skb->h.raw into a offset, reducing the size of struct sk_buff in 64bit land while possibly keeping it as a pointer on 32bit. This one touches just the most simple cases: skb->h.raw = skb->data; skb->h.raw = {skb_push|[__]skb_pull}() The next ones will handle the slightly more "complex" cases. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-18[IPSEC] af_key: Fix thinko in pfkey_xfrm_policy2msg()David S. Miller
Make sure to actually assign the determined mode to rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode. Noticed by Joe Perches. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-17[KEY]: Fix conversion between IPSEC_MODE_xxx and XFRM_MODE_xxx.Kazunori MIYAZAWA
We should not blindly convert between IPSEC_MODE_xxx and XFRM_MODE_xxx just by incrementing / decrementing because the assumption is not true any longer. Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org> Singed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
2007-03-07[IPSEC]: xfrm audit hook misplaced in pfkey_delete and xfrm_del_saEric Paris
Inside pfkey_delete and xfrm_del_sa the audit hooks were not called if there was any permission/security failures in attempting to do the del operation (such as permission denied from security_xfrm_state_delete). This patch moves the audit hook to the exit path such that all failures (and successes) will actually get audited. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-03-07[IPSEC]: Add xfrm policy change auditing to pfkey_spdgetEric Paris
pfkey_spdget neither had an LSM security hook nor auditing for the removal of xfrm_policy structs. The security hook was added when it was moved into xfrm_policy_byid instead of the callers to that function by my earlier patch and this patch adds the auditing hooks as well. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-03-07[IPSEC]: xfrm_policy delete security check misplacedEric Paris
The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were actually done after the policy was removed. Since the unlinking and deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks inside those 2 functions. There we have all the information needed to do the security check and it can be done before the deletion. Since auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions. This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy (xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken by xfrm_policy_by*) It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in xfrm_add_pol_expire. In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the initialization would cause err to be ENOENT. But since err has since been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by* function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT. Also fixed some white space damage in the same area. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-12[XFRM]: Fix OOPSes in xfrm_audit_log().David S. Miller
Make sure that this function is called correctly, and add BUG() checking to ensure the arguments are sane. Based upon a patch by Joy Latten. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-10[NET] KEY: Fix whitespace errors.YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-08[PFKEYV2]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)Shinta Sugimoto
Extend PF_KEYv2 framework so that user application can take advantage of MIGRATE feature via PF_KEYv2 interface. User application can either send or receive an MIGRATE message to/from PF_KEY socket. Detail information can be found in the internet-draft <draft-sugimoto-mip6-pfkey-migrate>. Signed-off-by: Shinta Sugimoto <shinta.sugimoto@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-06audit: Add auditing to ipsecJoy Latten
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA or ipsec policy is created/deleted. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02[IPSEC]: Add AF_KEY interface for encapsulation family.Miika Komu
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi> Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
2006-12-02[XFRM]: annotate ->new_mapping()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-10-11IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matchingVenkat Yekkirala
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled" IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable xfrm(s) applied. The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by default" in the above case. This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context). Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied, such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). This patch: Fix the selinux side of things. This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated with the IPSec policy rule. Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case is now handled properly. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-09-28[XFRM]: ports in struct xfrm_selector annotatedAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[XFRM] POLICY: Support netlink socket interface for sub policy.Masahide NAKAMURA
Sub policy can be used through netlink socket. PF_KEY uses main only and it is TODO to support sub. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[XFRM]: Add XFRM_MODE_xxx for future use.Masahide NAKAMURA
Transformation mode is used as either IPsec transport or tunnel. It is required to add two more items, route optimization and inbound trigger for Mobile IPv6. Based on MIPL2 kernel patch. This patch was also written by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi> Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policiesVenkat Yekkirala
This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the same as the socket they are set on. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Add security context to acquire messages using PF_KEYVenkat Yekkirala
This includes the security context of a security association created for use by IKE in the acquire messages sent to IKE daemons using PF_KEY. This would allow the daemons to include the security context in the negotiation, so that the resultant association is unique to that security context. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-17[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux AuthorizeCatherine Zhang
This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20[NET] sem2mutex: net/Arjan van de Ven
Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20[IPSEC]: Sync series - userJamal Hadi Salim
Add xfrm as the user of the core changes Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-02-23[XFRM]: Eliminate refcounting confusion by creating __xfrm_state_put().Herbert Xu
We often just do an atomic_dec(&x->refcnt) on an xfrm_state object because we know there is more than 1 reference remaining and thus we can elide the heavier xfrm_state_put() call. Do this behind an inline function called __xfrm_state_put() so that is more obvious and also to allow us to more cleanly add refcount debugging later. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-24[AF_KEY]: no message type setJerome Borsboom
When returning a message to userspace in reply to a SADB_FLUSH or SADB_X_SPDFLUSH message, the type was not set for the returned PFKEY message. The patch below corrects this problem. Signed-off-by: Jerome Borsboom <j.borsboom@erasmusmc.nl> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-11[PATCH] capable/capability.h (net/)Randy Dunlap
net: Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-09[NET]: Change some "if (x) BUG();" to "BUG_ON(x);"Kris Katterjohn
This changes some simple "if (x) BUG();" statements to "BUG_ON(x);" Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-03[NET]: move struct proto_ops to constEric Dumazet
I noticed that some of 'struct proto_ops' used in the kernel may share a cache line used by locks or other heavily modified data. (default linker alignement is 32 bytes, and L1_CACHE_LINE is 64 or 128 at least) This patch makes sure a 'struct proto_ops' can be declared as const, so that all cpus can share all parts of it without false sharing. This is not mandatory : a driver can still use a read/write structure if it needs to (and eventually a __read_mostly) I made a global stubstitute to change all existing occurences to make them const. This should reduce the possibility of false sharing on SMP, and speedup some socket system calls. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-03[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.Trent Jaeger
This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-10-08[PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1Al Viro
- added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t; - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with typedef) and documents what's going on far better. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-05[IPSEC]: Document that policy direction is derived from the index.Herbert Xu
Here is a patch that adds a helper called xfrm_policy_id2dir to document the fact that the policy direction can be and is derived from the index. This is based on a patch by YOSHIFUJI Hideaki and 210313105@suda.edu.cn. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-10-04[AF_KEY]: fix sparse gfp nocast warningsRandy Dunlap
Fix implicit nocast warnings in net/key code: net/key/af_key.c:195:27: warning: implicit cast to nocast type net/key/af_key.c:1439:28: warning: implicit cast to nocast type Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-20[IPSEC]: Add XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC flagHerbert Xu
This patch adds the flag XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC for xfrm states. It is similar to the nopmtudisc on IPIP/GRE tunnels. It only has an effect on IPv4 tunnel mode states. For these states, it will ensure that the DF flag is always cleared. This is primarily useful to work around ICMP blackholes. In future this flag could also allow a larger MTU to be set within the tunnel just like IPIP/GRE tunnels. This could be useful for short haul tunnels where temporary fragmentation outside the tunnel is desired over smaller fragments inside the tunnel. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-20[IPSEC]: Add xfrm_init_stateHerbert Xu
This patch adds xfrm_init_state which is simply a wrapper that calls xfrm_get_type and subsequently x->type->init_state. It also gets rid of the unused args argument. Abstracting it out allows us to add common initialisation code, e.g., to set family-specific flags. The add_time setting in xfrm_user.c was deleted because it's already set by xfrm_state_alloc. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>