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commit 1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2 upstream.
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df upstream.
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream.
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.
We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
replay_window.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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It doesn't support to run 32bit 'ip' to set xfrm objdect on 64bit host.
But the return value is unknown for user program:
ip xfrm policy list
RTNETLINK answers: Unknown error 524
Replace ENOTSUPP with EOPNOTSUPP:
ip xfrm policy list
RTNETLINK answers: Operation not supported
Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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When we fail to attach the security context in xfrm_state_construct()
we'll return 0 as error value which, in turn, will wrongly claim success
to userland when, in fact, we won't be adding / updating the XFRM state.
This is a regression introduced by commit fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink:
Inline attach_encap_tmpl(), attach_sec_ctx(), and attach_one_addr()").
Fix it by propagating the error returned by security_xfrm_state_alloc()
in this case.
Fixes: fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl()...")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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During fuzzing I regularly run into this WARN(). According to Herbert Xu,
this "certainly shouldn't be a WARN, it probably shouldn't print anything
either".
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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AFAICT this message is just printed whenever input validation fails.
This is a normal failure and we shouldn't be dumping the stack over it.
Looks like it was originally a printk that was maybe incorrectly
upgraded to a WARN:
commit 62db5cfd70b1ef53aa21f144a806fe3b78c84fab
Author: stephen hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Date: Wed May 12 06:37:06 2010 +0000
xfrm: add severity to printk
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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If we hit any of the error conditions inside xfrm_dump_sa(), then
xfrm_state_walk_init() never gets called. However, we still call
xfrm_state_walk_done() from xfrm_dump_sa_done(), which will crash
because the state walk was never initialized properly.
We can fix this by setting cb->args[0] only after we've processed the
first element and checking this before calling xfrm_state_walk_done().
Fixes: d3623099d3 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump")
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The code wants to prevent compat code from receiving messages. Use
in_compat_syscall for this.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2015-10-30
1) The flow cache is limited by the flow cache limit which
depends on the number of cpus and the xfrm garbage collector
threshold which is independent of the number of cpus. This
leads to the fact that on systems with more than 16 cpus
we hit the xfrm garbage collector limit and refuse new
allocations, so new flows are dropped. On systems with 16
or less cpus, we hit the flowcache limit. In this case, we
shrink the flow cache instead of refusing new flows.
We increase the xfrm garbage collector threshold to INT_MAX
to get the same behaviour, independent of the number of cpus.
2) Fix some unaligned accesses on sparc systems.
From Sowmini Varadhan.
3) Fix some header checks in _decode_session4. We may call
pskb_may_pull with a negative value converted to unsigened
int from pskb_may_pull. This can lead to incorrect policy
lookups. We fix this by a check of the data pointer position
before we call pskb_may_pull.
4) Reload skb header pointers after calling pskb_may_pull
in _decode_session4 as this may change the pointers into
the packet.
5) Add a missing statistic counter on inner mode errors.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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On sparc, deleting established SAs (e.g., by restarting ipsec)
results in unaligned access messages via xfrm_del_sa ->
km_state_notify -> xfrm_send_state_notify().
Even though struct xfrm_usersa_info is aligned on 8-byte boundaries,
netlink attributes are fundamentally only 4 byte aligned, and this
cannot be changed for nla_data() that is passed up to userspace.
As a result, the put_unaligned() macro needs to be used to
set up potentially unaligned fields such as the xfrm_stats in
copy_to_user_state()
Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Allow to change the replay threshold (XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH) and expiry
timer (XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH) of a state without having to set other
attributes like replay counter and byte lifetime. Changing these other
values while traffic flows will break the state.
Signed-off-by: Michael Rossberg <michael.rossberg@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The patch was generated using fixed coccinelle semantic patch
scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci [1].
[1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2014320
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@jwilk.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch adds IV generator information to xfrm_state. This
is currently obtained from our own list of algorithm descriptions.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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structure like xfrm_usersa_info or xfrm_userpolicy_info
has different sizeof when compiled as 32bits and 64bits
due to not appending pack attribute in their definition.
This will result in broken SA and SP information when user
trying to configure them through netlink interface.
Inform user land about this situation instead of keeping
silent, the upper test scripts would behave accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Contrary to common expectations for an "int" return, these functions
return only a positive value -- if used correctly they cannot even
return 0 because the message header will necessarily be in the skb.
This makes the very common pattern of
if (genlmsg_end(...) < 0) { ... }
be a whole bunch of dead code. Many places also simply do
return nlmsg_end(...);
and the caller is expected to deal with it.
This also commonly (at least for me) causes errors, because it is very
common to write
if (my_function(...))
/* error condition */
and if my_function() does "return nlmsg_end()" this is of course wrong.
Additionally, there's not a single place in the kernel that actually
needs the message length returned, and if anyone needs it later then
it'll be very easy to just use skb->len there.
Remove this, and make the functions void. This removes a bunch of dead
code as described above. The patch adds lines because I did
- return nlmsg_end(...);
+ nlmsg_end(...);
+ return 0;
I could have preserved all the function's return values by returning
skb->len, but instead I've audited all the places calling the affected
functions and found that none cared. A few places actually compared
the return value with <= 0 in dump functionality, but that could just
be changed to < 0 with no change in behaviour, so I opted for the more
efficient version.
One instance of the error I've made numerous times now is also present
in net/phonet/pn_netlink.c in the route_dumpit() function - it didn't
check for <0 or <=0 and thus broke out of the loop every single time.
I've preserved this since it will (I think) have caused the messages to
userspace to be formatted differently with just a single message for
every SKB returned to userspace. It's possible that this isn't needed
for the tools that actually use this, but I don't even know what they
are so couldn't test that changing this behaviour would be acceptable.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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After this commit, the attribute XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL is added when no ESN replay
value is defined. Thus sequence number values are always notified to userspace.
Signed-off-by: dingzhi <zhi.ding@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrien Mazarguil <adrien.mazarguil@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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While tracking down the MAX_AH_AUTH_LEN crash in an old kernel
I thought that this limit was rather arbitrary and we should
just get rid of it.
In fact it seems that we've already done all the work needed
to remove it apart from actually removing it. This limit was
there in order to limit stack usage. Since we've already
switched over to allocating scratch space using kmalloc, there
is no longer any need to limit the authentication length.
This patch kills all references to it, including the BUG_ONs
that led me here.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the
policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message.
prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and
XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh).
example:
struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = {
.lbits = 0;
.rbits = 24;
};
struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = {
.lbits = 0;
.rbits = 56;
};
struct nlmsghdr *hdr;
struct nl_msg *msg;
msg = nlmsg_alloc();
hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST);
nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4);
nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6);
nla_send_auto(sk, msg);
The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a
policy in the hash table.
- lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies,
destination address for in and fwd policies).
- rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out
policies, source address for in and fwd policies).
The default values are:
XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32
XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128
Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values
are changed.
The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request:
the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an
XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes
XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The SPI check introduced in ea9884b3acf3311c8a11db67bfab21773f6f82ba
was intended for IPComp SAs but actually prevented AH SAs from getting
installed (depending on the SPI).
Fixes: ea9884b3acf3 ("xfrm: check user specified spi for IPComp")
Cc: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Conflicts:
include/net/inetpeer.h
net/ipv6/output_core.c
Changes in net were fixing bugs in code removed in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The xfrm_user module registers its pernet init/exit after xfrm
itself so that its net exit function xfrm_user_net_exit() is
executed before xfrm_net_exit() which calls xfrm_state_fini() to
cleanup the SA's (xfrm states). This opens a window between
zeroing net->xfrm.nlsk pointer and deleting all xfrm_state
instances which may access it (via the timer). If an xfrm state
expires in this window, xfrm_exp_state_notify() will pass null
pointer as socket to nlmsg_multicast().
As the notifications are called inside rcu_read_lock() block, it
is sufficient to retrieve the nlsk socket with rcu_dereference()
and check the it for null.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2014-05-22
This is the last ipsec pull request before I leave for
a three weeks vacation tomorrow. David, can you please
take urgent ipsec patches directly into net/net-next
during this time?
I'll continue to run the ipsec/ipsec-next trees as soon
as I'm back.
1) Simplify the xfrm audit handling, from Tetsuo Handa.
2) Codingstyle cleanup for xfrm_output, from abian Frederick.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit f1370cc4 "xfrm: Remove useless secid field from xfrm_audit." changed
"struct xfrm_audit" to have either
{ audit_get_loginuid(current) / audit_get_sessionid(current) } or
{ INVALID_UID / -1 } pair.
This means that we can represent "struct xfrm_audit" as "bool".
This patch replaces "struct xfrm_audit" argument with "bool".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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It seems to me that commit ab5f5e8b "[XFRM]: xfrm audit calls" is doing
something strange at xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo().
If secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) != 0, the caller calls
audit_log_task_context() which basically does
secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) == 0 case
except that secid is obtained from current thread's context.
Oh, what happens if secid passed to xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() was
obtained from other thread's context? It might audit current thread's
context rather than other thread's context if security_secid_to_secctx()
in xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() failed for some reason.
Then, are all the caller of xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() passing either
secid obtained from current thread's context or secid == 0?
It seems to me that they are.
If I didn't miss something, we don't need to pass secid to
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() because audit_log_task_context() will
obtain secid from current thread's context.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Conflicts:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt
net/core/netpoll.c
The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening
to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'.
In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
One patch to rename a newly introduced struct. The rest is
the rework of the IPsec virtual tunnel interface for ipv6 to
support inter address family tunneling and namespace crossing.
1) Rename the newly introduced struct xfrm_filter to avoid a
conflict with iproute2. From Nicolas Dichtel.
2) Introduce xfrm_input_afinfo to access the address family
dependent tunnel callback functions properly.
3) Add and use a IPsec protocol multiplexer for ipv6.
4) Remove dst_entry caching. vti can lookup multiple different
dst entries, dependent of the configured xfrm states. Therefore
it does not make to cache a dst_entry.
5) Remove caching of flow informations. vti6 does not use the the
tunnel endpoint addresses to do route and xfrm lookups.
6) Update the vti6 to use its own receive hook.
7) Remove the now unused xfrm_tunnel_notifier. This was used from vti
and is replaced by the IPsec protocol multiplexer hooks.
8) Support inter address family tunneling for vti6.
9) Check if the tunnel endpoints of the xfrm state and the vti interface
are matching and return an error otherwise.
10) Enable namespace crossing for vti devices.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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iproute2 already defines a structure with that name, let's use another one to
avoid any conflict.
CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/recv.c
drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/pcie.c
net/ipv6/sit.c
The SIT driver conflict consists of a bug fix being done by hand
in 'net' (missing u64_stats_init()) whilst in 'net-next' a helper
was created (netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats()) which takes care of this.
The two wireless conflicts were overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We loose a lot of information of the original state if we
clone it with xfrm_state_clone(). In particular, there is
no crypto algorithm attached if the original state uses
an aead algorithm. This patch add the missing information
to the clone state.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The goal of this patch is to allow userland to dump only a part of SA by
specifying a filter during the dump.
The kernel is in charge to filter SA, this avoids to generate useless netlink
traffic (it save also some cpu cycles). This is particularly useful when there
is a big number of SA set on the system.
Note that I removed the union in struct xfrm_state_walk to fix a problem on arm.
struct netlink_callback->args is defined as a array of 6 long and the first long
is used in xfrm code to flag the cb as initialized. Hence, we must have:
sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) <= sizeof(long) * 5.
With the union, it was false on arm (sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) was
sizeof(long) * 7), due to the padding.
In fact, whatever the arch is, this union seems useless, there will be always
padding after it. Removing it will not increase the size of this struct (and
reduce it on arm).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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In the case when KMs have no listeners, km_query() will fail and
temporary SAs are garbage collected immediately after their allocation.
This causes strain on memory allocation, leading even to OOM since
temporary SA alloc/free cycle is performed for every packet
and garbage collection does not keep up the pace.
The sane thing to do is to make sure we have audience before
temporary SA allocation.
Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Clear checking when user try to use ESN through netlink keymgr for AH.
As only ESP and AH support ESN feature according to RFC.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) BPF debugger and asm tool by Daniel Borkmann.
2) Speed up create/bind in AF_PACKET, also from Daniel Borkmann.
3) Correct reciprocal_divide and update users, from Hannes Frederic
Sowa and Daniel Borkmann.
4) Currently we only have a "set" operation for the hw timestamp socket
ioctl, add a "get" operation to match. From Ben Hutchings.
5) Add better trace events for debugging driver datapath problems, also
from Ben Hutchings.
6) Implement auto corking in TCP, from Eric Dumazet. Basically, if we
have a small send and a previous packet is already in the qdisc or
device queue, defer until TX completion or we get more data.
7) Allow userspace to manage ipv6 temporary addresses, from Jiri Pirko.
8) Add a qdisc bypass option for AF_PACKET sockets, from Daniel
Borkmann.
9) Share IP header compression code between Bluetooth and IEEE802154
layers, from Jukka Rissanen.
10) Fix ipv6 router reachability probing, from Jiri Benc.
11) Allow packets to be captured on macvtap devices, from Vlad Yasevich.
12) Support tunneling in GRO layer, from Jerry Chu.
13) Allow bonding to be configured fully using netlink, from Scott
Feldman.
14) Allow AF_PACKET users to obtain the VLAN TPID, just like they can
already get the TCI. From Atzm Watanabe.
15) New "Heavy Hitter" qdisc, from Terry Lam.
16) Significantly improve the IPSEC support in pktgen, from Fan Du.
17) Allow ipv4 tunnels to cache routes, just like sockets. From Tom
Herbert.
18) Add Proportional Integral Enhanced packet scheduler, from Vijay
Subramanian.
19) Allow openvswitch to mmap'd netlink, from Thomas Graf.
20) Key TCP metrics blobs also by source address, not just destination
address. From Christoph Paasch.
21) Support 10G in generic phylib. From Andy Fleming.
22) Try to short-circuit GRO flow compares using device provided RX
hash, if provided. From Tom Herbert.
The wireless and netfilter folks have been busy little bees too.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2064 commits)
net/cxgb4: Fix referencing freed adapter
ipv6: reallocate addrconf router for ipv6 address when lo device up
fib_frontend: fix possible NULL pointer dereference
rtnetlink: remove IFLA_BOND_SLAVE definition
rtnetlink: remove check for fill_slave_info in rtnl_have_link_slave_info
qlcnic: update version to 5.3.55
qlcnic: Enhance logic to calculate msix vectors.
qlcnic: Refactor interrupt coalescing code for all adapters.
qlcnic: Update poll controller code path
qlcnic: Interrupt code cleanup
qlcnic: Enhance Tx timeout debugging.
qlcnic: Use bool for rx_mac_learn.
bonding: fix u64 division
rtnetlink: add missing IFLA_BOND_AD_INFO_UNSPEC
sfc: Use the correct maximum TX DMA ring size for SFC9100
Add Shradha Shah as the sfc driver maintainer.
net/vxlan: Share RX skb de-marking and checksum checks with ovs
tulip: cleanup by using ARRAY_SIZE()
ip_tunnel: clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() in case dst_link_failure() is called
net/cxgb4: Don't retrieve stats during recovery
...
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Right now the sessionid value in the kernel is a combination of u32,
int, and unsigned int. Just use unsigned int throughout.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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Fix checkpatch error "space prohibited xxx".
Signed-off-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This patch cleanup some space errors.
Signed-off-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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In order to check against valid IPcomp spi range, export verify_userspi_info
for both pfkey and netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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IPComp connection between two hosts is broken if given spi bigger
than 0xffff.
OUTSPI=0x87
INSPI=0x11112
ip xfrm policy update dst 192.168.1.101 src 192.168.1.109 dir out action allow \
tmpl dst 192.168.1.101 src 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $OUTSPI
ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.101 dst 192.168.1.109 dir in action allow \
tmpl src 192.168.1.101 dst 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $INSPI
ip xfrm state add src 192.168.1.101 dst 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $INSPI \
comp deflate
ip xfrm state add dst 192.168.1.101 src 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $OUTSPI \
comp deflate
tcpdump can capture outbound ping packet, but inbound packet is
dropped with XfrmOutNoStates errors. It looks like spi value used
for IPComp is expected to be 16bits wide only.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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By semantics, xfrm layer is fully name space aware,
so will the locks, e.g. xfrm_state/pocliy_lock.
Ensure exclusive access into state/policy link list
for different name space with one global lock is not
right in terms of semantics aspect at first place,
as they are indeed mutually independent with each
other, but also more seriously causes scalability
problem.
One practical scenario is on a Open Network Stack,
more than hundreds of lxc tenants acts as routers
within one host, a global xfrm_state/policy_lock
becomes the bottleneck. But onces those locks are
decoupled in a per-namespace fashion, locks contend
is just with in specific name space scope, without
causing additional SPD/SAD access delay for other
name space.
Also this patch improve scalability while as without
changing original xfrm behavior.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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because the home agent could surely be run on a different
net namespace other than init_net. The original behavior
could lead into inconsistent of key info.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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xfrm code always searches for unused policy index for
newly created policy regardless whether or not user
space policy index hint supplied.
This patch enables such feature so that using
"ip xfrm ... index=xxx" can be used by user to set
specific policy index.
Currently this beahvior is broken, so this patch make
it happen as expected.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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For legacy IPsec anti replay mechanism:
bitmap in struct xfrm_replay_state could only provide a 32 bits
window size limit in current design, thus user level parameter
sadb_sa_replay should honor this limit, otherwise misleading
outputs("replay=244") by setkey -D will be:
192.168.25.2 192.168.22.2
esp mode=transport spi=147561170(0x08cb9ad2) reqid=0(0x00000000)
E: aes-cbc 9a8d7468 7655cf0b 719d27be b0ddaac2
A: hmac-sha1 2d2115c2 ebf7c126 1c54f186 3b139b58 264a7331
seq=0x00000000 replay=244 flags=0x00000000 state=mature
created: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 current: Sep 17 14:00:22 2013
diff: 22(s) hard: 30(s) soft: 26(s)
last: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s)
current: 1408(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes)
allocated: 22 hard: 0 soft: 0
sadb_seq=1 pid=4854 refcnt=0
192.168.22.2 192.168.25.2
esp mode=transport spi=255302123(0x0f3799eb) reqid=0(0x00000000)
E: aes-cbc 6485d990 f61a6bd5 e5660252 608ad282
A: hmac-sha1 0cca811a eb4fa893 c47ae56c 98f6e413 87379a88
seq=0x00000000 replay=244 flags=0x00000000 state=mature
created: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 current: Sep 17 14:00:22 2013
diff: 22(s) hard: 30(s) soft: 26(s)
last: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s)
current: 1408(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes)
allocated: 22 hard: 0 soft: 0
sadb_seq=0 pid=4854 refcnt=0
And also, optimizing xfrm_replay_check window checking by setting the
desirable x->props.replay_window with only doing the comparison once
for all when xfrm_state is first born.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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We pass the wrong netlink attribute to xfrm_replay_verify_len().
It should be XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL and not XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL as
we currently doing. This causes memory corruptions if the
replay esn attribute has incorrect length. Fix this by passing
the right attribute to xfrm_replay_verify_len().
Reported-by: Michael Rossberg <michael.rossberg@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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In some cases after deleting a policy from the SPD the policy would
remain in the dst/flow/route cache for an extended period of time
which caused problems for SELinux as its dynamic network access
controls key off of the number of XFRM policy and state entries.
This patch corrects this problem by forcing a XFRM garbage collection
whenever a policy is sucessfully removed.
Reported-by: Ondrej Moris <omoris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is no need to modify the netlink dispatch table at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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