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2014-10-09nl80211: clear skb cb before passing to netlinkJohannes Berg
commit bd8c78e78d5011d8111bc2533ee73b13a3bd6c42 upstream. In testmode and vendor command reply/event SKBs we use the skb cb data to store nl80211 parameters between allocation and sending. This causes the code for CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP to get confused, because it takes ownership of the skb cb data when the SKB is handed off to netlink, and it doesn't explicitly clear it. Clear the skb cb explicitly when we're done and before it gets passed to netlink to avoid this issue. Reported-by: Assaf Azulay <assaf.azulay@intel.com> Reported-by: David Spinadel <david.spinadel@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-10-05netfilter: nf_conntrack: avoid large timeout for mid-stream pickupFlorian Westphal
commit 6547a221871f139cc56328a38105d47c14874cbe upstream. When loose tracking is enabled (default), non-syn packets cause creation of new conntracks in established state with default timeout for established state (5 days). This causes the table to fill up with UNREPLIED when the 'new ack' packet happened to be the last-ack of a previous, already timed-out connection. Consider: A 192.168.x.52792 > 10.184.y.80: F, 426:426(0) ack 9237 win 255 B 10.184.y.80 > 192.168.x.52792: ., ack 427 win 123 <61 second pause> C 10.184.y.80 > 192.168.x.52792: F, 9237:9237(0) ack 427 win 123 D 192.168.x.52792 > 10.184.y.80: ., ack 9238 win 255 B moves conntrack to CLOSE_WAIT and will kill it after 60 second timeout, C is ignored (FIN set), but last packet (D) causes new ct with 5-days timeout. Use UNACK timeout (5 minutes) instead to get rid of these entries sooner when in ESTABLISHED state without having seen traffic in both directions. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Florian Koch <florian.koch1981@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-10-05ipvs: fix ipv6 hook registration for local repliesJulian Anastasov
commit eb90b0c734ad793d5f5bf230a9e9a4dcc48df8aa upstream. commit fc604767613b6d2036cdc35b660bc39451040a47 ("ipvs: changes for local real server") from 2.6.37 introduced DNAT support to local real server but the IPv6 LOCAL_OUT handler ip_vs_local_reply6() is registered incorrectly as IPv4 hook causing any outgoing IPv4 traffic to be dropped depending on the IP header values. Chris tracked down the problem to CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6=y Bug report: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1349768 Reported-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Tested-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-10-05ipvs: Maintain all DSCP and ECN bits for ipv6 tun forwardingAlex Gartrell
commit 76f084bc10004b3050b2cff9cfac29148f1f6088 upstream. Previously, only the four high bits of the tclass were maintained in the ipv6 case. This matches the behavior of ipv4, though whether or not we should reflect ECN bits may be up for debate. Signed-off-by: Alex Gartrell <agartrell@fb.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-10-05ipvs: avoid netns exit crash on ip_vs_conn_drop_conntrackJulian Anastasov
commit 2627b7e15c5064ddd5e578e4efd948d48d531a3f upstream. commit 8f4e0a18682d91 ("IPVS netns exit causes crash in conntrack") added second ip_vs_conn_drop_conntrack call instead of just adding the needed check. As result, the first call still can cause crash on netns exit. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans@schillstrom.com> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-10-05Revert "mac80211: disable uAPSD if all ACs are under ACM"Johannes Berg
commit bb512ad0732232f1d2693bb68f31a76bed8f22ae upstream. This reverts commit 24aa11ab8ae03292d38ec0dbd9bc2ac49fe8a6dd. That commit was wrong since it uses data that hasn't even been set up yet, but might be a hold-over from a previous connection. Additionally, it seems like a driver-specific workaround that shouldn't have been in mac80211 to start with. Fixes: 24aa11ab8ae0 ("mac80211: disable uAPSD if all ACs are under ACM") Reviewed-by: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17libceph: gracefully handle large reply messages from the monSage Weil
commit 73c3d4812b4c755efeca0140f606f83772a39ce4 upstream. We preallocate a few of the message types we get back from the mon. If we get a larger message than we are expecting, fall back to trying to allocate a new one instead of blindly using the one we have. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17libceph: rename ceph_msg::front_max to front_alloc_lenIlya Dryomov
commit 3cea4c3071d4e55e9d7356efe9d0ebf92f0c2204 upstream. Rename front_max field of struct ceph_msg to front_alloc_len to make its purpose more clear. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket lenIlya Dryomov
commit c27a3e4d667fdcad3db7b104f75659478e0c68d8 upstream. We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at the point where we know how much is going to be needed. Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17libceph: add process_one_ticket() helperIlya Dryomov
commit 597cda357716a3cf8d994cb11927af917c8d71fa upstream. Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets. Needed for the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers. (Most of the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17libceph: set last_piece in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init() correctlyIlya Dryomov
commit 5f740d7e1531099b888410e6bab13f68da9b1a4d upstream. Determining ->last_piece based on the value of ->page_offset + length is incorrect because length here is the length of the entire message. ->last_piece set to false even if page array data item length is <= PAGE_SIZE, which results in invalid length passed to ceph_tcp_{send,recv}page() and causes various asserts to fire. # cat pages-cursor-init.sh #!/bin/bash rbd create --size 10 --image-format 2 foo FOO_DEV=$(rbd map foo) dd if=/dev/urandom of=$FOO_DEV bs=1M &>/dev/null rbd snap create foo@snap rbd snap protect foo@snap rbd clone foo@snap bar # rbd_resize calls librbd rbd_resize(), size is in bytes ./rbd_resize bar $(((4 << 20) + 512)) rbd resize --size 10 bar BAR_DEV=$(rbd map bar) # trigger a 512-byte copyup -- 512-byte page array data item dd if=/dev/urandom of=$BAR_DEV bs=1M count=1 seek=5 The problem exists only in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init(), ceph_msg_data_pages_advance() does the right thing. The size_t cast is unnecessary. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17Bluetooth: Avoid use of session socket after the session gets freedVignesh Raman
commit 32333edb82fb2009980eefc5518100068147ab82 upstream. The commits 08c30aca9e698faddebd34f81e1196295f9dc063 "Bluetooth: Remove RFCOMM session refcnt" and 8ff52f7d04d9cc31f1e81dcf9a2ba6335ed34905 "Bluetooth: Return RFCOMM session ptrs to avoid freed session" allow rfcomm_recv_ua and rfcomm_session_close to delete the session (and free the corresponding socket) and propagate NULL session pointer to the upper callers. Additional fix is required to terminate the loop in rfcomm_process_rx function to avoid use of freed 'sk' memory. The issue is only reproducible with kernel option CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING enabled making freed memory being changed and filled up with fixed char value used to unmask use-after-free issues. Signed-off-by: Vignesh Raman <Vignesh_Raman@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuzmichev <Vitaly_Kuzmichev@mentor.com> Acked-by: Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17Bluetooth: never linger on process exitVladimir Davydov
commit 093facf3634da1b0c2cc7ed106f1983da901bbab upstream. If the current process is exiting, lingering on socket close will make it unkillable, so we should avoid it. Reproducer: #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define BTPROTO_L2CAP 0 #define BTPROTO_SCO 2 #define BTPROTO_RFCOMM 3 int main() { int fd; struct linger ling; fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_STREAM, BTPROTO_RFCOMM); //or: fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_DGRAM, BTPROTO_L2CAP); //or: fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_SEQPACKET, BTPROTO_SCO); ling.l_onoff = 1; ling.l_linger = 1000000000; setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &ling, sizeof(ling)); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-05svcrdma: Select NFSv4.1 backchannel transport based on forward channelChuck Lever
commit 3c45ddf823d679a820adddd53b52c6699c9a05ac upstream. The current code always selects XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_TCP for the back channel, even when the forward channel was not TCP (eg, RDMA). When a 4.1 mount is attempted with RDMA, the server panics in the TCP BC code when trying to send CB_NULL. Instead, construct the transport protocol number from the forward channel transport or'd with XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC. Transports that do not support bi-directional RPC will not have registered a "BC" transport, causing create_backchannel_client() to fail immediately. Fixes: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=265 Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14sctp: fix possible seqlock seadlock in sctp_packet_transmit()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 757efd32d5ce31f67193cc0e6a56e4dffcc42fb1 ] Dave reported following splat, caused by improper use of IP_INC_STATS_BH() in process context. BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: trinity-c117/14551 caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 CPU: 3 PID: 14551 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 3.16.0+ #33 ffffffff9ec898f0 0000000047ea7e23 ffff88022d32f7f0 ffffffff9e7ee207 0000000000000003 ffff88022d32f818 ffffffff9e397eaa ffff88023ee70b40 ffff88022d32f970 ffff8801c026d580 ffff88022d32f828 ffffffff9e397ee3 Call Trace: [<ffffffff9e7ee207>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a [<ffffffff9e397eaa>] check_preemption_disabled+0xfa/0x100 [<ffffffff9e397ee3>] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [<ffffffffc0839872>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x692/0x710 [sctp] [<ffffffffc082a7f2>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2a2/0xc30 [sctp] [<ffffffff9e0d985c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff9e7f8c6d>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80 [<ffffffffc082b99a>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1a/0x20 [sctp] [<ffffffffc081e112>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.23+0x1142/0x13f0 [sctp] [<ffffffffc081c86b>] sctp_do_sm+0xdb/0x330 [sctp] [<ffffffff9e0b8f1b>] ? preempt_count_sub+0xab/0x100 [<ffffffffc083b350>] ? sctp_cname+0x70/0x70 [sctp] [<ffffffffc08389ca>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x3a/0x50 [sctp] [<ffffffffc083358f>] sctp_sendmsg+0x88f/0xe30 [sctp] [<ffffffff9e0d673a>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0x9a/0x160 [<ffffffff9e0d62ce>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.27+0xe/0x30 [<ffffffff9e73b624>] inet_sendmsg+0x104/0x220 [<ffffffff9e73b525>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x220 [<ffffffff9e68ac4e>] sock_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 [<ffffffff9e1c0c09>] ? might_fault+0xb9/0xc0 [<ffffffff9e1c0bae>] ? might_fault+0x5e/0xc0 [<ffffffff9e68b234>] SYSC_sendto+0x124/0x1c0 [<ffffffff9e0136b0>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x250/0x330 [<ffffffff9e68c3ce>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff9e7f9be4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 This is a followup of commits f1d8cba61c3c4b ("inet: fix possible seqlock deadlocks") and 7f88c6b23afbd315 ("ipv6: fix possible seqlock deadlock in ip6_finish_output2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14iovec: make sure the caller actually wants anything in memcpy_fromiovecendSasha Levin
[ Upstream commit 06ebb06d49486676272a3c030bfeef4bd969a8e6 ] Check for cases when the caller requests 0 bytes instead of running off and dereferencing potentially invalid iovecs. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14net: Correctly set segment mac_len in skb_segment().Vlad Yasevich
[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7fa4cb74391d42b6a26dc07c20dab1d82 ] When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right out of the original skb. However, this value is not always set correctly (like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad value. One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding bridge port. The packets show up corrupt like this: 16:18:24.985548 52:54:00:ab:be:25 > 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q (0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0, 0x0000: 8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d. 0x0010: 0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0.. 0x0020: 29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3 0x0030: 000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp 0x0040: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp 0x0050: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp 0x0060: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp ... This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and cause retransmissions. The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available in then new skb. We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len(). After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance is restored. CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisionsDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 1be9a950c646c9092fb3618197f7b6bfb50e82aa ] Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with SCTP authentication enabled: Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1 task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000 PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38 pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013 sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924 r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254 r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660 Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015 Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0) Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000) [...] Backtrace: [<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8) [<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844) [<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28) [<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220) [<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4) [<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160) [<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74) [<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888) While we already had various kind of bugs in that area ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different kind. Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is needed can be found in RFC4895: SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against blind attackers. These values are not changed during the lifetime of an SCTP association. Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by the original peer that started the association and not by a malicious attacker. To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO parameters that are being negotiated among peers: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random number and the peer's random number *after* the association has been established. The local and peer's random number along with the shared key are then part of the secret used for calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk. Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other, thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------- -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------> ... Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags, the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1: In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random Number and the peer's Random Number after the association has been established. In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B: B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an association at about the same time but the peer endpoint started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint. The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may running and send a COOKIE ACK. In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in Action B of section 5.2.4. Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b() case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created association to update the existing one. Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated. However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK). That in fact causes the server side when responding with ... <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK ----------------- ... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key and dereferences it in ... crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len) ... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack() called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1 and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks in that case are not sent by the temporary association which are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the *updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state), since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init() was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually throw away each time. The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(), so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic. Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14tcp: Fix integer-overflow in TCP vegasChristoph Paasch
[ Upstream commit 1f74e613ded11517db90b2bd57e9464d9e0fb161 ] In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done. Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches. Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie> Fixes: 8d3a564da34e (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix) Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14tcp: Fix integer-overflows in TCP venoChristoph Paasch
[ Upstream commit 45a07695bc64b3ab5d6d2215f9677e5b8c05a7d0 ] In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done. A first attempt at fixing 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control) was made by 159131149c2 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid(). Fixes: 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control) Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereferenceAndrey Ryabinin
[ Upstream commit 40eea803c6b2cfaab092f053248cbeab3f368412 ] Sasha's report: > While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next > kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew: > > [ 4448.949424] ================================================================== > [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0 > [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638: > [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813 > [ 4448.956823] ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40 > [ 4448.958233] ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d > [ 4448.959552] 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000 > [ 4448.961266] Call Trace: > [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) > [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184) > [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352) > [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339) > [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339) > [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555) > [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654) > [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741) > [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740) > [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64) > [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096) > [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254) > [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273) > [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1)) > [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188) > [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181) > [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600) > [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607) > [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2)) > [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600) > [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201) > [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542) > [ 4448.988929] ================================================================== This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg->msg_name == NULL and msg->msg_namelen > 0. After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference" and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it. This bug was introduced in f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c (net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic). Commit message states that: "Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address." But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed, verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg->msg_namelen > 0 and msg->msg_name == NULL. This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL. Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14ip: make IP identifiers less predictableEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ] In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-14inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_countEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ] Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP generator. linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge cost on servers disabling MTU discovery. 1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes 2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs, with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load. 3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth is about 20. 4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id()) 5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively. IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect' Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time, so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments with a recycled ID. We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP as a key. ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it belongs (it is only used from this file) secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed. Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-07net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockoptSasha Levin
commit 3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf upstream. The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket. As David Miller points out: "If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be" Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL. Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-07Revert "mac80211: move "bufferable MMPDU" check to fix AP mode scan"Johannes Berg
commit 08b9939997df30e42a228e1ecb97f99e9c8ea84e upstream. This reverts commit 277d916fc2e959c3f106904116bb4f7b1148d47a as it was at least breaking iwlwifi by setting the IEEE80211_TX_CTL_NO_PS_BUFFER flag in all kinds of interface modes, not only for AP mode where it is appropriate. To avoid reintroducing the original problem, explicitly check for probe request frames in the multicast buffering code. Fixes: 277d916fc2e9 ("mac80211: move "bufferable MMPDU" check to fix AP mode scan") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-08-07cfg80211: fix mic_failure tracingEliad Peller
commit 8c26d458394be44e135d1c6bd4557e1c4e1a0535 upstream. tsc can be NULL (mac80211 currently always passes NULL), resulting in NULL-dereference. check before copying it. Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-31core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errorsZoltan Kiss
commit 36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c upstream. skb_zerocopy can copy elements of the frags array between skbs, but it doesn't orphan them. Also, it doesn't handle errors, so this patch takes care of that as well, and modify the callers accordingly. skb_tx_error() is also added to the callers so they will signal the failed delivery towards the creator of the skb. Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.13: skb_zerocopy() is new in 3.14, but was moved from a static function in nfnetlink_queue. We need to patch that and its caller, but not openvswitch.] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28ipv4: fix buffer overflow in ip_options_compile()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 10ec9472f05b45c94db3c854d22581a20b97db41 ] There is a benign buffer overflow in ip_options_compile spotted by AddressSanitizer[1] : Its benign because we always can access one extra byte in skb->head (because header is followed by struct skb_shared_info), and in this case this byte is not even used. [28504.910798] ================================================================== [28504.912046] AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in ip_options_compile [28504.913170] Read of size 1 by thread T15843: [28504.914026] [<ffffffff81802f91>] ip_options_compile+0x121/0x9c0 [28504.915394] [<ffffffff81804a0d>] ip_options_get_from_user+0xad/0x120 [28504.916843] [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630 [28504.918175] [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [28504.919490] [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90 [28504.920835] [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70 [28504.922208] [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140 [28504.923459] [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [28504.924722] [28504.925106] Allocated by thread T15843: [28504.925815] [<ffffffff81804995>] ip_options_get_from_user+0x35/0x120 [28504.926884] [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630 [28504.927975] [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [28504.929175] [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90 [28504.930400] [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70 [28504.931677] [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140 [28504.932851] [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [28504.934018] [28504.934377] The buggy address ffff880026382828 is located 0 bytes to the right [28504.934377] of 40-byte region [ffff880026382800, ffff880026382828) [28504.937144] [28504.937474] Memory state around the buggy address: [28504.938430] ffff880026382300: ........ rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.939884] ffff880026382400: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.941294] ffff880026382500: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.942504] ffff880026382600: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.943483] ffff880026382700: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.944511] >ffff880026382800: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.945573] ^ [28504.946277] ffff880026382900: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.094949] ffff880026382a00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.096114] ffff880026382b00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.097116] ffff880026382c00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.098472] ffff880026382d00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.099804] Legend: [28505.100269] f - 8 freed bytes [28505.100884] r - 8 redzone bytes [28505.101649] . - 8 allocated bytes [28505.102406] x=1..7 - x allocated bytes + (8-x) redzone bytes [28505.103637] ================================================================== [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28dns_resolver: Null-terminate the right stringBen Hutchings
[ Upstream commit 640d7efe4c08f06c4ae5d31b79bd8740e7f6790a ] *_result[len] is parsed as *(_result[len]) which is not at all what we want to touch here. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Fixes: 84a7c0b1db1c ("dns_resolver: assure that dns_query() result is null-terminated") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28dns_resolver: assure that dns_query() result is null-terminatedManuel Schölling
[ Upstream commit 84a7c0b1db1c17d5ded8d3800228a608e1070b40 ] dns_query() credulously assumes that keys are null-terminated and returns a copy of a memory block that is off by one. Signed-off-by: Manuel Schölling <manuel.schoelling@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28net: sctp: fix information leaks in ulpevent layerDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 8f2e5ae40ec193bc0a0ed99e95315c3eebca84ea ] While working on some other SCTP code, I noticed that some structures shared with user space are leaking uninitialized stack or heap buffer. In particular, struct sctp_sndrcvinfo has a 2 bytes hole between .sinfo_flags and .sinfo_ppid that remains unfilled by us in sctp_ulpevent_read_sndrcvinfo() when putting this into cmsg. But also struct sctp_remote_error contains a 2 bytes hole that we don't fill but place into a skb through skb_copy_expand() via sctp_ulpevent_make_remote_error(). Both structures are defined by the IETF in RFC6458: * Section 5.3.2. SCTP Header Information Structure: The sctp_sndrcvinfo structure is defined below: struct sctp_sndrcvinfo { uint16_t sinfo_stream; uint16_t sinfo_ssn; uint16_t sinfo_flags; <-- 2 bytes hole --> uint32_t sinfo_ppid; uint32_t sinfo_context; uint32_t sinfo_timetolive; uint32_t sinfo_tsn; uint32_t sinfo_cumtsn; sctp_assoc_t sinfo_assoc_id; }; * 6.1.3. SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR: A remote peer may send an Operation Error message to its peer. This message indicates a variety of error conditions on an association. The entire ERROR chunk as it appears on the wire is included in an SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR event. Please refer to the SCTP specification [RFC4960] and any extensions for a list of possible error formats. An SCTP error notification has the following format: struct sctp_remote_error { uint16_t sre_type; uint16_t sre_flags; uint32_t sre_length; uint16_t sre_error; <-- 2 bytes hole --> sctp_assoc_t sre_assoc_id; uint8_t sre_data[]; }; Fix this by setting both to 0 before filling them out. We also have other structures shared between user and kernel space in SCTP that contains holes (e.g. struct sctp_paddrthlds), but we copy that buffer over from user space first and thus don't need to care about it in that cases. While at it, we can also remove lengthy comments copied from the draft, instead, we update the comment with the correct RFC number where one can look it up. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28tipc: clear 'next'-pointer of message fragments before reassemblyJon Paul Maloy
[ Upstream commit 999417549c16dd0e3a382aa9f6ae61688db03181 ] If the 'next' pointer of the last fragment buffer in a message is not zeroed before reassembly, we risk ending up with a corrupt message, since the reassembly function itself isn't doing this. Currently, when a buffer is retrieved from the deferred queue of the broadcast link, the next pointer is not cleared, with the result as described above. This commit corrects this, and thereby fixes a bug that may occur when long broadcast messages are transmitted across dual interfaces. The bug has been present since 40ba3cdf542a469aaa9083fa041656e59b109b90 ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain") This commit should be applied to both net and net-next. Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28netlink: Fix handling of error from netlink_dump().Ben Pfaff
[ Upstream commit ac30ef832e6af0505b6f0251a6659adcfa74975e ] netlink_dump() returns a negative errno value on error. Until now, netlink_recvmsg() directly recorded that negative value in sk->sk_err, but that's wrong since sk_err takes positive errno values. (This manifests as userspace receiving a positive return value from the recv() system call, falsely indicating success.) This bug was introduced in the commit that started checking the netlink_dump() return value, commit b44d211 (netlink: handle errors from netlink_dump()). Multithreaded Netlink dumps are one way to trigger this behavior in practice, as described in the commit message for the userspace workaround posted here: http://openvswitch.org/pipermail/dev/2014-June/042339.html This commit also fixes the same bug in netlink_poll(), introduced in commit cd1df525d (netlink: add flow control for memory mapped I/O). Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28appletalk: Fix socket referencing in skbAndrey Utkin
[ Upstream commit 36beddc272c111689f3042bf3d10a64d8a805f93 ] Setting just skb->sk without taking its reference and setting a destructor is invalid. However, in the places where this was done, skb is used in a way not requiring skb->sk setting. So dropping the setting of skb->sk. Thanks to Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> for correct solution. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79441 Reported-by: Ed Martin <edman007@edman007.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28tcp: fix false undo corner casesYuchung Cheng
[ Upstream commit 6e08d5e3c8236e7484229e46fdf92006e1dd4c49 ] The undo code assumes that, upon entering loss recovery, TCP 1) always retransmit something 2) the retransmission never fails locally (e.g., qdisc drop) so undo_marker is set in tcp_enter_recovery() and undo_retrans is incremented only when tcp_retransmit_skb() is successful. When the assumption is broken because TCP's cwnd is too small to retransmit or the retransmit fails locally. The next (DUP)ACK would incorrectly revert the cwnd and the congestion state in tcp_try_undo_dsack() or tcp_may_undo(). Subsequent (DUP)ACKs may enter the recovery state. The sender repeatedly enter and (incorrectly) exit recovery states if the retransmits continue to fail locally while receiving (DUP)ACKs. The fix is to initialize undo_retrans to -1 and start counting on the first retransmission. Always increment undo_retrans even if the retransmissions fail locally because they couldn't cause DSACKs to undo the cwnd reduction. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28igmp: fix the problem when mc leave groupdingtianhong
[ Upstream commit 52ad353a5344f1f700c5b777175bdfa41d3cd65a ] The problem was triggered by these steps: 1) create socket, bind and then setsockopt for add mc group. mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr("255.0.0.37"); mreq.imr_interface.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.2"); setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)); 2) drop the mc group for this socket. mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr("255.0.0.37"); mreq.imr_interface.s_addr = inet_addr("0.0.0.0"); setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)); 3) and then drop the socket, I found the mc group was still used by the dev: netstat -g Interface RefCnt Group --------------- ------ --------------------- eth2 1 255.0.0.37 Normally even though the IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP return error, the mc group still need to be released for the netdev when drop the socket, but this process was broken when route default is NULL, the reason is that: The ip_mc_leave_group() will choose the in_dev by the imr_interface.s_addr, if input addr is NULL, the default route dev will be chosen, then the ifindex is got from the dev, then polling the inet->mc_list and return -ENODEV, but if the default route dev is NULL, the in_dev and ifIndex is both NULL, when polling the inet->mc_list, the mc group will be released from the mc_list, but the dev didn't dec the refcnt for this mc group, so when dropping the socket, the mc_list is NULL and the dev still keep this group. v1->v2: According Hideaki's suggestion, we should align with IPv6 (RFC3493) and BSDs, so I add the checking for the in_dev before polling the mc_list, make sure when we remove the mc group, dec the refcnt to the real dev which was using the mc address. The problem would never happened again. Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28ipv4: icmp: Fix pMTU handling for rare caseEdward Allcutt
[ Upstream commit 68b7107b62983f2cff0948292429d5f5999df096 ] Some older router implementations still send Fragmentation Needed errors with the Next-Hop MTU field set to zero. This is explicitly described as an eventuality that hosts must deal with by the standard (RFC 1191) since older standards specified that those bits must be zero. Linux had a generic (for all of IPv4) implementation of the algorithm described in the RFC for searching a list of MTU plateaus for a good value. Commit 46517008e116 ("ipv4: Kill ip_rt_frag_needed().") removed this as part of the changes to remove the routing cache. Subsequently any Fragmentation Needed packet with a zero Next-Hop MTU has been discarded without being passed to the per-protocol handlers or notifying userspace for raw sockets. When there is a router which does not implement RFC 1191 on an MTU limited path then this results in stalled connections since large packets are discarded and the local protocols are not notified so they never attempt to lower the pMTU. One example I have seen is an OpenBSD router terminating IPSec tunnels. It's worth pointing out that this case is distinct from the BSD 4.2 bug which incorrectly calculated the Next-Hop MTU since the commit in question dismissed that as a valid concern. All of the per-protocols handlers implement the simple approach from RFC 1191 of immediately falling back to the minimum value. Although this is sub-optimal it is vastly preferable to connections hanging indefinitely. Remove the Next-Hop MTU != 0 check and allow such packets to follow the normal path. Fixes: 46517008e116 ("ipv4: Kill ip_rt_frag_needed().") Signed-off-by: Edward Allcutt <edward.allcutt@openmarket.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28tcp: Fix divide by zero when pushing during tcp-repairChristoph Paasch
[ Upstream commit 5924f17a8a30c2ae18d034a86ee7581b34accef6 ] When in repair-mode and TCP_RECV_QUEUE is set, we end up calling tcp_push with mss_now being 0. If data is in the send-queue and tcp_set_skb_tso_segs gets called, we crash because it will divide by mss_now: [ 347.151939] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 347.152907] Modules linked in: [ 347.152907] CPU: 1 PID: 1123 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2 #4 [ 347.152907] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 [ 347.152907] task: f5b88540 ti: f3c82000 task.ti: f3c82000 [ 347.152907] EIP: 0060:[<c1601359>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 1 [ 347.152907] EIP is at tcp_set_skb_tso_segs+0x49/0xa0 [ 347.152907] EAX: 00000b67 EBX: f5acd080 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 [ 347.152907] ESI: f5a28f40 EDI: f3c88f00 EBP: f3c83d10 ESP: f3c83d00 [ 347.152907] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 347.152907] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 083158b0 CR3: 35146000 CR4: 000006b0 [ 347.152907] Stack: [ 347.152907] c167f9d9 f5acd080 000005b4 00000002 f3c83d20 c16013e6 f3c88f00 f5acd080 [ 347.152907] f3c83da0 c1603b5a f3c83d38 c10a0188 00000000 00000000 f3c83d84 c10acc85 [ 347.152907] c1ad5ec0 00000000 00000000 c1ad679c 010003e0 00000000 00000000 f3c88fc8 [ 347.152907] Call Trace: [ 347.152907] [<c167f9d9>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x2d/0x34 [ 347.152907] [<c16013e6>] tcp_init_tso_segs+0x36/0x50 [ 347.152907] [<c1603b5a>] tcp_write_xmit+0x7a/0xbf0 [ 347.152907] [<c10a0188>] ? up+0x28/0x40 [ 347.152907] [<c10acc85>] ? console_unlock+0x295/0x480 [ 347.152907] [<c10ad24f>] ? vprintk_emit+0x1ef/0x4b0 [ 347.152907] [<c1605716>] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x36/0xd0 [ 347.152907] [<c15f4860>] tcp_push+0xf0/0x120 [ 347.152907] [<c15f7641>] tcp_sendmsg+0xf1/0xbf0 [ 347.152907] [<c116d920>] ? kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x120 [ 347.152907] [<c106a682>] ? __sigqueue_free+0x32/0x40 [ 347.152907] [<c106a682>] ? __sigqueue_free+0x32/0x40 [ 347.152907] [<c114f0f0>] ? do_wp_page+0x3e0/0x850 [ 347.152907] [<c161c36a>] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0 [ 347.152907] [<c1150269>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x709/0xfb0 [ 347.152907] [<c15a006b>] sock_aio_write+0xbb/0xd0 [ 347.152907] [<c1180b79>] do_sync_write+0x69/0xa0 [ 347.152907] [<c1181023>] vfs_write+0x123/0x160 [ 347.152907] [<c1181d55>] SyS_write+0x55/0xb0 [ 347.152907] [<c167f0d8>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x28 This can easily be reproduced with the following packetdrill-script (the "magic" with netem, sk_pacing and limit_output_bytes is done to prevent the kernel from pushing all segments, because hitting the limit without doing this is not so easy with packetdrill): 0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 1) = 0 +0 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460> +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460> +0.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 65000 +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 // This forces that not all segments of the snd-queue will be pushed +0 `tc qdisc add dev tun0 root netem delay 10ms` +0 `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_limit_output_bytes=2` +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 47, [2], 4) = 0 +0 write(4,...,10000) = 10000 +0 write(4,...,10000) = 10000 // Set tcp-repair stuff, particularly TCP_RECV_QUEUE +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, 19, [1], 4) = 0 +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, 20, [1], 4) = 0 // This now will make the write push the remaining segments +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 47, [20000], 4) = 0 +0 `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_limit_output_bytes=130000` // Now we will crash +0 write(4,...,1000) = 1000 This happens since ec3423257508 (tcp: fix retransmission in repair mode). Prior to that, the call to tcp_push was prevented by a check for tp->repair. The patch fixes it, by adding the new goto-label out_nopush. When exiting tcp_sendmsg and a push is not required, which is the case for tp->repair, we go to this label. When repairing and calling send() with TCP_RECV_QUEUE, the data is actually put in the receive-queue. So, no push is required because no data has been added to the send-queue. Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Fixes: ec3423257508 (tcp: fix retransmission in repair mode) Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28ipv4: irq safe sk_dst_[re]set() and ipv4_sk_update_pmtu() fixEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 7f502361531e9eecb396cf99bdc9e9a59f7ebd7f ] We have two different ways to handle changes to sk->sk_dst First way (used by TCP) assumes socket lock is owned by caller, and use no extra lock : __sk_dst_set() & __sk_dst_reset() Another way (used by UDP) uses sk_dst_lock because socket lock is not always taken. Note that sk_dst_lock is not softirq safe. These ways are not inter changeable for a given socket type. ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(), added in linux-3.8, added a race, as it used the socket lock as synchronization, but users might be UDP sockets. Instead of converting sk_dst_lock to a softirq safe version, use xchg() as we did for sk_rx_dst in commit e47eb5dfb296b ("udp: ipv4: do not use sk_dst_lock from softirq context") In a follow up patch, we probably can remove sk_dst_lock, as it is only used in IPv6. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Fixes: 9cb3a50c5f63e ("ipv4: Invalidate the socket cached route on pmtu events if possible") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit f88649721268999bdff09777847080a52004f691 ] When IP route cache had been removed in linux-3.6, we broke assumption that dst entries were all freed after rcu grace period. DST_NOCACHE dst were supposed to be freed from dst_release(). But it appears we want to keep such dst around, either in UDP sockets or tunnels. In sk_dst_get() we need to make sure dst refcount is not 0 before incrementing it, or else we might end up freeing a dst twice. DST_NOCACHE set on a dst does not mean this dst can not be attached to a socket or a tunnel. Then, before actual freeing, we need to observe a rcu grace period to make sure all other cpus can catch the fact the dst is no longer usable. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dormando <dormando@rydia.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-288021q: fix a potential memory leakLi RongQing
[ Upstream commit 916c1689a09bc1ca81f2d7a34876f8d35aadd11b ] skb_cow called in vlan_reorder_header does not free the skb when it failed, and vlan_reorder_header returns NULL to reset original skb when it is called in vlan_untag, lead to a memory leak. Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28net: sctp: check proc_dointvec result in proc_sctp_do_authDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 24599e61b7552673dd85971cf5a35369cd8c119e ] When writing to the sysctl field net.sctp.auth_enable, it can well be that the user buffer we handed over to proc_dointvec() via proc_sctp_do_auth() handler contains something other than integers. In that case, we would set an uninitialized 4-byte value from the stack to net->sctp.auth_enable that can be leaked back when reading the sysctl variable, and it can unintentionally turn auth_enable on/off based on the stack content since auth_enable is interpreted as a boolean. Fix it up by making sure proc_dointvec() returned sucessfully. Fixes: b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint") Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28tcp: fix tcp_match_skb_to_sack() for unaligned SACK at end of an skbNeal Cardwell
[ Upstream commit 2cd0d743b05e87445c54ca124a9916f22f16742e ] If there is an MSS change (or misbehaving receiver) that causes a SACK to arrive that covers the end of an skb but is less than one MSS, then tcp_match_skb_to_sack() was rounding up pkt_len to the full length of the skb ("Round if necessary..."), then chopping all bytes off the skb and creating a zero-byte skb in the write queue. This was visible now because the recently simplified TLP logic in bef1909ee3ed1c ("tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery") could find that 0-byte skb at the end of the write queue, and now that we do not check that skb's length we could send it as a TLP probe. Consider the following example scenario: mss: 1000 skb: seq: 0 end_seq: 4000 len: 4000 SACK: start_seq: 3999 end_seq: 4000 The tcp_match_skb_to_sack() code will compute: in_sack = false pkt_len = start_seq - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = 3999 - 0 = 3999 new_len = (pkt_len / mss) * mss = (3999/1000)*1000 = 3000 new_len += mss = 4000 Previously we would find the new_len > skb->len check failing, so we would fall through and set pkt_len = new_len = 4000 and chop off pkt_len of 4000 from the 4000-byte skb, leaving a 0-byte segment afterward in the write queue. With this new commit, we notice that the new new_len >= skb->len check succeeds, so that we return without trying to fragment. Fixes: adb92db857ee ("tcp: Make SACK code to split only at mss boundaries") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Ilpo Jarvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-28ip_tunnel: fix ip_tunnel_lookupDmitry Popov
[ Upstream commit e0056593b61253f1a8a9941dacda22e73b963cdc ] This patch fixes 3 similar bugs where incoming packets might be routed into wrong non-wildcard tunnels: 1) Consider the following setup: ip address add 1.1.1.1/24 dev eth0 ip address add 1.1.1.2/24 dev eth0 ip tunnel add ipip1 remote 2.2.2.2 local 1.1.1.1 mode ipip dev eth0 ip link set ipip1 up Incoming ipip packets from 2.2.2.2 were routed into ipip1 even if it has dst = 1.1.1.2. Moreover even if there was wildcard tunnel like ip tunnel add ipip0 remote 2.2.2.2 local any mode ipip dev eth0 but it was created before explicit one (with local 1.1.1.1), incoming ipip packets with src = 2.2.2.2 and dst = 1.1.1.2 were still routed into ipip1. Same issue existed with all tunnels that use ip_tunnel_lookup (gre, vti) 2) ip address add 1.1.1.1/24 dev eth0 ip tunnel add ipip1 remote 2.2.146.85 local 1.1.1.1 mode ipip dev eth0 ip link set ipip1 up Incoming ipip packets with dst = 1.1.1.1 were routed into ipip1, no matter what src address is. Any remote ip address which has ip_tunnel_hash = 0 raised this issue, 2.2.146.85 is just an example, there are more than 4 million of them. And again, wildcard tunnel like ip tunnel add ipip0 remote any local 1.1.1.1 mode ipip dev eth0 wouldn't be ever matched if it was created before explicit tunnel like above. Gre & vti tunnels had the same issue. 3) ip address add 1.1.1.1/24 dev eth0 ip tunnel add gre1 remote 2.2.146.84 local 1.1.1.1 key 1 mode gre dev eth0 ip link set gre1 up Any incoming gre packet with key = 1 were routed into gre1, no matter what src/dst addresses are. Any remote ip address which has ip_tunnel_hash = 0 raised the issue, 2.2.146.84 is just an example, there are more than 4 million of them. Wildcard tunnel like ip tunnel add gre2 remote any local any key 1 mode gre dev eth0 wouldn't be ever matched if it was created before explicit tunnel like above. All this stuff happened because while looking for a wildcard tunnel we didn't check that matched tunnel is a wildcard one. Fixed. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-09mac80211: fix a memory leak on sta rate selection tableFelix Fietkau
commit 53d045258ee2e38b1e882617cb0799a04d05f5fa upstream. If the rate control algorithm uses a selection table, it is leaked when the station is destroyed - fix that. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Reported-by: Christophe Prévotaux <cprevotaux@nltinc.com> Fixes: 0d528d85c519 ("mac80211: improve the rate control API") [add commit log entry, remove pointless NULL check] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-09mac80211: don't check netdev state for debugfs read/writeArik Nemtsov
commit 923eaf367206e01f22c97aee22300e332d071916 upstream. Doing so will lead to an oops for a p2p-dev interface, since it has no netdev. Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-09Bluetooth: Fix locking of hdev when calling into SMP codeJohan Hedberg
commit c73f94b8c093a615ce80eabbde0ac6eb9abfe31a upstream. The SMP code expects hdev to be unlocked since e.g. crypto functions will try to (re)lock it. Therefore, we need to release the lock before calling into smp.c from mgmt.c. Without this we risk a deadlock whenever the smp_user_confirm_reply() function is called. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Rymanowski <lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-09Bluetooth: Fix check for connection encryptionJohan Hedberg
commit e694788d73efe139b24f78b036deb97fe57fa8cb upstream. The conn->link_key variable tracks the type of link key in use. It is set whenever we respond to a link key request as well as when we get a link key notification event. These two events do not however always guarantee that encryption is enabled: getting a link key request and responding to it may only mean that the remote side has requested authentication but not encryption. On the other hand, the encrypt change event is a certain guarantee that encryption is enabled. The real encryption state is already tracked in the conn->link_mode variable through the HCI_LM_ENCRYPT bit. This patch fixes a check for encryption in the hci_conn_auth function to use the proper conn->link_mode value and thereby eliminates the chance of a false positive result. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-09Bluetooth: Fix SSP acceptor just-works confirmation without MITMJohan Hedberg
commit ba15a58b179ed76a7e887177f2b06de12c58ec8f upstream. From the Bluetooth Core Specification 4.1 page 1958: "if both devices have set the Authentication_Requirements parameter to one of the MITM Protection Not Required options, authentication stage 1 shall function as if both devices set their IO capabilities to DisplayOnly (e.g., Numeric comparison with automatic confirmation on both devices)" So far our implementation has done user confirmation for all just-works cases regardless of the MITM requirements, however following the specification to the word means that we should not be doing confirmation when neither side has the MITM flag set. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-06netfilter: ipt_ULOG: fix info leaksMathias Krause
commit 278f2b3e2af5f32ea1afe34fa12a2518153e6e49 upstream. The ulog messages leak heap bytes by the means of padding bytes and incompletely filled string arrays. Fix those by memset(0)'ing the whole struct before filling it. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Jan Tore Morken <jantore@morken.priv.no> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.0.4) at 2024-11-11 07:18:28 +0000