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[ Upstream commit 5a3da1fe9561828d0ca7eca664b16ec2b9bf0055 ]
This patch introduces a constant limit of the fragment queue hash
table bucket list lengths. Currently the limit 128 is choosen somewhat
arbitrary and just ensures that we can fill up the fragment cache with
empty packets up to the default ip_frag_high_thresh limits. It should
just protect from list iteration eating considerable amounts of cpu.
If we reach the maximum length in one hash bucket a warning is printed.
This is implemented on the caller side of inet_frag_find to distinguish
between the different users of inet_fragment.c.
I dropped the out of memory warning in the ipv4 fragment lookup path,
because we already get a warning by the slab allocator.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <jbrouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit a5b8db91442fce9c9713fcd656c3698f1adde1d6 ]
Range/validity checks on rta_type in rtnetlink_rcv_msg() do
not account for flags that may be set. This causes the function
to return -EINVAL when flags are set on the type (for example
NLA_F_NESTED).
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 16fad69cfe4adbbfa813de516757b87bcae36d93 ]
Chrome OS team reported a crash on a Pixel ChromeBook in TCP stack :
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=182056
commit a21d45726acac (tcp: avoid order-1 allocations on wifi and tx
path) did a poor choice adding an 'avail_size' field to skb, while
what we really needed was a 'reserved_tailroom' one.
It would have avoided commit 22b4a4f22da (tcp: fix retransmit of
partially acked frames) and this commit.
Crash occurs because skb_split() is not aware of the 'avail_size'
management (and should not be aware)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Mukesh Agrawal <quiche@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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matched transport
[ Upstream commit 2317f449af30073cfa6ec8352e4a65a89e357bdd ]
sctp_assoc_lookup_tsn() function searchs which transport a certain TSN
was sent on, if not found in the active_path transport, then go search
all the other transports in the peer's transport_addr_list, however, we
should continue to the next entry rather than break the loop when meet
the active_path transport.
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea ]
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 4660c7f498c07c43173142ea95145e9dac5a6d14 ]
This is needed in order to detect if the timestamp option appears
more than once in a packet, to remove the option if the packet is
fragmented, etc. My previous change neglected to store the option
location when the router addresses were prespecified and Pointer >
Length. But now the option location is also stored when Flag is an
unrecognized value, to ensure these option handling behaviors are
still performed.
Signed-off-by: David Ward <david.ward@ll.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 9026c4927254f5bea695cc3ef2e255280e6a3011 ]
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0 ]
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372 ]
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit ddf64354af4a702ee0b85d0a285ba74c7278a460 ]
v2:
a) used struct ipv6_addr_props
v3:
a) reverted changes for ipv6_addr_props
v4:
a) do not use __ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 3bc1b1add7a8484cc4a261c3e128dbe1528ce01f ]
The frames for which rx_handlers return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED are no longer
counted as dropped. They are counted as successfully received by
'netif_receive_skb'.
This allows network interface drivers to correctly update their RX-OK and
RX-DRP counters based on the result of 'netif_receive_skb'.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Bercaru <B43982@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commits 0c1233aba1e948c37f6dc7620cb7c253fcd71ce9 and
a6a8fe950e1b8596bb06f2c89c3a1a4bf2011ba9 ]
When we have a large number of static label mappings that spill across
the netlink message boundary we fail to properly save our state in the
netlink_callback struct which causes us to repeat the same listings.
This patch fixes this problem by saving the state correctly between
calls to the NetLabel static label netlink "dumpit" routines.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit aab2b4bf224ef8358d262f95b568b8ad0cecf0a0 ]
We should not update ts_recent and call tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts() both
before and after going to step5. That wastes CPU and double-counts the
receiver-side RTT sample.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 3e8b0ac3e41e3c882222a5522d5df7212438ab51 ]
Setting net.ipv6.conf.<interface>.accept_ra=2 causes the kernel
to accept RAs even when forwarding is enabled. However, enabling
forwarding purges all default routes on the system, breaking
connectivity until the next RA is received. Fix this by not
purging default routes on interfaces that have accept_ra=2.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit ece6b0a2b25652d684a7ced4ae680a863af041e0 ]
Dave Jones reported the following bug:
"When fed mangled socket data, rds will trust what userspace gives it,
and tries to allocate enormous amounts of memory larger than what
kmalloc can satisfy."
WARNING: at mm/page_alloc.c:2393 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xa0d/0xbe0()
Hardware name: GA-MA78GM-S2H
Modules linked in: vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock fuse bnep dlci bridge 8021q garp stp mrp binfmt_misc l2tp_ppp l2tp_core rfcomm s
Pid: 24652, comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.8.0+ #65
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81044155>] warn_slowpath_common+0x75/0xa0
[<ffffffff8104419a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[<ffffffff811444ad>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xa0d/0xbe0
[<ffffffff8100a196>] ? native_sched_clock+0x26/0x90
[<ffffffff810b2128>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xc0
[<ffffffff810b21cd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff811861f8>] alloc_pages_current+0xb8/0x180
[<ffffffff8113eaaa>] __get_free_pages+0x2a/0x80
[<ffffffff811934fe>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x3e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81193955>] __kmalloc+0x2f5/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8104df0c>] ? local_bh_enable_ip+0x7c/0xf0
[<ffffffffa0401ab3>] rds_message_alloc+0x23/0xb0 [rds]
[<ffffffffa04043a1>] rds_sendmsg+0x2b1/0x990 [rds]
[<ffffffff810b21cd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff81564620>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[<ffffffff810b2052>] ? get_lock_stats+0x22/0x70
[<ffffffff810b24be>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.23+0xe/0x40
[<ffffffff81567f30>] sys_sendto+0x130/0x180
[<ffffffff810b872d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff816c547b>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3b/0x60
[<ffffffff816cd767>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
[<ffffffff810b8695>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x115/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81341d8e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff816cd742>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
---[ end trace eed6ae990d018c8b ]---
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 8b82547e33e85fc24d4d172a93c796de1fefa81a ]
The sendmsg() syscall handler for PPPoL2TP doesn't decrease the socket
reference counter after successful transmissions. Any successful
sendmsg() call from userspace will then increase the reference counter
forever, thus preventing the kernel's session and tunnel data from
being freed later on.
The problem only happens when writing directly on L2TP sockets.
PPP sockets attached to L2TP are unaffected as the PPP subsystem
uses pppol2tp_xmit() which symmetrically increase/decrease reference
counters.
This patch adds the missing call to sock_put() before returning from
pppol2tp_sendmsg().
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b5a1eeef04cc7859f34dec9b72ea1b28e4aba07c upstream.
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit c00b6856fc642b234895cfabd15b289e76726430 upstream.
Writing a icmp_packet_rr and then reading icmp_packet can lead to kernel
memory corruption, if __user *buf is just below TASK_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Paul Kot <pawlkt@gmail.com>
[sven@narfation.org: made it checkpatch clean]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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When decnet is built as a module a simple:
echo 0.0 >/proc/sys/net/decnet/node_address
results in most of the sysctl entries under /proc/sys/net/decnet and
/proc/sys/net/decnet/conf disappearing.
For more details see http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg226123.html.
This change applies the same workaround used in
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c and net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c of creating
a skeleton of decnet sysctl entries before doing anything else.
The problem first appeared in kernel 2.6.27. The later rewrite of
sysctl in kernel 3.4 restored the previous behavior and eliminated the
need for this workaround.
This patch was heavily inspired by a similar but more complex patch by
Larry Baker.
Reported-by: Larry Baker <baker@usgs.gov>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a9a6b52ee1baa865283a91eb8d443ee91adfca56 upstream.
If the socket is full, we're better off just waiting until it empties,
or until the connection is broken. The reason why we generally don't
want to time out is that the call to xprt->ops->release_xprt() will
trigger a connection reset, which isn't helpful...
Let's make an exception for soft RPC calls, since they have to provide
timeout guarantees.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 08dcdbf6a7b9d14c2302c5bd0c5390ddf122f664 ]
It looks like its possible to open thousands of TCP IPv6
sessions on a server, all landing in a single slot of TCP hash
table. Incoming packets have to lookup sockets in a very
long list.
We should hash all bits from foreign IPv6 addresses, using
a salt and hash mix, not a simple XOR.
inet6_ehashfn() can also separately use the ports, instead
of xoring them.
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit b531ed61a2a2a77eeb2f7c88b49aa5ec7d9880d8 ]
We should get 'type' and 'code' from the outer ICMP header.
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <lw@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 547b4e718115eea74087e28d7fa70aec619200db ]
Spanning Tree Protocol packets should have always been marked as
control packets, this causes them to get queued in the high prirority
FIFO. As Radia Perlman mentioned in her LCA talk, STP dies if bridge
gets overloaded and can't communicate. This is a long-standing bug back
to the first versions of Linux bridge.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit e75bafbff2270993926abcc31358361db74a9bc2 upstream.
svc_age_temp_xprts expires xprts in a two-step process: first it takes
the sv_lock and moves the xprts to expire off their server-wide list
(sv_tempsocks or sv_permsocks) to a local list. Then it drops the
sv_lock and enqueues and puts each one.
I see no reason for this: svc_xprt_enqueue() will take sp_lock, but the
sv_lock and sp_lock are not otherwise nested anywhere (and documentation
at the top of this file claims it's correct to nest these with sp_lock
inside.)
Tested-by: Jason Tibbitts <tibbs@math.uh.edu>
Tested-by: Paweł Sikora <pawel.sikora@agmk.net>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6caab7b0544e83e6c160b5e80f5a4a7dd69545c7 ]
If lower layer driver leaves the ip header in the skb fragment, it needs to
be first pulled into skb->data before inspecting ip header length or ip version
number.
Signed-off-by: Sarveshwar Bandi <sarveshwar.bandi@emulex.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6731d2095bd4aef18027c72ef845ab1087c3ba63 ]
There are transients during normal FRTO procedure during which
the packets_in_flight can go to zero between write_queue state
updates and firing the resulting segments out. As FRTO processing
occurs during that window the check must be more precise to
not match "spuriously" :-). More specificly, e.g., when
packets_in_flight is zero but FLAG_DATA_ACKED is true the problematic
branch that set cwnd into zero would not be taken and new segments
might be sent out later.
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Tested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 2e5f421211ff76c17130b4597bc06df4eeead24f ]
Commit 9dc274151a548 (tcp: fix ABC in tcp_slow_start())
uncovered a bug in FRTO code :
tcp_process_frto() is setting snd_cwnd to 0 if the number
of in flight packets is 0.
As Neal pointed out, if no packet is in flight we lost our
chance to disambiguate whether a loss timeout was spurious.
We should assume it was a proper loss.
Reported-by: Pasi Kärkkäinen <pasik@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]
On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 ]
In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user
passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after
internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we
should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the
allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in
sctp_auth_key_put().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86 ]
Jamie Parsons reported a problem recently, in which the re-initalization of an
association (The duplicate init case), resulted in a loss of receive window
space. He tracked down the root cause to sctp_outq_teardown, which discarded
all the data on an outq during a re-initalization of the corresponding
association, but never reset the outq->outstanding_data field to zero. I wrote,
and he tested this fix, which does a proper full re-initalization of the outq,
fixing this problem, and hopefully future proofing us from simmilar issues down
the road.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Jamie Parsons <Jamie.Parsons@metaswitch.com>
Tested-by: Jamie Parsons <Jamie.Parsons@metaswitch.com>
CC: Jamie Parsons <Jamie.Parsons@metaswitch.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 9665d5d62487e8e7b1f546c00e11107155384b9a ]
When releasing a packet socket, the routine packet_set_ring() is reused
to free rings instead of allocating them. But when calling it for the
first time, it fills req->tp_block_nr with the value of rb->pg_vec_len
which in the second invocation makes it bail out since req->tp_block_nr
is greater zero but req->tp_block_size is zero.
This patch solves the problem by passing a zeroed auto-variable to
packet_set_ring() upon each invocation from packet_release().
As far as I can tell, this issue exists even since 69e3c75 (net: TX_RING
and packet mmap), i.e. the original inclusion of TX ring support into
af_packet, but applies only to sockets with both RX and TX ring
allocated, which is probably why this was unnoticed all the time.
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil.sutter@viprinet.com>
Cc: Johann Baudy <johann.baudy@gnu-log.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit bd30e947207e2ea0ff2c08f5b4a03025ddce48d3 ]
They will be created at output, if ever needed. This avoids creating
empty neighbor entries when TPROXYing/Forwarding packets for addresses
that are not even directly reachable.
Note that IPv4 already handles it this way. No neighbor entries are
created for local input.
Tested by myself and customer.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 604dfd6efc9b79bce432f2394791708d8e8f6efc ]
The return value of pktgen_add_device() is not checked, so
even if we fail to add some device, for example, non-exist one,
we still see "OK:...". This patch fixes it.
After this patch, I got:
# echo "add_device non-exist" > /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
-bash: echo: write error: No such device
# cat /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
Running:
Stopped:
Result: ERROR: can not add device non-exist
# echo "add_device eth0" > /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
# cat /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
Running:
Stopped: eth0
Result: OK: add_device=eth0
(Candidate for -stable)
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 7efdba5bd9a2f3e2059beeb45c9fa55eefe1bced ]
Commit 299b0767 (ipv6: Fix IPsec slowpath fragmentation problem)
has introduced a error in the header length calculation that
provokes corrupted packets when non-fragmentable extensions
headers (Destination Option or Routing Header Type 2) are used.
rt->rt6i_nfheader_len is the length of the non-fragmentable
extension header, and it should be substracted to
rt->dst.header_len, and not to exthdrlen, as it was done before
commit 299b0767.
This patch reverts to the original and correct behavior. It has
been successfully tested with and without IPsec on packets
that include non-fragmentable extensions headers.
Signed-off-by: Romain Kuntz <r.kuntz@ipflavors.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 85da53bf1c336bb07ac038fb951403ab0478d2c5 ]
The tests on the flags in addrconf_get_prefix_route() does no make
much sense: the 'noflags' parameter contains the set of flags that
must not match with the route flags, so the test must be done
against 'noflags', and not against 'flags'.
Signed-off-by: Romain Kuntz <r.kuntz@ipflavors.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit c9be4a5c49cf51cc70a993f004c5bb30067a65ce ]
A regression is introduced by the following commit:
commit 4d52cfbef6266092d535237ba5a4b981458ab171
Author: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 2 00:42:16 2009 -0700
net: ipv4/ip_sockglue.c cleanups
Pure cleanups
but it is not a pure cleanup...
- if (val != -1 && (val < 1 || val>255))
+ if (val != -1 && (val < 0 || val > 255))
Since there is no reason provided to allow ttl=0, change it back.
Reported-by: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com>
Cc: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit dbccd791a3fbbdac12c33834b73beff3984988e9 upstream.
After sending reset command wait for its command complete event before
sending next command. Some chips sends CC event for command received
before reset if reset was send before chip replied with CC.
This is also required by specification that host shall not send
additional HCI commands before receiving CC for reset.
< HCI Command: Reset (0x03|0x0003) plen 0 [hci0] 18.404612
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 [hci0] 18.405850
Write Extended Inquiry Response (0x03|0x0052) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: Read Local Supported Features (0x04|0x0003) plen 0 [hci0] 18.406079
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 [hci0] 18.407864
Reset (0x03|0x0003) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: Read Local Supported Features (0x04|0x0003) plen 0 [hci0] 18.408062
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 [hci0] 18.408835
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Acked-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 8cf9fa1240229cbdd888236c0c43fcbad680cf00 upstream.
The conn->smp_chan pointer can be NULL if SMP PDUs arrive at unexpected
moments. To avoid NULL pointer dereferences the code should be checking
for this and disconnect if an unexpected SMP PDU arrives. This patch
fixes the issue by adding a check for conn->smp_chan for all other PDUs
except pairing request and security request (which are are the first
PDUs to come to initialize the SMP context).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b upstream.
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 87ed50036b866db2ec2ba16b2a7aec4a2b0b7c39 upstream.
If the rpc_task exits while holding the socket write lock before it has
allocated an rpc slot, then the usual mechanism for releasing the write
lock in xprt_release() is defeated.
The problem occurs if the call to xprt_lock_write() initially fails, so
that the rpc_task is put on the xprt->sending wait queue. If the task
exits after being assigned the lock by __xprt_lock_write_func, but
before it has retried the call to xprt_lock_and_alloc_slot(), then
it calls xprt_release() while holding the write lock, but will
immediately exit due to the test for task->tk_rqstp != NULL.
Reported-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a56f992cdabc63f56b4b142885deebebf936ff76 upstream.
This is a very old bug, but there's nothing that prevents the
timer from running while the module is being removed when we
only do del_timer() instead of del_timer_sync().
The timer should normally not be running at this point, but
it's not clearly impossible (or we could just remove this.)
Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 ]
RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation]
All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks
that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.
Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward
declaration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit bd090dfc634ddd711a5fbd0cadc6e0ab4977bcaf ]
We added support for RFC 5961 in latest kernels but TCP fails
to perform exhaustive check of ACK sequence.
We can update our view of peer tsval from a frame that is
later discarded by tcp_ack()
This makes timestamps enabled sessions vulnerable to injection of
a high tsval : peers start an ACK storm, since the victim
sends a dupack each time it receives an ACK from the other peer.
As tcp_validate_incoming() is called before tcp_ack(), we should
not peform tcp_replace_ts_recent() from it, and let callers do it
at the right time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit e371589917011efe6ff8c7dfb4e9e81934ac5855 ]
Followup of commit 0c24604b68fc (tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2)
As reported by Vijay Subramanian, we should send a challenge ACK
instead of a dup ack if a SYN flag is set on a packet received out of
window.
This permits the ratelimiting to work as intended, and to increase
correct SNMP counters.
Suggested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 0c24604b68fc7810d429d6c3657b6f148270e528 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using SYN bit.
Section 4.2 of RFC 5961 advises to send a Challenge ACK and drop
incoming packet, instead of resetting the session.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent
in response to SYN packets.
(netstat -s | grep TCPSYNChallenge)
Remove obsolete TCPAbortOnSyn, since we no longer abort a TCP session
because of a SYN flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using RST bit.
Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence,
to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted
window : (RCV.NXT <= SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND)
If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send
a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an
RST with the appropriate sequence.
Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit
number of challenge ACK sent per second.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent.
(netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit d2fe85da52e89b8012ffad010ef352a964725d5f ]
Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit e337e24d6624e74a558aa69071e112a65f7b5758 ]
If in either of the above functions inet_csk_route_child_sock() or
__inet_inherit_port() fails, the newsk will not be freed:
unreferenced object 0xffff88022e8a92c0 (size 1592):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294946244 (age 726.160s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
0a 01 01 01 0a 01 01 02 00 00 00 00 a7 cc 16 00 ................
02 00 03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8153d190>] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x3e
[<ffffffff810ab3e7>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xb5/0xc5
[<ffffffff8149b65b>] sk_prot_alloc.isra.53+0x2b/0xcd
[<ffffffff8149b784>] sk_clone_lock+0x16/0x21e
[<ffffffff814d711a>] inet_csk_clone_lock+0x10/0x7b
[<ffffffff814ebbc3>] tcp_create_openreq_child+0x21/0x481
[<ffffffff814e8fa5>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x3a/0x23b
[<ffffffff814ec5ba>] tcp_check_req+0x29f/0x416
[<ffffffff814e8e10>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x161/0x2bc
[<ffffffff814eb917>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x6c9/0x701
[<ffffffff814cea9f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x70/0xc4
[<ffffffff814cec20>] ip_local_deliver+0x4e/0x7f
[<ffffffff814ce9f8>] ip_rcv_finish+0x1fc/0x233
[<ffffffff814cee68>] ip_rcv+0x217/0x267
[<ffffffff814a7bbe>] __netif_receive_skb+0x49e/0x553
[<ffffffff814a7cc3>] netif_receive_skb+0x50/0x82
This happens, because sk_clone_lock initializes sk_refcnt to 2, and thus
a single sock_put() is not enough to free the memory. Additionally, things
like xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,... may have been initialized.
We have to free them properly.
This is fixed by forcing a call to tcp_done(), ending up in
inet_csk_destroy_sock, doing the final sock_put(). tcp_done() is necessary,
because it ends up doing all the cleanup on xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,
xfrm,...
Before calling tcp_done, we have to set the socket to SOCK_DEAD, to
force it entering inet_csk_destroy_sock. To avoid the warning in
inet_csk_destroy_sock, inet_num has to be set to 0.
As inet_csk_destroy_sock does a dec on orphan_count, we first have to
increase it.
Calling tcp_done() allows us to remove the calls to
tcp_clear_xmit_timer() and tcp_cleanup_congestion_control().
A similar approach is taken for dccp by calling dccp_done().
This is in the kernel since 093d282321 (tproxy: fix hash locking issue
when using port redirection in __inet_inherit_port()), thus since
version >= 2.6.37.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 5b632fe85ec82e5c43740b52e74c66df50a37db3 upstream.
Commit f0425beda4d404a6e751439b562100b902ba9c98 "mac80211: retry sending
failed BAR frames later instead of tearing down aggr" caused regression
on rt2x00 hardware (connection hangs). This regression was fixed by
commit be03d4a45c09ee5100d3aaaedd087f19bc20d01 "rt2x00: Don't let
mac80211 send a BAR when an AMPDU subframe fails". But the latter
commit caused yet another problem reported in
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42828#c22
After long discussion in this thread:
http://mid.gmane.org/20121018075615.GA18212@redhat.com
and testing various alternative solutions, which failed on one or other
setup, we have no other good fix for the issues like just revert both
mentioned earlier commits.
To do not affect other hardware which benefit from commit
f0425beda4d404a6e751439b562100b902ba9c98, instead of reverting it,
introduce flag that when used will restore mac80211 behaviour before
the commit.
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[replaced link with mid.gmane.org that has message-id]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit c6567ed1402c55e19b012e66a8398baec2a726f3 upstream.
This patch ensures that we free the rpc_task after the cleanup callbacks
are done in order to avoid a deadlock problem that can be triggered if
the callback needs to wait for another workqueue item to complete.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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