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[ Upstream commit 3a3713ec360138f806c6fc368d1de570f692b347 ]
Instead of calling ieee80211_recalc_txpower on monitor interfaces
directly, call it using the virtual monitor interface, if one exists.
In case of a single monitor interface given, reject setting TX power,
if no virtual monitor interface exists.
That being checked, don't warn in ieee80211_bss_info_change_notify,
after setting TX power on a monitor interface.
Fixes warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2193 at net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:167
ieee80211_bss_info_change_notify+0x111/0x190 Modules linked in: uvcvideo
videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_core
rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii tp_smapi(O) thinkpad_ec(O) ohci_hcd vboxpci(O)
vboxnetadp(O) vboxnetflt(O) v boxdrv(O) x86_pkg_temp_thermal kvm_intel kvm
irqbypass iwldvm iwlwifi ehci_pci ehci_hcd tpm_tis tpm_tis_core tpm CPU: 0
PID: 2193 Comm: iw Tainted: G O 4.12.12-gentoo #2 task:
ffff880186fd5cc0 task.stack: ffffc90001b54000 RIP:
0010:ieee80211_bss_info_change_notify+0x111/0x190 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001b57a10
EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: ffff8801052ce840 RCX:
0000000000000064 RDX: 00000000fffffffc RSI: 0000000000040000 RDI:
ffff8801052ce840 RBP: ffffc90001b57a38 R08: 0000000000000062 R09:
0000000000000000 R10: ffff8802144b5000 R11: ffff880049dc4614 R12:
0000000000040000 R13: 0000000000000064 R14: ffff8802105f0760 R15:
ffffc90001b57b48 FS: 00007f92644b4580(0000) GS:ffff88021e200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9263c109f0 CR3: 00000001df850000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
Call Trace:
ieee80211_recalc_txpower+0x33/0x40
ieee80211_set_tx_power+0x40/0x180
nl80211_set_wiphy+0x32e/0x950
Reported-by: Peter Große <pegro@friiks.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Große <pegro@friiks.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7ae0c649c47f1c5d2db8cee6dd75855970af1669 ]
If the rds_sock is not added to the bind_hash_table, we must
reset rs_bound_addr so that rds_remove_bound will not trip on
this rds_sock.
rds_add_bound() does a rds_sock_put() in this failure path, so
failing to reset rs_bound_addr will result in a socket refcount
bug, and will trigger a WARN_ON with the stack shown below when
the application subsequently tries to close the PF_RDS socket.
WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 19499 at net/rds/af_rds.c:496 \
rds_sock_destruct+0x15/0x30 [rds]
:
__sk_destruct+0x21/0x190
rds_remove_bound.part.13+0xb6/0x140 [rds]
rds_release+0x71/0x120 [rds]
sock_release+0x1a/0x70
sock_close+0xe/0x20
__fput+0xd5/0x210
task_work_run+0x82/0xa0
do_exit+0x2ce/0xb30
? syscall_trace_enter+0x1cc/0x2b0
do_group_exit+0x39/0xa0
SyS_exit_group+0x10/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x61/0x1a0
Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 820da5357572715c6235ba3b3daa2d5b43a1198f ]
Report offset parameter in L2TP_CMD_SESSION_GET command if
it has been configured by userspace
Fixes: 309795f4bec ("l2tp: Add netlink control API for L2TP")
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0908cf4dfef35fc6ac12329007052ebe93ff1081 ]
There is a race condition in llc_ui_bind if two or more processes/threads
try to bind a same socket.
If more processes/threads bind a same socket success that will lead to
two problems, one is this action is not what we expected, another is
will lead to kernel in unstable status or oops(in my simple test case,
cause llc2.ko can't unload).
The current code is test SOCK_ZAPPED bit to avoid a process to
bind a same socket twice but that is can't avoid more processes/threads
try to bind a same socket at the same time.
So, add lock_sock in llc_ui_bind like others, such as llc_ui_connect.
Signed-off-by: Lin Zhang <xiaolou4617@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7c3f1875c66fbc19762760097cabc91849ea0bbb ]
The default value for somaxconn is set in sysctl_core_net_init(), but this
function is not called when kernel is configured without CONFIG_SYSCTL.
This results in the kernel not being able to accept TCP connections,
because the backlog has zero size. Usually, the user ends up with:
"TCP: request_sock_TCP: Possible SYN flooding on port 7. Dropping request. Check SNMP counters."
If SYN cookies are not enabled the connection is rejected.
Before ef547f2ac16 (tcp: remove max_qlen_log), the effects were less
severe, because the backlog was always at least eight slots long.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kapl <roman.kapl@sysgo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0e1a1b5a833b625c93d3d49847609350ebd79db ]
Paul Fiterau Brostean reported :
<quote>
Linux TCP stack we analyze exhibits behavior that seems odd to me.
The scenario is as follows (all packets have empty payloads, no window
scaling, rcv/snd window size should not be a factor):
TEST HARNESS (CLIENT) LINUX SERVER
1. - LISTEN (server listen,
then accepts)
2. - --> <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN> --> SYN-RECEIVED
3. - <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
4. - --> <SEQ=101><ACK=301><CTL=ACK> --> ESTABLISHED
5. - <-- <SEQ=301><ACK=101><CTL=FIN,ACK> <-- FIN WAIT-1 (server
opts to close the data connection calling "close" on the connection
socket)
6. - --> <SEQ=101><ACK=99999><CTL=FIN,ACK> --> CLOSING (client sends
FIN,ACK with not yet sent acknowledgement number)
7. - <-- <SEQ=302><ACK=102><CTL=ACK> <-- CLOSING (ACK is 102
instead of 101, why?)
... (silence from CLIENT)
8. - <-- <SEQ=301><ACK=102><CTL=FIN,ACK> <-- CLOSING
(retransmission, again ACK is 102)
Now, note that packet 6 while having the expected sequence number,
acknowledges something that wasn't sent by the server. So I would
expect
the packet to maybe prompt an ACK response from the server, and then be
ignored. Yet it is not ignored and actually leads to an increase of the
acknowledgement number in the server's retransmission of the FIN,ACK
packet. The explanation I found is that the FIN in packet 6 was
processed, despite the acknowledgement number being unacceptable.
Further experiments indeed show that the server processes this FIN,
transitioning to CLOSING, then on receiving an ACK for the FIN it had
send in packet 5, the server (or better said connection) transitions
from CLOSING to TIME_WAIT (as signaled by netstat).
</quote>
Indeed, tcp_rcv_state_process() calls tcp_ack() but
does not exploit the @acceptable status but for TCP_SYN_RECV
state.
What we want here is to send a challenge ACK, if not in TCP_SYN_RECV
state. TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state is not the only state we should fix.
Add a FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK so that tcp_rcv_state_process()
can choose to send a challenge ACK and discard the packet instead
of wrongly change socket state.
With help from Neal Cardwell.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Paul Fiterau Brostean <p.fiterau-brostean@science.ru.nl>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fefa92679dbe0c613e62b6c27235dcfbe9640ad1 ]
If nf_conntrack_htable_size was adjusted by the user during the ct
dump operation, we may invoke nf_ct_put twice for the same ct, i.e.
the "last" ct. This will cause the ct will be freed but still linked
in hash buckets.
It's very easy to reproduce the problem by the following commands:
# while : ; do
echo $RANDOM > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_buckets
done
# while : ; do
conntrack -L
done
# iperf -s 127.0.0.1 &
# iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -P 60 -t 36000
After a while, the system will hang like this:
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [bash:20184]
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [iperf:20382]
...
So at last if we find cb->args[1] is equal to "last", this means hash
resize happened, then we can set cb->args[1] to 0 to fix the above
issue.
Fixes: d205dc40798d ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 293dffaad8d500e1a5336eeb90d544cf40d4fbd8 ]
If there is not enough space then ceph_decode_32_safe() does a goto bad.
We need to return an error code in that situation. The current code
returns ERR_PTR(0) which is NULL. The callers are not expecting that
and it results in a NULL dereference.
Fixes: f24e9980eb86 ("ceph: OSD client")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a611c58b3d42a92e6b23423e166dd17c0c7fffce ]
This patch fixes the kernel oops when release net_device reference in
advance. In function raw_sendmsg(i think the dgram_sendmsg has the same
problem), there is a race condition between dev_put and dev_queue_xmit
when the device is gong that maybe lead to dev_queue_ximt to see
an illegal net_device pointer.
My test kernel is 3.13.0-32 and because i am not have a real 802154
device, so i change lowpan_newlink function to this:
/* find and hold real wpan device */
real_dev = dev_get_by_index(src_net, nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_LINK]));
if (!real_dev)
return -ENODEV;
// if (real_dev->type != ARPHRD_IEEE802154) {
// dev_put(real_dev);
// return -EINVAL;
// }
lowpan_dev_info(dev)->real_dev = real_dev;
lowpan_dev_info(dev)->fragment_tag = 0;
mutex_init(&lowpan_dev_info(dev)->dev_list_mtx);
Also, in order to simulate preempt, i change the raw_sendmsg function
to this:
skb->dev = dev;
skb->sk = sk;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IEEE802154);
dev_put(dev);
//simulate preempt
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(30 * HZ);
err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
and this is my userspace test code named test_send_data:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[127];
int sockfd;
sockfd = socket(AF_IEEE802154, SOCK_RAW, 0);
if (sockfd < 0) {
printf("create sockfd error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
send(sockfd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
return 0;
}
This is my test case:
root@zhanglin-x-computer:~/develop/802154# uname -a
Linux zhanglin-x-computer 3.13.0-32-generic #57-Ubuntu SMP Tue Jul 15
03:51:08 UTC 2014 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
root@zhanglin-x-computer:~/develop/802154# ip link add link eth0 name
lowpan0 type lowpan
root@zhanglin-x-computer:~/develop/802154#
//keep the lowpan0 device down
root@zhanglin-x-computer:~/develop/802154# ./test_send_data &
//wait a while
root@zhanglin-x-computer:~/develop/802154# ip link del link dev lowpan0
//the device is gone
//oops
[381.303307] general protection fault: 0000 [#1]SMP
[381.303407] Modules linked in: af_802154 6lowpan bnep rfcomm
bluetooth nls_iso8859_1 snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek
rts5139(C) snd_hda_intel
snd_had_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_req intel_rapl snd_seq_device
coretemp i915 kvm_intel
kvm snd_timer snd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel
cypted drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit soundcore video mac_hid
parport_pc ppdev ip parport hid_generic
usbhid hid ahci r8169 mii libahdi
[381.304286] CPU:1 PID: 2524 Commm: 1 Tainted: G C 0 3.13.0-32-generic
[381.304409] Hardware name: Haier Haier DT Computer/Haier DT Codputer,
BIOS FIBT19H02_X64 06/09/2014
[381.304546] tasks: ffff000096965fc0 ti: ffffB0013779c000 task.ti:
ffffB8013779c000
[381.304659] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff01621fe1>] [<ffffffff81621fe1>]
__dev_queue_ximt+0x61/0x500
[381.304798] RSP: 0018:ffffB8013779dca0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[381.304880] RAX: 272b031d57565351 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800968f1a00
[381.304987] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800968f1a00
[381.305095] RBP: ffff8e013773dce0 R08: 0000000000000266 R09: 0000000000000004
[381.305202] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88013902e000
[381.305310] R13: 000000000000007f R14: 000000000000007f R15: ffff8800968f1a00
[381.305418] FS: 00007fc57f50f740(0000) GS: ffff88013fc80000(0000)
knlGS: 0000000000000000
[381.305540] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[381.305627] CR2: 00007fad0841c000 CR3: 00000001368dd000 CR4: 00000000001007e0
[361.905734] Stack:
[381.305768] 00000000002052d0 000000003facb30a ffff88013779dcc0
ffff880137764000
[381.305898] ffff88013779de70 000000000000007f 000000000000007f
ffff88013902e000
[381.306026] ffff88013779dcf0 ffffffff81622490 ffff88013779dd39
ffffffffa03af9f1
[381.306155] Call Trace:
[381.306202] [<ffffffff81622490>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
[381.306294] [<ffffffffa03af9f1>] raw_sendmsg+0x1b1/0x270 [af_802154]
[381.306396] [<ffffffffa03af054>] ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x14/0x20 [af_802154]
[381.306512] [<ffffffff816079eb>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
[381.306600] [<ffffffff811d52a5>] ? __d_alloc+0x25/0x180
[381.306687] [<ffffffff811a1f56>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1c6/0x1f0
[381.306791] [<ffffffff81607b91>] SYSC_sendto+0x121/0x1c0
[381.306878] [<ffffffff8109ddf4>] ? vtime_account_user+x54/0x60
[381.306975] [<ffffffff81020d45>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x145/0x250
[381.307073] [<ffffffff816086ae>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
[381.307156] [<ffffffff8172c87f>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
[381.307233] Code: c6 a1 a4 ff 41 8b 57 78 49 8b 47 20 85 d2 48 8b 80
78 07 00 00 75 21 49 8b 57 18 48 85 d2 74 18 48 85 c0 74 13 8b 92 ac
01 00 00 <3b> 50 10 73 08 8b 44 90 14 41 89 47 78 41 f6 84 24 d5 00 00
00
[381.307801] RIP [<ffffffff81621fe1>] _dev_queue_xmit+0x61/0x500
[381.307901] RSP <ffff88013779dca0>
[381.347512] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[381.347747] drm_kms_helper: panic occurred, switching back to text console
In my opinion, there is always exist a chance that the device is gong
before call dev_queue_xmit.
I think the latest kernel is have the same problem and that
dev_put should be behind of the dev_queue_xmit.
Signed-off-by: Lin Zhang <xiaolou4617@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a486cd23661c9387fb076c3f6ae8b2aa9d20d54a ]
During xfrm migration copy replay and preplay sequence numbers
from the previous state.
Here is a tcpdump output showing the problem.
10.0.10.46 is running vanilla kernel, is the IKE/IPsec responder.
After the migration it sent wrong sequence number, reset to 1.
The migration is from 10.0.0.52 to 10.0.0.53.
IP 10.0.0.52.4500 > 10.0.10.46.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0x43ef462d,seq=0x7cf), length 136
IP 10.0.10.46.4500 > 10.0.0.52.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0xca1c282d,seq=0x7cf), length 136
IP 10.0.0.52.4500 > 10.0.10.46.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0x43ef462d,seq=0x7d0), length 136
IP 10.0.10.46.4500 > 10.0.0.52.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0xca1c282d,seq=0x7d0), length 136
IP 10.0.0.53.4500 > 10.0.10.46.4500: NONESP-encap: isakmp: child_sa inf2[I]
IP 10.0.10.46.4500 > 10.0.0.53.4500: NONESP-encap: isakmp: child_sa inf2[R]
IP 10.0.0.53.4500 > 10.0.10.46.4500: NONESP-encap: isakmp: child_sa inf2[I]
IP 10.0.10.46.4500 > 10.0.0.53.4500: NONESP-encap: isakmp: child_sa inf2[R]
IP 10.0.0.53.4500 > 10.0.10.46.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0x43ef462d,seq=0x7d1), length 136
NOTE: next sequence is wrong 0x1
IP 10.0.10.46.4500 > 10.0.0.53.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0xca1c282d,seq=0x1), length 136
IP 10.0.0.53.4500 > 10.0.10.46.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0x43ef462d,seq=0x7d2), length 136
IP 10.0.10.46.4500 > 10.0.0.53.4500: UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0xca1c282d,seq=0x2), length 136
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony@phenome.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@tricolour.ca>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 64df6d525fcff1630098db9238bfd2b3e092d5c1 ]
The function x25_init is not properly unregister related resources
on error handler.It is will result in kernel oops if x25_init init
failed, so add properly unregister call on error handler.
Also, i adjust the coding style and make x25_register_sysctl properly
return failure.
Signed-off-by: linzhang <xiaolou4617@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 23d268eb240954e6e78f7cfab04f2b1e79f84489 ]
When arp_accept is 1, gratuitous ARPs are supposed to override matching
entries irrespective of whether they arrive during locktime. This was
implemented in commit 56022a8fdd87 ("ipv4: arp: update neighbour address
when a gratuitous arp is received and arp_accept is set")
There is a glitch in the patch though. RFC 2002, section 4.6, "ARP,
Proxy ARP, and Gratuitous ARP", defines gratuitous ARPs so that they can
be either of Request or Reply type. Those Reply gratuitous ARPs can be
triggered with standard tooling, for example, arping -A option does just
that.
This patch fixes the glitch, making both Request and Reply flavours of
gratuitous ARPs to behave identically.
As per RFC, if gratuitous ARPs are of Reply type, their Target Hardware
Address field should also be set to the link-layer address to which this
cache entry should be updated. The field is present in ARP over Ethernet
but not in IEEE 1394. In this patch, I don't consider any broadcasted
ARP replies as gratuitous if the field is not present, to conform the
standard. It's not clear whether there is such a thing for IEEE 1394 as
a gratuitous ARP reply; until it's cleared up, we will ignore such
broadcasts. Note that they will still update existing ARP cache entries,
assuming they arrive out of locktime time interval.
Signed-off-by: Ihar Hrachyshka <ihrachys@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 77d7123342dcf6442341b67816321d71da8b2b16 ]
It's a common practice to send gratuitous ARPs after moving an
IP address to another device to speed up healing of a service. To
fulfill service availability constraints, the timing of network peers
updating their caches to point to a new location of an IP address can be
particularly important.
Sometimes neigh_update calls won't touch neither lladdr nor state, for
example if an update arrives in locktime interval. The neigh->updated
value is tested by the protocol specific neigh code, which in turn
will influence whether NEIGH_UPDATE_F_OVERRIDE gets set in the
call to neigh_update() or not. As a result, we may effectively ignore
the update request, bailing out of touching the neigh entry, except that
we still bump its timestamps inside neigh_update.
This may be a problem for updates arriving in quick succession. For
example, consider the following scenario:
A service is moved to another device with its IP address. The new device
sends three gratuitous ARP requests into the network with ~1 seconds
interval between them. Just before the first request arrives to one of
network peer nodes, its neigh entry for the IP address transitions from
STALE to DELAY. This transition, among other things, updates
neigh->updated. Once the kernel receives the first gratuitous ARP, it
ignores it because its arrival time is inside the locktime interval. The
kernel still bumps neigh->updated. Then the second gratuitous ARP
request arrives, and it's also ignored because it's still in the (new)
locktime interval. Same happens for the third request. The node
eventually heals itself (after delay_first_probe_time seconds since the
initial transition to DELAY state), but it just wasted some time and
require a new ARP request/reply round trip. This unfortunate behaviour
both puts more load on the network, as well as reduces service
availability.
This patch changes neigh_update so that it bumps neigh->updated (as well
as neigh->confirmed) only once we are sure that either lladdr or entry
state will change). In the scenario described above, it means that the
second gratuitous ARP request will actually update the entry lladdr.
Ideally, we would update the neigh entry on the very first gratuitous
ARP request. The locktime mechanism is designed to ignore ARP updates in
a short timeframe after a previous ARP update was honoured by the kernel
layer. This would require tracking timestamps for state transitions
separately from timestamps when actual updates are received. This would
probably involve changes in neighbour struct. Therefore, the patch
doesn't tackle the issue of the first gratuitous APR ignored, leaving
it for a follow-up.
Signed-off-by: Ihar Hrachyshka <ihrachys@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bcfc7d33110b0f33069d74138eeb7ca9acbb3c85 ]
The skb->dev that is passed into ip_mr_input is
the loX device for VRFs. When we lookup a vif
for this dev, none is found as we do not create
vifs for loopbacks. Instead lookup a vif for the
actual device that the packet was received on,
eg the vlan.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
cc: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
cc: roopa <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 66eb9f86e50547ec2a8ff7a75997066a74ef584b ]
Every address gets added with TENTATIVE flag even for the addresses with
IFA_F_NODAD flag and dad-work is scheduled for them. During this DAD process
we realize it's an address with NODAD and complete the process without
sending any probe. However the TENTATIVE flags stays on the
address for sometime enough to cause misinterpretation when we receive a NS.
While processing NS, if the address has TENTATIVE flag, we mark it DADFAILED
and endup with an address that was originally configured as NODAD with
DADFAILED.
We can't avoid scheduling dad_work for addresses with NODAD but we can
avoid adding TENTATIVE flag to avoid this racy situation.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8860ce836f2d502b07ef99559707fe55d90f5bc ]
If ieee80211_hw_restart() is called during authentication, the
authentication process will continue, causing the driver to be called
in a wrong state. This ultimately causes an oops in the iwlwifi
driver (at least).
This fixes bugzilla 195299 partly.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195299
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d90c902449a7561f1b1d58ba5a0d11728ce8b0b2 ]
The sadb_x_sec_len is stored in the unit 'byte divided by eight'.
So we have to multiply this value by eight before we can do
size checks. Otherwise we may get a slab-out-of-bounds when
we memcpy the user sec_ctx.
Fixes: df71837d502 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit 1139d77d8a7f9aa6b6ae0a1c902f94775dad2f52 which is
commit 53c81e95df1793933f87748d36070a721f6cb287 upstream.
Ben writes that there are a number of follow-on patches needed to fix
this up, but they get complex to backport, and some custom fixes are
needed, so let's just revert this and wait for a "real" set of patches
to resolve this to be submitted if it is really needed.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 64e759f58f128730b97a3c3a26d283c075ad7c86 upstream.
If Security Request is received on connection that is already encrypted
with sufficient security master should perform encryption key refresh
procedure instead of just ignoring Slave Security Request
(Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3 Part H 2.4.6).
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 6
SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
< HCI Command: LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) plen 28
Handle: 3585
Random number: 0x0000000000000000
Encrypted diversifier: 0x0000
Long term key: 44264272a5c426a9e868f034cf0e69f3
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Encryption Key Refresh Complete (0x30) plen 3
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 3585
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream.
recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that
name is 0 terminated.
This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/".
Add helper for this and then use it for both.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 upstream.
ebt_among is special, it has a dynamic match size and is exempt
from the central size checks.
commit c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks")
added validation for pool size, but missed fact that the macros
ebt_among_wh_src/dst can already return out-of-bound result because
they do not check value of wh_src/dst_ofs (an offset) vs. the size
of the match that userspace gave to us.
v2:
check that offset has correct alignment.
Paolo Abeni points out that we should also check that src/dst
wormhash arrays do not overlap, and src + length lines up with
start of dst (or vice versa).
v3: compact wormhash_sizes_valid() part
NB: Fixes tag is intentionally wrong, this bug exists from day
one when match was added for 2.6 kernel. Tag is there so stable
maintainers will notice this one too.
Tested with same rules from the earlier patch.
Fixes: c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks")
Reported-by: <syzbot+bdabab6f1983a03fc009@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 19d7df69fdb2636856dc8919de72fc1bf8f79598 upstream.
We don't have a compat layer for xfrm, so userspace and kernel
structures have different sizes in this case. This results in
a broken configuration, so refuse to configure socket policies
when trying to insert from 32 bit userspace as we do it already
with policies inserted via netlink.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e1a1577ca8bcb47b769a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 upstream.
f7c83bcbfaf5 ("net: xfrm: use __this_cpu_read per-cpu helper") added a
__this_cpu_read() call inside ipcomp_alloc_tfms().
At the time, __this_cpu_read() required the caller to either not care
about races or to handle preemption/interrupt issues. 3.15 tightened
the rules around some per-cpu operations, and now __this_cpu_read()
should never be used in a preemptible context. On 3.15 and later, we
need to use this_cpu_read() instead.
syzkaller reported this leading to the following kernel BUG while
fuzzing sendmsg:
BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: repro/3101
caller is ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990
CPU: 3 PID: 3101 Comm: repro Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4-00123-g86f84779d8e9 #154
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xb9/0x115
check_preemption_disabled+0x1cb/0x1f0
ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990
? __xfrm_init_state+0x876/0xc20
? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0
ipcomp4_init_state+0xaa/0x7c0
__xfrm_init_state+0x3eb/0xc20
xfrm_init_state+0x19/0x60
pfkey_add+0x20df/0x36f0
? pfkey_broadcast+0x3dd/0x600
? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340
? pfkey_seq_stop+0x80/0x80
? __skb_clone+0x236/0x750
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f6/0x260
? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340
? pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0
pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0
? pfkey_send_new_mapping+0x11c0/0x11c0
? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1390/0x1390
pfkey_sendmsg+0x383/0x750
? dump_sp+0x430/0x430
sock_sendmsg+0xc0/0x100
___sys_sendmsg+0x6c8/0x8b0
? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x3b0/0x3b0
? pagevec_lru_move_fn+0x144/0x1f0
? find_held_lock+0x32/0x1c0
? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0xc43/0x11e0
? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0
? get_kernel_page+0xb0/0xb0
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x400/0x11e0
? __handle_mm_fault+0x553/0x2460
? __fget_light+0x163/0x1f0
? __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170
__sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170
? SyS_shutdown+0x1a0/0x1a0
? __do_page_fault+0x5a0/0xca0
? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0
SyS_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
? __sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x19f/0x640
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x7f0ee73dfb79
RSP: 002b:00007ffe14fc15a8 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0ee73dfb79
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000208befc8 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffe14fc15b0 R08: 00007ffe14fc15c0 R09: 00007ffe14fc15c0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: 0000000000400440
R13: 00007ffe14fc16b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e upstream.
The sanity test added in ecd7918745234 can be bypassed, validation
only occurs if XFRM_STATE_ESN flag is set, but rest of code doesn't care
and just checks if the attribute itself is present.
So always validate. Alternative is to reject if we have the attribute
without the flag but that would change abi.
Reported-by: syzbot+0ab777c27d2bb7588f73@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Fixes: ecd7918745234 ("xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid")
Fixes: d8647b79c3b7e ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a4ac6f2e53e568a77a2eb3710efd99ca08634c0a upstream.
cfg80211_chandef_create() expects an 'enum nl80211_channel_type' as
channel type however in ieee80211_sta_join_ibss()
NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_20_NOHT is passed in two occasions, which is of
the enum type 'nl80211_chan_width'. Change the value to NL80211_CHAN_NO_HT
(20 MHz, non-HT channel) of the channel type enum.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 93f56de259376d7e4fff2b2d104082e1fa66e237 upstream.
When clang detects a non-boolean constant in a logical operation it
generates a 'constant-logical-operand' warning. In
ieee80211_try_rate_control_ops_get() the result of strlen(<const str>)
is used in a logical operation, clang resolves the expression to an
(integer) constant at compile time when clang's builtin strlen function
is used.
Change the condition to check for strlen() > 0 to make the constant
operand boolean and thus avoid the warning.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a2b7cbdd2559aff06cebc28a7150f81c307a90d3 upstream.
Not all parameters passed to ctnetlink_parse_tuple() and
ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple() match the enum type in the signatures of these
functions. Since this is intended change the argument type of to be an
unsigned integer value.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aa1702dd162f420bf85ecef0c77686ef0dbc1496 upstream.
__ieee80211_amsdu_copy_frag intentionally initializes a pointer to
array[-1] to increment it later to valid values. clang rightfully
generates an array-bounds warning on the initialization statement.
Initialize the pointer to array[0] and change the algorithm from
increment before to increment after consume.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bbf67e450a5dc2a595e1e7a67b4869f1a7f5a338 upstream.
rate_flg is of type 'enum nl80211_attrs', however it is assigned with
'enum nl80211_rate_info' values. Change the type of rate_flg accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eee6ebbac18a189ef33d25ea9b8bcae176515e49 upstream.
Clang produces the following warning:
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c:553:6: error:
logical not is only applied to the left hand side of this comparison
[-Werror,-Wlogical-not-parentheses]
if (!set_h225_addr(skb, protoff, data, dataoff, taddr,
^
add parentheses after the '!' to evaluate the comparison first
add parentheses around left hand side expression to silence this warning
There's not necessarily a bug here, but it's cleaner to return early,
ex:
if (x)
return
...
rather than:
if (x == 0)
...
else
return
Also added a return code check that seemed to be missing in one
instance.
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2cc683e88c0c993ac3721d9b702cb0630abe2879 ]
Need to lock lower socket in order to provide mutual exclusion
with kcm_unattach.
v2: Add Reported-by for syzbot
Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832e32a09f4e804 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+ea75c0ffcd353d32515f064aaebefc5279e6161e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e5d58fdc9bedd0255a8781b258f10bbdc63e975 ]
When errors are enqueued to the error queue via sock_queue_err_skb()
function, it is possible that the waiting application is not notified.
Calling 'sk->sk_data_ready()' would not notify applications that
selected only POLLERR events in poll() (for example).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Randy E. Witt <randy.e.witt@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2cbb4ea7de167b02ffa63e9cdfdb07a7e7094615 ]
Only allow ifindex from IP_PKTINFO to override SO_BINDTODEVICE settings
if the index is actually set in the message.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 02a2385f37a7c6594c9d89b64c4a1451276f08eb ]
nlmsg_multicast() consumes always the skb, thus the original skb must be
freed only when this function is called with a clone.
Fixes: cb9f7a9a5c96 ("netlink: ensure to loop over all netns in genlmsg_multicast_allns()")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fa6a91e9b907231d2e38ea5ed89c537b3525df3d ]
Free memory by calling put_device(), if afiucv_iucv_init is not
successful.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 17cfe79a65f98abe535261856c5aef14f306dff7 ]
syzkaller found an issue caused by lack of sufficient checks
in l2tp_tunnel_create()
RAW sockets can not be considered as UDP ones for instance.
In another patch, we shall replace all pr_err() by less intrusive
pr_debug() so that syzkaller can find other bugs faster.
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x3ee/0x5f0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:69
dst_release: dst:00000000d53d0d0f refcnt:-1
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801d013b798 by task syz-executor3/6242
CPU: 1 PID: 6242 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #253
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report+0x23b/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x3ee/0x5f0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:69
l2tp_tunnel_create+0x1354/0x17f0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1596
pppol2tp_connect+0x14b1/0x1dd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:707
SYSC_connect+0x213/0x4a0 net/socket.c:1640
SyS_connect+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:1621
do_syscall_64+0x280/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9f62c15f28b0d1d746734666d88a79f08ba1e43e ]
Fix the following slab-out-of-bounds kasan report in
ndisc_fill_redirect_hdr_option when the incoming ipv6 packet is not
linear and the accessed data are not in the linear data region of orig_skb.
[ 1503.122508] ==================================================================
[ 1503.122832] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ndisc_send_redirect+0x94e/0x990
[ 1503.123036] Read of size 1184 at addr ffff8800298ab6b0 by task netperf/1932
[ 1503.123220] CPU: 0 PID: 1932 Comm: netperf Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #124
[ 1503.123347] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014
[ 1503.123527] Call Trace:
[ 1503.123579] <IRQ>
[ 1503.123638] print_address_description+0x6e/0x280
[ 1503.123849] kasan_report+0x233/0x350
[ 1503.123946] memcpy+0x1f/0x50
[ 1503.124037] ndisc_send_redirect+0x94e/0x990
[ 1503.125150] ip6_forward+0x1242/0x13b0
[...]
[ 1503.153890] Allocated by task 1932:
[ 1503.153982] kasan_kmalloc+0x9f/0xd0
[ 1503.154074] __kmalloc_track_caller+0xb5/0x160
[ 1503.154198] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.41+0x24/0x70
[ 1503.154324] __alloc_skb+0x130/0x3e0
[ 1503.154415] sctp_packet_transmit+0x21a/0x1810
[ 1503.154533] sctp_outq_flush+0xc14/0x1db0
[ 1503.154624] sctp_do_sm+0x34e/0x2740
[ 1503.154715] sctp_primitive_SEND+0x57/0x70
[ 1503.154807] sctp_sendmsg+0xaa6/0x1b10
[ 1503.154897] sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
[ 1503.154987] ___sys_sendmsg+0x431/0x4b0
[ 1503.155078] __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x130
[ 1503.155168] do_syscall_64+0x171/0x3f0
[ 1503.155259] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
[ 1503.155436] Freed by task 1932:
[ 1503.155527] __kasan_slab_free+0x134/0x180
[ 1503.155618] kfree+0xbc/0x180
[ 1503.155709] skb_release_data+0x27f/0x2c0
[ 1503.155800] consume_skb+0x94/0xe0
[ 1503.155889] sctp_chunk_put+0x1aa/0x1f0
[ 1503.155979] sctp_inq_pop+0x2f8/0x6e0
[ 1503.156070] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x6a/0x230
[ 1503.156164] sctp_inq_push+0x117/0x150
[ 1503.156255] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xdf/0x4a0
[ 1503.156346] __release_sock+0x142/0x250
[ 1503.156436] release_sock+0x80/0x180
[ 1503.156526] sctp_sendmsg+0xbb0/0x1b10
[ 1503.156617] sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
[ 1503.156708] ___sys_sendmsg+0x431/0x4b0
[ 1503.156799] __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x130
[ 1503.156889] do_syscall_64+0x171/0x3f0
[ 1503.156980] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
[ 1503.157158] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800298ab600
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 1503.157444] The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8800298ab600, ffff8800298aba00)
[ 1503.157702] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 1503.157820] page:ffffea0000a62a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 1503.158053] flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
[ 1503.158171] raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800e000e
[ 1503.158350] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880036002600 0000000000000000
[ 1503.158523] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 1503.158698] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 1503.158816] ffff8800298ab900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 1503.158988] ffff8800298ab980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 1503.159165] >ffff8800298aba00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1503.159338] ^
[ 1503.159436] ffff8800298aba80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1503.159610] ffff8800298abb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1503.159785] ==================================================================
[ 1503.159964] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
The test scenario to trigger the issue consists of 4 devices:
- H0: data sender, connected to LAN0
- H1: data receiver, connected to LAN1
- GW0 and GW1: routers between LAN0 and LAN1. Both of them have an
ethernet connection on LAN0 and LAN1
On H{0,1} set GW0 as default gateway while on GW0 set GW1 as next hop for
data from LAN0 to LAN1.
Moreover create an ip6ip6 tunnel between H0 and H1 and send 3 concurrent
data streams (TCP/UDP/SCTP) from H0 to H1 through ip6ip6 tunnel (send
buffer size is set to 16K). While data streams are active flush the route
cache on HA multiple times.
I have not been able to identify a given commit that introduced the issue
since, using the reproducer described above, the kasan report has been
triggered from 4.14 and I have not gone back further.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 67f93df79aeefc3add4e4b31a752600f834236e2 ]
dccp_disconnect() sets 'dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid' tx handler to NULL,
therefore if DCCP socket is disconnected and dccp_sendmsg() is
called after it, it will cause a NULL pointer dereference in
dccp_write_xmit().
This crash and the reproducer was reported by syzbot. Looks like
it is reproduced if commit 69c64866ce07 ("dccp: CVE-2017-8824:
use-after-free in DCCP code") is applied.
Reported-by: syzbot+f99ab3887ab65d70f816@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit a560002437d3646dafccecb1bf32d1685112ddda ]
inet_evict_bucket() iterates global list, and
several tasks may call it in parallel. All of
them hash the same fq->list_evictor to different
lists, which leads to list corruption.
This patch makes fq be hashed to expired list
only if this has not been made yet by another
task. Since inet_frag_alloc() allocates fq
using kmem_cache_zalloc(), we may rely on
list_evictor is initially unhashed.
The problem seems to exist before async
pernet_operations, as there was possible to have
exit method to be executed in parallel with
inet_frags::frags_work, so I add two Fixes tags.
This also may go to stable.
Fixes: d1fe19444d82 "inet: frag: don't re-use chainlist for evictor"
Fixes: f84c6821aa54 "net: Convert pernet_subsys, registered from inet_init()"
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 4dcb31d4649df36297296b819437709f5407059c ]
Andrei Vagin reported a KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds error in
skb_update_prio()
Since SYNACK might be attached to a request socket, we need to
get back to the listener socket.
Since this listener is manipulated without locks, add const
qualifiers to sock_cgroup_prioidx() so that the const can also
be used in skb_update_prio()
Also add the const qualifier to sock_cgroup_classid() for consistency.
Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit ca0edb131bdf1e6beaeb2b8289fd6b374b74147d ]
A tun device type can trivially be set to arbitrary value using
TUNSETLINK ioctl().
Therefore, lowpan_device_event() must really check that ieee802154_ptr
is not NULL.
Fixes: 2c88b5283f60d ("ieee802154: 6lowpan: remove check on null")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 35d889d10b649fda66121891ec05eca88150059d ]
When we exceed current packets limit and we have more than one
segment in the list returned by skb_gso_segment(), netem drops
only the first one, skipping the rest, hence kmemleak reports:
unreferenced object 0xffff880b5d23b600 (size 1024):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4384527763 (age 2770.629s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 80 23 5d 0b 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..#]............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d8a19b9d>] __alloc_skb+0xc9/0x520
[<000000001709b32f>] skb_segment+0x8c8/0x3710
[<00000000c7b9bb88>] tcp_gso_segment+0x331/0x1830
[<00000000c921cba1>] inet_gso_segment+0x476/0x1370
[<000000008b762dd4>] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1f9/0x510
[<000000002182660a>] __skb_gso_segment+0x1dd/0x620
[<00000000412651b9>] netem_enqueue+0x1536/0x2590 [sch_netem]
[<0000000005d3b2a9>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1167/0x2120
[<00000000fc5f7327>] ip_finish_output2+0x998/0xf00
[<00000000d309e9d3>] ip_output+0x1aa/0x2c0
[<000000007ecbd3a4>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x18db/0x3670
[<0000000042d2a45f>] tcp_write_xmit+0x4d4/0x58c0
[<0000000056a44199>] tcp_tasklet_func+0x3d9/0x540
[<0000000013d06d02>] tasklet_action+0x1ca/0x250
[<00000000fcde0b8b>] __do_softirq+0x1b4/0x5a3
[<00000000e7ed027c>] irq_exit+0x1e2/0x210
Fix it by adding the rest of the segments, if any, to skb 'to_free'
list. Add new __qdisc_drop_all() and qdisc_drop_all() functions
because they can be useful in the future if we need to drop segmented
GSO packets in other places.
Fixes: 6071bd1aa13e ("netem: Segment GSO packets on enqueue")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 51d4740f88affd85d49c04e3c9cd129c0e33bcb9 ]
If set/unset mode of the tunnel_key action is not provided, ->init() still
returns 0, and the caller proceeds with bogus 'struct tc_action *' object,
this results in crash:
% tc actions add action tunnel_key src_ip 1.1.1.1 dst_ip 2.2.2.1 id 7 index 1
[ 35.805515] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 35.806161] Modules linked in: act_tunnel_key kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64
crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd serio_raw
[ 35.808233] CPU: 1 PID: 428 Comm: tc Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #286
[ 35.808929] RIP: 0010:tcf_action_init+0x90/0x190
[ 35.809457] RSP: 0018:ffffb8edc068b9a0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 35.810053] RAX: 1320c000000a0003 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 35.810866] RDX: 0000000000000070 RSI: 0000000000007965 RDI: ffffb8edc068b910
[ 35.811660] RBP: ffffb8edc068b9d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb8edc068b808
[ 35.812463] R10: ffffffffc02bf040 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffffb8edc068bb38
[ 35.813235] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffb8edc068b910
[ 35.814006] FS: 00007f3d0d8556c0(0000) GS:ffff91d1dbc40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 35.814881] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 35.815540] CR2: 000000000043f720 CR3: 0000000019248001 CR4: 00000000001606a0
[ 35.816457] Call Trace:
[ 35.817158] tc_ctl_action+0x11a/0x220
[ 35.817795] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x2e0
[ 35.818457] ? __slab_alloc+0x1c/0x30
[ 35.819079] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb1/0x2b0
[ 35.819544] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.30+0xe0/0xe0
[ 35.820231] netlink_rcv_skb+0xce/0x100
[ 35.820744] netlink_unicast+0x164/0x220
[ 35.821500] netlink_sendmsg+0x293/0x370
[ 35.822040] sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40
[ 35.822508] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2c5/0x2e0
[ 35.823149] ? pagecache_get_page+0x27/0x220
[ 35.823714] ? filemap_fault+0xa2/0x640
[ 35.824423] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x108/0x200
[ 35.825065] ? alloc_set_pte+0x2aa/0x530
[ 35.825585] ? finish_fault+0x4e/0x70
[ 35.826140] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xbc1/0x10d0
[ 35.826723] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x41/0x70
[ 35.827230] __sys_sendmsg+0x41/0x70
[ 35.827710] do_syscall_64+0x68/0x120
[ 35.828195] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[ 35.828859] RIP: 0033:0x7f3d0ca4da67
[ 35.829331] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9f284338 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
[ 35.830304] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc9f284460 RCX: 00007f3d0ca4da67
[ 35.831247] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc9f2843b0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 35.832167] RBP: 000000005aa6a7a9 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 35.833075] R10: 00000000000005f1 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 35.833997] R13: 00007ffc9f2884c0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000674640
[ 35.834923] Code: 24 30 bb 01 00 00 00 45 31 f6 eb 5e 8b 50 08 83 c2 07 83 e2
fc 83 c2 70 49 8b 07 48 8b 40 70 48 85 c0 74 10 48 89 14 24 4c 89 ff <ff> d0 48
8b 14 24 48 01 c2 49 01 d6 45 85 ed 74 05 41 83 47 2c
[ 35.837442] RIP: tcf_action_init+0x90/0x190 RSP: ffffb8edc068b9a0
[ 35.838291] ---[ end trace a095c06ee4b97a26 ]---
Fixes: d0f6dd8a914f ("net/sched: Introduce act_tunnel_key")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 53c81e95df1793933f87748d36070a721f6cb287 ]
LTP/udp6_ipsec_vti tests fail when sending large UDP datagrams over
ip6_vti that require fragmentation and the underlying device has an
MTU smaller than 1500 plus some extra space for headers. This happens
because ip6_vti, by default, sets MTU to ETH_DATA_LEN and not updating
it depending on a destination address or link parameter. Further
attempts to send UDP packets may succeed because pmtu gets updated on
ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG in vti6_err().
In case the lower device has larger MTU size, e.g. 9000, ip6_vti works
but not using the possible maximum size, output packets have 1500 limit.
The above cases require manual MTU setup after ip6_vti creation. However
ip_vti already updates MTU based on lower device with ip_tunnel_bind_dev().
Here is the example when the lower device MTU is set to 9000:
# ip a sh ltp_ns_veth2
ltp_ns_veth2@if7: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 9000 ...
inet 10.0.0.2/24 scope global ltp_ns_veth2
inet6 fd00::2/64 scope global
# ip li add vti6 type vti6 local fd00::2 remote fd00::1
# ip li show vti6
vti6@NONE: <POINTOPOINT,NOARP> mtu 1500 ...
link/tunnel6 fd00::2 peer fd00::1
After the patch:
# ip li add vti6 type vti6 local fd00::2 remote fd00::1
# ip li show vti6
vti6@NONE: <POINTOPOINT,NOARP> mtu 8832 ...
link/tunnel6 fd00::2 peer fd00::1
Reported-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7dde07e9c53617549d67dd3e1d791496d0d3868e ]
According to my static checker we should unlock here before the return.
That seems reasonable to me as well.
Fixes" b9e69e127397 ("netfilter: xtables: don't hook tables by default")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 21a8e9dd52b64f0170bad208293ef8c30c3c1403 ]
Existing API 'ieee80211_get_sdata_band' returns default 2 GHz band even
if the channel context configuration is NULL. This crashes for chipsets
which support 5 Ghz alone when it tries to access members of 'sband'.
Channel context configuration can be NULL in multivif case and when
channel switch is in progress (or) when it fails. Fix this by replacing
the API 'ieee80211_get_sdata_band' with 'ieee80211_get_sband' which
returns a NULL pointer for sband when the channel configuration is NULL.
An example scenario is as below:
In multivif mode (AP + STA) with drivers like ath10k, when we do a
channel switch in the AP vif (which has a number of clients connected)
and a STA vif which is connected to some other AP, when the channel
switch in AP vif fails, while the STA vifs tries to connect to the
other AP, there is a window where the channel context is NULL/invalid
and this results in a crash while the clients connected to the AP vif
tries to reconnect and this race is very similar to the one investigated
by Michal in https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/3788161/ and this does
happens with hardware that supports 5Ghz alone after long hours of
testing with continuous channel switch on the AP vif
ieee80211 phy0: channel context reservation cannot be finalized because
some interfaces aren't switching
wlan0: failed to finalize CSA, disconnecting
wlan0-1: deauthenticating from 8c:fd:f0:01:54:9c by local choice
(Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19032 at net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h:1013 sta_info_alloc+0x374/0x3fc [mac80211]
[<bf77272c>] (sta_info_alloc [mac80211])
[<bf78776c>] (ieee80211_add_station [mac80211]))
[<bf73cc50>] (nl80211_new_station [cfg80211])
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual
address 00000014
pgd = d5f4c000
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
PC is at sta_info_alloc+0x380/0x3fc [mac80211]
LR is at sta_info_alloc+0x37c/0x3fc [mac80211]
[<bf772738>] (sta_info_alloc [mac80211])
[<bf78776c>] (ieee80211_add_station [mac80211])
[<bf73cc50>] (nl80211_new_station [cfg80211]))
Cc: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mohammed@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1442f6f7c1b77de1c508318164a527e240c24a4d ]
When creating a new ipvs service, ipv6 addresses are always accepted
if CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 is enabled. On dest creation the address family
is not explicitly checked.
This allows the user-space to configure ipvs services even if the
system is booted with ipv6.disable=1. On specific configuration, ipvs
can try to call ipv6 routing code at setup time, causing the kernel to
oops due to fib6_rules_ops being NULL.
This change addresses the issue adding a check for the ipv6
module being enabled while validating ipv6 service operations and
adding the same validation for dest operations.
According to git history, this issue is apparently present since
the introduction of ipv6 support, and the oops can be triggered
since commit 09571c7ae30865ad ("IPVS: Add function to determine
if IPv6 address is local")
Fixes: 09571c7ae30865ad ("IPVS: Add function to determine if IPv6 address is local")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cf147085fdda044622973a12e4e06f1c753ab677 ]
ieee80211_frame_acked is called when a frame is acked by
the peer. In case this is a management frame, we check
if this an SMPS frame, in which case we can update our
antenna configuration.
When we parse the management frame we look at the category
in case it is an action frame. That byte sits after the IV
in case the frame was encrypted. This means that if the
frame was encrypted, we basically look at the IV instead
of looking at the category. It is then theorically
possible that we think that an SMPS action frame was acked
where really we had another frame that was encrypted.
Since the only management frame whose ack needs to be
tracked is the SMPS action frame, and that frame is not
a robust management frame, it will never be encrypted.
The easiest way to fix this problem is then to not look
at frames that were encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9378b274e1eb6925db315e345f48850d2d5d9789 ]
Trying to create MRs while the transport is being torn down can
cause a crash.
Fixes: e2ac236c0b65 ("xprtrdma: Allocate MRs on demand")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 277a292835c196894ef895d5e1fd6170bb916f55 ]
Currently, after adding the following nft rules:
# nft add set x target1 { type ipv4_addr \; flags timeout \;}
# nft add rule x y set add ip daddr timeout 1d @target1 counter
the counters will always be zero despite of the elements are added
to the dynamic set "target1" or not, as we will break the nft expr
traversal unconditionally:
# nft list ruleset
...
set target1 {
...
elements = { 8.8.8.8 expires 23h59m53s}
}
chain output {
...
set add ip daddr timeout 1d @target1 counter packets 0 bytes 0
^ ^
...
}
Since we add the elements to the set successfully, we should continue
to the next expression.
Additionally, if elements are added to "flow table" successfully, we
will _always_ continue to the next expr, even if the operation is
_OP_ADD. So it's better to keep them to be consistent.
Fixes: 22fe54d5fefc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for dynamic set updates")
Reported-by: Robert White <rwhite@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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