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path: root/security/capability.c
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2013-01-14tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devicesPaul Moore
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-12-14security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hookKees Cook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example, read extended attributes for signatures, etc. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-11consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-09-21userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgidsEric W. Biederman
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-05-31split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()Al Viro
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-04-09SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_openEric Paris
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-02-10security: create task_free security callbackKees Cook
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-14Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
2012-01-06switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-05security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()Eric Paris
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-03switch ->path_mknod() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch ->path_mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch security_path_chmod() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch ->mknod() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch ->create() to umode_tAl Viro
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent and it's the only caller of the method Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch vfs_mkdir() and ->mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-07-20->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->inode_permission()Al Viro
pass that via mask instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-04-22SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-16Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6Linus Torvalds
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits) bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag bonding: wrap slave state work net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler be2net: Bump up the version number be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables xen network backend driver bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward() be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve netxen: support for GbE port settings ... Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c with the staging updates.
2011-03-03LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSMEric Paris
The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-02-22xfrm: Mark flowi arg to security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() const.David S. Miller
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-02-01security: remove unused security_sysctl hookLucian Adrian Grijincu
The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more. Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2011-02-01fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creationEric Paris
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2011-01-05af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.David S. Miller
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other" during stream connects. However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned to NULL under the unix_state_lock(). Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead of the forward mapping. Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-11-15capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failureEric Paris
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-10-21secmark: make secmark object handling genericEric Paris
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-10Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linuxLinus Torvalds
* 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux: unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit rlimits: add rlimit64 structure rlimits: do security check under task_lock rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks rlimits: split sys_setrlimit rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4 along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
2010-08-02Security: capability: code style issueChihau Chau
This fix a little code style issue deleting a space between a function name and a open parenthesis. Signed-off-by: Chihau Chau <chihau@gmail.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02LSM: Remove unused arguments from security_path_truncate().Tetsuo Handa
When commit be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(), only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed. But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor. Thus, let's remove these arguments. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-16rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitJiri Slaby
Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-05-17LSM: Add __init to fixup function.Tetsuo Handa
register_security() became __init function. So do verify() and security_fixup_ops(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook acctEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook key_session_to_parentEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook task_setgroupsEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook task_setgidEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook task_setuidEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook cred_commitEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook inode_deleteEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook sb_post_pivotrootEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook sb_post_addmountEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook sb_post_remountEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook sb_umount_busyEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove dead hook sb_umount_closeEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12security: remove sb_check_sb hooksEric Paris
Unused hook. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-02-24Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variablewzt.wzt@gmail.com
Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy), but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config. Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available. Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-11-10security: report the module name to security_module_requestEric Paris
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request. Example output: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-12LSM: Add security_path_chroot().Tetsuo Handa
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-12LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().Tetsuo Handa
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security ↵David P. Quigley
context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]David Howells
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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