From fcd7c26901c83681532c6daac599e53d4df11738 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahmad Fatoum Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:57:00 +0200 Subject: KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Acked-by: Sumit Garg Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 ++++++++++ Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 3f1cc5e317ed..4deed1908a75 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5963,6 +5963,16 @@ first trust source as a backend which is initialized successfully during iteration. + trusted.rng= [KEYS] + Format: + The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys. + Can be one of: + - "kernel" + - the same value as trusted.source: "tpm" or "tee" + - "default" + If not specified, "default" is used. In this case, + the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. Format: [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index f614dad7de12..2fe6fd1a2bbd 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -87,22 +87,26 @@ Key Generation Trusted Keys ------------ -New keys are created from random numbers generated in the trust source. They -are encrypted/decrypted using a child key in the storage key hierarchy. -Encryption and decryption of the child key must be protected by a strong -access control policy within the trust source. +New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using +a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the +child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the +trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the +selected trust source: - * TPM (hardware device) based RNG + * TPM: hardware device based RNG - Strength of random numbers may vary from one device manufacturer to - another. + Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary + from one device manufacturer to another. - * TEE (OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone) based RNG + * TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. +Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel +command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. + Encrypted Keys -------------- -- cgit v1.2.3 From e9c5048c2de1913d0bcd589bc1487810c2e24bc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahmad Fatoum Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:57:03 +0200 Subject: KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material. This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES encryption/decryption of user data. This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys. Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these, provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys. Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Tim Harvey Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 4deed1908a75..9afb7046ce97 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5958,6 +5958,7 @@ sources: - "tpm" - "tee" + - "caam" If not specified then it defaults to iterating through the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the first trust source as a backend which is initialized -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5002426e426166f57e1636b936666b275e6b3d2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahmad Fatoum Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:57:04 +0200 Subject: doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs. Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 2fe6fd1a2bbd..0bfb4c339748 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ safe. Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip fuses and is accessible to TEE only. + (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs) + + When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure + mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key + randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. + Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -46,6 +53,10 @@ safe. Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process. + (3) CAAM + + Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe. Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can be extended with TEE based measured boot process. + (3) CAAM + + Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs + for platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -74,10 +90,13 @@ safe. TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``. + (3) CAAM + + Interface is specific to silicon vendor. * Threat model - The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given + The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data. @@ -104,6 +123,12 @@ selected trust source: from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. + * CAAM: Kernel RNG + + The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the + CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device + is probed. + Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. @@ -193,6 +218,19 @@ Usage:: specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: CAAM +------------------------ + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a +CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- -- cgit v1.2.3