From 9c7417b5ec440242bb5b64521acd53d4e19130c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 11:06:57 +0200 Subject: coredump: Move dump_emit_page() to kill unused warning MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If CONFIG_ELF_CORE is not set: fs/coredump.c:835:12: error: ‘dump_emit_page’ defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function] 835 | static int dump_emit_page(struct coredump_params *cprm, struct page *page) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fix this by moving dump_emit_page() inside the existing section protected by #ifdef CONFIG_ELF_CORE. Fixes: 06bbaa6dc53cb720 ("[coredump] don't use __kernel_write() on kmap_local_page()") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- fs/coredump.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c index de78bde2991b..a25ecec9ca7c 100644 --- a/fs/coredump.c +++ b/fs/coredump.c @@ -838,6 +838,30 @@ static int __dump_skip(struct coredump_params *cprm, size_t nr) } } +int dump_emit(struct coredump_params *cprm, const void *addr, int nr) +{ + if (cprm->to_skip) { + if (!__dump_skip(cprm, cprm->to_skip)) + return 0; + cprm->to_skip = 0; + } + return __dump_emit(cprm, addr, nr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_emit); + +void dump_skip_to(struct coredump_params *cprm, unsigned long pos) +{ + cprm->to_skip = pos - cprm->pos; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_skip_to); + +void dump_skip(struct coredump_params *cprm, size_t nr) +{ + cprm->to_skip += nr; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_skip); + +#ifdef CONFIG_ELF_CORE static int dump_emit_page(struct coredump_params *cprm, struct page *page) { struct bio_vec bvec = { @@ -871,30 +895,6 @@ static int dump_emit_page(struct coredump_params *cprm, struct page *page) return 1; } -int dump_emit(struct coredump_params *cprm, const void *addr, int nr) -{ - if (cprm->to_skip) { - if (!__dump_skip(cprm, cprm->to_skip)) - return 0; - cprm->to_skip = 0; - } - return __dump_emit(cprm, addr, nr); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_emit); - -void dump_skip_to(struct coredump_params *cprm, unsigned long pos) -{ - cprm->to_skip = pos - cprm->pos; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_skip_to); - -void dump_skip(struct coredump_params *cprm, size_t nr) -{ - cprm->to_skip += nr; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_skip); - -#ifdef CONFIG_ELF_CORE int dump_user_range(struct coredump_params *cprm, unsigned long start, unsigned long len) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From f7c11affde9e29316d24b6736d16faeaac8278f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tanmay Bhushan <007047221b@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2023 21:32:15 +0100 Subject: btrfs: raid56: fix stripes if vertical errors are found We take two stripe numbers if vertical errors are found. In case it is just a pstripe it does not matter but in case of raid 6 it matters as both stripes need to be fixed. Fixes: 7a3150723061 ("btrfs: raid56: do data csum verification during RMW cycle") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Tanmay Bhushan <007047221b@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/raid56.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c index 6a2cf754912d..f35898a78b16 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c @@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ pstripe: sector->uptodate = 1; } if (failb >= 0) { - ret = verify_one_sector(rbio, faila, sector_nr); + ret = verify_one_sector(rbio, failb, sector_nr); if (ret < 0) goto cleanup; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 16:35:13 -0500 Subject: btrfs: limit device extents to the device size There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group allocator"). This however isn't a regression introduced by those patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in these patches. The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the ^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink. The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and use this to find a hole for a device extent. However during shrink we may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size. We don't actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume that we will not find a hole past our device size. This isn't true with shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the device size. Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index bcfef75b97da..4cdadf30163d 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ again: if (ret < 0) goto out; - while (1) { + while (search_start < search_end) { l = path->nodes[0]; slot = path->slots[0]; if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(l)) { @@ -1623,6 +1623,9 @@ again: if (key.type != BTRFS_DEV_EXTENT_KEY) goto next; + if (key.offset > search_end) + break; + if (key.offset > search_start) { hole_size = key.offset - search_start; dev_extent_hole_check(device, &search_start, &hole_size, @@ -1683,6 +1686,7 @@ next: else ret = 0; + ASSERT(max_hole_start + max_hole_size <= search_end); out: btrfs_free_path(path); *start = max_hole_start; -- cgit v1.2.3 From eadd7deca0ad8a83edb2b894d8326c78e78635d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Potapenko Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 12:32:34 +0100 Subject: btrfs: zlib: zero-initialize zlib workspace KMSAN reports uses of uninitialized memory in zlib's longest_match() called on memory originating from zlib_alloc_workspace(). This issue is known by zlib maintainers and is claimed to be harmless, but to be on the safe side we'd better initialize the memory. Link: https://zlib.net/zlib_faq.html#faq36 Reported-by: syzbot+14d9e7602ebdf7ec0a60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/zlib.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/zlib.c b/fs/btrfs/zlib.c index 01a13de11832..da7bb9187b68 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/zlib.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/zlib.c @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct list_head *zlib_alloc_workspace(unsigned int level) workspacesize = max(zlib_deflate_workspacesize(MAX_WBITS, MAX_MEM_LEVEL), zlib_inflate_workspacesize()); - workspace->strm.workspace = kvmalloc(workspacesize, GFP_KERNEL); + workspace->strm.workspace = kvzalloc(workspacesize, GFP_KERNEL); workspace->level = level; workspace->buf = NULL; /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 33e17b3f5ab74af12aca58c515bc8424ff69a343 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Sterba Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 20:32:10 +0100 Subject: btrfs: send: limit number of clones and allocated memory size The arg->clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated. Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715. Real world number of clones is from tens to hundreds, so this is future proof. Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/send.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index 67f7c698ade3..26dace7b74c6 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -8072,10 +8072,10 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct inode *inode, struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args *arg) /* * Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request * clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside - * access_ok. + * access_ok. Also set an upper limit for allocation size so this can't + * easily exhaust memory. Max number of clone sources is about 200K. */ - if (arg->clone_sources_count > - ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) { + if (arg->clone_sources_count > SZ_8M / sizeof(struct clone_root)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a9ad4d87aa263de36895402b66115a3a4b88bf1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2023 16:06:11 +0800 Subject: btrfs: raid56: make error_bitmap update atomic In the rework of raid56 code, there is very limited concurrency in the endio context. Most of the work is done inside the sectors arrays, which different bios will never touch the same sector. But there is a concurrency here for error_bitmap. Both read and write endio functions need to touch them, and we can have multiple write bios touching the same error bitmap if they all hit some errors. Here we fix the unprotected bitmap operation by going set_bit() in a loop. Since we have a very small ceiling of the sectors (at most 16 sectors), such set_bit() in a loop should be very acceptable. Fixes: 2942a50dea74 ("btrfs: raid56: introduce btrfs_raid_bio::error_bitmap") Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/raid56.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c index f35898a78b16..ff4b1d583788 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c @@ -1426,12 +1426,20 @@ static void rbio_update_error_bitmap(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, struct bio *bi u32 bio_size = 0; struct bio_vec *bvec; struct bvec_iter_all iter_all; + int i; bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, iter_all) bio_size += bvec->bv_len; - bitmap_set(rbio->error_bitmap, total_sector_nr, - bio_size >> rbio->bioc->fs_info->sectorsize_bits); + /* + * Since we can have multiple bios touching the error_bitmap, we cannot + * call bitmap_set() without protection. + * + * Instead use set_bit() for each bit, as set_bit() itself is atomic. + */ + for (i = total_sector_nr; i < total_sector_nr + + (bio_size >> rbio->bioc->fs_info->sectorsize_bits); i++) + set_bit(i, rbio->error_bitmap); } /* Verify the data sectors at read time. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 72e544b1b28325fe78a4687b980871a7e4101f76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 13:52:26 +0300 Subject: squashfs: harden sanity check in squashfs_read_xattr_id_table While mounting a corrupted filesystem, a signed integer '*xattr_ids' can become less than zero. This leads to the incorrect computation of 'len' and 'indexes' values which can cause null-ptr-deref in copy_bio_to_actor() or out-of-bounds accesses in the next sanity checks inside squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230117105226.329303-2-pchelkin@ispras.ru Fixes: 506220d2ba21 ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup") Reported-by: Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov Cc: Phillip Lougher Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c index 087cab8c78f4..f6d78cbc3e74 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 table_start, /* Sanity check values */ /* there is always at least one xattr id */ - if (*xattr_ids == 0) + if (*xattr_ids <= 0) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0d7866eace86c174e2d4f4fe3a7eca7a3a31247a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:16:38 -0800 Subject: freevxfs: Kconfig: fix spelling Fix a spello in freevxfs Kconfig. (reported by codespell) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230124181638.15604-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/freevxfs/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/freevxfs/Kconfig b/fs/freevxfs/Kconfig index c05c71d57291..0e2fc08f7de4 100644 --- a/fs/freevxfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/freevxfs/Kconfig @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ config VXFS_FS of SCO UnixWare (and possibly others) and optionally available for Sunsoft Solaris, HP-UX and many other operating systems. However these particular OS implementations of vxfs may differ in on-disk - data endianess and/or superblock offset. The vxfs module has been + data endianness and/or superblock offset. The vxfs module has been tested with SCO UnixWare and HP-UX B.10.20 (pa-risc 1.1 arch.) Currently only readonly access is supported and VxFX versions 2, 3 and 4. Tests were performed with HP-UX VxFS version 3. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3489dbb696d25602aea8c3e669a6d43b76bd5358 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Kravetz Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 14:27:20 -0800 Subject: mm: hugetlb: proc: check for hugetlb shared PMD in /proc/PID/smaps Patch series "Fixes for hugetlb mapcount at most 1 for shared PMDs". This issue of mapcount in hugetlb pages referenced by shared PMDs was discussed in [1]. The following two patches address user visible behavior caused by this issue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Y9BF+OCdWnCSilEu@monkey/ This patch (of 2): A hugetlb page will have a mapcount of 1 if mapped by multiple processes via a shared PMD. This is because only the first process increases the map count, and subsequent processes just add the shared PMD page to their page table. page_mapcount is being used to decide if a hugetlb page is shared or private in /proc/PID/smaps. Pages referenced via a shared PMD were incorrectly being counted as private. To fix, check for a shared PMD if mapcount is 1. If a shared PMD is found count the hugetlb page as shared. A new helper to check for a shared PMD is added. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplification, per David] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: hugetlb.h: include page_ref.h for page_count()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230126222721.222195-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Fixes: 25ee01a2fca0 ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add hugetlb-related fields to /proc/PID/smaps") Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz Acked-by: Peter Xu Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: James Houghton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Muchun Song Cc: Naoya Horiguchi Cc: Vishal Moola (Oracle) Cc: Yang Shi Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index e35a0398db63..af1c49ae11b1 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -745,9 +745,7 @@ static int smaps_hugetlb_range(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask, page = pfn_swap_entry_to_page(swpent); } if (page) { - int mapcount = page_mapcount(page); - - if (mapcount >= 2) + if (page_mapcount(page) >= 2 || hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte)) mss->shared_hugetlb += huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma)); else mss->private_hugetlb += huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f65c4bbbd682b0877b669828b4e033b8d5d0a2dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phillip Lougher Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 06:18:42 +0000 Subject: Squashfs: fix handling and sanity checking of xattr_ids count A Sysbot [1] corrupted filesystem exposes two flaws in the handling and sanity checking of the xattr_ids count in the filesystem. Both of these flaws cause computation overflow due to incorrect typing. In the corrupted filesystem the xattr_ids value is 4294967071, which stored in a signed variable becomes the negative number -225. Flaw 1 (64-bit systems only): The signed integer xattr_ids variable causes sign extension. This causes variable overflow in the SQUASHFS_XATTR_*(A) macros. The variable is first multiplied by sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id) where the type of the sizeof operator is "unsigned long". On a 64-bit system this is 64-bits in size, and causes the negative number to be sign extended and widened to 64-bits and then become unsigned. This produces the very large number 18446744073709548016 or 2^64 - 3600. This number when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and divided by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows and produces a length of 0 (stored in len). Flaw 2 (32-bit systems only): On a 32-bit system the integer variable is not widened by the unsigned long type of the sizeof operator (32-bits), and the signedness of the variable has no effect due it always being treated as unsigned. The above corrupted xattr_ids value of 4294967071, when multiplied overflows and produces the number 4294963696 or 2^32 - 3400. This number when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and divided by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows again and produces a length of 0. The effect of the 0 length computation: In conjunction with the corrupted xattr_ids field, the filesystem also has a corrupted xattr_table_start value, where it matches the end of filesystem value of 850. This causes the following sanity check code to fail because the incorrectly computed len of 0 matches the incorrect size of the table reported by the superblock (0 bytes). len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids); indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids); /* * The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly * match the table start and end points */ start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table); end = msblk->bytes_used; if (len != (end - start)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); Changing the xattr_ids variable to be "usigned int" fixes the flaw on a 64-bit system. This relies on the fact the computation is widened by the unsigned long type of the sizeof operator. Casting the variable to u64 in the above macro fixes this flaw on a 32-bit system. It also means 64-bit systems do not implicitly rely on the type of the sizeof operator to widen the computation. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000cd44f005f1a0f17f@google.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230127061842.10965-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Fixes: 506220d2ba21 ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup") Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher Reported-by: Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov Cc: Fedor Pchelkin Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h | 2 +- fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h | 2 +- fs/squashfs/xattr.h | 4 ++-- fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h index b3fdc8212c5f..95f8e8901768 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h +++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static inline int squashfs_block_size(__le32 raw) #define SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_BYTES(A) (SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCKS(A) *\ sizeof(u64)) /* xattr id lookup table defines */ -#define SQUASHFS_XATTR_BYTES(A) ((A) * sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id)) +#define SQUASHFS_XATTR_BYTES(A) (((u64) (A)) * sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id)) #define SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK(A) (SQUASHFS_XATTR_BYTES(A) / \ SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) diff --git a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h index 659082e9e51d..72f6f4b37863 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h +++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct squashfs_sb_info { long long bytes_used; unsigned int inodes; unsigned int fragments; - int xattr_ids; + unsigned int xattr_ids; unsigned int ids; bool panic_on_errors; const struct squashfs_decompressor_thread_ops *thread_ops; diff --git a/fs/squashfs/xattr.h b/fs/squashfs/xattr.h index d8a270d3ac4c..f1a463d8bfa0 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/xattr.h +++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr.h @@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XATTR extern __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *, u64, - u64 *, int *); + u64 *, unsigned int *); extern int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_block *, unsigned int, int *, unsigned int *, unsigned long long *); #else static inline __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, - u64 start, u64 *xattr_table_start, int *xattr_ids) + u64 start, u64 *xattr_table_start, unsigned int *xattr_ids) { struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table; diff --git a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c index f6d78cbc3e74..b88d19e9581e 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int index, * Read uncompressed xattr id lookup table indexes from disk into memory */ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 table_start, - u64 *xattr_table_start, int *xattr_ids) + u64 *xattr_table_start, unsigned int *xattr_ids) { struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info; unsigned int len, indexes; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b38b17b6a01ca4e738af097a1529910646ef4270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 09:36:44 +0800 Subject: ceph: move mount state enum to super.h These flags are only used in ceph filesystem in fs/ceph, so just move it to the place it should be. Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/super.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index 0ed3be75bb9a..cd95b426ee00 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ struct ceph_mount_options { char *mon_addr; }; +/* mount state */ +enum { + CEPH_MOUNT_MOUNTING, + CEPH_MOUNT_MOUNTED, + CEPH_MOUNT_UNMOUNTING, + CEPH_MOUNT_UNMOUNTED, + CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN, + CEPH_MOUNT_RECOVER, +}; + #define CEPH_ASYNC_CREATE_CONFLICT_BITS 8 struct ceph_fs_client { -- cgit v1.2.3 From a68e564adcaa69b0930809fb64d9d5f7d9c32ba9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 09:36:45 +0800 Subject: ceph: blocklist the kclient when receiving corrupted snap trace When received corrupted snap trace we don't know what exactly has happened in MDS side. And we shouldn't continue IOs and metadatas access to MDS, which may corrupt or get incorrect contents. This patch will just block all the further IO/MDS requests immediately and then evict the kclient itself. The reason why we still need to evict the kclient just after blocking all the further IOs is that the MDS could revoke the caps faster. Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57686 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/caps.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/file.c | 3 +++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/snap.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 8c74871e37c9..cac4083e387a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) struct inode *inode = rreq->inode; struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); - struct ceph_osd_request *req; + struct ceph_osd_request *req = NULL; struct ceph_vino vino = ceph_vino(inode); struct iov_iter iter; struct page **pages; @@ -313,6 +313,11 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) int err = 0; u64 len = subreq->len; + if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) { + err = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (ceph_has_inline_data(ci) && ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq)) return; @@ -563,6 +568,9 @@ static int writepage_nounlock(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) dout("writepage %p idx %lu\n", page, page->index); + if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) + return -EIO; + /* verify this is a writeable snap context */ snapc = page_snap_context(page); if (!snapc) { @@ -1643,7 +1651,7 @@ int ceph_uninline_data(struct file *file) struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); struct ceph_osd_request *req = NULL; - struct ceph_cap_flush *prealloc_cf; + struct ceph_cap_flush *prealloc_cf = NULL; struct folio *folio = NULL; u64 inline_version = CEPH_INLINE_NONE; struct page *pages[1]; @@ -1657,6 +1665,11 @@ int ceph_uninline_data(struct file *file) dout("uninline_data %p %llx.%llx inline_version %llu\n", inode, ceph_vinop(inode), inline_version); + if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) { + err = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE) return 0; diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index f75ad432f375..210e40037881 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -4078,6 +4078,7 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, void *p, *end; struct cap_extra_info extra_info = {}; bool queue_trunc; + bool close_sessions = false; dout("handle_caps from mds%d\n", session->s_mds); @@ -4215,9 +4216,13 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, realm = NULL; if (snaptrace_len) { down_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); - ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, - snaptrace + snaptrace_len, - false, &realm); + if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, + snaptrace + snaptrace_len, + false, &realm)) { + up_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); + close_sessions = true; + goto done; + } downgrade_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); } else { down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); @@ -4277,6 +4282,11 @@ done_unlocked: iput(inode); out: ceph_put_string(extra_info.pool_ns); + + /* Defer closing the sessions after s_mutex lock being released */ + if (close_sessions) + ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(mdsc); + return; flush_cap_releases: diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 764598e1efd9..b5cff85925a1 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -2011,6 +2011,9 @@ static int ceph_zero_partial_object(struct inode *inode, loff_t zero = 0; int op; + if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!length) { op = offset ? CEPH_OSD_OP_DELETE : CEPH_OSD_OP_TRUNCATE; length = &zero; diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 26a0a8b9975e..e163f58ff3c5 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -806,6 +806,9 @@ static struct ceph_mds_session *register_session(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, { struct ceph_mds_session *s; + if (READ_ONCE(mdsc->fsc->mount_state) == CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + if (mds >= mdsc->mdsmap->possible_max_rank) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -1478,6 +1481,9 @@ static int __open_session(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, int mstate; int mds = session->s_mds; + if (READ_ONCE(mdsc->fsc->mount_state) == CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO) + return -EIO; + /* wait for mds to go active? */ mstate = ceph_mdsmap_get_state(mdsc->mdsmap, mds); dout("open_session to mds%d (%s)\n", mds, @@ -2860,6 +2866,11 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, return; } + if (READ_ONCE(mdsc->fsc->mount_state) == CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO) { + dout("do_request metadata corrupted\n"); + err = -EIO; + goto finish; + } if (req->r_timeout && time_after_eq(jiffies, req->r_started + req->r_timeout)) { dout("do_request timed out\n"); @@ -3245,6 +3256,7 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_mds_session *session, struct ceph_msg *msg) u64 tid; int err, result; int mds = session->s_mds; + bool close_sessions = false; if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*head)) { pr_err("mdsc_handle_reply got corrupt (short) reply\n"); @@ -3351,10 +3363,17 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_mds_session *session, struct ceph_msg *msg) realm = NULL; if (rinfo->snapblob_len) { down_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); - ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, rinfo->snapblob, + err = ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, rinfo->snapblob, rinfo->snapblob + rinfo->snapblob_len, le32_to_cpu(head->op) == CEPH_MDS_OP_RMSNAP, &realm); + if (err) { + up_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); + close_sessions = true; + if (err == -EIO) + ceph_msg_dump(msg); + goto out_err; + } downgrade_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); } else { down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); @@ -3412,6 +3431,10 @@ out_err: req->r_end_latency, err); out: ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); + + /* Defer closing the sessions after s_mutex lock being released */ + if (close_sessions) + ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(mdsc); return; } @@ -5011,7 +5034,7 @@ static bool done_closing_sessions(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, int skipped) } /* - * called after sb is ro. + * called after sb is ro or when metadata corrupted. */ void ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) { @@ -5301,7 +5324,8 @@ static void mds_peer_reset(struct ceph_connection *con) struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc; pr_warn("mds%d closed our session\n", s->s_mds); - send_mds_reconnect(mdsc, s); + if (READ_ONCE(mdsc->fsc->mount_state) != CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO) + send_mds_reconnect(mdsc, s); } static void mds_dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) diff --git a/fs/ceph/snap.c b/fs/ceph/snap.c index e4151852184e..87007203f130 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/snap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/snap.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -766,8 +767,10 @@ int ceph_update_snap_trace(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct ceph_snap_realm *realm; struct ceph_snap_realm *first_realm = NULL; struct ceph_snap_realm *realm_to_rebuild = NULL; + struct ceph_client *client = mdsc->fsc->client; int rebuild_snapcs; int err = -ENOMEM; + int ret; LIST_HEAD(dirty_realms); lockdep_assert_held_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); @@ -884,6 +887,27 @@ fail: if (first_realm) ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, first_realm); pr_err("%s error %d\n", __func__, err); + + /* + * When receiving a corrupted snap trace we don't know what + * exactly has happened in MDS side. And we shouldn't continue + * writing to OSD, which may corrupt the snapshot contents. + * + * Just try to blocklist this kclient and then this kclient + * must be remounted to continue after the corrupted metadata + * fixed in the MDS side. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(mdsc->fsc->mount_state, CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO); + ret = ceph_monc_blocklist_add(&client->monc, &client->msgr.inst.addr); + if (ret) + pr_err("%s failed to blocklist %s: %d\n", __func__, + ceph_pr_addr(&client->msgr.inst.addr), ret); + + WARN(1, "%s: %s%sdo remount to continue%s", + __func__, ret ? "" : ceph_pr_addr(&client->msgr.inst.addr), + ret ? "" : " was blocklisted, ", + err == -EIO ? " after corrupted snaptrace is fixed" : ""); + return err; } @@ -984,6 +1008,7 @@ void ceph_handle_snap(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, __le64 *split_inos = NULL, *split_realms = NULL; int i; int locked_rwsem = 0; + bool close_sessions = false; /* decode */ if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h)) @@ -1092,8 +1117,12 @@ skip_inode: * update using the provided snap trace. if we are deleting a * snap, we can avoid queueing cap_snaps. */ - ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, p, e, - op == CEPH_SNAP_OP_DESTROY, NULL); + if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, p, e, + op == CEPH_SNAP_OP_DESTROY, + NULL)) { + close_sessions = true; + goto bad; + } if (op == CEPH_SNAP_OP_SPLIT) /* we took a reference when we created the realm, above */ @@ -1112,6 +1141,9 @@ bad: out: if (locked_rwsem) up_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); + + if (close_sessions) + ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(mdsc); return; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index cd95b426ee00..07c6906cda70 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ enum { CEPH_MOUNT_UNMOUNTED, CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN, CEPH_MOUNT_RECOVER, + CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO, }; #define CEPH_ASYNC_CREATE_CONFLICT_BITS 8 -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa5465aeca3c66fecdf7efcf554aed79b4c4b211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ZhaoLong Wang Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 09:10:09 +0800 Subject: cifs: Fix use-after-free in rdata->read_into_pages() When the network status is unstable, use-after-free may occur when read data from the server. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in readpages_fill_pages+0x14c/0x7e0 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x4c print_report+0x16f/0x4a6 kasan_report+0xb7/0x130 readpages_fill_pages+0x14c/0x7e0 cifs_readv_receive+0x46d/0xa40 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x121c/0x1490 kthread+0x16b/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 Allocated by task 2535: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 cifs_readdata_direct_alloc+0x2c/0x110 cifs_readdata_alloc+0x2d/0x60 cifs_readahead+0x393/0xfe0 read_pages+0x12f/0x470 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1b1/0x240 filemap_get_pages+0x1c8/0x9a0 filemap_read+0x1c0/0x540 cifs_strict_readv+0x21b/0x240 vfs_read+0x395/0x4b0 ksys_read+0xb8/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 79: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x10e/0x1a0 __kmem_cache_free+0x7a/0x1a0 cifs_readdata_release+0x49/0x60 process_one_work+0x46c/0x760 worker_thread+0x2a4/0x6f0 kthread+0x16b/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x95/0xb0 insert_work+0x2b/0x130 __queue_work+0x1fe/0x660 queue_work_on+0x4b/0x60 smb2_readv_callback+0x396/0x800 cifs_abort_connection+0x474/0x6a0 cifs_reconnect+0x5cb/0xa50 cifs_readv_from_socket.cold+0x22/0x6c cifs_read_page_from_socket+0xc1/0x100 readpages_fill_pages.cold+0x2f/0x46 cifs_readv_receive+0x46d/0xa40 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x121c/0x1490 kthread+0x16b/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 The following function calls will cause UAF of the rdata pointer. readpages_fill_pages cifs_read_page_from_socket cifs_readv_from_socket cifs_reconnect __cifs_reconnect cifs_abort_connection mid->callback() --> smb2_readv_callback queue_work(&rdata->work) # if the worker completes first, # the rdata is freed cifs_readv_complete kref_put cifs_readdata_release kfree(rdata) return rdata->... # UAF in readpages_fill_pages() Similarly, this problem also occurs in the uncache_fill_pages(). Fix this by adjusts the order of condition judgment in the return statement. Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/file.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/file.c b/fs/cifs/file.c index 22dfc1f8b4f1..b8d1cbadb689 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/file.c +++ b/fs/cifs/file.c @@ -3889,7 +3889,7 @@ uncached_fill_pages(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, rdata->got_bytes += result; } - return rdata->got_bytes > 0 && result != -ECONNABORTED ? + return result != -ECONNABORTED && rdata->got_bytes > 0 ? rdata->got_bytes : result; } @@ -4665,7 +4665,7 @@ readpages_fill_pages(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, rdata->got_bytes += result; } - return rdata->got_bytes > 0 && result != -ECONNABORTED ? + return result != -ECONNABORTED && rdata->got_bytes > 0 ? rdata->got_bytes : result; } -- cgit v1.2.3