From 980737282232b752bb14dab96d77665c15889c36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Budankov Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 11:45:31 +0300 Subject: capabilities: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems. CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases. CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability. Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Acked-by: James Morris Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: Song Liu Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Igor Lubashev Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux/capability.h') diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index ecce0f43c73a..027d7e4a853b 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a17b53c4a4b55ec322c132b6670743612229ee9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexei Starovoitov Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 16:03:53 -0700 Subject: bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN. For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well. The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF: - to load tracing program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON - to load networking program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN There are few exceptions from this rule: - bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON if networking program is using this helper. - BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only to discourage production use. - BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. - bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only. CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions: - loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users, hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time. - flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach, hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command. This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example: task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link. task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs. CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything. Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can accidentely mess with each other programs and maps. Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other. CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data. Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers. bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets. But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools. CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access. CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2. CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own. Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog. CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system. Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected. In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com --- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux/capability.h') diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 027d7e4a853b..b4345b38a6be 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -256,6 +256,11 @@ static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); } +static inline bool bpf_capable(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); -- cgit v1.2.3