From 003c941057eaa868ca6fedd29a274c863167230d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shannon Nelson Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2017 14:24:58 -0800 Subject: tcp: fix tcp_fastopen unaligned access complaints on sparc Fix up a data alignment issue on sparc by swapping the order of the cookie byte array field with the length field in struct tcp_fastopen_cookie, and making it a proper union to clean up the typecasting. This addresses log complaints like these: log_unaligned: 113 callbacks suppressed Kernel unaligned access at TPC[976490] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2d0/0x360 Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764ac] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2ec/0x360 Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764c8] tcp_try_fastopen+0x308/0x360 Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764e4] tcp_try_fastopen+0x324/0x360 Kernel unaligned access at TPC[976490] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2d0/0x360 Cc: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/tcp.h | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index fc5848dad7a4..c93f4b3a59cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -62,8 +62,13 @@ static inline unsigned int tcp_optlen(const struct sk_buff *skb) /* TCP Fast Open Cookie as stored in memory */ struct tcp_fastopen_cookie { + union { + u8 val[TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX]; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct in6_addr addr; +#endif + }; s8 len; - u8 val[TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX]; bool exp; /* In RFC6994 experimental option format */ }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f1f7714ea51c56b7163fb1a5acf39c6a204dd758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2017 23:38:15 +0100 Subject: bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +- include/linux/filter.h | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index f74ae68086dc..05cf951df3fe 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ u64 bpf_tail_call(u64 ctx, u64 r2, u64 index, u64 r4, u64 r5); u64 bpf_get_stackid(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5); bool bpf_prog_array_compatible(struct bpf_array *array, const struct bpf_prog *fp); -int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp); +int bpf_prog_calc_tag(struct bpf_prog *fp); const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_trace_printk_proto(void); diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index a0934e6c9bab..e4eb2546339a 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux; /* BPF program can access up to 512 bytes of stack space. */ #define MAX_BPF_STACK 512 +#define BPF_TAG_SIZE 8 + /* Helper macros for filter block array initializers. */ /* ALU ops on registers, bpf_add|sub|...: dst_reg += src_reg */ @@ -408,7 +410,7 @@ struct bpf_prog { kmemcheck_bitfield_end(meta); enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */ u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */ - u32 digest[SHA_DIGEST_WORDS]; /* Program digest */ + u8 tag[BPF_TAG_SIZE]; struct bpf_prog_aux *aux; /* Auxiliary fields */ struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; /* Original BPF program */ unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const void *ctx, @@ -519,7 +521,7 @@ static inline u32 bpf_prog_insn_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog) return prog->len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn); } -static inline u32 bpf_prog_digest_scratch_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog) +static inline u32 bpf_prog_tag_scratch_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog) { return round_up(bpf_prog_insn_size(prog) + sizeof(__be64) + 1, SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES); -- cgit v1.2.3