From 5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Ignatov Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 15:08:00 -0700 Subject: bpf: Check attach type at prog load time == The problem == There are use-cases when a program of some type can be attached to multiple attach points and those attach points must have different permissions to access context or to call helpers. E.g. context structure may have fields for both IPv4 and IPv6 but it doesn't make sense to read from / write to IPv6 field when attach point is somewhere in IPv4 stack. Same applies to BPF-helpers: it may make sense to call some helper from some attach point, but not from other for same prog type. == The solution == Introduce `expected_attach_type` field in in `struct bpf_attr` for `BPF_PROG_LOAD` command. If scenario described in "The problem" section is the case for some prog type, the field will be checked twice: 1) At load time prog type is checked to see if attach type for it must be known to validate program permissions correctly. Prog will be rejected with EINVAL if it's the case and `expected_attach_type` is not specified or has invalid value. 2) At attach time `attach_type` is compared with `expected_attach_type`, if prog type requires to have one, and, if they differ, attach will be rejected with EINVAL. The `expected_attach_type` is now available as part of `struct bpf_prog` in both `bpf_verifier_ops->is_valid_access()` and `bpf_verifier_ops->get_func_proto()` () and can be used to check context accesses and calls to helpers correspondingly. Initially the idea was discussed by Alexei Starovoitov and Daniel Borkmann here: https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=152107378717201&w=2 Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf.h | 5 ++++- include/linux/filter.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 819229c80eca..95a7abd0ee92 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -208,12 +208,15 @@ struct bpf_prog_ops { struct bpf_verifier_ops { /* return eBPF function prototype for verification */ - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); + const struct bpf_func_proto * + (*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + const struct bpf_prog *prog); /* return true if 'size' wide access at offset 'off' within bpf_context * with 'type' (read or write) is allowed */ bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, + const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info); int (*gen_prologue)(struct bpf_insn *insn, bool direct_write, const struct bpf_prog *prog); diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 897ff3d95968..13c044e4832d 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ struct bpf_prog { is_func:1, /* program is a bpf function */ kprobe_override:1; /* Do we override a kprobe? */ enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */ + enum bpf_attach_type expected_attach_type; /* For some prog types */ u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */ u32 jited_len; /* Size of jited insns in bytes */ u8 tag[BPF_TAG_SIZE]; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4fbac77d2d092b475dda9eea66da674369665427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Ignatov Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 15:08:02 -0700 Subject: bpf: Hooks for sys_bind == The problem == There is a use-case when all processes inside a cgroup should use one single IP address on a host that has multiple IP configured. Those processes should use the IP for both ingress and egress, for TCP and UDP traffic. So TCP/UDP servers should be bound to that IP to accept incoming connections on it, and TCP/UDP clients should make outgoing connections from that IP. It should not require changing application code since it's often not possible. Currently it's solved by intercepting glibc wrappers around syscalls such as `bind(2)` and `connect(2)`. It's done by a shared library that is preloaded for every process in a cgroup so that whenever TCP/UDP server calls `bind(2)`, the library replaces IP in sockaddr before passing arguments to syscall. When application calls `connect(2)` the library transparently binds the local end of connection to that IP (`bind(2)` with `IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` to avoid performance penalty). Shared library approach is fragile though, e.g.: * some applications clear env vars (incl. `LD_PRELOAD`); * `/etc/ld.so.preload` doesn't help since some applications are linked with option `-z nodefaultlib`; * other applications don't use glibc and there is nothing to intercept. == The solution == The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 1st part of the problem: binding TCP/UDP servers on desired IP. It does not depend on application environment and implementation details (whether glibc is used or not). It adds new eBPF program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` and attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND` (similar to already existing `BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE`). The new program type is intended to be used with sockets (`struct sock`) in a cgroup and provided by user `struct sockaddr`. Pointers to both of them are parts of the context passed to programs of newly added types. The new attach types provides hooks in `bind(2)` system call for both IPv4 and IPv6 so that one can write a program to override IP addresses and ports user program tries to bind to and apply such a program for whole cgroup. == Implementation notes == [1] Separate attach types for `AF_INET` and `AF_INET6` are added intentionally to prevent reading/writing to offsets that don't make sense for corresponding socket family. E.g. if user passes `sockaddr_in` it doesn't make sense to read from / write to `user_ip6[]` context fields. [2] The write access to `struct bpf_sock_addr_kern` is implemented using special field as an additional "register". There are just two registers in `sock_addr_convert_ctx_access`: `src` with value to write and `dst` with pointer to context that can't be changed not to break later instructions. But the fields, allowed to write to, are not available directly and to access them address of corresponding pointer has to be loaded first. To get additional register the 1st not used by `src` and `dst` one is taken, its content is saved to `bpf_sock_addr_kern.tmp_reg`, then the register is used to load address of pointer field, and finally the register's content is restored from the temporary field after writing `src` value. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/bpf_types.h | 1 + include/linux/filter.h | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h index 8a4566691c8f..67dc4a6471ad 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include struct sock; +struct sockaddr; struct cgroup; struct sk_buff; struct bpf_sock_ops_kern; @@ -63,6 +64,10 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb(struct sock *sk, int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk(struct sock *sk, enum bpf_attach_type type); +int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk, + struct sockaddr *uaddr, + enum bpf_attach_type type); + int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_ops(struct sock *sk, struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *sock_ops, enum bpf_attach_type type); @@ -103,6 +108,20 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_check_dev_permission(short dev_type, u32 major, u32 minor, __ret; \ }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, type) \ +({ \ + int __ret = 0; \ + if (cgroup_bpf_enabled) \ + __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type); \ + __ret; \ +}) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND(sk, uaddr) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND(sk, uaddr) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) + #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_SOCK_OPS(sock_ops) \ ({ \ int __ret = 0; \ @@ -135,6 +154,8 @@ static inline int cgroup_bpf_inherit(struct cgroup *cgrp) { return 0; } #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_INGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_EGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_SOCK_OPS(sock_ops) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_DEVICE_CGROUP(type,major,minor,access) ({ 0; }) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_types.h b/include/linux/bpf_types.h index 6d7243bfb0ff..2b28fcf6f6ae 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_types.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_types.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT, tc_cls_act) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, xdp) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, cg_skb) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK, cg_sock) +BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR, cg_sock_addr) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, lwt_inout) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT, lwt_inout) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT, lwt_xmit) diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 13c044e4832d..fc4e8f91b03d 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -1021,6 +1021,16 @@ static inline int bpf_tell_extensions(void) return SKF_AD_MAX; } +struct bpf_sock_addr_kern { + struct sock *sk; + struct sockaddr *uaddr; + /* Temporary "register" to make indirect stores to nested structures + * defined above. We need three registers to make such a store, but + * only two (src and dst) are available at convert_ctx_access time + */ + u64 tmp_reg; +}; + struct bpf_sock_ops_kern { struct sock *sk; u32 op; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d74bad4e74ee373787a9ae24197c17b7cdc428d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Ignatov Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 15:08:05 -0700 Subject: bpf: Hooks for sys_connect == The problem == See description of the problem in the initial patch of this patch set. == The solution == The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 2nd part of the problem: making outgoing connecttion from desired IP. It adds new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT` for program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` that can be used to override both source and destination of a connection at connect(2) time. Local end of connection can be bound to desired IP using newly introduced BPF-helper `bpf_bind()`. It allows to bind to only IP though, and doesn't support binding to port, i.e. leverages `IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` socket option. There are two reasons for this: * looking for a free port is expensive and can affect performance significantly; * there is no use-case for port. As for remote end (`struct sockaddr *` passed by user), both parts of it can be overridden, remote IP and remote port. It's useful if an application inside cgroup wants to connect to another application inside same cgroup or to itself, but knows nothing about IP assigned to the cgroup. Support is added for IPv4 and IPv6, for TCP and UDP. IPv4 and IPv6 have separate attach types for same reason as sys_bind hooks, i.e. to prevent reading from / writing to e.g. user_ip6 fields when user passes sockaddr_in since it'd be out-of-bound. == Implementation notes == The patch introduces new field in `struct proto`: `pre_connect` that is a pointer to a function with same signature as `connect` but is called before it. The reason is in some cases BPF hooks should be called way before control is passed to `sk->sk_prot->connect`. Specifically `inet_dgram_connect` autobinds socket before calling `sk->sk_prot->connect` and there is no way to call `bpf_bind()` from hooks from e.g. `ip4_datagram_connect` or `ip6_datagram_connect` since it'd cause double-bind. On the other hand `proto.pre_connect` provides a flexible way to add BPF hooks for connect only for necessary `proto` and call them at desired time before `connect`. Since `bpf_bind()` is allowed to bind only to IP and autobind in `inet_dgram_connect` binds only port there is no chance of double-bind. bpf_bind() sets `force_bind_address_no_port` to bind to only IP despite of value of `bind_address_no_port` socket field. bpf_bind() sets `with_lock` to `false` when calling to __inet_bind() and __inet6_bind() since all call-sites, where bpf_bind() is called, already hold socket lock. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h index 67dc4a6471ad..c6ab295e6dcb 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h @@ -116,12 +116,38 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_check_dev_permission(short dev_type, u32 major, u32 minor, __ret; \ }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type) \ +({ \ + int __ret = 0; \ + if (cgroup_bpf_enabled) { \ + lock_sock(sk); \ + __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type); \ + release_sock(sk); \ + } \ + __ret; \ +}) + #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND(sk, uaddr) \ BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND(sk, uaddr) \ BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) +#define BPF_CGROUP_PRE_CONNECT_ENABLED(sk) (cgroup_bpf_enabled && \ + sk->sk_prot->pre_connect) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT) + #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_SOCK_OPS(sock_ops) \ ({ \ int __ret = 0; \ @@ -151,11 +177,16 @@ struct cgroup_bpf {}; static inline void cgroup_bpf_put(struct cgroup *cgrp) {} static inline int cgroup_bpf_inherit(struct cgroup *cgrp) { return 0; } +#define BPF_CGROUP_PRE_CONNECT_ENABLED(sk) (0) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_INGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_EGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_SOCK_OPS(sock_ops) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_DEVICE_CGROUP(type,major,minor,access) ({ 0; }) -- cgit v1.2.3 From aac3fc320d9404f2665a8b1249dc3170d5fa3caf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Ignatov Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 15:08:07 -0700 Subject: bpf: Post-hooks for sys_bind "Post-hooks" are hooks that are called right before returning from sys_bind. At this time IP and port are already allocated and no further changes to `struct sock` can happen before returning from sys_bind but BPF program has a chance to inspect the socket and change sys_bind result. Specifically it can e.g. inspect what port was allocated and if it doesn't satisfy some policy, BPF program can force sys_bind to fail and return EPERM to user. Another example of usage is recording the IP:port pair to some map to use it in later calls to sys_connect. E.g. if some TCP server inside cgroup was bound to some IP:port_n, it can be recorded to a map. And later when some TCP client inside same cgroup is trying to connect to 127.0.0.1:port_n, BPF hook for sys_connect can override the destination and connect application to IP:port_n instead of 127.0.0.1:port_n. That helps forcing all applications inside a cgroup to use desired IP and not break those applications if they e.g. use localhost to communicate between each other. == Implementation details == Post-hooks are implemented as two new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_POST_BIND` for existing prog type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK`. Separate attach types for IPv4 and IPv6 are introduced to avoid access to IPv6 field in `struct sock` from `inet_bind()` and to IPv4 field from `inet6_bind()` since those fields might not make sense in such cases. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann --- include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h index c6ab295e6dcb..30d15e64b993 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h @@ -98,16 +98,24 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_check_dev_permission(short dev_type, u32 major, u32 minor, __ret; \ }) -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) \ +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SK_PROG(sk, type) \ ({ \ int __ret = 0; \ if (cgroup_bpf_enabled) { \ - __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk(sk, \ - BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE); \ + __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk(sk, type); \ } \ __ret; \ }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SK_PROG(sk, BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(sk) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SK_PROG(sk, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_BIND) + +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk) \ + BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SK_PROG(sk, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_POST_BIND) + #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, type) \ ({ \ int __ret = 0; \ @@ -183,6 +191,8 @@ static inline int cgroup_bpf_inherit(struct cgroup *cgrp) { return 0; } #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; }) +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; }) -- cgit v1.2.3