From 1227418989346af3af179742cf42ce842e0ad484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dov Murik Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:24 +0000 Subject: efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example: [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018 The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- include/linux/efi.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index ccd4d3f91c98..771d4cd06b56 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2) #define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68) #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) /* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) @@ -596,6 +597,7 @@ extern struct efi { unsigned long tpm_log; /* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log; /* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table; /* MOK variable config table */ + unsigned long coco_secret; /* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time; efi_set_time_t *set_time; @@ -1335,4 +1337,12 @@ extern void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt); static inline void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt) { } #endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { + u64 base_pa; + u64 size; +}; + +/* Header of a populated EFI secret area */ +#define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b) + #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa480379d8bdb33920d68acfd90f823c8af32578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kiszka Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 07:36:37 +0100 Subject: efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info Fixes "no previous declaration for 'efi_capsule_setup_info'" warnings under W=1. Fixes: 2959c95d510c ("efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header") Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c28d3f86-dd72-27d1-e2c2-40971b8da6bd@siemens.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 771d4cd06b56..fd266198f9d8 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ struct capsule_info { size_t page_bytes_remain; }; +int efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info, void *kbuff, + size_t hdr_bytes); int __efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info); /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3ba75c1316390b2bc39c19cb8f0f85922ab3f9ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baskov Evgeniy Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 17:21:19 +0300 Subject: efi: libstub: declare DXE services table UEFI DXE services are not yet used in kernel code but are required to manipulate page table memory protection flags. Add required declarations to use DXE services functions. Signed-off-by: Baskov Evgeniy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303142120.1975-2-baskov@ispras.ru [ardb: ignore absent DXE table but warn if the signature check fails] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index fd266198f9d8..b1f7c6a3e5bf 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define EFI_LOAD_FILE_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x56ec3091, 0x954c, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b) #define EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x4006c0c1, 0xfcb3, 0x403e, 0x99, 0x6d, 0x4a, 0x6c, 0x87, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x6d) #define EFI_RT_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xeb66918a, 0x7eef, 0x402a, 0x84, 0x2e, 0x93, 0x1d, 0x21, 0xc3, 0x8a, 0xe9) +#define EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x05ad34ba, 0x6f02, 0x4214, 0x95, 0x2e, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x39, 0x8e, 0x2b, 0xb9) #define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f) #define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23) @@ -438,6 +439,7 @@ typedef struct { } efi_config_table_type_t; #define EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE ((u64)0x5453595320494249ULL) +#define EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_SIGNATURE ((u64)0x565245535f455844ULL) #define EFI_2_30_SYSTEM_TABLE_REVISION ((2 << 16) | (30)) #define EFI_2_20_SYSTEM_TABLE_REVISION ((2 << 16) | (20)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07768c55f9c2ad64ccae3ed82447a87d8af8a687 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 19:00:20 +0100 Subject: efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader If the loader has already placed the EFI kernel image randomly in physical memory, and indicates having done so by installing the 'fixed placement' protocol onto the image handle, don't bother randomizing the placement again in the EFI stub. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- include/linux/efi.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index b1f7c6a3e5bf..580ce607d6f5 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -410,6 +410,17 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) #define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) +/* + * This GUID may be installed onto the kernel image's handle as a NULL protocol + * to signal to the stub that the placement of the image should be respected, + * and moving the image in physical memory is undesirable. To ensure + * compatibility with 64k pages kernels with virtually mapped stacks, and to + * avoid defeating physical randomization, this protocol should only be + * installed if the image was placed at a randomized 128k aligned address in + * memory. + */ +#define LINUX_EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_FIXED_GUID EFI_GUID(0xf5a37b6d, 0x3344, 0x42a5, 0xb6, 0xbb, 0x97, 0x86, 0x48, 0xc1, 0x89, 0x0a) + /* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) #define AMD_SEV_MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID EFI_GUID(0x0cf29b71, 0x9e51, 0x433a, 0xa3, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xab, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x75) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f68e69520d3d52d66a6ad872a75b7d8f2ea7665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sunil V L Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 10:45:12 +0530 Subject: riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL Add support for getting the boot hart ID from the Linux EFI stub using RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL. This method is preferred over the existing DT based approach since it works irrespective of DT or ACPI. The specification of the protocol is hosted at: https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-uefi Signed-off-by: Sunil V L Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519051512.136724-2-sunilvl@ventanamicro.com [ardb: minor tweaks for coding style and whitespace] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 580ce607d6f5..0412304ce34e 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -410,6 +410,8 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) #define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) +#define RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0xccd15fec, 0x6f73, 0x4eec, 0x83, 0x95, 0x3e, 0x69, 0xe4, 0xb9, 0x40, 0xbf) + /* * This GUID may be installed onto the kernel image's handle as a NULL protocol * to signal to the stub that the placement of the image should be respected, -- cgit v1.2.3