From 2532386f480eefbdd67b48be55fb4fb3e5a6081c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 10:09:25 -0400 Subject: Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages so we can audit who sent netlink messages. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index a7b16086d36f..ad6d1abfa1d2 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -252,14 +252,15 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message) } static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old, - uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, int allow_changes) + uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid, + int allow_changes) { struct audit_buffer *ab; int rc = 0; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); - audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%d old=%d by auid=%u", function_name, new, - old, loginuid); + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%d old=%d auid=%u ses=%u", function_name, new, + old, loginuid, sessionid); if (sid) { char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; @@ -279,7 +280,8 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old, } static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change, - int new, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) + int new, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, + u32 sid) { int allow_changes, rc = 0, old = *to_change; @@ -290,8 +292,8 @@ static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change, allow_changes = 1; if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF) { - rc = audit_log_config_change(function_name, new, old, - loginuid, sid, allow_changes); + rc = audit_log_config_change(function_name, new, old, loginuid, + sessionid, sid, allow_changes); if (rc) allow_changes = 0; } @@ -305,26 +307,28 @@ static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change, return rc; } -static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) +static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, + u32 sid) { return audit_do_config_change("audit_rate_limit", &audit_rate_limit, - limit, loginuid, sid); + limit, loginuid, sessionid, sid); } -static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) +static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, + u32 sid) { return audit_do_config_change("audit_backlog_limit", &audit_backlog_limit, - limit, loginuid, sid); + limit, loginuid, sessionid, sid); } -static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) +static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid) { int rc; if (state < AUDIT_OFF || state > AUDIT_LOCKED) return -EINVAL; rc = audit_do_config_change("audit_enabled", &audit_enabled, state, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); if (!rc) audit_ever_enabled |= !!state; @@ -332,7 +336,7 @@ static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) return rc; } -static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) +static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid) { if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK @@ -340,7 +344,7 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid) return -EINVAL; return audit_do_config_change("audit_failure", &audit_failure, state, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); } static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) @@ -385,7 +389,7 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) return 0; } -static int audit_prepare_user_tty(pid_t pid, uid_t loginuid) +static int audit_prepare_user_tty(pid_t pid, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid) { struct task_struct *tsk; int err; @@ -404,7 +408,7 @@ static int audit_prepare_user_tty(pid_t pid, uid_t loginuid) if (err) goto out; - tty_audit_push_task(tsk, loginuid); + tty_audit_push_task(tsk, loginuid, sessionid); out: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); return err; @@ -534,7 +538,8 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) } static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type, - u32 pid, u32 uid, uid_t auid, u32 sid) + u32 pid, u32 uid, uid_t auid, u32 ses, + u32 sid) { int rc = 0; char *ctx = NULL; @@ -546,8 +551,8 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type, } *ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type); - audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u", - pid, uid, auid); + audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", + pid, uid, auid, ses); if (sid) { rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); if (rc) @@ -570,6 +575,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) struct audit_buffer *ab; u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type; uid_t loginuid; /* loginuid of sender */ + u32 sessionid; struct audit_sig_info *sig_data; char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; @@ -591,6 +597,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) pid = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid; uid = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->uid; loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid; + sessionid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sessionid; sid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); @@ -613,12 +620,12 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) status_get = (struct audit_status *)data; if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) { err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); if (err < 0) return err; } if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE) { err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); if (err < 0) return err; } if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) { @@ -627,17 +634,17 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF) audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, loginuid, - sid, 1); + sessionid, sid, 1); audit_pid = new_pid; audit_nlk_pid = NETLINK_CB(skb).pid; } if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) err = audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT) err = audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: @@ -649,12 +656,13 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (err == 1) { err = 0; if (msg_type == AUDIT_USER_TTY) { - err = audit_prepare_user_tty(pid, loginuid); + err = audit_prepare_user_tty(pid, loginuid, + sessionid); if (err) break; } audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type, pid, uid, - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY) audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.1024s'", @@ -677,7 +685,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return -EINVAL; if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) { audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, pid, - uid, loginuid, sid); + uid, loginuid, sessionid, sid); audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0", audit_enabled); @@ -688,7 +696,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) case AUDIT_LIST: err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh), - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); break; case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: @@ -696,7 +704,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return -EINVAL; if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) { audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, pid, - uid, loginuid, sid); + uid, loginuid, sessionid, sid); audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0", audit_enabled); @@ -707,13 +715,13 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh), - loginuid, sid); + loginuid, sessionid, sid); break; case AUDIT_TRIM: audit_trim_trees(); audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, pid, - uid, loginuid, sid); + uid, loginuid, sessionid, sid); audit_log_format(ab, " op=trim res=1"); audit_log_end(ab); @@ -745,7 +753,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) err = audit_tag_tree(old, new); audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, pid, - uid, loginuid, sid); + uid, loginuid, sessionid, sid); audit_log_format(ab, " op=make_equiv old="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, old); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f3d357b092956959563398b59ef2fdd10aea387d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 10:02:28 -0400 Subject: Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back This patch causes the kernel audit subsystem to store up to audit_backlog_limit messages for use by auditd if it ever appears sometime in the future in userspace. This is useful to collect audit messages during bootup and even when auditd is stopped. This is NOT a reliable mechanism, it does not ever call audit_panic, nor should it. audit_log_lost()/audit_panic() are called during the normal delivery mechanism. The messages are still sent to printk/syslog as usual and if too many messages appear to be queued they will be silently discarded. I liked doing it by default, but this patch only uses the queue in question if it was booted with audit=1 or if the kernel was built enabling audit by default. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index ad6d1abfa1d2..fee9052eb5cf 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ static int audit_freelist_count; static LIST_HEAD(audit_freelist); static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue; +/* queue of skbs to send to auditd when/if it comes back */ +static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_hold_queue; static struct task_struct *kauditd_task; static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(kauditd_wait); static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait); @@ -347,30 +349,83 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid) loginuid, sessionid, sid); } +/* + * Queue skbs to be sent to auditd when/if it comes back. These skbs should + * already have been sent via prink/syslog and so if these messages are dropped + * it is not a huge concern since we already passed the audit_log_lost() + * notification and stuff. This is just nice to get audit messages during + * boot before auditd is running or messages generated while auditd is stopped. + * This only holds messages is audit_default is set, aka booting with audit=1 + * or building your kernel that way. + */ +static void audit_hold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + if (audit_default && + skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_hold_queue) < audit_backlog_limit) + skb_queue_tail(&audit_skb_hold_queue, skb); + else + kfree_skb(skb); +} + +static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int err; + /* take a reference in case we can't send it and we want to hold it */ + skb_get(skb); + err = netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, audit_nlk_pid, 0); + if (err < 0) { + BUG_ON(err != -ECONNREFUSED); /* Shoudn't happen */ + printk(KERN_ERR "audit: *NO* daemon at audit_pid=%d\n", audit_pid); + audit_log_lost("auditd dissapeared\n"); + audit_pid = 0; + /* we might get lucky and get this in the next auditd */ + audit_hold_skb(skb); + } else + /* drop the extra reference if sent ok */ + kfree_skb(skb); +} + static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) { struct sk_buff *skb; set_freezable(); while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + /* + * if auditd just started drain the queue of messages already + * sent to syslog/printk. remember loss here is ok. we already + * called audit_log_lost() if it didn't go out normally. so the + * race between the skb_dequeue and the next check for audit_pid + * doesn't matter. + * + * if you ever find kauditd to be too slow we can get a perf win + * by doing our own locking and keeping better track if there + * are messages in this queue. I don't see the need now, but + * in 5 years when I want to play with this again I'll see this + * note and still have no friggin idea what i'm thinking today. + */ + if (audit_default && audit_pid) { + skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_hold_queue); + if (unlikely(skb)) { + while (skb && audit_pid) { + kauditd_send_skb(skb); + skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_hold_queue); + } + } + } + skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_queue); wake_up(&audit_backlog_wait); if (skb) { - if (audit_pid) { - int err = netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, audit_nlk_pid, 0); - if (err < 0) { - BUG_ON(err != -ECONNREFUSED); /* Shoudn't happen */ - printk(KERN_ERR "audit: *NO* daemon at audit_pid=%d\n", audit_pid); - audit_log_lost("auditd dissapeared\n"); - audit_pid = 0; - } - } else { + if (audit_pid) + kauditd_send_skb(skb); + else { if (printk_ratelimit()) - printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s\n", skb->data + - NLMSG_SPACE(0)); + printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s\n", skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0)); else audit_log_lost("printk limit exceeded\n"); - kfree_skb(skb); + + audit_hold_skb(skb); } } else { DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); @@ -885,6 +940,7 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue); + skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_hold_queue); audit_initialized = 1; audit_enabled = audit_default; audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default; @@ -1363,19 +1419,23 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab) audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded"); } else { struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(ab->skb); + nlh->nlmsg_len = ab->skb->len - NLMSG_SPACE(0); + if (audit_pid) { - nlh->nlmsg_len = ab->skb->len - NLMSG_SPACE(0); skb_queue_tail(&audit_skb_queue, ab->skb); - ab->skb = NULL; wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait); - } else if (nlh->nlmsg_type != AUDIT_EOE) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) { - printk(KERN_NOTICE "type=%d %s\n", - nlh->nlmsg_type, - ab->skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0)); - } else - audit_log_lost("printk limit exceeded\n"); + } else { + if (nlh->nlmsg_type != AUDIT_EOE) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) { + printk(KERN_NOTICE "type=%d %s\n", + nlh->nlmsg_type, + ab->skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0)); + } else + audit_log_lost("printk limit exceeded\n"); + } + audit_hold_skb(ab->skb); } + ab->skb = NULL; } audit_buffer_free(ab); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f09ac9db2aafe36fde9ebd63c8c5d776f6e7bd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 10:11:04 -0400 Subject: Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load A deadlock is possible between kauditd and auditd under load if auditd receives a signal. When auditd receives a signal it sends a netlink message to the kernel asking for information about the sender of the signal. In that same context the audit system will attempt to send a netlink message back to the userspace auditd. If kauditd has already filled the socket buffer (see netlink_attachskb()) auditd will now put itself to sleep waiting for room to send the message. Since auditd is responsible for draining that socket we have a deadlock. The fix, since the response from the kernel does not need to be synchronous is to send the signal information back to auditd in a separate thread. And thus auditd can continue to drain the audit queue normally. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index fee9052eb5cf..520583d8ca18 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -156,6 +156,11 @@ struct audit_buffer { gfp_t gfp_mask; }; +struct audit_reply { + int pid; + struct sk_buff *skb; +}; + static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid) { if (ab) { @@ -528,6 +533,19 @@ nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */ return NULL; } +static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) +{ + struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg; + + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); + + /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, + because our timeout is set to infinite. */ + netlink_unicast(audit_sock, reply->skb, reply->pid, 0); + kfree(reply); + return 0; +} /** * audit_send_reply - send an audit reply message via netlink * @pid: process id to send reply to @@ -544,14 +562,26 @@ nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */ void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, void *payload, int size) { - struct sk_buff *skb; + struct sk_buff *skb; + struct task_struct *tsk; + struct audit_reply *reply = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_reply), + GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!reply) + return; + skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, type, done, multi, payload, size); if (!skb) return; - /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, - because our timeout is set to infinite. */ - netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, pid, 0); - return; + + reply->pid = pid; + reply->skb = skb; + + tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply"); + if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { + kfree(reply); + kfree_skb(skb); + } } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From b556f8ad58c6e9f8f485c8cef7546e3fc82c382a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 10:12:59 -0400 Subject: Audit: standardize string audit interfaces This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use: void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n); void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf); void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n); void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string); This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 19 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 520583d8ca18..5b9ad3dda885 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -757,8 +757,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) audit_log_format(ab, " msg="); size = nlmsg_len(nlh); - audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, size, - data); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, data, size); } audit_set_pid(ab, pid); audit_log_end(ab); @@ -1293,7 +1292,7 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) * This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb. */ -void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, +void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { int i, avail, new_len; @@ -1329,8 +1328,8 @@ void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, * Format a string of no more than slen characters into the audit buffer, * enclosed in quote marks. */ -static void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, size_t slen, - const char *string) +void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, + size_t slen) { int avail, new_len; unsigned char *ptr; @@ -1386,13 +1385,13 @@ int audit_string_contains_control(const char *string, size_t len) * The caller specifies the number of characters in the string to log, which may * or may not be the entire string. */ -void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, size_t len, - const char *string) +void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, + size_t len) { if (audit_string_contains_control(string, len)) - audit_log_hex(ab, string, len); + audit_log_n_hex(ab, string, len); else - audit_log_n_string(ab, len, string); + audit_log_n_string(ab, string, len); } /** @@ -1405,7 +1404,7 @@ void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, size_t len, */ void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string) { - audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, strlen(string), string); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, string, strlen(string)); } /* This is a helper-function to print the escaped d_path */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7719e437fac119e57b17588bab3a8e39ff9d22eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Harvey Harrison Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 02:39:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings Use msglen as the identifier. kernel/audit.c:724:10: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one kernel/audit.c:575:8: originally declared here Don't use ino_f to check the inode field at the end of the functions. kernel/auditfilter.c:429:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditfilter.c:420:21: originally declared here kernel/auditfilter.c:542:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditfilter.c:529:21: originally declared here i always used as a counter for a for loop and initialized to zero before use. Eliminate the inner i variables. kernel/auditsc.c:1295:8: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here kernel/auditsc.c:1320:7: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 5b9ad3dda885..f4799eb6977a 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -813,21 +813,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: { void *bufp = data; u32 sizes[2]; - size_t len = nlmsg_len(nlh); + size_t msglen = nlmsg_len(nlh); char *old, *new; err = -EINVAL; - if (len < 2 * sizeof(u32)) + if (msglen < 2 * sizeof(u32)) break; memcpy(sizes, bufp, 2 * sizeof(u32)); bufp += 2 * sizeof(u32); - len -= 2 * sizeof(u32); - old = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &len, sizes[0]); + msglen -= 2 * sizeof(u32); + old = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &msglen, sizes[0]); if (IS_ERR(old)) { err = PTR_ERR(old); break; } - new = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &len, sizes[1]); + new = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &msglen, sizes[1]); if (IS_ERR(new)) { err = PTR_ERR(new); kfree(old); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a761b8c1d7a3a4ee7ccf92ce255d986f601e067 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Emelyanov Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 13:30:15 -0700 Subject: [patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code The pid to lookup a task by is passed inside audit code via netlink message. Thanks to Denis Lunev, netlink packets are now (since 2.6.24) _always_ processed in the context of the sending task. So this is correct to lookup the task with find_task_by_vpid() here. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index f4799eb6977a..b7d3709cc452 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ static int audit_prepare_user_tty(pid_t pid, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid) int err; read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid); + tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid); err = -ESRCH; if (!tsk) goto out; @@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) struct task_struct *tsk; read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid); + tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!tsk) err = -ESRCH; else { @@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (s->enabled != 0 && s->enabled != 1) return -EINVAL; read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid); + tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!tsk) err = -ESRCH; else { -- cgit v1.2.3