From 50b8b6e75fa0c08cef1e1ed30a7ab91f05bcb779 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 14:29:27 -0700 Subject: net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages [ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby --- kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 50512d11a445..197a496587a6 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -593,13 +593,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) case AUDIT_TTY_SET: case AUDIT_TRIM: case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) err = -EPERM; break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) + if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) err = -EPERM; break; default: /* bad msg */ -- cgit v1.2.3