From 586c31f3bf04c290dc0a0de7fc91d20aa9a5ee53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 00:55:37 +0000 Subject: net: sctp: sctp_auth_key_put: use kzfree instead of kfree For sensitive data like keying material, it is common practice to zero out keys before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/auth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c index 159b9bc5d633..d8420ae614dc 100644 --- a/net/sctp/auth.c +++ b/net/sctp/auth.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ void sctp_auth_key_put(struct sctp_auth_bytes *key) return; if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->refcnt)) { - kfree(key); + kzfree(key); SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(keys); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 03:04:34 +0000 Subject: net: sctp: sctp_setsockopt_auth_key: use kzfree instead of kfree In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in sctp_auth_key_put(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 9e65758cb038..cedd9bf67b8c 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3390,7 +3390,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk, ret = sctp_auth_set_key(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, asoc, authkey); out: - kfree(authkey); + kzfree(authkey); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 03:04:35 +0000 Subject: net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 17a001bac2cc..1a9c5fb77310 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk); -- cgit v1.2.3