From 725f2865d4df31ac0768b13ae763beadc4bb8ce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Coffman Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2010 13:02:46 -0400 Subject: gss_krb5: Introduce encryption type framework Make the client and server code consistent regarding the extra buffer space made available for the auth code when wrapping data. Add some comments/documentation about the available buffer space in the xdr_buf head and tail when gss_wrap is called. Add a compile-time check to make sure we are not exceeding the available buffer space. Add a central function to shift head data. Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 2 +- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 6 ++---- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index c389ccf6437d..75602ece58eb 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static const struct rpc_credops gss_nullops; # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif -#define GSS_CRED_SLACK 1024 +#define GSS_CRED_SLACK (RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2) /* length of a krb5 verifier (48), plus data added before arguments when * using integrity (two 4-byte integers): */ #define GSS_VERF_SLACK 100 diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index e9b636176687..746b3e139aed 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -325,3 +325,41 @@ gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, return xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc); } + +/* + * This function makes the assumption that it was ultimately called + * from gss_wrap(). + * + * The client auth_gss code moves any existing tail data into a + * separate page before calling gss_wrap. + * The server svcauth_gss code ensures that both the head and the + * tail have slack space of RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE before calling gss_wrap. + * + * Even with that guarantee, this function may be called more than + * once in the processing of gss_wrap(). The best we can do is + * verify at compile-time (see GSS_KRB5_SLACK_CHECK) that the + * largest expected shift will fit within RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE. + * At run-time we can verify that a single invocation of this + * function doesn't attempt to use more the RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE. + */ + +int +xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, unsigned int shiftlen) +{ + u8 *p; + + if (shiftlen == 0) + return 0; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE); + BUG_ON(shiftlen > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE); + + p = buf->head[0].iov_base + base; + + memmove(p + shiftlen, p, buf->head[0].iov_len - base); + + buf->head[0].iov_len += shiftlen; + buf->len += shiftlen; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index a6e905637e03..496281fabb91 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -155,11 +155,9 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; /* shift data to make room for header. */ + xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen); + /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */ - /* XXX bounds checking, slack, etc. */ - memmove(ptr + headlen, ptr, buf->head[0].iov_len - offset); - buf->head[0].iov_len += headlen; - buf->len += headlen; BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, -- cgit v1.2.3