From 876c27314ce51fe7e7e2aeb24a6448da1a26c78f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 12:10:09 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: allow duplicate SDP expectations Callum Sinclair reported SIP IP Phone errors that he tracked down to such phones sending session descriptions for different media types but with same port numbers. The expect core will only 'refresh' existing expectation if it is from same master AND same expectation class (media type). As expectation class is different, we get an error. The SIP connection tracking code will then 1). drop the SDP packet 2). if an rtp expectation was already installed successfully, error on rtcp expectation will cancel the rtp one. Make the expect core report back to caller when the conflict is due to different expectation class and have SIP tracker ignore soft-error. Reported-by: Callum Sinclair Tested-by: Callum Sinclair Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 5 ++++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index 8ef21d9f9a00..4b2b3d53acfc 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static inline int expect_clash(const struct nf_conntrack_expect *a, static inline int expect_matches(const struct nf_conntrack_expect *a, const struct nf_conntrack_expect *b) { - return a->master == b->master && a->class == b->class && + return a->master == b->master && nf_ct_tuple_equal(&a->tuple, &b->tuple) && nf_ct_tuple_mask_equal(&a->mask, &b->mask) && net_eq(nf_ct_net(a->master), nf_ct_net(b->master)) && @@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ static inline int __nf_ct_expect_check(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect) h = nf_ct_expect_dst_hash(net, &expect->tuple); hlist_for_each_entry_safe(i, next, &nf_ct_expect_hash[h], hnode) { if (expect_matches(i, expect)) { + if (i->class != expect->class) + return -EALREADY; + if (nf_ct_remove_expect(i)) break; } else if (expect_clash(i, expect)) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c index 4dbb5bad4363..908e51e2dc2b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c @@ -938,11 +938,19 @@ static int set_expected_rtp_rtcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, datalen, rtp_exp, rtcp_exp, mediaoff, medialen, daddr); else { - if (nf_ct_expect_related(rtp_exp) == 0) { - if (nf_ct_expect_related(rtcp_exp) != 0) - nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp); - else + /* -EALREADY handling works around end-points that send + * SDP messages with identical port but different media type, + * we pretend expectation was set up. + */ + int errp = nf_ct_expect_related(rtp_exp); + + if (errp == 0 || errp == -EALREADY) { + int errcp = nf_ct_expect_related(rtcp_exp); + + if (errcp == 0 || errcp == -EALREADY) ret = NF_ACCEPT; + else if (errp == 0) + nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp); } } nf_ct_expect_put(rtcp_exp); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c64576a77894a50be80be0024bed27171b55989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Anastasov Date: Sat, 7 Apr 2018 15:50:47 +0300 Subject: ipvs: fix rtnl_lock lockups caused by start_sync_thread syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2] We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding: 1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally, sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA deadlock). 2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave the mcast group (sock_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> rtnl_lock) they hang. Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path, now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes. Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread. [1] IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ... WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 but task is already holding lock: IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ... (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000703f78e3>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431 lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643 inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595 start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261 udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x446a69 RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69 RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8 R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60 [2] IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4, id = 0 IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ... INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ #284 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. syz-executor7 D23688 25421 4408 0x00000004 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline] __schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440 schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499 schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline] __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline] wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline] wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139 kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530 stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253 sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x454889 RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889 RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001 Showing all locks held in the system: 2 locks held by khungtaskd/868: #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline] #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60 kernel/hung_task.c:249 #1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [<0000000037c2f8f9>] debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470 1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247: #0: (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [<000000000d8d6983>] __fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765 2 locks held by getty/4338: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4339: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4340: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4341: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4342: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4343: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4344: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494: #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084 #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000278427d5>] process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088 #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421: #0: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000d414a689>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393 2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000e6d48489>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e0b26cc997d5 ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 8 --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c index 5ebde4b15810..f36098887ad0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -2384,11 +2384,7 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len) strlcpy(cfg.mcast_ifn, dm->mcast_ifn, sizeof(cfg.mcast_ifn)); cfg.syncid = dm->syncid; - rtnl_lock(); - mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); ret = start_sync_thread(ipvs, &cfg, dm->state); - mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); - rtnl_unlock(); } else { mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); ret = stop_sync_thread(ipvs, dm->state); @@ -3481,12 +3477,8 @@ static int ip_vs_genl_new_daemon(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct nlattr **attrs) if (ipvs->mixed_address_family_dests > 0) return -EINVAL; - rtnl_lock(); - mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); ret = start_sync_thread(ipvs, &c, nla_get_u32(attrs[IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_STATE])); - mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); - rtnl_unlock(); return ret; } diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c index fbaf3bd05b2e..001501e25625 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* Used for ntoh_seq and hton_seq */ @@ -1360,15 +1361,9 @@ static void set_mcast_pmtudisc(struct sock *sk, int val) /* * Specifiy default interface for outgoing multicasts */ -static int set_mcast_if(struct sock *sk, char *ifname) +static int set_mcast_if(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev) { - struct net_device *dev; struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); - - dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev->ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if) return -EINVAL; @@ -1396,19 +1391,14 @@ static int set_mcast_if(struct sock *sk, char *ifname) * in the in_addr structure passed in as a parameter. */ static int -join_mcast_group(struct sock *sk, struct in_addr *addr, char *ifname) +join_mcast_group(struct sock *sk, struct in_addr *addr, struct net_device *dev) { - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct ip_mreqn mreq; - struct net_device *dev; int ret; memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq)); memcpy(&mreq.imr_multiaddr, addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); - dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev->ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if) return -EINVAL; @@ -1423,15 +1413,10 @@ join_mcast_group(struct sock *sk, struct in_addr *addr, char *ifname) #ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 static int join_mcast_group6(struct sock *sk, struct in6_addr *addr, - char *ifname) + struct net_device *dev) { - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); - struct net_device *dev; int ret; - dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev->ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if) return -EINVAL; @@ -1443,24 +1428,18 @@ static int join_mcast_group6(struct sock *sk, struct in6_addr *addr, } #endif -static int bind_mcastif_addr(struct socket *sock, char *ifname) +static int bind_mcastif_addr(struct socket *sock, struct net_device *dev) { - struct net *net = sock_net(sock->sk); - struct net_device *dev; __be32 addr; struct sockaddr_in sin; - dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; - addr = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE); if (!addr) pr_err("You probably need to specify IP address on " "multicast interface.\n"); IP_VS_DBG(7, "binding socket with (%s) %pI4\n", - ifname, &addr); + dev->name, &addr); /* Now bind the socket with the address of multicast interface */ sin.sin_family = AF_INET; @@ -1493,7 +1472,8 @@ static void get_mcast_sockaddr(union ipvs_sockaddr *sa, int *salen, /* * Set up sending multicast socket over UDP */ -static struct socket *make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id) +static int make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, + struct net_device *dev, struct socket **sock_ret) { /* multicast addr */ union ipvs_sockaddr mcast_addr; @@ -1505,9 +1485,10 @@ static struct socket *make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id) IPPROTO_UDP, &sock); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error during creation of socket; terminating\n"); - return ERR_PTR(result); + goto error; } - result = set_mcast_if(sock->sk, ipvs->mcfg.mcast_ifn); + *sock_ret = sock; + result = set_mcast_if(sock->sk, dev); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error setting outbound mcast interface\n"); goto error; @@ -1522,7 +1503,7 @@ static struct socket *make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id) set_sock_size(sock->sk, 1, result); if (AF_INET == ipvs->mcfg.mcast_af) - result = bind_mcastif_addr(sock, ipvs->mcfg.mcast_ifn); + result = bind_mcastif_addr(sock, dev); else result = 0; if (result < 0) { @@ -1538,19 +1519,18 @@ static struct socket *make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id) goto error; } - return sock; + return 0; error: - sock_release(sock); - return ERR_PTR(result); + return result; } /* * Set up receiving multicast socket over UDP */ -static struct socket *make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, - int ifindex) +static int make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, + struct net_device *dev, struct socket **sock_ret) { /* multicast addr */ union ipvs_sockaddr mcast_addr; @@ -1562,8 +1542,9 @@ static struct socket *make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, IPPROTO_UDP, &sock); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error during creation of socket; terminating\n"); - return ERR_PTR(result); + goto error; } + *sock_ret = sock; /* it is equivalent to the REUSEADDR option in user-space */ sock->sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE; result = sysctl_sync_sock_size(ipvs); @@ -1571,7 +1552,7 @@ static struct socket *make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, set_sock_size(sock->sk, 0, result); get_mcast_sockaddr(&mcast_addr, &salen, &ipvs->bcfg, id); - sock->sk->sk_bound_dev_if = ifindex; + sock->sk->sk_bound_dev_if = dev->ifindex; result = sock->ops->bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&mcast_addr, salen); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error binding to the multicast addr\n"); @@ -1582,21 +1563,20 @@ static struct socket *make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, #ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 if (ipvs->bcfg.mcast_af == AF_INET6) result = join_mcast_group6(sock->sk, &mcast_addr.in6.sin6_addr, - ipvs->bcfg.mcast_ifn); + dev); else #endif result = join_mcast_group(sock->sk, &mcast_addr.in.sin_addr, - ipvs->bcfg.mcast_ifn); + dev); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error joining to the multicast group\n"); goto error; } - return sock; + return 0; error: - sock_release(sock); - return ERR_PTR(result); + return result; } @@ -1778,13 +1758,12 @@ static int sync_thread_backup(void *data) int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, int state) { - struct ip_vs_sync_thread_data *tinfo; + struct ip_vs_sync_thread_data *tinfo = NULL; struct task_struct **array = NULL, *task; - struct socket *sock; struct net_device *dev; char *name; int (*threadfn)(void *data); - int id, count, hlen; + int id = 0, count, hlen; int result = -ENOMEM; u16 mtu, min_mtu; @@ -1792,6 +1771,18 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, IP_VS_DBG(7, "Each ip_vs_sync_conn entry needs %zd bytes\n", sizeof(struct ip_vs_sync_conn_v0)); + /* Do not hold one mutex and then to block on another */ + for (;;) { + rtnl_lock(); + if (mutex_trylock(&ipvs->sync_mutex)) + break; + rtnl_unlock(); + mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + if (rtnl_trylock()) + break; + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + } + if (!ipvs->sync_state) { count = clamp(sysctl_sync_ports(ipvs), 1, IPVS_SYNC_PORTS_MAX); ipvs->threads_mask = count - 1; @@ -1810,7 +1801,8 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, dev = __dev_get_by_name(ipvs->net, c->mcast_ifn); if (!dev) { pr_err("Unknown mcast interface: %s\n", c->mcast_ifn); - return -ENODEV; + result = -ENODEV; + goto out_early; } hlen = (AF_INET6 == c->mcast_af) ? sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + sizeof(struct udphdr) : @@ -1827,26 +1819,30 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, c->sync_maxlen = mtu - hlen; if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) { + result = -EEXIST; if (ipvs->ms) - return -EEXIST; + goto out_early; ipvs->mcfg = *c; name = "ipvs-m:%d:%d"; threadfn = sync_thread_master; } else if (state == IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) { + result = -EEXIST; if (ipvs->backup_threads) - return -EEXIST; + goto out_early; ipvs->bcfg = *c; name = "ipvs-b:%d:%d"; threadfn = sync_thread_backup; } else { - return -EINVAL; + result = -EINVAL; + goto out_early; } if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) { struct ipvs_master_sync_state *ms; + result = -ENOMEM; ipvs->ms = kcalloc(count, sizeof(ipvs->ms[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ipvs->ms) goto out; @@ -1862,39 +1858,38 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, } else { array = kcalloc(count, sizeof(struct task_struct *), GFP_KERNEL); + result = -ENOMEM; if (!array) goto out; } - tinfo = NULL; for (id = 0; id < count; id++) { - if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) - sock = make_send_sock(ipvs, id); - else - sock = make_receive_sock(ipvs, id, dev->ifindex); - if (IS_ERR(sock)) { - result = PTR_ERR(sock); - goto outtinfo; - } + result = -ENOMEM; tinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*tinfo), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tinfo) - goto outsocket; + goto out; tinfo->ipvs = ipvs; - tinfo->sock = sock; + tinfo->sock = NULL; if (state == IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) { tinfo->buf = kmalloc(ipvs->bcfg.sync_maxlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!tinfo->buf) - goto outtinfo; + goto out; } else { tinfo->buf = NULL; } tinfo->id = id; + if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) + result = make_send_sock(ipvs, id, dev, &tinfo->sock); + else + result = make_receive_sock(ipvs, id, dev, &tinfo->sock); + if (result < 0) + goto out; task = kthread_run(threadfn, tinfo, name, ipvs->gen, id); if (IS_ERR(task)) { result = PTR_ERR(task); - goto outtinfo; + goto out; } tinfo = NULL; if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) @@ -1911,20 +1906,20 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, ipvs->sync_state |= state; spin_unlock_bh(&ipvs->sync_buff_lock); + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + rtnl_unlock(); + /* increase the module use count */ ip_vs_use_count_inc(); return 0; -outsocket: - sock_release(sock); - -outtinfo: - if (tinfo) { - sock_release(tinfo->sock); - kfree(tinfo->buf); - kfree(tinfo); - } +out: + /* We do not need RTNL lock anymore, release it here so that + * sock_release below and in the kthreads can use rtnl_lock + * to leave the mcast group. + */ + rtnl_unlock(); count = id; while (count-- > 0) { if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) @@ -1932,13 +1927,23 @@ outtinfo: else kthread_stop(array[count]); } - kfree(array); - -out: if (!(ipvs->sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_MASTER)) { kfree(ipvs->ms); ipvs->ms = NULL; } + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + if (tinfo) { + if (tinfo->sock) + sock_release(tinfo->sock); + kfree(tinfo->buf); + kfree(tinfo); + } + kfree(array); + return result; + +out_early: + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + rtnl_unlock(); return result; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f1e53abff84cf40b1adb3455d480dd295bf42e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 21:13:30 +0200 Subject: netfilter: ebtables: don't attempt to allocate 0-sized compat array Dmitry reports 32bit ebtables on 64bit kernel got broken by a recent change that returns -EINVAL when ruleset has no entries. ebtables however only counts user-defined chains, so for the initial table nentries will be 0. Don't try to allocate the compat array in this case, as no user defined rules exist no rule will need 64bit translation. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Fixes: 7d7d7e02111e9 ("netfilter: compat: reject huge allocation requests") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 032e0fe45940..28a4c3490359 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -1825,13 +1825,14 @@ static int compat_table_info(const struct ebt_table_info *info, { unsigned int size = info->entries_size; const void *entries = info->entries; - int ret; newinfo->entries_size = size; - - ret = xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, info->nentries); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (info->nentries) { + int ret = xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, + info->nentries); + if (ret) + return ret; + } return EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entries, size, compat_calc_entry, info, entries, newinfo); -- cgit v1.2.3 From cf43ae63c024971e6df94665e829c01c22202a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Ma Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 15:45:16 +1200 Subject: netfilter: xt_connmark: Add bit mapping for bit-shift operation. With the addition of bit-shift operations, we are able to shift ct/skbmark based on user requirements. However, this change might also cause the most left/right hand- side mark to be accidentially lost during shift operations. This patch adds the ability to 'grep' certain bits based on ctmask or nfmask out of the original mark. Then, apply shift operations to achieve a new mapping between ctmark and skb->mark. For example: If someone would like save the fourth F bits of ctmark 0xFFF(F)000F into the seventh hexadecimal (0) skb->mark 0xABC000(0)E. new_targetmark = (ctmark & ctmask) >> 12; (new) skb->mark = (skb->mark &~nfmask) ^ new_targetmark; This will preserve the other bits that are not related to this operation. Fixes: 472a73e00757 ("netfilter: xt_conntrack: Support bit-shifting for CONNMARK & MARK targets.") Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Jack Ma Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c b/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c index 773da82190dc..4b424e6caf3e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 shift_bits, u8 shift_dir) { enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + u_int32_t new_targetmark; struct nf_conn *ct; u_int32_t newmark; @@ -61,24 +62,26 @@ connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, } break; case XT_CONNMARK_SAVE: - newmark = (ct->mark & ~info->ctmask) ^ - (skb->mark & info->nfmask); + new_targetmark = (skb->mark & info->nfmask); if (shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) - newmark >>= shift_bits; + new_targetmark >>= shift_bits; else - newmark <<= shift_bits; + new_targetmark <<= shift_bits; + newmark = (ct->mark & ~info->ctmask) ^ + new_targetmark; if (ct->mark != newmark) { ct->mark = newmark; nf_conntrack_event_cache(IPCT_MARK, ct); } break; case XT_CONNMARK_RESTORE: - newmark = (skb->mark & ~info->nfmask) ^ - (ct->mark & info->ctmask); + new_targetmark = (ct->mark & info->ctmask); if (shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) - newmark >>= shift_bits; + new_targetmark >>= shift_bits; else - newmark <<= shift_bits; + new_targetmark <<= shift_bits; + newmark = (skb->mark & ~info->nfmask) ^ + new_targetmark; skb->mark = newmark; break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b16520f7493d06d8ef6d4255bdfcf7a803d7874a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 17:52:34 -0700 Subject: net/tls: Remove VLA usage In the quest to remove VLAs from the kernel[1], this replaces the VLA size with the only possible size used in the code, and adds a mechanism to double-check future IV sizes. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Dave Watson Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 4dc766b03f00..71e79597f940 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ #include #include +#define MAX_IV_SIZE TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE + static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sgin, struct scatterlist *sgout, @@ -673,7 +675,7 @@ static int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, { struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx); - char iv[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE + tls_ctx->rx.iv_size]; + char iv[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE]; struct scatterlist sgin_arr[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2]; struct scatterlist *sgin = &sgin_arr[0]; struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); @@ -1094,6 +1096,12 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx) goto free_priv; } + /* Sanity-check the IV size for stack allocations. */ + if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto free_priv; + } + cctx->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size; cctx->tag_size = tag_size; cctx->overhead_size = cctx->prepend_size + cctx->tag_size; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c3317f4db831b7564ff8d1670326456a7fbbbcb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 22:52:09 +0200 Subject: tipc: fix unbalanced reference counter When a topology subscription is created, we may encounter (or KASAN may provoke) a failure to create a corresponding service instance in the binding table. Instead of letting the tipc_nametbl_subscribe() report the failure back to the caller, the function just makes a warning printout and returns, without incrementing the subscription reference counter as expected by the caller. This makes the caller believe that the subscription was successful, so it will at a later moment try to unsubscribe the item. This involves a sub_put() call. Since the reference counter never was incremented in the first place, we get a premature delete of the subscription item, followed by a "use-after-free" warning. We fix this by adding a return value to tipc_nametbl_subscribe() and make the caller aware of the failure to subscribe. This bug seems to always have been around, but this fix only applies back to the commit shown below. Given the low risk of this happening we believe this to be sufficient. Fixes: commit 218527fe27ad ("tipc: replace name table service range array with rb tree") Reported-by: syzbot+aa245f26d42b8305d157@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/name_table.c | 5 ++++- net/tipc/name_table.h | 2 +- net/tipc/subscr.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/name_table.c b/net/tipc/name_table.c index b1fe20972aa9..4068eaad61a6 100644 --- a/net/tipc/name_table.c +++ b/net/tipc/name_table.c @@ -665,13 +665,14 @@ int tipc_nametbl_withdraw(struct net *net, u32 type, u32 lower, /** * tipc_nametbl_subscribe - add a subscription object to the name table */ -void tipc_nametbl_subscribe(struct tipc_subscription *sub) +bool tipc_nametbl_subscribe(struct tipc_subscription *sub) { struct name_table *nt = tipc_name_table(sub->net); struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(sub->net); struct tipc_subscr *s = &sub->evt.s; u32 type = tipc_sub_read(s, seq.type); struct tipc_service *sc; + bool res = true; spin_lock_bh(&tn->nametbl_lock); sc = tipc_service_find(sub->net, type); @@ -685,8 +686,10 @@ void tipc_nametbl_subscribe(struct tipc_subscription *sub) pr_warn("Failed to subscribe for {%u,%u,%u}\n", type, tipc_sub_read(s, seq.lower), tipc_sub_read(s, seq.upper)); + res = false; } spin_unlock_bh(&tn->nametbl_lock); + return res; } /** diff --git a/net/tipc/name_table.h b/net/tipc/name_table.h index 4b14fc28d9e2..0febba41da86 100644 --- a/net/tipc/name_table.h +++ b/net/tipc/name_table.h @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct publication *tipc_nametbl_insert_publ(struct net *net, u32 type, struct publication *tipc_nametbl_remove_publ(struct net *net, u32 type, u32 lower, u32 upper, u32 node, u32 key); -void tipc_nametbl_subscribe(struct tipc_subscription *s); +bool tipc_nametbl_subscribe(struct tipc_subscription *s); void tipc_nametbl_unsubscribe(struct tipc_subscription *s); int tipc_nametbl_init(struct net *net); void tipc_nametbl_stop(struct net *net); diff --git a/net/tipc/subscr.c b/net/tipc/subscr.c index b7d80bc5f4ab..f340e53da625 100644 --- a/net/tipc/subscr.c +++ b/net/tipc/subscr.c @@ -153,7 +153,10 @@ struct tipc_subscription *tipc_sub_subscribe(struct net *net, memcpy(&sub->evt.s, s, sizeof(*s)); spin_lock_init(&sub->lock); kref_init(&sub->kref); - tipc_nametbl_subscribe(sub); + if (!tipc_nametbl_subscribe(sub)) { + kfree(sub); + return NULL; + } timer_setup(&sub->timer, tipc_sub_timeout, 0); timeout = tipc_sub_read(&sub->evt.s, timeout); if (timeout != TIPC_WAIT_FOREVER) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7212303268918b9a203aebeacfdbd83b5e87b20d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 14:36:28 -0700 Subject: tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in tcp_parse_options() [1] I believe this was caused by a TCP_MD5SIG being set on live flow. This is highly unexpected, since TCP option space is limited. For instance, presence of TCP MD5 option automatically disables TCP TimeStamp option at SYN/SYNACK time, which we can not do once flow has been established. Really, adding/deleting an MD5 key only makes sense on sockets in CLOSE or LISTEN state. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_parse_options+0xd74/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3720 CPU: 1 PID: 6177 Comm: syzkaller192004 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 tcp_parse_options+0xd74/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3720 tcp_fast_parse_options net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3858 [inline] tcp_validate_incoming+0x4f1/0x2790 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5184 tcp_rcv_established+0xf60/0x2bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5453 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x6cd/0xd90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1469 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_sendmsg+0xd6/0x100 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1464 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x448fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fd472c64d38 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e5a30 RCX: 0000000000448fe9 RDX: 000000000000029f RSI: 0000000020a88f88 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000006e5a34 R08: 0000000020e68000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000200007fd R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fff074899ef R14: 00007fd472c659c0 R15: 0000000000000009 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline] tcp_send_ack+0x18c/0x910 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3624 __tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5040 [inline] tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5053 [inline] tcp_rcv_established+0x2103/0x2bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5469 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x6cd/0xd90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1469 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_sendmsg+0xd6/0x100 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1464 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Fixes: cfb6eeb4c860 ("[TCP]: MD5 Signature Option (RFC2385) support.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index bccc4c270087..4fa3f812b9ff 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2813,8 +2813,10 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG case TCP_MD5SIG: case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT: - /* Read the IP->Key mappings from userspace */ - err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen); + if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)) + err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen); + else + err = -EINVAL; break; #endif case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7dd07c143a4b54d050e748bee4b4b9e94a7b1744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 14:46:00 -0700 Subject: net: validate attribute sizes in neigh_dump_table() Since neigh_dump_table() calls nlmsg_parse() without giving policy constraints, attributes can have arbirary size that we must validate Reported by syzbot/KMSAN : BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in neigh_master_filtered net/core/neighbour.c:2292 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in neigh_dump_table net/core/neighbour.c:2348 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in neigh_dump_info+0x1af0/0x2250 net/core/neighbour.c:2438 CPU: 1 PID: 3575 Comm: syzkaller268891 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 neigh_master_filtered net/core/neighbour.c:2292 [inline] neigh_dump_table net/core/neighbour.c:2348 [inline] neigh_dump_info+0x1af0/0x2250 net/core/neighbour.c:2438 netlink_dump+0x9ad/0x1540 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2225 __netlink_dump_start+0x1167/0x12a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2322 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:214 [inline] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1435/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4598 netlink_rcv_skb+0x355/0x5f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2447 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4653 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1311 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x1672/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1337 netlink_sendmsg+0x1048/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091 SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x43fed9 RSP: 002b:00007ffddbee2798 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fed9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401800 R13: 0000000000401890 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1183 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0x9a6/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1875 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091 SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Fixes: 21fdd092acc7 ("net: Add support for filtering neigh dump by master device") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: David Ahern Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/neighbour.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 7b7a14abba28..a8bc02bb339f 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -2323,12 +2323,16 @@ static int neigh_dump_table(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct sk_buff *skb, err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct ndmsg), tb, NDA_MAX, NULL, NULL); if (!err) { - if (tb[NDA_IFINDEX]) + if (tb[NDA_IFINDEX]) { + if (nla_len(tb[NDA_IFINDEX]) != sizeof(u32)) + return -EINVAL; filter_idx = nla_get_u32(tb[NDA_IFINDEX]); - - if (tb[NDA_MASTER]) + } + if (tb[NDA_MASTER]) { + if (nla_len(tb[NDA_MASTER]) != sizeof(u32)) + return -EINVAL; filter_master_idx = nla_get_u32(tb[NDA_MASTER]); - + } if (filter_idx || filter_master_idx) flags |= NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9d0c75bf6e03d9bf80c55b0f677dc9b982958fd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Doron Roberts-Kedes Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 15:05:16 -0700 Subject: strparser: Fix incorrect strp->need_bytes value. strp_data_ready resets strp->need_bytes to 0 if strp_peek_len indicates that the remainder of the message has been received. However, do_strp_work does not reset strp->need_bytes to 0. If do_strp_work completes a partial message, the value of strp->need_bytes will continue to reflect the needed bytes of the previous message, causing future invocations of strp_data_ready to return early if strp->need_bytes is less than strp_peek_len. Resetting strp->need_bytes to 0 in __strp_recv on handing a full message to the upper layer solves this problem. __strp_recv also calculates strp->need_bytes using stm->accum_len before stm->accum_len has been incremented by cand_len. This can cause strp->need_bytes to be equal to the full length of the message instead of the full length minus the accumulated length. This, in turn, causes strp_data_ready to return early, even when there is sufficient data to complete the partial message. Incrementing stm->accum_len before using it to calculate strp->need_bytes solves this problem. Found while testing net/tls_sw recv path. Fixes: 43a0c6751a322847 ("strparser: Stream parser for messages") Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/strparser/strparser.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c index b9283ce5cd85..805b139756db 100644 --- a/net/strparser/strparser.c +++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c @@ -296,9 +296,9 @@ static int __strp_recv(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *orig_skb, strp_start_timer(strp, timeo); } + stm->accum_len += cand_len; strp->need_bytes = stm->strp.full_len - stm->accum_len; - stm->accum_len += cand_len; stm->early_eaten = cand_len; STRP_STATS_ADD(strp->stats.bytes, cand_len); desc->count = 0; /* Stop reading socket */ @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static int __strp_recv(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *orig_skb, /* Hurray, we have a new message! */ cancel_delayed_work(&strp->msg_timer_work); strp->skb_head = NULL; + strp->need_bytes = 0; STRP_STATS_INCR(strp->stats.msgs); /* Give skb to upper layer */ @@ -410,9 +411,7 @@ void strp_data_ready(struct strparser *strp) return; if (strp->need_bytes) { - if (strp_peek_len(strp) >= strp->need_bytes) - strp->need_bytes = 0; - else + if (strp_peek_len(strp) < strp->need_bytes) return; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 335b929b28aeb5bfc0698adb21deaf685b2982d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 01:15:48 +0200 Subject: tipc: fix missing initializer in tipc_sendmsg() The stack variable 'dnode' in __tipc_sendmsg() may theoretically end up tipc_node_get_mtu() as an unitilalized variable. We fix this by intializing the variable at declaration. We also add a default else clause to the two conditional ones already there, so that we never end up in the named function if the given address type is illegal. Reported-by: syzbot+b0975ce9355b347c1546@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/socket.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c index 1fd1c8b5ce03..252a52ae0893 100644 --- a/net/tipc/socket.c +++ b/net/tipc/socket.c @@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ static int __tipc_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t dlen) struct tipc_msg *hdr = &tsk->phdr; struct tipc_name_seq *seq; struct sk_buff_head pkts; - u32 dnode, dport; + u32 dport, dnode = 0; u32 type, inst; int mtu, rc; @@ -1348,6 +1348,8 @@ static int __tipc_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t dlen) msg_set_destnode(hdr, dnode); msg_set_destport(hdr, dest->addr.id.ref); msg_set_hdr_sz(hdr, BASIC_H_SIZE); + } else { + return -EINVAL; } /* Block or return if destination link is congested */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1071ec9d453a38023579714b64a951a2fb982071 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 14:24:31 +0800 Subject: sctp: do not check port in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr pf->cmp_addr() is called before binding a v6 address to the sock. It should not check ports, like in sctp_inet_cmp_addr. But sctp_inet6_cmp_addr checks the addr by invoking af(6)->cmp_addr, sctp_v6_cmp_addr where it also compares the ports. This would cause that setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD) could bind multiple duplicated IPv6 addresses after Commit 40b4f0fd74e4 ("sctp: lack the check for ports in sctp_v6_cmp_addr"). This patch is to remove af->cmp_addr called in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr, but do the proper check for both v6 addrs and v4mapped addrs. v1->v2: - define __sctp_v6_cmp_addr to do the common address comparison used for both pf and af v6 cmp_addr. Fixes: 40b4f0fd74e4 ("sctp: lack the check for ports in sctp_v6_cmp_addr") Reported-by: Jianwen Ji Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c index 31083b5035ec..2e3f7b75a8ec 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c @@ -556,46 +556,49 @@ static void sctp_v6_to_addr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct in6_addr *saddr, addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0; } -/* Compare addresses exactly. - * v4-mapped-v6 is also in consideration. - */ -static int sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1, - const union sctp_addr *addr2) +static int __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1, + const union sctp_addr *addr2) { if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family) { if (addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 && - ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr2->v6.sin6_addr)) { - if (addr2->v6.sin6_port == addr1->v4.sin_port && - addr2->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] == - addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) - return 1; - } + ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr2->v6.sin6_addr) && + addr2->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] == + addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) + return 1; + if (addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 && - ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr)) { - if (addr1->v6.sin6_port == addr2->v4.sin_port && - addr1->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] == - addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) - return 1; - } + ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) && + addr1->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] == + addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) + return 1; + return 0; } - if (addr1->v6.sin6_port != addr2->v6.sin6_port) - return 0; + if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr, &addr2->v6.sin6_addr)) return 0; + /* If this is a linklocal address, compare the scope_id. */ - if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) { - if (addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id && addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id && - (addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id != addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id)) { - return 0; - } - } + if ((ipv6_addr_type(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) && + addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id && addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id && + addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id != addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id) + return 0; return 1; } +/* Compare addresses exactly. + * v4-mapped-v6 is also in consideration. + */ +static int sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1, + const union sctp_addr *addr2) +{ + return __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(addr1, addr2) && + addr1->v6.sin6_port == addr2->v6.sin6_port; +} + /* Initialize addr struct to INADDR_ANY. */ static void sctp_v6_inaddr_any(union sctp_addr *addr, __be16 port) { @@ -875,8 +878,8 @@ static int sctp_inet6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1, const union sctp_addr *addr2, struct sctp_sock *opt) { - struct sctp_af *af1, *af2; struct sock *sk = sctp_opt2sk(opt); + struct sctp_af *af1, *af2; af1 = sctp_get_af_specific(addr1->sa.sa_family); af2 = sctp_get_af_specific(addr2->sa.sa_family); @@ -892,10 +895,7 @@ static int sctp_inet6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1, if (sctp_is_any(sk, addr1) || sctp_is_any(sk, addr2)) return 1; - if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family) - return 0; - - return af1->cmp_addr(addr1, addr2); + return __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(addr1, addr2); } /* Verify that the provided sockaddr looks bindable. Common verification, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 53b76cdf7e8fecec1d09e38aad2f8579882591a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wolfgang Bumiller Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 10:46:55 +0200 Subject: net: fix deadlock while clearing neighbor proxy table When coming from ndisc_netdev_event() in net/ipv6/ndisc.c, neigh_ifdown() is called with &nd_tbl, locking this while clearing the proxy neighbor entries when eg. deleting an interface. Calling the table's pndisc_destructor() with the lock still held, however, can cause a deadlock: When a multicast listener is available an IGMP packet of type ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION may be sent out. When reaching ip6_finish_output2(), if no neighbor entry for the target address is found, __neigh_create() is called with &nd_tbl, which it'll want to lock. Move the elements into their own list, then unlock the table and perform the destruction. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199289 Fixes: 6fd6ce2056de ("ipv6: Do not depend on rt->n in ip6_finish_output2().") Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/neighbour.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index a8bc02bb339f..ce519861be59 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ static void neigh_timer_handler(struct timer_list *t); static void __neigh_notify(struct neighbour *n, int type, int flags, u32 pid); static void neigh_update_notify(struct neighbour *neigh, u32 nlmsg_pid); -static int pneigh_ifdown(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev); +static int pneigh_ifdown_and_unlock(struct neigh_table *tbl, + struct net_device *dev); #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS static const struct file_operations neigh_stat_seq_fops; @@ -291,8 +292,7 @@ int neigh_ifdown(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev) { write_lock_bh(&tbl->lock); neigh_flush_dev(tbl, dev); - pneigh_ifdown(tbl, dev); - write_unlock_bh(&tbl->lock); + pneigh_ifdown_and_unlock(tbl, dev); del_timer_sync(&tbl->proxy_timer); pneigh_queue_purge(&tbl->proxy_queue); @@ -681,9 +681,10 @@ int pneigh_delete(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net *net, const void *pkey, return -ENOENT; } -static int pneigh_ifdown(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev) +static int pneigh_ifdown_and_unlock(struct neigh_table *tbl, + struct net_device *dev) { - struct pneigh_entry *n, **np; + struct pneigh_entry *n, **np, *freelist = NULL; u32 h; for (h = 0; h <= PNEIGH_HASHMASK; h++) { @@ -691,16 +692,23 @@ static int pneigh_ifdown(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev) while ((n = *np) != NULL) { if (!dev || n->dev == dev) { *np = n->next; - if (tbl->pdestructor) - tbl->pdestructor(n); - if (n->dev) - dev_put(n->dev); - kfree(n); + n->next = freelist; + freelist = n; continue; } np = &n->next; } } + write_unlock_bh(&tbl->lock); + while ((n = freelist)) { + freelist = n->next; + n->next = NULL; + if (tbl->pdestructor) + tbl->pdestructor(n); + if (n->dev) + dev_put(n->dev); + kfree(n); + } return -ENOENT; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5846c131c39b6d0add36ec19dc8650700690f930 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 20:50:33 +0200 Subject: l2tp: hold reference on tunnels in netlink dumps l2tp_tunnel_find_nth() is unsafe: no reference is held on the returned tunnel, therefore it can be freed whenever the caller uses it. This patch defines l2tp_tunnel_get_nth() which works similarly, but also takes a reference on the returned tunnel. The caller then has to drop it after it stops using the tunnel. Convert netlink dumps to make them safe against concurrent tunnel deletion. Fixes: 309795f4bec2 ("l2tp: Add netlink control API for L2TP") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 2 ++ net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c | 11 ++++++++--- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 0fbd3ee26165..c8c4183f0f37 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -183,6 +183,26 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get(const struct net *net, u32 tunnel_id) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_get); +struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(const struct net *net, int nth) +{ + const struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(net); + struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel; + int count = 0; + + rcu_read_lock_bh(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) { + if (++count > nth) { + l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(tunnel); + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + return tunnel; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_get_nth); + /* Lookup a session. A new reference is held on the returned session. */ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get(const struct net *net, struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h index ba33cbec71eb..e4896413b2b6 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h @@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ static inline void *l2tp_session_priv(struct l2tp_session *session) } struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get(const struct net *net, u32 tunnel_id); +struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(const struct net *net, int nth); + void l2tp_tunnel_free(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel); struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get(const struct net *net, diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c index b05dbd9ffcb2..6616c9fd292f 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c @@ -487,14 +487,17 @@ static int l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); for (;;) { - tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(net, ti); + tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(net, ti); if (tunnel == NULL) goto out; if (l2tp_nl_tunnel_send(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI, - tunnel, L2TP_CMD_TUNNEL_GET) < 0) + tunnel, L2TP_CMD_TUNNEL_GET) < 0) { + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(tunnel); goto out; + } + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(tunnel); ti++; } @@ -848,7 +851,7 @@ static int l2tp_nl_cmd_session_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback for (;;) { if (tunnel == NULL) { - tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(net, ti); + tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(net, ti); if (tunnel == NULL) goto out; } @@ -856,6 +859,7 @@ static int l2tp_nl_cmd_session_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback session = l2tp_session_get_nth(tunnel, si); if (session == NULL) { ti++; + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(tunnel); tunnel = NULL; si = 0; continue; @@ -865,6 +869,7 @@ static int l2tp_nl_cmd_session_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI, session, L2TP_CMD_SESSION_GET) < 0) { l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session); + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(tunnel); break; } l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0e0c3fee3a59a387aeecc4fca6f3a2e9615a5443 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 20:50:34 +0200 Subject: l2tp: hold reference on tunnels printed in pppol2tp proc file Use l2tp_tunnel_get_nth() instead of l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(), to be safe against concurrent tunnel deletion. Unlike sessions, we can't drop the reference held on tunnels in pppol2tp_seq_show(). Tunnels are reused across several calls to pppol2tp_seq_start() when iterating over sessions. These iterations need the tunnel for accessing the next session. Therefore the only safe moment for dropping the reference is just before searching for the next tunnel. Normally, the last invocation of pppol2tp_next_tunnel() doesn't find any new tunnel, so it drops the last tunnel without taking any new reference. However, in case of error, pppol2tp_seq_stop() is called directly, so we have to drop the reference there. Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 896bbca9bdaa..7d0c963680e6 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1551,16 +1551,19 @@ struct pppol2tp_seq_data { static void pppol2tp_next_tunnel(struct net *net, struct pppol2tp_seq_data *pd) { + /* Drop reference taken during previous invocation */ + if (pd->tunnel) + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); + for (;;) { - pd->tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(net, pd->tunnel_idx); + pd->tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(net, pd->tunnel_idx); pd->tunnel_idx++; - if (pd->tunnel == NULL) - break; + /* Only accept L2TPv2 tunnels */ + if (!pd->tunnel || pd->tunnel->version == 2) + return; - /* Ignore L2TPv3 tunnels */ - if (pd->tunnel->version < 3) - break; + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); } } @@ -1609,7 +1612,14 @@ static void *pppol2tp_seq_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) static void pppol2tp_seq_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) { - /* nothing to do */ + struct pppol2tp_seq_data *pd = v; + + if (!pd || pd == SEQ_START_TOKEN) + return; + + /* Drop reference taken by last invocation of pppol2tp_next_tunnel() */ + if (pd->tunnel) + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); } static void pppol2tp_seq_tunnel_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) -- cgit v1.2.3 From f726214d9b23e5fce8c11937577a289a3202498f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 20:50:35 +0200 Subject: l2tp: hold reference on tunnels printed in l2tp/tunnels debugfs file Use l2tp_tunnel_get_nth() instead of l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(), to be safe against concurrent tunnel deletion. Use the same mechanism as in l2tp_ppp.c for dropping the reference taken by l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(). That is, drop the reference just before looking up the next tunnel. In case of error, drop the last accessed tunnel in l2tp_dfs_seq_stop(). That was the last use of l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(). Fixes: 0ad6614048cf ("l2tp: Add debugfs files for dumping l2tp debug info") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 20 -------------------- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 1 - net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index c8c4183f0f37..40261cb68e83 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -355,26 +355,6 @@ err_tlock: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_register); -struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(const struct net *net, int nth) -{ - struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(net); - struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel; - int count = 0; - - rcu_read_lock_bh(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) { - if (++count > nth) { - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - return tunnel; - } - } - - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - - return NULL; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_find_nth); - /***************************************************************************** * Receive data handling *****************************************************************************/ diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h index e4896413b2b6..c199020f8a8a 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h @@ -222,7 +222,6 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get(const struct net *net, struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth); struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_by_ifname(const struct net *net, const char *ifname); -struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(const struct net *net, int nth); int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 peer_tunnel_id, struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg *cfg, diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c index 72e713da4733..b8f9d45bfeb1 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c @@ -47,7 +47,11 @@ struct l2tp_dfs_seq_data { static void l2tp_dfs_next_tunnel(struct l2tp_dfs_seq_data *pd) { - pd->tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(pd->net, pd->tunnel_idx); + /* Drop reference taken during previous invocation */ + if (pd->tunnel) + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); + + pd->tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(pd->net, pd->tunnel_idx); pd->tunnel_idx++; } @@ -96,7 +100,14 @@ static void *l2tp_dfs_seq_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) static void l2tp_dfs_seq_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) { - /* nothing to do */ + struct l2tp_dfs_seq_data *pd = v; + + if (!pd || pd == SEQ_START_TOKEN) + return; + + /* Drop reference taken by last invocation of l2tp_dfs_next_tunnel() */ + if (pd->tunnel) + l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); } static void l2tp_dfs_seq_tunnel_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a3877c4cedd95543f8726b0a98743ed8db0c0fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 01:15:46 -0400 Subject: rpc_pipefs: fix double-dput() if we ever hit rpc_gssd_dummy_depopulate() dentry passed to it has refcount equal to 1. __rpc_rmpipe() drops it and dput() done after that hits an already freed dentry. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c index 0f08934b2cea..c81ef5e6c981 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c @@ -1375,6 +1375,7 @@ rpc_gssd_dummy_depopulate(struct dentry *pipe_dentry) struct dentry *clnt_dir = pipe_dentry->d_parent; struct dentry *gssd_dir = clnt_dir->d_parent; + dget(pipe_dentry); __rpc_rmpipe(d_inode(clnt_dir), pipe_dentry); __rpc_depopulate(clnt_dir, gssd_dummy_info_file, 0, 1); __rpc_depopulate(gssd_dir, gssd_dummy_clnt_dir, 0, 1); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bffd168c3fc5cc7d2bad4c668fa90e7a9010db4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2018 20:44:46 -0400 Subject: tcp: clear tp->packets_out when purging write queue Clear tp->packets_out when purging the write queue, otherwise tcp_rearm_rto() mistakenly assumes TCP write queue is not empty. This results in NULL pointer dereference. Also, remove the redundant `tp->packets_out = 0` from tcp_disconnect(), since tcp_disconnect() calls tcp_write_queue_purge(). Fixes: a27fd7a8ed38 (tcp: purge write queue upon RST) Reported-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan Reported-by: Sami Farin Tested-by: Sami Farin Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 4fa3f812b9ff..9ce1c726185e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2368,6 +2368,7 @@ void tcp_write_queue_purge(struct sock *sk) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_sk(sk)->tsorted_sent_queue); sk_mem_reclaim(sk); tcp_clear_all_retrans_hints(tcp_sk(sk)); + tcp_sk(sk)->packets_out = 0; } int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags) @@ -2417,7 +2418,6 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags) icsk->icsk_backoff = 0; tp->snd_cwnd = 2; icsk->icsk_probes_out = 0; - tp->packets_out = 0; tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH; tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0; tp->window_clamp = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5171b37d959641bbc619781caf62e61f7b940871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 15 Apr 2018 17:52:04 -0700 Subject: net: af_packet: fix race in PACKET_{R|T}X_RING In order to remove the race caught by syzbot [1], we need to lock the socket before using po->tp_version as this could change under us otherwise. This means lock_sock() and release_sock() must be done by packet_set_ring() callers. [1] : BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249 CPU: 0 PID: 20195 Comm: syzkaller707632 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249 packet_setsockopt+0x12c6/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3662 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849 SyS_setsockopt+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:1828 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x449099 RSP: 002b:00007f42b5307ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000070003c RCX: 0000000000449099 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000107 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000700038 R08: 000000000000001c R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000080eecf R14: 00007f42b53089c0 R15: 0000000000000001 Local variable description: ----req_u@packet_setsockopt Variable was created at: packet_setsockopt+0x13f/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3612 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849 Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 616cb9c18f88..c31b0687396a 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -3008,6 +3008,7 @@ static int packet_release(struct socket *sock) packet_flush_mclist(sk); + lock_sock(sk); if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) { memset(&req_u, 0, sizeof(req_u)); packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 1, 0); @@ -3017,6 +3018,7 @@ static int packet_release(struct socket *sock) memset(&req_u, 0, sizeof(req_u)); packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 1, 1); } + release_sock(sk); f = fanout_release(sk); @@ -3643,6 +3645,7 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv union tpacket_req_u req_u; int len; + lock_sock(sk); switch (po->tp_version) { case TPACKET_V1: case TPACKET_V2: @@ -3653,12 +3656,17 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv len = sizeof(req_u.req3); break; } - if (optlen < len) - return -EINVAL; - if (copy_from_user(&req_u.req, optval, len)) - return -EFAULT; - return packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 0, - optname == PACKET_TX_RING); + if (optlen < len) { + ret = -EINVAL; + } else { + if (copy_from_user(&req_u.req, optval, len)) + ret = -EFAULT; + else + ret = packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 0, + optname == PACKET_TX_RING); + } + release_sock(sk); + return ret; } case PACKET_COPY_THRESH: { @@ -4208,8 +4216,6 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u, /* Added to avoid minimal code churn */ struct tpacket_req *req = &req_u->req; - lock_sock(sk); - rb = tx_ring ? &po->tx_ring : &po->rx_ring; rb_queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue; @@ -4347,7 +4353,6 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u, if (pg_vec) free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr); out: - release_sock(sk); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 114aa35d06d4920c537b72f9fa935de5dd205260 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 13:22:06 -0700 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: silent a memory leak warning The following memory leak is false postive: unreferenced object 0xffff8f37f156fb38 (size 128): comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294899665 (age 11.292s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk 00 00 00 00 30 00 20 00 48 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b ....0. .Hkkkkkkk backtrace: [<000000004fda266a>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x10d/0x141 [<000000007b0a7e3c>] __krealloc+0x45/0x62 [<00000000d08e0bfb>] nf_ct_ext_add+0xdc/0x133 [<0000000099b47fd8>] init_conntrack+0x1b1/0x392 [<0000000086dc36ec>] nf_conntrack_in+0x1ee/0x34b [<00000000940592de>] nf_hook_slow+0x36/0x95 [<00000000d1bd4da7>] nf_hook.constprop.43+0x1c3/0x1dd [<00000000c3673266>] __ip_local_out+0xae/0xb4 [<000000003e4192a6>] ip_local_out+0x17/0x33 [<00000000b64356de>] igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x23e/0x26f [<000000006a8f3032>] call_timer_fn+0x14c/0x2a5 [<00000000650c1725>] __run_timers.part.34+0x150/0x182 [<0000000090e6946e>] run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x4c [<000000004d1e7293>] __do_softirq+0x1d1/0x3c2 [<000000004643557d>] irq_exit+0x53/0xa2 [<0000000029ddee8f>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x22a/0x235 because __krealloc() is not supposed to release the old memory and it is released later via kfree_rcu(). Since this is the only external user of __krealloc(), just mark it as not leak here. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c index 9fe0ddc333fb..bd71a828ebde 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ void *nf_ct_ext_add(struct nf_conn *ct, enum nf_ct_ext_id id, gfp_t gfp) rcu_read_unlock(); alloc = max(newlen, NF_CT_EXT_PREALLOC); + kmemleak_not_leak(old); new = __krealloc(old, alloc, gfp); if (!new) return NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a6615743704fdc179e227f84b7903edd1f0b4241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 12:53:12 +0200 Subject: netfilter: fix CONFIG_NF_REJECT_IPV6=m link error We get a new link error with CONFIG_NFT_REJECT_INET=y and CONFIG_NF_REJECT_IPV6=m after larger parts of the nftables modules are linked together: net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.o: In function `nft_reject_inet_eval': nft_reject_inet.c:(.text+0x17c): undefined reference to `nf_send_unreach6' nft_reject_inet.c:(.text+0x190): undefined reference to `nf_send_reset6' The problem is that with NF_TABLES_INET set, we implicitly try to use the ipv6 version as well for NFT_REJECT, but when CONFIG_IPV6 is set to a loadable module, it's impossible to reach that. The best workaround I found is to express the above as a Kconfig dependency, forcing NFT_REJECT itself to be 'm' in that particular configuration. Fixes: 02c7b25e5f54 ("netfilter: nf_tables: build-in filter chain type") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/netfilter/Kconfig index 704b3832dbad..44d8a55e9721 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -594,6 +594,7 @@ config NFT_QUOTA config NFT_REJECT default m if NETFILTER_ADVANCED=n tristate "Netfilter nf_tables reject support" + depends on !NF_TABLES_INET || (IPV6!=m || m) help This option adds the "reject" expression that you can use to explicitly deny and notify via TCP reset/ICMP informational errors -- cgit v1.2.3 From 569ccae68b38654f04b6842b034aa33857f605fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 09:30:27 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: can't fail after linking rule into active rule list rules in nftables a free'd using kfree, but protected by rcu, i.e. we must wait for a grace period to elapse. Normal removal patch does this, but nf_tables_newrule() doesn't obey this rule during error handling. It calls nft_trans_rule_add() *after* linking rule, and, if that fails to allocate memory, it unlinks the rule and then kfree() it -- this is unsafe. Switch order -- first add rule to transaction list, THEN link it to public list. Note: nft_trans_rule_add() uses GFP_KERNEL; it will not fail so this is not a problem in practice (spotted only during code review). Fixes: 0628b123c96d12 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: add batch support and use it from nf_tables") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 9134cc429ad4..b1984f8f7253 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -2361,41 +2361,46 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) { - if (nft_is_active_next(net, old_rule)) { - trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_DELRULE, - old_rule); - if (trans == NULL) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto err2; - } - nft_deactivate_next(net, old_rule); - chain->use--; - list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); - } else { + if (!nft_is_active_next(net, old_rule)) { err = -ENOENT; goto err2; } - } else if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_APPEND) - if (old_rule) - list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); - else - list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules); - else { - if (old_rule) - list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); - else - list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules); - } + trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_DELRULE, + old_rule); + if (trans == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err2; + } + nft_deactivate_next(net, old_rule); + chain->use--; - if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto err3; + if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err2; + } + + list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); + } else { + if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err2; + } + + if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_APPEND) { + if (old_rule) + list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); + else + list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules); + } else { + if (old_rule) + list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); + else + list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules); + } } chain->use++; return 0; -err3: - list_del_rcu(&rule->list); err2: nf_tables_rule_destroy(&ctx, rule); err1: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2f6adf481527c8ab8033c601f55bfb5b3712b2ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 09:00:24 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: free set name in error path set->name must be free'd here in case ops->init fails. Fixes: 387454901bd6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow set names of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index b1984f8f7253..102ad873acb4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -3212,18 +3212,20 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, err = ops->init(set, &desc, nla); if (err < 0) - goto err2; + goto err3; err = nft_trans_set_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWSET, set); if (err < 0) - goto err3; + goto err4; list_add_tail_rcu(&set->list, &table->sets); table->use++; return 0; -err3: +err4: ops->destroy(set); +err3: + kfree(set->name); err2: kvfree(set); err1: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9783ccd0f2507cbe3c5ff1cb84bf6ae3a512d17d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gao Feng Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 10:16:45 +0800 Subject: net: Fix one possible memleak in ip_setup_cork It would allocate memory in this function when the cork->opt is NULL. But the memory isn't freed if failed in the latter rt check, and return error directly. It causes the memleak if its caller is ip_make_skb which also doesn't free the cork->opt when meet a error. Now move the rt check ahead to avoid the memleak. Signed-off-by: Gao Feng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c index 4c11b810a447..83c73bab2c3d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c @@ -1109,6 +1109,10 @@ static int ip_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork *cork, struct ip_options_rcu *opt; struct rtable *rt; + rt = *rtp; + if (unlikely(!rt)) + return -EFAULT; + /* * setup for corking. */ @@ -1124,9 +1128,7 @@ static int ip_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork *cork, cork->flags |= IPCORK_OPT; cork->addr = ipc->addr; } - rt = *rtp; - if (unlikely(!rt)) - return -EFAULT; + /* * We steal reference to this route, caller should not release it */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From ec518f21cb1a1b1f8a516499ea05c60299e04963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 08:29:42 -0700 Subject: tipc: add policy for TIPC_NLA_NET_ADDR Before syzbot/KMSAN bites, add the missing policy for TIPC_NLA_NET_ADDR Fixes: 27c21416727a ("tipc: add net set to new netlink api") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jon Maloy Cc: Ying Xue Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/netlink.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink.c b/net/tipc/netlink.c index b76f13f6fea1..d4e0bbeee727 100644 --- a/net/tipc/netlink.c +++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c @@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_sock_policy[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX + 1] = { const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_net_policy[TIPC_NLA_NET_MAX + 1] = { [TIPC_NLA_NET_UNSPEC] = { .type = NLA_UNSPEC }, - [TIPC_NLA_NET_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 } + [TIPC_NLA_NET_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [TIPC_NLA_NET_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_link_policy[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From c6404122cb18f1fbd2a6dc85ab687f6fa2e454cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 08:29:43 -0700 Subject: tipc: fix possible crash in __tipc_nl_net_set() syzbot reported a crash in __tipc_nl_net_set() caused by NULL dereference. We need to check that both TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID and TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID_W1 are present. We also need to make sure userland provided u64 attributes. Fixes: d50ccc2d3909 ("tipc: add 128-bit node identifier") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jon Maloy Cc: Ying Xue Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/net.c | 2 ++ net/tipc/netlink.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/net.c b/net/tipc/net.c index 856f9e97ea29..4fbaa0464405 100644 --- a/net/tipc/net.c +++ b/net/tipc/net.c @@ -252,6 +252,8 @@ int __tipc_nl_net_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) u64 *w0 = (u64 *)&node_id[0]; u64 *w1 = (u64 *)&node_id[8]; + if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID_W1]) + return -EINVAL; *w0 = nla_get_u64(attrs[TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID]); *w1 = nla_get_u64(attrs[TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID_W1]); tipc_net_init(net, node_id, 0); diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink.c b/net/tipc/netlink.c index d4e0bbeee727..6ff2254088f6 100644 --- a/net/tipc/netlink.c +++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_net_policy[TIPC_NLA_NET_MAX + 1] = { [TIPC_NLA_NET_UNSPEC] = { .type = NLA_UNSPEC }, [TIPC_NLA_NET_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [TIPC_NLA_NET_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, + [TIPC_NLA_NET_NODEID_W1] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, }; const struct nla_policy tipc_nl_link_policy[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 765cca91b895c8b747bca0b5fa54d1dc85c867a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Rothwell Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 09:28:59 +1000 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: include kmemleak.h for kmemleak_not_leak() After merging the netfilter tree, today's linux-next build (powerpc ppc64_defconfig) failed like this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c: In function 'nf_ct_ext_add': net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c:74:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'kmemleak_not_leak' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] kmemleak_not_leak(old); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ cc1: some warnings being treated as errors Fixes: 114aa35d06d4 ("netfilter: conntrack: silent a memory leak warning") Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c index bd71a828ebde..277bbfe26478 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. */ #include +#include #include #include #include -- cgit v1.2.3 From 05e489b1596f0aa1025a1fa572676631cd9665da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Hajnoczi Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 14:25:58 +0800 Subject: VSOCK: make af_vsock.ko removable again Commit c1eef220c1760762753b602c382127bfccee226d ("vsock: always call vsock_init_tables()") introduced a module_init() function without a corresponding module_exit() function. Modules with an init function can only be removed if they also have an exit function. Therefore the vsock module was considered "permanent" and could not be removed. This patch adds an empty module_exit() function so that "rmmod vsock" works. No explicit cleanup is required because: 1. Transports call vsock_core_exit() upon exit and cannot be removed while sockets are still alive. 2. vsock_diag.ko does not perform any action that requires cleanup by vsock.ko. Fixes: c1eef220c176 ("vsock: always call vsock_init_tables()") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu Cc: Cong Wang Cc: Jorgen Hansen Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index aac9b8f6552e..c1076c19b858 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -2018,7 +2018,13 @@ const struct vsock_transport *vsock_core_get_transport(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_core_get_transport); +static void __exit vsock_exit(void) +{ + /* Do nothing. This function makes this module removable. */ +} + module_init(vsock_init_tables); +module_exit(vsock_exit); MODULE_AUTHOR("VMware, Inc."); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("VMware Virtual Socket Family"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 77ac725e0c5b27c925e514b999cd46d01eedafd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dechesne Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 14:03:26 +0200 Subject: net: qrtr: add MODULE_ALIAS_NETPROTO macro To ensure that qrtr can be loaded automatically, when needed, if it is compiled as module. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dechesne Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/qrtr/qrtr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/qrtr/qrtr.c b/net/qrtr/qrtr.c index b33e5aeb4c06..2aa07b547b16 100644 --- a/net/qrtr/qrtr.c +++ b/net/qrtr/qrtr.c @@ -1135,3 +1135,4 @@ module_exit(qrtr_proto_fini); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Qualcomm IPC-router driver"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_ALIAS_NETPROTO(PF_QIPCRTR); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7ce2367254e84753bceb07327aaf5c953cfce117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toshiaki Makita Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 18:46:14 +0900 Subject: vlan: Fix reading memory beyond skb->tail in skb_vlan_tagged_multi Syzkaller spotted an old bug which leads to reading skb beyond tail by 4 bytes on vlan tagged packets. This is caused because skb_vlan_tagged_multi() did not check skb_headlen. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_type_vlan include/linux/if_vlan.h:283 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in skb_vlan_tagged_multi include/linux/if_vlan.h:656 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in vlan_features_check include/linux/if_vlan.h:672 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in dflt_features_check net/core/dev.c:2949 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in netif_skb_features+0xd1b/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:3009 CPU: 1 PID: 3582 Comm: syzkaller435149 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 eth_type_vlan include/linux/if_vlan.h:283 [inline] skb_vlan_tagged_multi include/linux/if_vlan.h:656 [inline] vlan_features_check include/linux/if_vlan.h:672 [inline] dflt_features_check net/core/dev.c:2949 [inline] netif_skb_features+0xd1b/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:3009 validate_xmit_skb+0x89/0x1320 net/core/dev.c:3084 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1cb2/0x2b60 net/core/dev.c:3549 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3590 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2944 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x7c57/0x8a10 net/packet/af_packet.c:2969 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x3b9/0x470 net/socket.c:909 do_iter_readv_writev+0x7bb/0x970 include/linux/fs.h:1776 do_iter_write+0x30d/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:932 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:977 [inline] do_writev+0x3c9/0x830 fs/read_write.c:1012 SYSC_writev+0x9b/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1085 SyS_writev+0x56/0x80 fs/read_write.c:1082 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x43ffa9 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cff3948 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043ffa9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006cb018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004018d0 R13: 0000000000401960 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1d4/0xb20 net/core/skbuff.c:5234 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xb56/0x1190 net/core/sock.c:2085 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2803 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2894 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x6444/0x8a10 net/packet/af_packet.c:2969 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x3b9/0x470 net/socket.c:909 do_iter_readv_writev+0x7bb/0x970 include/linux/fs.h:1776 do_iter_write+0x30d/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:932 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:977 [inline] do_writev+0x3c9/0x830 fs/read_write.c:1012 SYSC_writev+0x9b/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1085 SyS_writev+0x56/0x80 fs/read_write.c:1082 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Fixes: 58e998c6d239 ("offloading: Force software GSO for multiple vlan tags.") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+0bbe42c764feafa82c5a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 969462ebb296..af0558b00c6c 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -2969,7 +2969,7 @@ netdev_features_t passthru_features_check(struct sk_buff *skb, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(passthru_features_check); -static netdev_features_t dflt_features_check(const struct sk_buff *skb, +static netdev_features_t dflt_features_check(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, netdev_features_t features) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9c438d7a3a52dcc2b9ed095cb87d3a5e83cf7e60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 12:07:06 -0700 Subject: KEYS: DNS: limit the length of option strings Adding a dns_resolver key whose payload contains a very long option name resulted in that string being printed in full. This hit the WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() during the printk(), because printk() only supports a precision of up to 32767 bytes: precision 1000000 too large WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 752 at lib/vsprintf.c:2189 vsnprintf+0x4bc/0x5b0 Fix it by limiting option strings (combined name + value) to a much more reasonable 128 bytes. The exact limit is arbitrary, but currently the only recognized option is formatted as "dnserror=%lu" which fits well within this limit. Also ratelimit the printks. Reproducer: perl -e 'print "#", "A" x 1000000, "\x00"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s This bug was found using syzkaller. Reported-by: Mark Rutland Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index 8396705deffc..40c851693f77 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) next_opt = memchr(opt, '#', end - opt) ?: end; opt_len = next_opt - opt; - if (!opt_len) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "Empty option to dns_resolver key\n"); + if (opt_len <= 0 || opt_len > 128) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("Invalid option length (%d) for dns_resolver key\n", + opt_len); return -EINVAL; } @@ -127,10 +127,8 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) } bad_option_value: - printk(KERN_WARNING - "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key:" - " bad/missing value\n", - opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt); + pr_warn_ratelimited("Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key: bad/missing value\n", + opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt); return -EINVAL; } while (opt = next_opt + 1, opt < end); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From be47e41d77fba5bc17e9fb5f1c99217bb6691989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 21:25:42 +0200 Subject: tipc: fix use-after-free in tipc_nametbl_stop When we delete a service item in tipc_nametbl_stop() we loop over all service ranges in the service's RB tree, and for each service range we loop over its pertaining publications while calling tipc_service_remove_publ() for each of them. However, tipc_service_remove_publ() has the side effect that it also removes the comprising service range item when there are no publications left. This leads to a "use-after-free" access when the inner loop continues to the next iteration, since the range item holding the list we are looping no longer exists. We fix this by moving the delete of the service range item outside the said function. Instead, we now let the two functions calling it test if the list is empty and perform the removal when that is the case. Reported-by: syzbot+d64b64afc55660106556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/name_table.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/name_table.c b/net/tipc/name_table.c index 4068eaad61a6..dd1c4fa2eb78 100644 --- a/net/tipc/name_table.c +++ b/net/tipc/name_table.c @@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ err: static struct publication *tipc_service_remove_publ(struct net *net, struct tipc_service *sc, u32 lower, u32 upper, - u32 node, u32 key) + u32 node, u32 key, + struct service_range **rng) { struct tipc_subscription *sub, *tmp; struct service_range *sr; @@ -275,19 +276,15 @@ static struct publication *tipc_service_remove_publ(struct net *net, list_del(&p->all_publ); list_del(&p->local_publ); - - /* Remove service range item if this was its last publication */ - if (list_empty(&sr->all_publ)) { + if (list_empty(&sr->all_publ)) last = true; - rb_erase(&sr->tree_node, &sc->ranges); - kfree(sr); - } /* Notify any waiting subscriptions */ list_for_each_entry_safe(sub, tmp, &sc->subscriptions, service_list) { tipc_sub_report_overlap(sub, p->lower, p->upper, TIPC_WITHDRAWN, p->port, p->node, p->scope, last); } + *rng = sr; return p; } @@ -379,13 +376,20 @@ struct publication *tipc_nametbl_remove_publ(struct net *net, u32 type, u32 node, u32 key) { struct tipc_service *sc = tipc_service_find(net, type); + struct service_range *sr = NULL; struct publication *p = NULL; if (!sc) return NULL; spin_lock_bh(&sc->lock); - p = tipc_service_remove_publ(net, sc, lower, upper, node, key); + p = tipc_service_remove_publ(net, sc, lower, upper, node, key, &sr); + + /* Remove service range item if this was its last publication */ + if (sr && list_empty(&sr->all_publ)) { + rb_erase(&sr->tree_node, &sc->ranges); + kfree(sr); + } /* Delete service item if this no more publications and subscriptions */ if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&sc->ranges) && list_empty(&sc->subscriptions)) { @@ -747,16 +751,17 @@ int tipc_nametbl_init(struct net *net) static void tipc_service_delete(struct net *net, struct tipc_service *sc) { struct service_range *sr, *tmpr; - struct publication *p, *tmpb; + struct publication *p, *tmp; spin_lock_bh(&sc->lock); rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(sr, tmpr, &sc->ranges, tree_node) { - list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmpb, - &sr->all_publ, all_publ) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &sr->all_publ, all_publ) { tipc_service_remove_publ(net, sc, p->lower, p->upper, - p->node, p->key); + p->node, p->key, &sr); kfree_rcu(p, rcu); } + rb_erase(&sr->tree_node, &sc->ranges); + kfree(sr); } hlist_del_init_rcu(&sc->service_list); spin_unlock_bh(&sc->lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 36a50a989ee8267588de520b8704b85f045a3220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tung Nguyen Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 21:58:27 +0200 Subject: tipc: fix infinite loop when dumping link monitor summary When configuring the number of used bearers to MAX_BEARER and issuing command "tipc link monitor summary", the command enters infinite loop in user space. This issue happens because function tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor() returns the wrong 'prev_bearer' value when all potential monitors have been scanned. The correct behavior is to always try to scan all monitors until either the netlink message is full, in which case we return the bearer identity of the affected monitor, or we continue through the whole bearer array until we can return MAX_BEARERS. This solution also caters for the case where there may be gaps in the bearer array. Signed-off-by: Tung Nguyen Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/monitor.c | 2 +- net/tipc/node.c | 11 ++++------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/monitor.c b/net/tipc/monitor.c index 32dc33a94bc7..5453e564da82 100644 --- a/net/tipc/monitor.c +++ b/net/tipc/monitor.c @@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ int __tipc_nl_add_monitor(struct net *net, struct tipc_nl_msg *msg, ret = tipc_bearer_get_name(net, bearer_name, bearer_id); if (ret || !mon) - return -EINVAL; + return 0; hdr = genlmsg_put(msg->skb, msg->portid, msg->seq, &tipc_genl_family, NLM_F_MULTI, TIPC_NL_MON_GET); diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index c77dd2f3c589..6f98b56dd48e 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -2232,8 +2232,8 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); u32 prev_bearer = cb->args[0]; struct tipc_nl_msg msg; + int bearer_id; int err; - int i; if (prev_bearer == MAX_BEARERS) return 0; @@ -2243,16 +2243,13 @@ int tipc_nl_node_dump_monitor(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) msg.seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq; rtnl_lock(); - for (i = prev_bearer; i < MAX_BEARERS; i++) { - prev_bearer = i; + for (bearer_id = prev_bearer; bearer_id < MAX_BEARERS; bearer_id++) { err = __tipc_nl_add_monitor(net, &msg, prev_bearer); if (err) - goto out; + break; } - -out: rtnl_unlock(); - cb->args[0] = prev_bearer; + cb->args[0] = bearer_id; return skb->len; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 39f2ff0816e5421476c2bc538b68b4bb0708a78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 12:23:39 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: NAT chain and extensions require NF_TABLES Move these options inside the scope of the 'if' NF_TABLES and NF_TABLES_IPV6 dependencies. This patch fixes: net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.o: In function `nft_nat_do_chain': >> net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.c:37: undefined reference to `nft_do_chain' net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.o: In function `nft_chain_nat_ipv6_exit': >> net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.c:94: undefined reference to `nft_unregister_chain_type' net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.o: In function `nft_chain_nat_ipv6_init': >> net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.c:87: undefined reference to `nft_register_chain_type' that happens with: CONFIG_NF_TABLES=m CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_NAT_IPV6=y Fixes: 02c7b25e5f54 ("netfilter: nf_tables: build-in filter chain type") Reported-by: kbuild test robot Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig index ccbfa83e4bb0..ce77bcc2490c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -48,6 +48,34 @@ config NFT_CHAIN_ROUTE_IPV6 fields such as the source, destination, flowlabel, hop-limit and the packet mark. +if NF_NAT_IPV6 + +config NFT_CHAIN_NAT_IPV6 + tristate "IPv6 nf_tables nat chain support" + help + This option enables the "nat" chain for IPv6 in nf_tables. This + chain type is used to perform Network Address Translation (NAT) + packet transformations such as the source, destination address and + source and destination ports. + +config NFT_MASQ_IPV6 + tristate "IPv6 masquerade support for nf_tables" + depends on NFT_MASQ + select NF_NAT_MASQUERADE_IPV6 + help + This is the expression that provides IPv4 masquerading support for + nf_tables. + +config NFT_REDIR_IPV6 + tristate "IPv6 redirect support for nf_tables" + depends on NFT_REDIR + select NF_NAT_REDIRECT + help + This is the expression that provides IPv4 redirect support for + nf_tables. + +endif # NF_NAT_IPV6 + config NFT_REJECT_IPV6 select NF_REJECT_IPV6 default NFT_REJECT @@ -107,39 +135,12 @@ config NF_NAT_IPV6 if NF_NAT_IPV6 -config NFT_CHAIN_NAT_IPV6 - depends on NF_TABLES_IPV6 - tristate "IPv6 nf_tables nat chain support" - help - This option enables the "nat" chain for IPv6 in nf_tables. This - chain type is used to perform Network Address Translation (NAT) - packet transformations such as the source, destination address and - source and destination ports. - config NF_NAT_MASQUERADE_IPV6 tristate "IPv6 masquerade support" help This is the kernel functionality to provide NAT in the masquerade flavour (automatic source address selection) for IPv6. -config NFT_MASQ_IPV6 - tristate "IPv6 masquerade support for nf_tables" - depends on NF_TABLES_IPV6 - depends on NFT_MASQ - select NF_NAT_MASQUERADE_IPV6 - help - This is the expression that provides IPv4 masquerading support for - nf_tables. - -config NFT_REDIR_IPV6 - tristate "IPv6 redirect support for nf_tables" - depends on NF_TABLES_IPV6 - depends on NFT_REDIR - select NF_NAT_REDIRECT - help - This is the expression that provides IPv4 redirect support for - nf_tables. - endif # NF_NAT_IPV6 config IP6_NF_IPTABLES -- cgit v1.2.3 From d71efb599ad42ef1e564c652d8084252bdc85edf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Taehee Yoo Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 23:35:34 +0900 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: fix out-of-bounds in nft_chain_commit_update When chain name is changed, nft_chain_commit_update is called. In the nft_chain_commit_update, trans->ctx.chain->name has old chain name and nft_trans_chain_name(trans) has new chain name. If new chain name is longer than old chain name, KASAN warns slab-out-of-bounds. [ 175.015012] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcpy+0x9e/0xb0 [ 175.022735] Write of size 1 at addr ffff880114e022da by task iptables-compat/1458 [ 175.031353] CPU: 0 PID: 1458 Comm: iptables-compat Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #146 [ 175.031353] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 175.031353] Call Trace: [ 175.031353] dump_stack+0x68/0xa0 [ 175.031353] print_address_description+0xd0/0x260 [ 175.031353] ? strcpy+0x9e/0xb0 [ 175.031353] kasan_report+0x234/0x350 [ 175.031353] __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x1c/0x20 [ 175.031353] strcpy+0x9e/0xb0 [ 175.031353] nf_tables_commit+0x1ccc/0x2990 [ 175.031353] nfnetlink_rcv+0x141e/0x16c0 [ 175.031353] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x150/0x150 [ 175.031353] ? lock_acquire+0x370/0x370 [ 175.031353] ? lock_acquire+0x370/0x370 [ 175.031353] netlink_unicast+0x444/0x640 [ 175.031353] ? netlink_attachskb+0x700/0x700 [ 175.031353] ? _copy_from_iter_full+0x180/0x740 [ 175.031353] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 175.031353] ? _copy_from_user+0x9b/0xd0 [ 175.031353] netlink_sendmsg+0x845/0xc70 [ ... ] Steps to reproduce: iptables-compat -N 1 iptables-compat -E 1 aaaaaaaaa Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 102ad873acb4..04d4e3772584 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -5745,7 +5745,7 @@ static void nft_chain_commit_update(struct nft_trans *trans) struct nft_base_chain *basechain; if (nft_trans_chain_name(trans)) - strcpy(trans->ctx.chain->name, nft_trans_chain_name(trans)); + swap(trans->ctx.chain->name, nft_trans_chain_name(trans)); if (!nft_is_base_chain(trans->ctx.chain)) return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5a786232eb69a1f870ddc0cfd69d5bdef241a2ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 16:17:14 +0200 Subject: netfilter: xt_connmark: do not cast xt_connmark_tginfo1 to xt_connmark_tginfo2 These structures have different layout, fill xt_connmark_tginfo2 with old fields in xt_connmark_tginfo1. Based on patch from Jack Ma. Fixes: 472a73e00757 ("netfilter: xt_conntrack: Support bit-shifting for CONNMARK & MARK targets.") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c b/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c index 4b424e6caf3e..94df000abb92 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_connmark.c @@ -36,9 +36,7 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("ipt_connmark"); MODULE_ALIAS("ip6t_connmark"); static unsigned int -connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct xt_connmark_tginfo1 *info, - u8 shift_bits, u8 shift_dir) +connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_connmark_tginfo2 *info) { enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; u_int32_t new_targetmark; @@ -52,10 +50,11 @@ connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, switch (info->mode) { case XT_CONNMARK_SET: newmark = (ct->mark & ~info->ctmask) ^ info->ctmark; - if (shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) - newmark >>= shift_bits; + if (info->shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) + newmark >>= info->shift_bits; else - newmark <<= shift_bits; + newmark <<= info->shift_bits; + if (ct->mark != newmark) { ct->mark = newmark; nf_conntrack_event_cache(IPCT_MARK, ct); @@ -63,10 +62,11 @@ connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, break; case XT_CONNMARK_SAVE: new_targetmark = (skb->mark & info->nfmask); - if (shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) - new_targetmark >>= shift_bits; + if (info->shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) + new_targetmark >>= info->shift_bits; else - new_targetmark <<= shift_bits; + new_targetmark <<= info->shift_bits; + newmark = (ct->mark & ~info->ctmask) ^ new_targetmark; if (ct->mark != newmark) { @@ -76,10 +76,11 @@ connmark_tg_shift(struct sk_buff *skb, break; case XT_CONNMARK_RESTORE: new_targetmark = (ct->mark & info->ctmask); - if (shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) - new_targetmark >>= shift_bits; + if (info->shift_dir == D_SHIFT_RIGHT) + new_targetmark >>= info->shift_bits; else - new_targetmark <<= shift_bits; + new_targetmark <<= info->shift_bits; + newmark = (skb->mark & ~info->nfmask) ^ new_targetmark; skb->mark = newmark; @@ -92,8 +93,14 @@ static unsigned int connmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) { const struct xt_connmark_tginfo1 *info = par->targinfo; - - return connmark_tg_shift(skb, info, 0, 0); + const struct xt_connmark_tginfo2 info2 = { + .ctmark = info->ctmark, + .ctmask = info->ctmask, + .nfmask = info->nfmask, + .mode = info->mode, + }; + + return connmark_tg_shift(skb, &info2); } static unsigned int @@ -101,8 +108,7 @@ connmark_tg_v2(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) { const struct xt_connmark_tginfo2 *info = par->targinfo; - return connmark_tg_shift(skb, (const struct xt_connmark_tginfo1 *)info, - info->shift_bits, info->shift_dir); + return connmark_tg_shift(skb, info); } static int connmark_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bb9aaaa1849eed763c6b7f20227a8a03300d4421 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: sunlianwen Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 09:22:39 +0800 Subject: net: change the comment of dev_mc_init The comment of dev_mc_init() is wrong. which use dev_mc_flush instead of dev_mc_init. Signed-off-by: Lianwen Sun --- net/core/dev_addr_lists.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c b/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c index e3e6a3e2ca22..d884d8f5f0e5 100644 --- a/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c +++ b/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c @@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ void dev_mc_flush(struct net_device *dev) EXPORT_SYMBOL(dev_mc_flush); /** - * dev_mc_flush - Init multicast address list + * dev_mc_init - Init multicast address list * @dev: device * * Init multicast address list. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5e84b38b07e676fcd3ab6e296780b4f77a29d09f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 12:00:08 +0100 Subject: net: caif: fix spelling mistake "UKNOWN" -> "UNKNOWN" Trivial fix to spelling mistake Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/caif/chnl_net.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/caif/chnl_net.c b/net/caif/chnl_net.c index 53ecda10b790..13e2ae6be620 100644 --- a/net/caif/chnl_net.c +++ b/net/caif/chnl_net.c @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static void chnl_flowctrl_cb(struct cflayer *layr, enum caif_ctrlcmd flow, flow == CAIF_CTRLCMD_DEINIT_RSP ? "CLOSE/DEINIT" : flow == CAIF_CTRLCMD_INIT_FAIL_RSP ? "OPEN_FAIL" : flow == CAIF_CTRLCMD_REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_IND ? - "REMOTE_SHUTDOWN" : "UKNOWN CTRL COMMAND"); + "REMOTE_SHUTDOWN" : "UNKNOWN CTRL COMMAND"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f7e43672683b097bb074a8fe7af9bc600a23f231 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 11:51:56 -0700 Subject: llc: hold llc_sap before release_sock() syzbot reported we still access llc->sap in llc_backlog_rcv() after it is freed in llc_sap_remove_socket(): Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 llc_conn_ac_send_sabme_cmd_p_set_x+0x3a8/0x460 net/llc/llc_c_ac.c:785 llc_exec_conn_trans_actions net/llc/llc_conn.c:475 [inline] llc_conn_service net/llc/llc_conn.c:400 [inline] llc_conn_state_process+0x4e1/0x13a0 net/llc/llc_conn.c:75 llc_backlog_rcv+0x195/0x1e0 net/llc/llc_conn.c:891 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:909 [inline] __release_sock+0x12f/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2335 release_sock+0xa4/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2850 llc_ui_release+0xc8/0x220 net/llc/af_llc.c:204 llc->sap is refcount'ed and llc_sap_remove_socket() is paired with llc_sap_add_socket(). This can be amended by holding its refcount before llc_sap_remove_socket() and releasing it after release_sock(). Reported-by: Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 01dcc0823d1f..6d29b2b94e84 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static int llc_ui_release(struct socket *sock) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc; + struct llc_sap *sap; if (unlikely(sk == NULL)) goto out; @@ -199,9 +200,15 @@ static int llc_ui_release(struct socket *sock) llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap); if (!llc_send_disc(sk)) llc_ui_wait_for_disc(sk, sk->sk_rcvtimeo); + sap = llc->sap; + /* Hold this for release_sock(), so that llc_backlog_rcv() could still + * use it. + */ + llc_sap_hold(sap); if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) llc_sap_remove_socket(llc->sap, sk); release_sock(sk); + llc_sap_put(sap); if (llc->dev) dev_put(llc->dev); sock_put(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1255fcb2a655f05e02f3a74675a6d6525f187afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ursula Braun Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 15:56:40 +0200 Subject: net/smc: fix shutdown in state SMC_LISTEN Calling shutdown with SHUT_RD and SHUT_RDWR for a listening SMC socket crashes, because commit 127f49705823 ("net/smc: release clcsock from tcp_listen_worker") releases the internal clcsock in smc_close_active() and sets smc->clcsock to NULL. For SHUT_RD the smc_close_active() call is removed. For SHUT_RDWR the kernel_sock_shutdown() call is omitted, since the clcsock is already released. Fixes: 127f49705823 ("net/smc: release clcsock from tcp_listen_worker") Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun Reported-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index 5f8046c62d90..f5d4b69dbabc 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -1259,14 +1259,12 @@ static int smc_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) rc = smc_close_shutdown_write(smc); break; case SHUT_RD: - if (sk->sk_state == SMC_LISTEN) - rc = smc_close_active(smc); - else - rc = 0; - /* nothing more to do because peer is not involved */ + rc = 0; + /* nothing more to do because peer is not involved */ break; } - rc1 = kernel_sock_shutdown(smc->clcsock, how); + if (smc->clcsock) + rc1 = kernel_sock_shutdown(smc->clcsock, how); /* map sock_shutdown_cmd constants to sk_shutdown value range */ sk->sk_shutdown |= how + 1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5411b6187adf62909e3b998ac782e722904c7487 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 16:20:48 +0200 Subject: l2tp: fix {pppol2tp, l2tp_dfs}_seq_stop() in case of seq_file overflow Commit 0e0c3fee3a59 ("l2tp: hold reference on tunnels printed in pppol2tp proc file") assumed that if pppol2tp_seq_stop() was called with non-NULL private data (the 'v' pointer), then pppol2tp_seq_start() would not be called again. It turns out that this isn't guaranteed, and overflowing the seq_file's buffer in pppol2tp_seq_show() is a way to get into this situation. Therefore, pppol2tp_seq_stop() needs to reset pd->tunnel, so that pppol2tp_seq_start() won't drop a reference again if it gets called. We also have to clear pd->session, because the rest of the code expects a non-NULL tunnel when pd->session is set. The l2tp_debugfs module has the same issue. Fix it in the same way. Fixes: 0e0c3fee3a59 ("l2tp: hold reference on tunnels printed in pppol2tp proc file") Fixes: f726214d9b23 ("l2tp: hold reference on tunnels printed in l2tp/tunnels debugfs file") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c | 5 ++++- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c index b8f9d45bfeb1..7f1e842ef05a 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c @@ -106,8 +106,11 @@ static void l2tp_dfs_seq_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) return; /* Drop reference taken by last invocation of l2tp_dfs_next_tunnel() */ - if (pd->tunnel) + if (pd->tunnel) { l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); + pd->tunnel = NULL; + pd->session = NULL; + } } static void l2tp_dfs_seq_tunnel_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 7d0c963680e6..1404bc1c1bb7 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1618,8 +1618,11 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) return; /* Drop reference taken by last invocation of pppol2tp_next_tunnel() */ - if (pd->tunnel) + if (pd->tunnel) { l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(pd->tunnel); + pd->tunnel = NULL; + pd->session = NULL; + } } static void pppol2tp_seq_tunnel_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) -- cgit v1.2.3 From b905ef9ab90115d001c1658259af4b1c65088779 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 12:25:38 -0700 Subject: llc: delete timers synchronously in llc_sk_free() The connection timers of an llc sock could be still flying after we delete them in llc_sk_free(), and even possibly after we free the sock. We could just wait synchronously here in case of troubles. Note, I leave other call paths as they are, since they may not have to wait, at least we can change them to synchronously when needed. Also, move the code to net/llc/llc_conn.c, which is apparently a better place. Reported-by: Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/llc/llc_c_ac.c | 9 +-------- net/llc/llc_conn.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/llc/llc_c_ac.c b/net/llc/llc_c_ac.c index 163121192aca..4d78375f9872 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_c_ac.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_c_ac.c @@ -1099,14 +1099,7 @@ int llc_conn_ac_inc_tx_win_size(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) int llc_conn_ac_stop_all_timers(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); - - del_timer(&llc->pf_cycle_timer.timer); - del_timer(&llc->ack_timer.timer); - del_timer(&llc->rej_sent_timer.timer); - del_timer(&llc->busy_state_timer.timer); - llc->ack_must_be_send = 0; - llc->ack_pf = 0; + llc_sk_stop_all_timers(sk, false); return 0; } diff --git a/net/llc/llc_conn.c b/net/llc/llc_conn.c index 110e32bcb399..c0ac522b48a1 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_conn.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_conn.c @@ -961,6 +961,26 @@ out: return sk; } +void llc_sk_stop_all_timers(struct sock *sk, bool sync) +{ + struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); + + if (sync) { + del_timer_sync(&llc->pf_cycle_timer.timer); + del_timer_sync(&llc->ack_timer.timer); + del_timer_sync(&llc->rej_sent_timer.timer); + del_timer_sync(&llc->busy_state_timer.timer); + } else { + del_timer(&llc->pf_cycle_timer.timer); + del_timer(&llc->ack_timer.timer); + del_timer(&llc->rej_sent_timer.timer); + del_timer(&llc->busy_state_timer.timer); + } + + llc->ack_must_be_send = 0; + llc->ack_pf = 0; +} + /** * llc_sk_free - Frees a LLC socket * @sk - socket to free @@ -973,7 +993,7 @@ void llc_sk_free(struct sock *sk) llc->state = LLC_CONN_OUT_OF_SVC; /* Stop all (possibly) running timers */ - llc_conn_ac_stop_all_timers(sk, NULL); + llc_sk_stop_all_timers(sk, true); #ifdef DEBUG_LLC_CONN_ALLOC printk(KERN_INFO "%s: unackq=%d, txq=%d\n", __func__, skb_queue_len(&llc->pdu_unack_q), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3a04ce7130a7e5dad4e78d45d50313747f8c830f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 21:54:34 -0700 Subject: llc: fix NULL pointer deref for SOCK_ZAPPED For SOCK_ZAPPED socket, we don't need to care about llc->sap, so we should just skip these refcount functions in this case. Fixes: f7e43672683b ("llc: hold llc_sap before release_sock()") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 6d29b2b94e84..cb80ebb38311 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -189,7 +189,6 @@ static int llc_ui_release(struct socket *sock) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc; - struct llc_sap *sap; if (unlikely(sk == NULL)) goto out; @@ -200,15 +199,19 @@ static int llc_ui_release(struct socket *sock) llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap); if (!llc_send_disc(sk)) llc_ui_wait_for_disc(sk, sk->sk_rcvtimeo); - sap = llc->sap; - /* Hold this for release_sock(), so that llc_backlog_rcv() could still - * use it. - */ - llc_sap_hold(sap); - if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) + if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) { + struct llc_sap *sap = llc->sap; + + /* Hold this for release_sock(), so that llc_backlog_rcv() + * could still use it. + */ + llc_sap_hold(sap); llc_sap_remove_socket(llc->sap, sk); - release_sock(sk); - llc_sap_put(sap); + release_sock(sk); + llc_sap_put(sap); + } else { + release_sock(sk); + } if (llc->dev) dev_put(llc->dev); sock_put(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a957fa190aa9d9168b33d460a5241a6d088c6265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahmed Abdelsalam Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 15:58:05 +0200 Subject: ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference in seg6_do_srh_encap()- v4 pkts In case of seg6 in encap mode, seg6_do_srh_encap() calls set_tun_src() in order to set the src addr of outer IPv6 header. The net_device is required for set_tun_src(). However calling ip6_dst_idev() on dst_entry in case of IPv4 traffic results on the following bug. Using just dst->dev should fix this BUG. [ 196.242461] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 [ 196.242975] PGD 800000010f076067 P4D 800000010f076067 PUD 10f060067 PMD 0 [ 196.243329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 196.243468] Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd input_leds glue_helper led_class pcspkr serio_raw mac_hid video autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid e1000 i2c_piix4 ahci pata_acpi libahci [ 196.244362] CPU: 2 PID: 1089 Comm: ping Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1 [ 196.244606] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 196.244968] RIP: 0010:seg6_do_srh_encap+0x1ac/0x300 [ 196.245236] RSP: 0018:ffffb2ce00b23a60 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 196.245464] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c7f53eea300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 196.245742] RDX: 0000f10000000000 RSI: ffff8c7f52085a6c RDI: ffff8c7f41166850 [ 196.246018] RBP: ffffb2ce00b23aa8 R08: 00000000000261e0 R09: ffff8c7f41166800 [ 196.246294] R10: ffffdce5040ac780 R11: ffff8c7f41166828 R12: ffff8c7f41166808 [ 196.246570] R13: ffff8c7f52085a44 R14: ffffffffb73211c0 R15: ffff8c7e69e44200 [ 196.246846] FS: 00007fc448789700(0000) GS:ffff8c7f59d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 196.247286] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 196.247526] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010f05a000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 196.247804] Call Trace: [ 196.247972] seg6_do_srh+0x15b/0x1c0 [ 196.248156] seg6_output+0x3c/0x220 [ 196.248341] ? prandom_u32+0x14/0x20 [ 196.248526] ? ip_idents_reserve+0x6c/0x80 [ 196.248723] ? __ip_select_ident+0x90/0x100 [ 196.248923] ? ip_append_data.part.50+0x6c/0xd0 [ 196.249133] lwtunnel_output+0x44/0x70 [ 196.249328] ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40 [ 196.249515] raw_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xac0 [ 196.249701] ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60 [ 196.249897] ? rw_copy_check_uvector+0x53/0x110 [ 196.250106] ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60 [ 196.250299] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0xce/0x140 [ 196.250508] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [ 196.250690] ___sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x2a0 [ 196.250881] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 196.251074] ? copy_termios+0x1e/0x70 [ 196.251261] ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30 [ 196.251575] ? tty_mode_ioctl+0x1c3/0x4e0 [ 196.251782] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 196.251972] ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30 [ 196.252152] ? vvar_fault+0xd2/0x110 [ 196.252337] ? __do_fault+0x1f/0xc0 [ 196.252521] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xc1f/0x12d0 [ 196.252727] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0 [ 196.252919] __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0 [ 196.253107] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x200 [ 196.253305] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 196.253530] RIP: 0033:0x7fc4480b0690 [ 196.253715] RSP: 002b:00007ffde9f252f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 196.254053] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 00007fc4480b0690 [ 196.254331] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000060a360 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 196.254608] RBP: 00007ffde9f253f0 R08: 00000000002d1e81 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 196.254884] R10: 00007ffde9f250c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000b22070 [ 196.255205] R13: 20c49ba5e353f7cf R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007ffde9f278fe [ 196.255484] Code: a5 0f b6 45 c0 41 88 41 28 41 0f b6 41 2c 48 c1 e0 04 49 8b 54 01 38 49 8b 44 01 30 49 89 51 20 49 89 41 18 48 8b 83 b0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 30 49 8b 86 08 0b 00 00 48 8b 40 20 48 8b 50 08 48 0b 10 [ 196.256190] RIP: seg6_do_srh_encap+0x1ac/0x300 RSP: ffffb2ce00b23a60 [ 196.256445] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 196.256676] ---[ end trace 71af7d093603885c ]--- Fixes: 8936ef7604c11 ("ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting encap source address") Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam Acked-by: David Lebrun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c index f343e6f0fc95..5fe139484919 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, int proto) isrh->nexthdr = proto; hdr->daddr = isrh->segments[isrh->first_segment]; - set_tun_src(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst)->dev, &hdr->daddr, &hdr->saddr); + set_tun_src(net, dst->dev, &hdr->daddr, &hdr->saddr); #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC if (sr_has_hmac(isrh)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c5aba211dd61f41d737a2c51729eb9fdcd3edf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Doron Roberts-Kedes Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 12:11:11 -0700 Subject: strparser: Do not call mod_delayed_work with a timeout of LONG_MAX struct sock's sk_rcvtimeo is initialized to LONG_MAX/MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT in sock_init_data. Calling mod_delayed_work with a timeout of LONG_MAX causes spurious execution of the work function. timer->expires is set equal to jiffies + LONG_MAX. When timer_base->clk falls behind the current value of jiffies, the delta between timer_base->clk and jiffies + LONG_MAX causes the expiration to be in the past. Returning early from strp_start_timer if timeo == LONG_MAX solves this problem. Found while testing net/tls_sw recv path. Fixes: 43a0c6751a322847 ("strparser: Stream parser for messages") Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/strparser/strparser.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c index 805b139756db..092bebc70048 100644 --- a/net/strparser/strparser.c +++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err) static void strp_start_timer(struct strparser *strp, long timeo) { - if (timeo) + if (timeo && timeo != LONG_MAX) mod_delayed_work(strp_wq, &strp->msg_timer_work, timeo); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f6cd14537ff9919081be19b9c53b9b19c0d3ea97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Aring Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 15:15:03 -0400 Subject: net: sched: ife: signal not finding metaid We need to record stats for received metadata that we dont know how to process. Have find_decode_metaid() return -ENOENT to capture this. Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring Reviewed-by: Yotam Gigi Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/act_ife.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/act_ife.c b/net/sched/act_ife.c index a5994cf0512b..49b8ab551fbe 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_ife.c +++ b/net/sched/act_ife.c @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ static int find_decode_metaid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcf_ife_info *ife, } } - return 0; + return -ENOENT; } static int tcf_ife_decode(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc74eddd0ff325d57373cea99f642b787d7f76f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Aring Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 15:15:04 -0400 Subject: net: sched: ife: handle malformed tlv length There is currently no handling to check on a invalid tlv length. This patch adds such handling to avoid killing the kernel with a malformed ife packet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring Reviewed-by: Yotam Gigi Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ife/ife.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/sched/act_ife.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ife/ife.c b/net/ife/ife.c index 7d1ec76e7f43..7fbe70a0af4b 100644 --- a/net/ife/ife.c +++ b/net/ife/ife.c @@ -92,12 +92,43 @@ struct meta_tlvhdr { __be16 len; }; +static bool __ife_tlv_meta_valid(const unsigned char *skbdata, + const unsigned char *ifehdr_end) +{ + const struct meta_tlvhdr *tlv; + u16 tlvlen; + + if (unlikely(skbdata + sizeof(*tlv) > ifehdr_end)) + return false; + + tlv = (const struct meta_tlvhdr *)skbdata; + tlvlen = ntohs(tlv->len); + + /* tlv length field is inc header, check on minimum */ + if (tlvlen < NLA_HDRLEN) + return false; + + /* overflow by NLA_ALIGN check */ + if (NLA_ALIGN(tlvlen) < tlvlen) + return false; + + if (unlikely(skbdata + NLA_ALIGN(tlvlen) > ifehdr_end)) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* Caller takes care of presenting data in network order */ -void *ife_tlv_meta_decode(void *skbdata, u16 *attrtype, u16 *dlen, u16 *totlen) +void *ife_tlv_meta_decode(void *skbdata, const void *ifehdr_end, u16 *attrtype, + u16 *dlen, u16 *totlen) { - struct meta_tlvhdr *tlv = (struct meta_tlvhdr *) skbdata; + struct meta_tlvhdr *tlv; + + if (!__ife_tlv_meta_valid(skbdata, ifehdr_end)) + return NULL; + tlv = (struct meta_tlvhdr *)skbdata; *dlen = ntohs(tlv->len) - NLA_HDRLEN; *attrtype = ntohs(tlv->type); diff --git a/net/sched/act_ife.c b/net/sched/act_ife.c index 49b8ab551fbe..8527cfdc446d 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_ife.c +++ b/net/sched/act_ife.c @@ -682,7 +682,12 @@ static int tcf_ife_decode(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, u16 mtype; u16 dlen; - curr_data = ife_tlv_meta_decode(tlv_data, &mtype, &dlen, NULL); + curr_data = ife_tlv_meta_decode(tlv_data, ifehdr_end, &mtype, + &dlen, NULL); + if (!curr_data) { + qstats_drop_inc(this_cpu_ptr(ife->common.cpu_qstats)); + return TC_ACT_SHOT; + } if (find_decode_metaid(skb, ife, mtype, dlen, curr_data)) { /* abuse overlimits to count when we receive metadata -- cgit v1.2.3 From d57493d6d1be26c8ac8516a4463bfe24956978eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Aring Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 15:15:05 -0400 Subject: net: sched: ife: check on metadata length This patch checks if sk buffer is available to dererence ife header. If not then NULL will returned to signal an malformed ife packet. This avoids to crashing the kernel from outside. Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring Reviewed-by: Yotam Gigi Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ife/ife.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ife/ife.c b/net/ife/ife.c index 7fbe70a0af4b..13bbf8cb6a39 100644 --- a/net/ife/ife.c +++ b/net/ife/ife.c @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ void *ife_decode(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *metalen) int total_pull; u16 ifehdrln; + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb->dev->hard_header_len + IFE_METAHDRLEN)) + return NULL; + ifehdr = (struct ifeheadr *) (skb->data + skb->dev->hard_header_len); ifehdrln = ntohs(ifehdr->metalen); total_pull = skb->dev->hard_header_len + ifehdrln; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7e5a206ab686f098367b61aca989f5cdfa8114a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 15:57:30 +0200 Subject: tcp: don't read out-of-bounds opsize The old code reads the "opsize" variable from out-of-bounds memory (first byte behind the segment) if a broken TCP segment ends directly after an opcode that is neither EOL nor NOP. The result of the read isn't used for anything, so the worst thing that could theoretically happen is a pagefault; and since the physmap is usually mostly contiguous, even that seems pretty unlikely. The following C reproducer triggers the uninitialized read - however, you can't actually see anything happen unless you put something like a pr_warn() in tcp_parse_md5sig_option() to print the opsize. ==================================== #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include void systemf(const char *command, ...) { char *full_command; va_list ap; va_start(ap, command); if (vasprintf(&full_command, command, ap) == -1) err(1, "vasprintf"); va_end(ap); printf("systemf: <<<%s>>>\n", full_command); system(full_command); } char *devname; int tun_alloc(char *name) { int fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR); if (fd == -1) err(1, "open tun dev"); static struct ifreq req = { .ifr_flags = IFF_TUN|IFF_NO_PI }; strcpy(req.ifr_name, name); if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &req)) err(1, "TUNSETIFF"); devname = req.ifr_name; printf("device name: %s\n", devname); return fd; } #define IPADDR(a,b,c,d) (((a)<<0)+((b)<<8)+((c)<<16)+((d)<<24)) void sum_accumulate(unsigned int *sum, void *data, int len) { assert((len&2)==0); for (int i=0; i> 16) + (sum & 0xffff); sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff); return htons(~sum); } void fix_ip_sum(struct iphdr *ip) { unsigned int sum = 0; sum_accumulate(&sum, ip, sizeof(*ip)); ip->check = sum_final(sum); } void fix_tcp_sum(struct iphdr *ip, struct tcphdr *tcp) { unsigned int sum = 0; struct { unsigned int saddr; unsigned int daddr; unsigned char pad; unsigned char proto_num; unsigned short tcp_len; } fakehdr = { .saddr = ip->saddr, .daddr = ip->daddr, .proto_num = ip->protocol, .tcp_len = htons(ntohs(ip->tot_len) - ip->ihl*4) }; sum_accumulate(&sum, &fakehdr, sizeof(fakehdr)); sum_accumulate(&sum, tcp, tcp->doff*4); tcp->check = sum_final(sum); } int main(void) { int tun_fd = tun_alloc("inject_dev%d"); systemf("ip link set %s up", devname); systemf("ip addr add 192.168.42.1/24 dev %s", devname); struct { struct iphdr ip; struct tcphdr tcp; unsigned char tcp_opts[20]; } __attribute__((packed)) syn_packet = { .ip = { .ihl = sizeof(struct iphdr)/4, .version = 4, .tot_len = htons(sizeof(syn_packet)), .ttl = 30, .protocol = IPPROTO_TCP, /* FIXUP check */ .saddr = IPADDR(192,168,42,2), .daddr = IPADDR(192,168,42,1) }, .tcp = { .source = htons(1), .dest = htons(1337), .seq = 0x12345678, .doff = (sizeof(syn_packet.tcp)+sizeof(syn_packet.tcp_opts))/4, .syn = 1, .window = htons(64), .check = 0 /*FIXUP*/ }, .tcp_opts = { /* INVALID: trailing MD5SIG opcode after NOPs */ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 19 } }; fix_ip_sum(&syn_packet.ip); fix_tcp_sum(&syn_packet.ip, &syn_packet.tcp); while (1) { int write_res = write(tun_fd, &syn_packet, sizeof(syn_packet)); if (write_res != sizeof(syn_packet)) err(1, "packet write failed"); } } ==================================== Fixes: cfb6eeb4c860 ("[TCP]: MD5 Signature Option (RFC2385) support.") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 367def6ddeda..e51c644484dc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3868,11 +3868,8 @@ const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th) int length = (th->doff << 2) - sizeof(*th); const u8 *ptr = (const u8 *)(th + 1); - /* If the TCP option is too short, we can short cut */ - if (length < TCPOLEN_MD5SIG) - return NULL; - - while (length > 0) { + /* If not enough data remaining, we can short cut */ + while (length >= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG) { int opcode = *ptr++; int opsize; -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa8f8778493c85fff480cdf8b349b1e1dcb5f243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 18:29:23 -0700 Subject: ipv6: add RTA_TABLE and RTA_PREFSRC to rtm_ipv6_policy KMSAN reported use of uninit-value that I tracked to lack of proper size check on RTA_TABLE attribute. I also believe RTA_PREFSRC lacks a similar check. Fixes: 86872cb57925 ("[IPv6] route: FIB6 configuration using struct fib6_config") Fixes: c3968a857a6b ("ipv6: RTA_PREFSRC support for ipv6 route source address selection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 49b954d6d0fa..cde7d8251377 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -3975,6 +3975,7 @@ void rt6_mtu_change(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int mtu) static const struct nla_policy rtm_ipv6_policy[RTA_MAX+1] = { [RTA_GATEWAY] = { .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) }, + [RTA_PREFSRC] = { .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) }, [RTA_OIF] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [RTA_IIF] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [RTA_PRIORITY] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, @@ -3986,6 +3987,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy rtm_ipv6_policy[RTA_MAX+1] = { [RTA_EXPIRES] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [RTA_UID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [RTA_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [RTA_TABLE] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; static int rtm_to_fib6_config(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, -- cgit v1.2.3 From eb1c28c05894a4b1f6b56c5bf072205e64cfa280 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 16:15:14 +0200 Subject: l2tp: check sockaddr length in pppol2tp_connect() Check sockaddr_len before dereferencing sp->sa_protocol, to ensure that it actually points to valid data. Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Reported-by: syzbot+a70ac890b23b1bf29f5c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 1404bc1c1bb7..1fd9e145076a 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -619,6 +619,13 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr, lock_sock(sk); error = -EINVAL; + + if (sockaddr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tp) && + sockaddr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3) && + sockaddr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpin6) && + sockaddr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3in6)) + goto end; + if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_OL2TP) goto end; -- cgit v1.2.3 From facb9f6eba3df4e8027301cc0e514dc582a1b366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 15:25:10 +0200 Subject: libceph: un-backoff on tick when we have a authenticated session This means that if we do some backoff, then authenticate, and are healthy for an extended period of time, a subsequent failure won't leave us starting our hunting sequence with a large backoff. Mirrors ceph.git commit d466bc6e66abba9b464b0b69687cf45c9dccf383. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+ Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman --- net/ceph/mon_client.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c index b3dac24412d3..02c441c12c38 100644 --- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c @@ -209,6 +209,14 @@ static void reopen_session(struct ceph_mon_client *monc) __open_session(monc); } +static void un_backoff(struct ceph_mon_client *monc) +{ + monc->hunt_mult /= 2; /* reduce by 50% */ + if (monc->hunt_mult < 1) + monc->hunt_mult = 1; + dout("%s hunt_mult now %d\n", __func__, monc->hunt_mult); +} + /* * Reschedule delayed work timer. */ @@ -963,6 +971,7 @@ static void delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) if (!monc->hunting) { ceph_con_keepalive(&monc->con); __validate_auth(monc); + un_backoff(monc); } if (is_auth && @@ -1123,9 +1132,7 @@ static void finish_hunting(struct ceph_mon_client *monc) dout("%s found mon%d\n", __func__, monc->cur_mon); monc->hunting = false; monc->had_a_connection = true; - monc->hunt_mult /= 2; /* reduce by 50% */ - if (monc->hunt_mult < 1) - monc->hunt_mult = 1; + un_backoff(monc); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7b4c443d139f1d2b5570da475f7a9cbcef86740c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 15:25:10 +0200 Subject: libceph: reschedule a tick in finish_hunting() If we go without an established session for a while, backoff delay will climb to 30 seconds. The keepalive timeout is also 30 seconds, so it's pretty easily hit after a prolonged hunting for a monitor: we don't get a chance to send out a keepalive in time, which means we never get back a keepalive ack in time, cutting an established session and attempting to connect to a different monitor every 30 seconds: [Sun Apr 1 23:37:05 2018] libceph: mon0 10.80.20.99:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:37:36 2018] libceph: mon0 10.80.20.99:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon [Sun Apr 1 23:37:36 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:38:07 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon [Sun Apr 1 23:38:07 2018] libceph: mon1 10.80.20.100:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:38:37 2018] libceph: mon1 10.80.20.100:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon [Sun Apr 1 23:38:37 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:39:08 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon The regular keepalive interval is 10 seconds. After ->hunting is cleared in finish_hunting(), call __schedule_delayed() to ensure we send out a keepalive after 10 seconds. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+ Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23537 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman --- net/ceph/mon_client.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c index 02c441c12c38..21ac6e3b96bb 100644 --- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c @@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ static void finish_hunting(struct ceph_mon_client *monc) monc->hunting = false; monc->had_a_connection = true; un_backoff(monc); + __schedule_delayed(monc); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a6361f0ca4b25460f2cdf3235ebe8115f622901e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 17:37:03 -0400 Subject: packet: fix bitfield update race Updates to the bitfields in struct packet_sock are not atomic. Serialize these read-modify-write cycles. Move po->running into a separate variable. Its writes are protected by po->bind_lock (except for one startup case at packet_create). Also replace a textual precondition warning with lockdep annotation. All others are set only in packet_setsockopt. Serialize these updates by holding the socket lock. Analogous to other field updates, also hold the lock when testing whether a ring is active (pg_vec). Fixes: 8dc419447415 ("[PACKET]: Add optional checksum computation for recvmsg") Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong Reported-by: Byoungyoung Lee Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/packet/internal.h | 10 ++++----- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index c31b0687396a..01f3515cada0 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -329,11 +329,11 @@ static void packet_pick_tx_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_index); } -/* register_prot_hook must be invoked with the po->bind_lock held, +/* __register_prot_hook must be invoked through register_prot_hook * or from a context in which asynchronous accesses to the packet * socket is not possible (packet_create()). */ -static void register_prot_hook(struct sock *sk) +static void __register_prot_hook(struct sock *sk) { struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk); @@ -348,8 +348,13 @@ static void register_prot_hook(struct sock *sk) } } -/* {,__}unregister_prot_hook() must be invoked with the po->bind_lock - * held. If the sync parameter is true, we will temporarily drop +static void register_prot_hook(struct sock *sk) +{ + lockdep_assert_held_once(&pkt_sk(sk)->bind_lock); + __register_prot_hook(sk); +} + +/* If the sync parameter is true, we will temporarily drop * the po->bind_lock and do a synchronize_net to make sure no * asynchronous packet processing paths still refer to the elements * of po->prot_hook. If the sync parameter is false, it is the @@ -359,6 +364,8 @@ static void __unregister_prot_hook(struct sock *sk, bool sync) { struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk); + lockdep_assert_held_once(&po->bind_lock); + po->running = 0; if (po->fanout) @@ -3252,7 +3259,7 @@ static int packet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, if (proto) { po->prot_hook.type = proto; - register_prot_hook(sk); + __register_prot_hook(sk); } mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock); @@ -3732,12 +3739,18 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv if (optlen != sizeof(val)) return -EINVAL; - if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) - return -EBUSY; if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) return -EFAULT; - po->tp_loss = !!val; - return 0; + + lock_sock(sk); + if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) { + ret = -EBUSY; + } else { + po->tp_loss = !!val; + ret = 0; + } + release_sock(sk); + return ret; } case PACKET_AUXDATA: { @@ -3748,7 +3761,9 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) return -EFAULT; + lock_sock(sk); po->auxdata = !!val; + release_sock(sk); return 0; } case PACKET_ORIGDEV: @@ -3760,7 +3775,9 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) return -EFAULT; + lock_sock(sk); po->origdev = !!val; + release_sock(sk); return 0; } case PACKET_VNET_HDR: @@ -3769,15 +3786,20 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW) return -EINVAL; - if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) - return -EBUSY; if (optlen < sizeof(val)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) return -EFAULT; - po->has_vnet_hdr = !!val; - return 0; + lock_sock(sk); + if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) { + ret = -EBUSY; + } else { + po->has_vnet_hdr = !!val; + ret = 0; + } + release_sock(sk); + return ret; } case PACKET_TIMESTAMP: { @@ -3815,11 +3837,17 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv if (optlen != sizeof(val)) return -EINVAL; - if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) - return -EBUSY; if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) return -EFAULT; - po->tp_tx_has_off = !!val; + + lock_sock(sk); + if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) { + ret = -EBUSY; + } else { + po->tp_tx_has_off = !!val; + ret = 0; + } + release_sock(sk); return 0; } case PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS: diff --git a/net/packet/internal.h b/net/packet/internal.h index a1d2b2319ae9..3bb7c5fb3bff 100644 --- a/net/packet/internal.h +++ b/net/packet/internal.h @@ -112,10 +112,12 @@ struct packet_sock { int copy_thresh; spinlock_t bind_lock; struct mutex pg_vec_lock; - unsigned int running:1, /* prot_hook is attached*/ - auxdata:1, + unsigned int running; /* bind_lock must be held */ + unsigned int auxdata:1, /* writer must hold sock lock */ origdev:1, - has_vnet_hdr:1; + has_vnet_hdr:1, + tp_loss:1, + tp_tx_has_off:1; int pressure; int ifindex; /* bound device */ __be16 num; @@ -125,8 +127,6 @@ struct packet_sock { enum tpacket_versions tp_version; unsigned int tp_hdrlen; unsigned int tp_reserve; - unsigned int tp_loss:1; - unsigned int tp_tx_has_off:1; unsigned int tp_tstamp; struct net_device __rcu *cached_dev; int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9c55ad1c214d9f8c4594ac2c3fa392c1c32431a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 19:10:55 +0200 Subject: libceph: validate con->state at the top of try_write() ceph_con_workfn() validates con->state before calling try_read() and then try_write(). However, try_read() temporarily releases con->mutex, notably in process_message() and ceph_con_in_msg_alloc(), opening the window for ceph_con_close() to sneak in, close the connection and release con->sock. When try_write() is called on the assumption that con->state is still valid (i.e. not STANDBY or CLOSED), a NULL sock gets passed to the networking stack: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x5/0x20 Make sure con->state is valid at the top of try_write() and add an explicit BUG_ON for this, similar to try_read(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23706 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman --- net/ceph/messenger.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index fcb40c12b1f8..3b3d33ea9ed8 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -2569,6 +2569,11 @@ static int try_write(struct ceph_connection *con) int ret = 1; dout("try_write start %p state %lu\n", con, con->state); + if (con->state != CON_STATE_PREOPEN && + con->state != CON_STATE_CONNECTING && + con->state != CON_STATE_NEGOTIATING && + con->state != CON_STATE_OPEN) + return 0; more: dout("try_write out_kvec_bytes %d\n", con->out_kvec_bytes); @@ -2594,6 +2599,8 @@ more: } more_kvec: + BUG_ON(!con->sock); + /* kvec data queued? */ if (con->out_kvec_left) { ret = write_partial_kvec(con); -- cgit v1.2.3