From 3c10ffddc61f8a1a59e29a110ba70b47e679206a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2021 22:04:00 +0300 Subject: net: xfrm: fix shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_get_default Syzbot hit shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_get_default. The problem was in missing validation check for user data. up->dirmask comes from user-space, so we need to check if this value is less than XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX to avoid shift-out-of-bounds bugs. Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b2be9dd8ca6f6c73ee2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 03b66d154b2b..4719a6d54aa6 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -2005,6 +2005,11 @@ static int xfrm_get_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, return -EMSGSIZE; } + if (up->dirmask >= XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX) { + kfree_skb(r_skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + r_up = nlmsg_data(r_nlh); r_up->action = ((net->xfrm.policy_default & (1 << up->dirmask)) >> up->dirmask); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7bbc3d385bd813077acaf0e6fdb2a86a901f5382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 18:26:34 +0200 Subject: netfilter: ipset: Fix oversized kvmalloc() calls The commit commit 7661809d493b426e979f39ab512e3adf41fbcc69 Author: Linus Torvalds Date: Wed Jul 14 09:45:49 2021 -0700 mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls limits the max allocatable memory via kvmalloc() to MAX_INT. Apply the same limit in ipset. Reported-by: syzbot+3493b1873fb3ea827986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+2b8443c35458a617c904@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+ee5cb15f4a0e85e0d54e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h index 6186358eac7c..6e391308431d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h @@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ htable_size(u8 hbits) { size_t hsize; - /* We must fit both into u32 in jhash and size_t */ + /* We must fit both into u32 in jhash and INT_MAX in kvmalloc_node() */ if (hbits > 31) return 0; hsize = jhash_size(hbits); - if ((((size_t)-1) - sizeof(struct htable)) / sizeof(struct hbucket *) + if ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct htable)) / sizeof(struct hbucket *) < hsize) return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 69e73dbfda14fbfe748d3812da1244cce2928dcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Claudi Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 18:08:39 +0200 Subject: ipvs: check that ip_vs_conn_tab_bits is between 8 and 20 ip_vs_conn_tab_bits may be provided by the user through the conn_tab_bits module parameter. If this value is greater than 31, or less than 0, the shift operator used to derive tab_size causes undefined behaviour. Fix this checking ip_vs_conn_tab_bits value to be in the range specified in ipvs Kconfig. If not, simply use default value. Fixes: 6f7edb4881bf ("IPVS: Allow boot time change of hash size") Reported-by: Yi Chen Signed-off-by: Andrea Claudi Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Acked-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c index c100c6b112c8..2c467c422dc6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c @@ -1468,6 +1468,10 @@ int __init ip_vs_conn_init(void) int idx; /* Compute size and mask */ + if (ip_vs_conn_tab_bits < 8 || ip_vs_conn_tab_bits > 20) { + pr_info("conn_tab_bits not in [8, 20]. Using default value\n"); + ip_vs_conn_tab_bits = CONFIG_IP_VS_TAB_BITS; + } ip_vs_conn_tab_size = 1 << ip_vs_conn_tab_bits; ip_vs_conn_tab_mask = ip_vs_conn_tab_size - 1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f8d858e607b2a36808ac6d4218f5f5203d7a7d63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 16:46:33 +0200 Subject: xfrm: make user policy API complete >From a userland POV, this API was based on some magic values: - dirmask and action were bitfields but meaning of bits (XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_*) are not exported; - action is confusing, if a bit is set, does it mean drop or accept? Let's try to simplify this uapi by using explicit field and macros. Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 4719a6d54aa6..90c88390f1fe 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1966,16 +1966,21 @@ static int xfrm_set_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, { struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); struct xfrm_userpolicy_default *up = nlmsg_data(nlh); - u8 dirmask; - u8 old_default = net->xfrm.policy_default; - if (up->dirmask >= XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX) - return -EINVAL; + if (up->in == XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK) + net->xfrm.policy_default |= XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_IN; + else if (up->in == XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT) + net->xfrm.policy_default &= ~XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_IN; - dirmask = (1 << up->dirmask) & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_MASK; + if (up->fwd == XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK) + net->xfrm.policy_default |= XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_FWD; + else if (up->fwd == XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT) + net->xfrm.policy_default &= ~XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_FWD; - net->xfrm.policy_default = (old_default & (0xff ^ dirmask)) - | (up->action << up->dirmask); + if (up->out == XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK) + net->xfrm.policy_default |= XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_OUT; + else if (up->out == XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT) + net->xfrm.policy_default &= ~XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_OUT; rt_genid_bump_all(net); @@ -1988,13 +1993,11 @@ static int xfrm_get_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, struct sk_buff *r_skb; struct nlmsghdr *r_nlh; struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); - struct xfrm_userpolicy_default *r_up, *up; + struct xfrm_userpolicy_default *r_up; int len = NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_default)); u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid; u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; - up = nlmsg_data(nlh); - r_skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!r_skb) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2005,15 +2008,14 @@ static int xfrm_get_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, return -EMSGSIZE; } - if (up->dirmask >= XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX) { - kfree_skb(r_skb); - return -EINVAL; - } - r_up = nlmsg_data(r_nlh); - r_up->action = ((net->xfrm.policy_default & (1 << up->dirmask)) >> up->dirmask); - r_up->dirmask = up->dirmask; + r_up->in = net->xfrm.policy_default & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_IN ? + XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT; + r_up->fwd = net->xfrm.policy_default & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_FWD ? + XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT; + r_up->out = net->xfrm.policy_default & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_OUT ? + XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT; nlmsg_end(r_skb, r_nlh); return nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, portid); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 88d0adb5f13b1c52fbb7d755f6f79db18c2f0c2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 16:46:34 +0200 Subject: xfrm: notify default policy on update This configuration knob is very sensible, it should be notified when changing. Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 90c88390f1fe..0eba0c27c665 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1961,6 +1961,36 @@ static struct sk_buff *xfrm_policy_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb, return skb; } +static int xfrm_notify_userpolicy(struct net *net) +{ + struct xfrm_userpolicy_default *up; + int len = NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(*up)); + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + struct sk_buff *skb; + + skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (skb == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT, sizeof(*up), 0); + if (nlh == NULL) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return -EMSGSIZE; + } + + up = nlmsg_data(nlh); + up->in = net->xfrm.policy_default & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_IN ? + XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT; + up->fwd = net->xfrm.policy_default & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_FWD ? + XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT; + up->out = net->xfrm.policy_default & XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_OUT ? + XFRM_USERPOLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_USERPOLICY_ACCEPT; + + nlmsg_end(skb, nlh); + + return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_POLICY); +} + static int xfrm_set_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, struct nlattr **attrs) { @@ -1984,6 +2014,7 @@ static int xfrm_set_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, rt_genid_bump_all(net); + xfrm_notify_userpolicy(net); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 310e2d43c3ad429c1fba4b175806cf1f55ed73a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Sowden Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2021 22:24:33 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ip6_tables: zero-initialize fragment offset ip6tables only sets the `IP6T_F_PROTO` flag on a rule if a protocol is specified (`-p tcp`, for example). However, if the flag is not set, `ip6_packet_match` doesn't call `ipv6_find_hdr` for the skb, in which case the fragment offset is left uninitialized and a garbage value is passed to each matcher. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index de2cf3943b91..a579ea14a69b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, * things we don't know, ie. tcp syn flag or ports). If the * rule is also a fragment-specific rule, non-fragments won't * match it. */ + acpar.fragoff = 0; acpar.hotdrop = false; acpar.state = state; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3c9cfb5269f76d447dbadb67835368f3111a91d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 14:17:35 +0300 Subject: net: update NXP copyright text NXP Legal insists that the following are not fine: - Saying "NXP Semiconductors" instead of "NXP", since the company's registered name is "NXP" - Putting a "(c)" sign in the copyright string - Putting a comma in the copyright string The only accepted copyright string format is "Copyright NXP". This patch changes the copyright headers in the networking files that were sent by me, or derived from code sent by me. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c | 2 +- net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c index d37ab98e7fe1..8025ed778d33 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* Copyright 2019 NXP Semiconductors +/* Copyright 2019 NXP */ #include #include diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c index 3038a257ba05..59072930cb02 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* Copyright 2020-2021 NXP Semiconductors +/* Copyright 2020-2021 NXP * * An implementation of the software-defined tag_8021q.c tagger format, which * also preserves full functionality under a vlan_filtering bridge. It does -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0650bf52b31ff35dc6430fc2e37969c36baba724 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 16:34:33 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown Lino reports that on his system with bcmgenet as DSA master and KSZ9897 as a switch, rebooting or shutting down never works properly. What does the bcmgenet driver have special to trigger this, that other DSA masters do not? It has an implementation of ->shutdown which simply calls its ->remove implementation. Otherwise said, it unregisters its network interface on shutdown. This message can be seen in a loop, and it hangs the reboot process there: unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 3 So why 3? A usage count of 1 is normal for a registered network interface, and any virtual interface which links itself as an upper of that will increment it via dev_hold. In the case of DSA, this is the call path: dsa_slave_create -> netdev_upper_dev_link -> __netdev_upper_dev_link -> __netdev_adjacent_dev_insert -> dev_hold So a DSA switch with 3 interfaces will result in a usage count elevated by two, and netdev_wait_allrefs will wait until they have gone away. Other stacked interfaces, like VLAN, watch NETDEV_UNREGISTER events and delete themselves, but DSA cannot just vanish and go poof, at most it can unbind itself from the switch devices, but that must happen strictly earlier compared to when the DSA master unregisters its net_device, so reacting on the NETDEV_UNREGISTER event is way too late. It seems that it is a pretty established pattern to have a driver's ->shutdown hook redirect to its ->remove hook, so the same code is executed regardless of whether the driver is unbound from the device, or the system is just shutting down. As Florian puts it, it is quite a big hammer for bcmgenet to unregister its net_device during shutdown, but having a common code path with the driver unbind helps ensure it is well tested. So DSA, for better or for worse, has to live with that and engage in an arms race of implementing the ->shutdown hook too, from all individual drivers, and do something sane when paired with masters that unregister their net_device there. The only sane thing to do, of course, is to unlink from the master. However, complications arise really quickly. The pattern of redirecting ->shutdown to ->remove is not unique to bcmgenet or even to net_device drivers. In fact, SPI controllers do it too (see dspi_shutdown -> dspi_remove), and presumably, I2C controllers and MDIO controllers do it too (this is something I have not researched too deeply, but even if this is not the case today, it is certainly plausible to happen in the future, and must be taken into consideration). Since DSA switches might be SPI devices, I2C devices, MDIO devices, the insane implication is that for the exact same DSA switch device, we might have both ->shutdown and ->remove getting called. So we need to do something with that insane environment. The pattern I've come up with is "if this, then not that", so if either ->shutdown or ->remove gets called, we set the device's drvdata to NULL, and in the other hook, we check whether the drvdata is NULL and just do nothing. This is probably not necessary for platform devices, just for devices on buses, but I would really insist for consistency among drivers, because when code is copy-pasted, it is not always copy-pasted from the best sources. So depending on whether the DSA switch's ->remove or ->shutdown will get called first, we cannot really guarantee even for the same driver if rebooting will result in the same code path on all platforms. But nonetheless, we need to do something minimally reasonable on ->shutdown too to fix the bug. Of course, the ->remove will do more (a full teardown of the tree, with all data structures freed, and this is why the bug was not caught for so long). The new ->shutdown method is kept separate from dsa_unregister_switch not because we couldn't have unregistered the switch, but simply in the interest of doing something quick and to the point. The big question is: does the DSA switch's ->shutdown get called earlier than the DSA master's ->shutdown? If not, there is still a risk that we might still trigger the WARN_ON in unregister_netdevice that says we are attempting to unregister a net_device which has uppers. That's no good. Although the reference to the master net_device won't physically go away even if DSA's ->shutdown comes afterwards, remember we have a dev_hold on it. The answer to that question lies in this comment above device_link_add: * A side effect of the link creation is re-ordering of dpm_list and the * devices_kset list by moving the consumer device and all devices depending * on it to the ends of these lists (that does not happen to devices that have * not been registered when this function is called). so the fact that DSA uses device_link_add towards its master is not exactly for nothing. device_shutdown() walks devices_kset from the back, so this is our guarantee that DSA's shutdown happens before the master's shutdown. Fixes: 2f1e8ea726e9 ("net: dsa: link interfaces with the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210909095324.12978-1-LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de/ Reported-by: Lino Sanfilippo Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Tested-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index eef13cd20f19..fa88e58705f0 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -1562,3 +1562,53 @@ void dsa_unregister_switch(struct dsa_switch *ds) mutex_unlock(&dsa2_mutex); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dsa_unregister_switch); + +/* If the DSA master chooses to unregister its net_device on .shutdown, DSA is + * blocking that operation from completion, due to the dev_hold taken inside + * netdev_upper_dev_link. Unlink the DSA slave interfaces from being uppers of + * the DSA master, so that the system can reboot successfully. + */ +void dsa_switch_shutdown(struct dsa_switch *ds) +{ + struct net_device *master, *slave_dev; + LIST_HEAD(unregister_list); + struct dsa_port *dp; + + mutex_lock(&dsa2_mutex); + rtnl_lock(); + + list_for_each_entry(dp, &ds->dst->ports, list) { + if (dp->ds != ds) + continue; + + if (!dsa_port_is_user(dp)) + continue; + + master = dp->cpu_dp->master; + slave_dev = dp->slave; + + netdev_upper_dev_unlink(master, slave_dev); + /* Just unlinking ourselves as uppers of the master is not + * sufficient. When the master net device unregisters, that will + * also call dev_close, which we will catch as NETDEV_GOING_DOWN + * and trigger a dev_close on our own devices (dsa_slave_close). + * In turn, that will call dev_mc_unsync on the master's net + * device. If the master is also a DSA switch port, this will + * trigger dsa_slave_set_rx_mode which will call dev_mc_sync on + * its own master. Lockdep will complain about the fact that + * all cascaded masters have the same dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key, + * which it normally would not do if the cascaded masters would + * be in a proper upper/lower relationship, which we've just + * destroyed. + * To suppress the lockdep warnings, let's actually unregister + * the DSA slave interfaces too, to avoid the nonsensical + * multicast address list synchronization on shutdown. + */ + unregister_netdevice_queue(slave_dev, &unregister_list); + } + unregister_netdevice_many(&unregister_list); + + rtnl_unlock(); + mutex_unlock(&dsa2_mutex); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dsa_switch_shutdown); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2dcb96bacce36021c2f3eaae0cef607b5bb71ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2021 14:42:35 +0200 Subject: net: core: Correct the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations lock_sock_fast() and lock_sock_nested() contain lockdep annotations for the sock::sk_lock.owned 'mutex'. sock::sk_lock.owned is not a regular mutex. It is just lockdep wise equivalent. In fact it's an open coded trivial mutex implementation with some interesting features. sock::sk_lock.slock is a regular spinlock protecting the 'mutex' representation sock::sk_lock.owned which is a plain boolean. If 'owned' is true, then some other task holds the 'mutex', otherwise it is uncontended. As this locking construct is obviously endangered by lock ordering issues as any other locking primitive it got lockdep annotated via a dedicated dependency map sock::sk_lock.dep_map which has to be updated at the lock and unlock sites. lock_sock_nested() is a straight forward 'mutex' lock operation: might_sleep(); spin_lock_bh(sock::sk_lock.slock) while (!try_lock(sock::sk_lock.owned)) { spin_unlock_bh(sock::sk_lock.slock); wait_for_release(); spin_lock_bh(sock::sk_lock.slock); } The lockdep annotation for sock::sk_lock.owned is for unknown reasons _after_ the lock has been acquired, i.e. after the code block above and after releasing sock::sk_lock.slock, but inside the bottom halves disabled region: spin_unlock(sock::sk_lock.slock); mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, subclass, 0, _RET_IP_); local_bh_enable(); The placement after the unlock is obvious because otherwise the mutex_acquire() would nest into the spin lock held region. But that's from the lockdep perspective still the wrong place: 1) The mutex_acquire() is issued _after_ the successful acquisition which is pointless because in a dead lock scenario this point is never reached which means that if the deadlock is the first instance of exposing the wrong lock order lockdep does not have a chance to detect it. 2) It only works because lockdep is rather lax on the context from which the mutex_acquire() is issued. Acquiring a mutex inside a bottom halves and therefore non-preemptible region is obviously invalid, except for a trylock which is clearly not the case here. This 'works' stops working on RT enabled kernels where the bottom halves serialization is done via a local lock, which exposes this misplacement because the 'mutex' and the local lock nest the wrong way around and lockdep complains rightfully about a lock inversion. The placement is wrong since the initial commit a5b5bb9a053a ("[PATCH] lockdep: annotate sk_locks") which introduced this. Fix it by moving the mutex_acquire() in front of the actual lock acquisition, which is what the regular mutex_lock() operation does as well. lock_sock_fast() is not that straight forward. It looks at the first glance like a convoluted trylock operation: spin_lock_bh(sock::sk_lock.slock) if (!sock::sk_lock.owned) return false; while (!try_lock(sock::sk_lock.owned)) { spin_unlock_bh(sock::sk_lock.slock); wait_for_release(); spin_lock_bh(sock::sk_lock.slock); } spin_unlock(sock::sk_lock.slock); mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, subclass, 0, _RET_IP_); local_bh_enable(); return true; But that's not the case: lock_sock_fast() is an interesting optimization for short critical sections which can run with bottom halves disabled and sock::sk_lock.slock held. This allows to shortcut the 'mutex' operation in the non contended case by preventing other lockers to acquire sock::sk_lock.owned because they are blocked on sock::sk_lock.slock, which in turn avoids the overhead of doing the heavy processing in release_sock() including waking up wait queue waiters. In the contended case, i.e. when sock::sk_lock.owned == true the behavior is the same as lock_sock_nested(). Semantically this shortcut means, that the task acquired the 'mutex' even if it does not touch the sock::sk_lock.owned field in the non-contended case. Not telling lockdep about this shortcut acquisition is hiding potential lock ordering violations in the fast path. As a consequence the same reasoning as for the above lock_sock_nested() case vs. the placement of the lockdep annotation applies. The current placement of the lockdep annotation was just copied from the original lock_sock(), now renamed to lock_sock_nested(), implementation. Fix this by moving the mutex_acquire() in front of the actual lock acquisition and adding the corresponding mutex_release() into unlock_sock_fast(). Also document the fast path return case with a comment. Reported-by: Sebastian Siewior Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 62627e868e03..512e629f9780 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -3179,17 +3179,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_init_data); void lock_sock_nested(struct sock *sk, int subclass) { + /* The sk_lock has mutex_lock() semantics here. */ + mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, subclass, 0, _RET_IP_); + might_sleep(); spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock); if (sk->sk_lock.owned) __lock_sock(sk); sk->sk_lock.owned = 1; - spin_unlock(&sk->sk_lock.slock); - /* - * The sk_lock has mutex_lock() semantics here: - */ - mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, subclass, 0, _RET_IP_); - local_bh_enable(); + spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(lock_sock_nested); @@ -3227,24 +3225,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_sock); */ bool lock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk) __acquires(&sk->sk_lock.slock) { + /* The sk_lock has mutex_lock() semantics here. */ + mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, 0, 0, _RET_IP_); + might_sleep(); spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock); - if (!sk->sk_lock.owned) + if (!sk->sk_lock.owned) { /* - * Note : We must disable BH + * Fast path return with bottom halves disabled and + * sock::sk_lock.slock held. + * + * The 'mutex' is not contended and holding + * sock::sk_lock.slock prevents all other lockers to + * proceed so the corresponding unlock_sock_fast() can + * avoid the slow path of release_sock() completely and + * just release slock. + * + * From a semantical POV this is equivalent to 'acquiring' + * the 'mutex', hence the corresponding lockdep + * mutex_release() has to happen in the fast path of + * unlock_sock_fast(). */ return false; + } __lock_sock(sk); sk->sk_lock.owned = 1; - spin_unlock(&sk->sk_lock.slock); - /* - * The sk_lock has mutex_lock() semantics here: - */ - mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, 0, 0, _RET_IP_); __acquire(&sk->sk_lock.slock); - local_bh_enable(); + spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock); return true; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(lock_sock_fast); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fd292c189a979838622d5e03e15fa688c81dd50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 17:29:16 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: tear down devlink port regions when tearing down the devlink port on error Commit 86f8b1c01a0a ("net: dsa: Do not make user port errors fatal") decided it was fine to ignore errors on certain ports that fail to probe, and go on with the ports that do probe fine. Commit fb6ec87f7229 ("net: dsa: Fix type was not set for devlink port") noticed that devlink_port_type_eth_set(dlp, dp->slave); does not get called, and devlink notices after a timeout of 3600 seconds and prints a WARN_ON. So it went ahead to unregister the devlink port. And because there exists an UNUSED port flavour, we actually re-register the devlink port as UNUSED. Commit 08156ba430b4 ("net: dsa: Add devlink port regions support to DSA") added devlink port regions, which are set up by the driver and not by DSA. When we trigger the devlink port deregistration and reregistration as unused, devlink now prints another WARN_ON, from here: devlink_port_unregister: WARN_ON(!list_empty(&devlink_port->region_list)); So the port still has regions, which makes sense, because they were set up by the driver, and the driver doesn't know we're unregistering the devlink port. Somebody needs to tear them down, and optionally (actually it would be nice, to be consistent) set them up again for the new devlink port. But DSA's layering stays in our way quite badly here. The options I've considered are: 1. Introduce a function in devlink to just change a port's type and flavour. No dice, devlink keeps a lot of state, it really wants the port to not be registered when you set its parameters, so changing anything can only be done by destroying what we currently have and recreating it. 2. Make DSA cache the parameters passed to dsa_devlink_port_region_create, and the region returned, keep those in a list, then when the devlink port unregister needs to take place, the existing devlink regions are destroyed by DSA, and we replay the creation of new regions using the cached parameters. Problem: mv88e6xxx keeps the region pointers in chip->ports[port].region, and these will remain stale after DSA frees them. There are many things DSA can do, but updating mv88e6xxx's private pointers is not one of them. 3. Just let the driver do it (i.e. introduce a very specific method called ds->ops->port_reinit_as_unused, which unregisters its devlink port devlink regions, then the old devlink port, then registers the new one, then the devlink port regions for it). While it does work, as opposed to the others, it's pretty horrible from an API perspective and we can do better. 4. Introduce a new pair of methods, ->port_setup and ->port_teardown, which in the case of mv88e6xxx must register and unregister the devlink port regions. Call these 2 methods when the port must be reinitialized as unused. Naturally, I went for the 4th approach. Fixes: 08156ba430b4 ("net: dsa: Add devlink port regions support to DSA") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index fa88e58705f0..f14897d9b31d 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static int dsa_port_setup(struct dsa_port *dp) { struct devlink_port *dlp = &dp->devlink_port; bool dsa_port_link_registered = false; + struct dsa_switch *ds = dp->ds; bool dsa_port_enabled = false; int err = 0; @@ -438,6 +439,12 @@ static int dsa_port_setup(struct dsa_port *dp) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dp->fdbs); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dp->mdbs); + if (ds->ops->port_setup) { + err = ds->ops->port_setup(ds, dp->index); + if (err) + return err; + } + switch (dp->type) { case DSA_PORT_TYPE_UNUSED: dsa_port_disable(dp); @@ -480,8 +487,11 @@ static int dsa_port_setup(struct dsa_port *dp) dsa_port_disable(dp); if (err && dsa_port_link_registered) dsa_port_link_unregister_of(dp); - if (err) + if (err) { + if (ds->ops->port_teardown) + ds->ops->port_teardown(ds, dp->index); return err; + } dp->setup = true; @@ -533,11 +543,15 @@ static int dsa_port_devlink_setup(struct dsa_port *dp) static void dsa_port_teardown(struct dsa_port *dp) { struct devlink_port *dlp = &dp->devlink_port; + struct dsa_switch *ds = dp->ds; struct dsa_mac_addr *a, *tmp; if (!dp->setup) return; + if (ds->ops->port_teardown) + ds->ops->port_teardown(ds, dp->index); + devlink_port_type_clear(dlp); switch (dp->type) { @@ -581,6 +595,36 @@ static void dsa_port_devlink_teardown(struct dsa_port *dp) dp->devlink_port_setup = false; } +/* Destroy the current devlink port, and create a new one which has the UNUSED + * flavour. At this point, any call to ds->ops->port_setup has been already + * balanced out by a call to ds->ops->port_teardown, so we know that any + * devlink port regions the driver had are now unregistered. We then call its + * ds->ops->port_setup again, in order for the driver to re-create them on the + * new devlink port. + */ +static int dsa_port_reinit_as_unused(struct dsa_port *dp) +{ + struct dsa_switch *ds = dp->ds; + int err; + + dsa_port_devlink_teardown(dp); + dp->type = DSA_PORT_TYPE_UNUSED; + err = dsa_port_devlink_setup(dp); + if (err) + return err; + + if (ds->ops->port_setup) { + /* On error, leave the devlink port registered, + * dsa_switch_teardown will clean it up later. + */ + err = ds->ops->port_setup(ds, dp->index); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + static int dsa_devlink_info_get(struct devlink *dl, struct devlink_info_req *req, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) @@ -938,12 +982,9 @@ static int dsa_tree_setup_switches(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) list_for_each_entry(dp, &dst->ports, list) { err = dsa_port_setup(dp); if (err) { - dsa_port_devlink_teardown(dp); - dp->type = DSA_PORT_TYPE_UNUSED; - err = dsa_port_devlink_setup(dp); + err = dsa_port_reinit_as_unused(dp); if (err) goto teardown; - continue; } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3765996e4f0b8a755cab215a08df744490c76052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xuan Zhuo Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2021 16:52:32 +0800 Subject: napi: fix race inside napi_enable The process will cause napi.state to contain NAPI_STATE_SCHED and not in the poll_list, which will cause napi_disable() to get stuck. The prefix "NAPI_STATE_" is removed in the figure below, and NAPI_STATE_HASHED is ignored in napi.state. CPU0 | CPU1 | napi.state =============================================================================== napi_disable() | | SCHED | NPSVC napi_enable() | | { | | smp_mb__before_atomic(); | | clear_bit(SCHED, &n->state); | | NPSVC | napi_schedule_prep() | SCHED | NPSVC | napi_poll() | | napi_complete_done() | | { | | if (n->state & (NPSVC | | (1) | _BUSY_POLL))) | | return false; | | ................ | | } | SCHED | NPSVC | | clear_bit(NPSVC, &n->state); | | SCHED } | | | | napi_schedule_prep() | | SCHED | MISSED (2) (1) Here return direct. Because of NAPI_STATE_NPSVC exists. (2) NAPI_STATE_SCHED exists. So not add napi.poll_list to sd->poll_list Since NAPI_STATE_SCHED already exists and napi is not in the sd->poll_list queue, NAPI_STATE_SCHED cannot be cleared and will always exist. 1. This will cause this queue to no longer receive packets. 2. If you encounter napi_disable under the protection of rtnl_lock, it will cause the entire rtnl_lock to be locked, affecting the overall system. This patch uses cmpxchg to implement napi_enable(), which ensures that there will be no race due to the separation of clear two bits. Fixes: 2d8bff12699abc ("netpoll: Close race condition between poll_one_napi and napi_disable") Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo Reviewed-by: Dust Li Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 74fd402d26dd..7ee9fecd3aff 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -6923,12 +6923,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(napi_disable); */ void napi_enable(struct napi_struct *n) { - BUG_ON(!test_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)); - smp_mb__before_atomic(); - clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state); - clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state); - if (n->dev->threaded && n->thread) - set_bit(NAPI_STATE_THREADED, &n->state); + unsigned long val, new; + + do { + val = READ_ONCE(n->state); + BUG_ON(!test_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &val)); + + new = val & ~(NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC); + if (n->dev->threaded && n->thread) + new |= NAPIF_STATE_THREADED; + } while (cmpxchg(&n->state, val, new) != val); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(napi_enable); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 563f23b002534176f49524b5ca0e1d94d8906c40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 16:02:18 +0300 Subject: nexthop: Fix division by zero while replacing a resilient group The resilient nexthop group torture tests in fib_nexthop.sh exposed a possible division by zero while replacing a resilient group [1]. The division by zero occurs when the data path sees a resilient nexthop group with zero buckets. The tests replace a resilient nexthop group in a loop while traffic is forwarded through it. The tests do not specify the number of buckets while performing the replacement, resulting in the kernel allocating a stub resilient table (i.e, 'struct nh_res_table') with zero buckets. This table should never be visible to the data path, but the old nexthop group (i.e., 'oldg') might still be used by the data path when the stub table is assigned to it. Fix this by only assigning the stub table to the old nexthop group after making sure the group is no longer used by the data path. Tested with fib_nexthops.sh: Tests passed: 222 Tests failed: 0 [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 1850 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.14.0-custom-10271-ga86eb53057fe #1107 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:nexthop_select_path+0x2d2/0x1a80 [...] Call Trace: fib_select_multipath+0x79b/0x1530 fib_select_path+0x8fb/0x1c10 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x1198/0x2da0 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x190/0x340 ip_route_output_flow+0x21/0x120 raw_sendmsg+0x91d/0x2e10 inet_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x23d/0x360 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 283a72a5599e ("nexthop: Add implementation of resilient next-hop groups") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Petr Machata Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c index 75ca4b6e484f..0e75fd3e57b4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c +++ b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c @@ -1982,6 +1982,8 @@ static int replace_nexthop_grp(struct net *net, struct nexthop *old, rcu_assign_pointer(old->nh_grp, newg); if (newg->resilient) { + /* Make sure concurrent readers are not using 'oldg' anymore. */ + synchronize_net(); rcu_assign_pointer(oldg->res_table, tmp_table); rcu_assign_pointer(oldg->spare->res_table, tmp_table); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c9c3b6811f7429b8c292de5774cea67f3a033eb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 14:28:35 +0200 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: make max chain length random Similar to commit 67d6d681e15b ("ipv4: make exception cache less predictible"): Use a random drop length to make it harder to detect when entries were hashed to same bucket list. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 94e18fb9690d..91b7edaa635c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static __read_mostly bool nf_conntrack_locks_all; #define GC_SCAN_INTERVAL (120u * HZ) #define GC_SCAN_MAX_DURATION msecs_to_jiffies(10) -#define MAX_CHAINLEN 64u +#define MIN_CHAINLEN 8u +#define MAX_CHAINLEN (32u - MIN_CHAINLEN) static struct conntrack_gc_work conntrack_gc_work; @@ -842,6 +843,7 @@ nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(struct nf_conn *ct) unsigned int hash, reply_hash; struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h; struct hlist_nulls_node *n; + unsigned int max_chainlen; unsigned int chainlen = 0; unsigned int sequence; int err = -EEXIST; @@ -857,13 +859,15 @@ nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(struct nf_conn *ct) &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple); } while (nf_conntrack_double_lock(net, hash, reply_hash, sequence)); + max_chainlen = MIN_CHAINLEN + prandom_u32_max(MAX_CHAINLEN); + /* See if there's one in the list already, including reverse */ hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(h, n, &nf_conntrack_hash[hash], hnnode) { if (nf_ct_key_equal(h, &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, zone, net)) goto out; - if (chainlen++ > MAX_CHAINLEN) + if (chainlen++ > max_chainlen) goto chaintoolong; } @@ -873,7 +877,7 @@ nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(struct nf_conn *ct) if (nf_ct_key_equal(h, &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple, zone, net)) goto out; - if (chainlen++ > MAX_CHAINLEN) + if (chainlen++ > max_chainlen) goto chaintoolong; } @@ -1103,8 +1107,8 @@ drop: int __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) { + unsigned int chainlen = 0, sequence, max_chainlen; const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone; - unsigned int chainlen = 0, sequence; unsigned int hash, reply_hash; struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h; struct nf_conn *ct; @@ -1168,6 +1172,7 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) goto dying; } + max_chainlen = MIN_CHAINLEN + prandom_u32_max(MAX_CHAINLEN); /* See if there's one in the list already, including reverse: NAT could have grabbed it without realizing, since we're not in the hash. If there is, we lost race. */ @@ -1175,7 +1180,7 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) if (nf_ct_key_equal(h, &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, zone, net)) goto out; - if (chainlen++ > MAX_CHAINLEN) + if (chainlen++ > max_chainlen) goto chaintoolong; } @@ -1184,7 +1189,7 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) if (nf_ct_key_equal(h, &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple, zone, net)) goto out; - if (chainlen++ > MAX_CHAINLEN) { + if (chainlen++ > max_chainlen) { chaintoolong: nf_ct_add_to_dying_list(ct); NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, chaintoolong); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b16ac3c4c886f323b06ae942f02ebd2a70bf8840 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 14:28:36 +0200 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: include zone id in tuple hash again commit deedb59039f111 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones") removed the zone id from the hash value. This has implications on hash chain lengths with overlapping tuples, which can hit 64k entries on released kernels, before upper droplimit was added in d7e7747ac5c ("netfilter: refuse insertion if chain has grown too large"). With that change reverted, test script coming with this series shows linear insertion time growth: 10000 entries in 3737 ms (now 10000 total, loop 1) 10000 entries in 16994 ms (now 20000 total, loop 2) 10000 entries in 47787 ms (now 30000 total, loop 3) 10000 entries in 72731 ms (now 40000 total, loop 4) 10000 entries in 95761 ms (now 50000 total, loop 5) 10000 entries in 96809 ms (now 60000 total, loop 6) inserted 60000 entries from packet path in 333825 ms With d7e7747ac5c in place, the test fails. There are three supported zone use cases: 1. Connection is in the default zone (zone 0). This means to special config (the default). 2. Connection is in a different zone (1 to 2**16). This means rules are in place to put packets in the desired zone, e.g. derived from vlan id or interface. 3. Original direction is in zone X and Reply is in zone 0. 3) allows to use of the existing NAT port collision avoidance to provide connectivity to internet/wan even when the various zones have overlapping source networks separated via policy routing. In case the original zone is 0 all three cases are identical. There is no way to place original direction in zone x and reply in zone y (with y != 0). Zones need to be assigned manually via the iptables/nftables ruleset, before conntrack lookup occurs (raw table in iptables) using the "CT" target conntrack template support (-j CT --{zone,zone-orig,zone-reply} X). Normally zone assignment happens based on incoming interface, but could also be derived from packet mark, vlan id and so on. This means that when case 3 is used, the ruleset will typically not even assign a connection tracking template to the "reply" packets, so lookup happens in zone 0. However, it is possible that reply packets also match a ct zone assignment rule which sets up a template for zone X (X > 0) in original direction only. Therefore, after making the zone id part of the hash, we need to do a second lookup using the reply zone id if we did not find an entry on the first lookup. In practice, most deployments will either not use zones at all or the origin and reply zones are the same, no second lookup is required in either case. After this change, packet path insertion test passes with constant insertion times: 10000 entries in 1064 ms (now 10000 total, loop 1) 10000 entries in 1074 ms (now 20000 total, loop 2) 10000 entries in 1066 ms (now 30000 total, loop 3) 10000 entries in 1079 ms (now 40000 total, loop 4) 10000 entries in 1081 ms (now 50000 total, loop 5) 10000 entries in 1082 ms (now 60000 total, loop 6) inserted 60000 entries from packet path in 6452 ms Cc: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 91b7edaa635c..97b91d62589d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -189,11 +189,13 @@ seqcount_spinlock_t nf_conntrack_generation __read_mostly; static siphash_key_t nf_conntrack_hash_rnd __read_mostly; static u32 hash_conntrack_raw(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + unsigned int zoneid, const struct net *net) { struct { struct nf_conntrack_man src; union nf_inet_addr dst_addr; + unsigned int zone; u32 net_mix; u16 dport; u16 proto; @@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ static u32 hash_conntrack_raw(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, /* The direction must be ignored, so handle usable members manually. */ combined.src = tuple->src; combined.dst_addr = tuple->dst.u3; + combined.zone = zoneid; combined.net_mix = net_hash_mix(net); combined.dport = (__force __u16)tuple->dst.u.all; combined.proto = tuple->dst.protonum; @@ -220,15 +223,17 @@ static u32 scale_hash(u32 hash) static u32 __hash_conntrack(const struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + unsigned int zoneid, unsigned int size) { - return reciprocal_scale(hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, net), size); + return reciprocal_scale(hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, zoneid, net), size); } static u32 hash_conntrack(const struct net *net, - const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + unsigned int zoneid) { - return scale_hash(hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, net)); + return scale_hash(hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, zoneid, net)); } static bool nf_ct_get_tuple_ports(const struct sk_buff *skb, @@ -651,9 +656,11 @@ static void nf_ct_delete_from_lists(struct nf_conn *ct) do { sequence = read_seqcount_begin(&nf_conntrack_generation); hash = hash_conntrack(net, - &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple); + &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, + nf_ct_zone_id(nf_ct_zone(ct), IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL)); reply_hash = hash_conntrack(net, - &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple); + &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple, + nf_ct_zone_id(nf_ct_zone(ct), IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)); } while (nf_conntrack_double_lock(net, hash, reply_hash, sequence)); clean_from_lists(ct); @@ -820,8 +827,20 @@ struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash * nf_conntrack_find_get(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { - return __nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, tuple, - hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, net)); + unsigned int rid, zone_id = nf_ct_zone_id(zone, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL); + struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *thash; + + thash = __nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, tuple, + hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, zone_id, net)); + + if (thash) + return thash; + + rid = nf_ct_zone_id(zone, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY); + if (rid != zone_id) + return __nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, tuple, + hash_conntrack_raw(tuple, rid, net)); + return thash; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_conntrack_find_get); @@ -854,9 +873,11 @@ nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(struct nf_conn *ct) do { sequence = read_seqcount_begin(&nf_conntrack_generation); hash = hash_conntrack(net, - &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple); + &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, + nf_ct_zone_id(nf_ct_zone(ct), IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL)); reply_hash = hash_conntrack(net, - &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple); + &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple, + nf_ct_zone_id(nf_ct_zone(ct), IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)); } while (nf_conntrack_double_lock(net, hash, reply_hash, sequence)); max_chainlen = MIN_CHAINLEN + prandom_u32_max(MAX_CHAINLEN); @@ -1137,8 +1158,8 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) hash = *(unsigned long *)&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].hnnode.pprev; hash = scale_hash(hash); reply_hash = hash_conntrack(net, - &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple); - + &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple, + nf_ct_zone_id(nf_ct_zone(ct), IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)); } while (nf_conntrack_double_lock(net, hash, reply_hash, sequence)); /* We're not in hash table, and we refuse to set up related @@ -1251,7 +1272,7 @@ nf_conntrack_tuple_taken(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, rcu_read_lock(); begin: nf_conntrack_get_ht(&ct_hash, &hsize); - hash = __hash_conntrack(net, tuple, hsize); + hash = __hash_conntrack(net, tuple, nf_ct_zone_id(zone, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY), hsize); hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(h, n, &ct_hash[hash], hnnode) { ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); @@ -1692,8 +1713,8 @@ resolve_normal_ct(struct nf_conn *tmpl, struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h; enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; struct nf_conntrack_zone tmp; + u32 hash, zone_id, rid; struct nf_conn *ct; - u32 hash; if (!nf_ct_get_tuple(skb, skb_network_offset(skb), dataoff, state->pf, protonum, state->net, @@ -1704,8 +1725,20 @@ resolve_normal_ct(struct nf_conn *tmpl, /* look for tuple match */ zone = nf_ct_zone_tmpl(tmpl, skb, &tmp); - hash = hash_conntrack_raw(&tuple, state->net); + + zone_id = nf_ct_zone_id(zone, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL); + hash = hash_conntrack_raw(&tuple, zone_id, state->net); h = __nf_conntrack_find_get(state->net, zone, &tuple, hash); + + if (!h) { + rid = nf_ct_zone_id(zone, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY); + if (zone_id != rid) { + u32 tmp = hash_conntrack_raw(&tuple, rid, state->net); + + h = __nf_conntrack_find_get(state->net, zone, &tuple, tmp); + } + } + if (!h) { h = init_conntrack(state->net, tmpl, &tuple, skb, dataoff, hash); @@ -2542,12 +2575,16 @@ int nf_conntrack_hash_resize(unsigned int hashsize) for (i = 0; i < nf_conntrack_htable_size; i++) { while (!hlist_nulls_empty(&nf_conntrack_hash[i])) { + unsigned int zone_id; + h = hlist_nulls_entry(nf_conntrack_hash[i].first, struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash, hnnode); ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); hlist_nulls_del_rcu(&h->hnnode); + + zone_id = nf_ct_zone_id(nf_ct_zone(ct), NF_CT_DIRECTION(h)); bucket = __hash_conntrack(nf_ct_net(ct), - &h->tuple, hashsize); + &h->tuple, zone_id, hashsize); hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&h->hnnode, &hash[bucket]); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d2966dc77ba7b2678f7aee97bf9a65702ec8e2b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 14:28:37 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nat: include zone id in nat table hash again Similar to the conntrack change, also use the zone id for the nat source lists if the zone id is valid in both directions. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c index 7008961f5cb0..273117683922 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c @@ -150,13 +150,16 @@ static void __nf_nat_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl) /* We keep an extra hash for each conntrack, for fast searching. */ static unsigned int -hash_by_src(const struct net *n, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) +hash_by_src(const struct net *net, + const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { unsigned int hash; struct { struct nf_conntrack_man src; u32 net_mix; u32 protonum; + u32 zone; } __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined; get_random_once(&nf_nat_hash_rnd, sizeof(nf_nat_hash_rnd)); @@ -165,9 +168,13 @@ hash_by_src(const struct net *n, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) /* Original src, to ensure we map it consistently if poss. */ combined.src = tuple->src; - combined.net_mix = net_hash_mix(n); + combined.net_mix = net_hash_mix(net); combined.protonum = tuple->dst.protonum; + /* Zone ID can be used provided its valid for both directions */ + if (zone->dir == NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR) + combined.zone = zone->id; + hash = siphash(&combined, sizeof(combined), &nf_nat_hash_rnd); return reciprocal_scale(hash, nf_nat_htable_size); @@ -272,7 +279,7 @@ find_appropriate_src(struct net *net, struct nf_conntrack_tuple *result, const struct nf_nat_range2 *range) { - unsigned int h = hash_by_src(net, tuple); + unsigned int h = hash_by_src(net, zone, tuple); const struct nf_conn *ct; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(ct, &nf_nat_bysource[h], nat_bysource) { @@ -619,7 +626,7 @@ nf_nat_setup_info(struct nf_conn *ct, unsigned int srchash; spinlock_t *lock; - srchash = hash_by_src(net, + srchash = hash_by_src(net, nf_ct_zone(ct), &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple); lock = &nf_nat_locks[srchash % CONNTRACK_LOCKS]; spin_lock_bh(lock); @@ -788,7 +795,7 @@ static void __nf_nat_cleanup_conntrack(struct nf_conn *ct) { unsigned int h; - h = hash_by_src(nf_ct_net(ct), &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple); + h = hash_by_src(nf_ct_net(ct), nf_ct_zone(ct), &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple); spin_lock_bh(&nf_nat_locks[h % CONNTRACK_LOCKS]); hlist_del_rcu(&ct->nat_bysource); spin_unlock_bh(&nf_nat_locks[h % CONNTRACK_LOCKS]); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a499b03bf36b0c2e3b958a381d828678ab0ffc5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2021 14:42:33 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: unlink table before deleting it syzbot reports following UAF: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcmp+0x18f/0x1c0 lib/string.c:955 nla_strcmp+0xf2/0x130 lib/nlattr.c:836 nft_table_lookup.part.0+0x1a2/0x460 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:570 nft_table_lookup net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4064 [inline] nf_tables_getset+0x1b3/0x860 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4064 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x659/0x13f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:285 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 Problem is that all get operations are lockless, so the commit_mutex held by nft_rcv_nl_event() isn't enough to stop a parallel GET request from doing read-accesses to the table object even after synchronize_rcu(). To avoid this, unlink the table first and store the table objects in on-stack scratch space. Fixes: 6001a930ce03 ("netfilter: nftables: introduce table ownership") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f31660cf279b0557160c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 081437dd75b7..33e771cd847c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -9599,7 +9599,6 @@ static void __nft_release_table(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table) table->use--; nf_tables_chain_destroy(&ctx); } - list_del(&table->list); nf_tables_table_destroy(&ctx); } @@ -9612,6 +9611,8 @@ static void __nft_release_tables(struct net *net) if (nft_table_has_owner(table)) continue; + list_del(&table->list); + __nft_release_table(net, table); } } @@ -9619,31 +9620,38 @@ static void __nft_release_tables(struct net *net) static int nft_rcv_nl_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { + struct nft_table *table, *to_delete[8]; struct nftables_pernet *nft_net; struct netlink_notify *n = ptr; - struct nft_table *table, *nt; struct net *net = n->net; - bool release = false; + unsigned int deleted; + bool restart = false; if (event != NETLINK_URELEASE || n->protocol != NETLINK_NETFILTER) return NOTIFY_DONE; nft_net = nft_pernet(net); + deleted = 0; mutex_lock(&nft_net->commit_mutex); +again: list_for_each_entry(table, &nft_net->tables, list) { if (nft_table_has_owner(table) && n->portid == table->nlpid) { __nft_release_hook(net, table); - release = true; + list_del_rcu(&table->list); + to_delete[deleted++] = table; + if (deleted >= ARRAY_SIZE(to_delete)) + break; } } - if (release) { + if (deleted) { + restart = deleted >= ARRAY_SIZE(to_delete); synchronize_rcu(); - list_for_each_entry_safe(table, nt, &nft_net->tables, list) { - if (nft_table_has_owner(table) && - n->portid == table->nlpid) - __nft_release_table(net, table); - } + while (deleted) + __nft_release_table(net, to_delete[--deleted]); + + if (restart) + goto again; } mutex_unlock(&nft_net->commit_mutex); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 45928afe94a094bcda9af858b96673d59bc4a0e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2021 20:38:52 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: Fix oversized kvmalloc() calls The commit 7661809d493b ("mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls") limits the max allocatable memory via kvmalloc() to MAX_INT. Reported-by: syzbot+cd43695a64bcd21b8596@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 33e771cd847c..b9546defdc28 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4336,7 +4336,7 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info, if (ops->privsize != NULL) size = ops->privsize(nla, &desc); alloc_size = sizeof(*set) + size + udlen; - if (alloc_size < size) + if (alloc_size < size || alloc_size > INT_MAX) return -ENOMEM; set = kvzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!set) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 30db406923b9285a9bac06a6af5e74bd6d0f1d06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2021 16:46:38 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_nat_masquerade: make async masq_inet6_event handling generic masq_inet6_event is called asynchronously from system work queue, because the inet6 notifier is atomic and nf_iterate_cleanup can sleep. The ipv4 and device notifiers call nf_iterate_cleanup directly. This is legal, but these notifiers are called with RTNL mutex held. A large conntrack table with many devices coming and going will have severe impact on the system usability, with 'ip a' blocking for several seconds. This change places the defer code into a helper and makes it more generic so ipv4 and ifdown notifiers can be converted to defer the cleanup walk as well in a follow patch. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c index 8e8a65d46345..415919a6ac1a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c @@ -9,8 +9,19 @@ #include +struct masq_dev_work { + struct work_struct work; + struct net *net; + union nf_inet_addr addr; + int ifindex; + int (*iter)(struct nf_conn *i, void *data); +}; + +#define MAX_MASQ_WORKER_COUNT 16 + static DEFINE_MUTEX(masq_mutex); static unsigned int masq_refcnt __read_mostly; +static atomic_t masq_worker_count __read_mostly; unsigned int nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hooknum, @@ -63,6 +74,63 @@ nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hooknum, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4); +static void iterate_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct masq_dev_work *w; + + w = container_of(work, struct masq_dev_work, work); + + nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net(w->net, w->iter, (void *)w, 0, 0); + + put_net(w->net); + kfree(w); + atomic_dec(&masq_worker_count); + module_put(THIS_MODULE); +} + +/* Iterate conntrack table in the background and remove conntrack entries + * that use the device/address being removed. + * + * In case too many work items have been queued already or memory allocation + * fails iteration is skipped, conntrack entries will time out eventually. + */ +static void nf_nat_masq_schedule(struct net *net, union nf_inet_addr *addr, + int ifindex, + int (*iter)(struct nf_conn *i, void *data), + gfp_t gfp_flags) +{ + struct masq_dev_work *w; + + if (atomic_read(&masq_worker_count) > MAX_MASQ_WORKER_COUNT) + return; + + net = maybe_get_net(net); + if (!net) + return; + + if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE)) + goto err_module; + + w = kzalloc(sizeof(*w), gfp_flags); + if (w) { + /* We can overshoot MAX_MASQ_WORKER_COUNT, no big deal */ + atomic_inc(&masq_worker_count); + + INIT_WORK(&w->work, iterate_cleanup_work); + w->ifindex = ifindex; + w->net = net; + w->iter = iter; + if (addr) + w->addr = *addr; + schedule_work(&w->work); + return; + } + + module_put(THIS_MODULE); + err_module: + put_net(net); +} + static int device_cmp(struct nf_conn *i, void *ifindex) { const struct nf_conn_nat *nat = nfct_nat(i); @@ -136,8 +204,6 @@ static struct notifier_block masq_inet_notifier = { }; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -static atomic_t v6_worker_count __read_mostly; - static int nat_ipv6_dev_get_saddr(struct net *net, const struct net_device *dev, const struct in6_addr *daddr, unsigned int srcprefs, @@ -187,13 +253,6 @@ nf_nat_masquerade_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_nat_range2 *range, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_nat_masquerade_ipv6); -struct masq_dev_work { - struct work_struct work; - struct net *net; - struct in6_addr addr; - int ifindex; -}; - static int inet6_cmp(struct nf_conn *ct, void *work) { struct masq_dev_work *w = (struct masq_dev_work *)work; @@ -204,21 +263,7 @@ static int inet6_cmp(struct nf_conn *ct, void *work) tuple = &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&w->addr, &tuple->dst.u3.in6); -} - -static void iterate_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work) -{ - struct masq_dev_work *w; - - w = container_of(work, struct masq_dev_work, work); - - nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net(w->net, inet6_cmp, (void *)w, 0, 0); - - put_net(w->net); - kfree(w); - atomic_dec(&v6_worker_count); - module_put(THIS_MODULE); + return nf_inet_addr_cmp(&w->addr, &tuple->dst.u3); } /* atomic notifier; can't call nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net (it can sleep). @@ -233,36 +278,19 @@ static int masq_inet6_event(struct notifier_block *this, { struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa = ptr; const struct net_device *dev; - struct masq_dev_work *w; - struct net *net; + union nf_inet_addr addr; - if (event != NETDEV_DOWN || atomic_read(&v6_worker_count) >= 16) + if (event != NETDEV_DOWN) return NOTIFY_DONE; dev = ifa->idev->dev; - net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(dev)); - if (!net) - return NOTIFY_DONE; - if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE)) - goto err_module; + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); - w = kmalloc(sizeof(*w), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (w) { - atomic_inc(&v6_worker_count); + addr.in6 = ifa->addr; - INIT_WORK(&w->work, iterate_cleanup_work); - w->ifindex = dev->ifindex; - w->net = net; - w->addr = ifa->addr; - schedule_work(&w->work); - - return NOTIFY_DONE; - } - - module_put(THIS_MODULE); - err_module: - put_net(net); + nf_nat_masq_schedule(dev_net(dev), &addr, dev->ifindex, inet6_cmp, + GFP_ATOMIC); return NOTIFY_DONE; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7970a19b71044bf4dc2c1becc200275bdf1884d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2021 16:46:39 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_nat_masquerade: defer conntrack walk to work queue The ipv4 and device notifiers are called with RTNL mutex held. The table walk can take some time, better not block other RTNL users. 'ip a' has been reported to block for up to 20 seconds when conntrack table has many entries and device down events are frequent (e.g., PPP). Reported-and-tested-by: Martin Zaharinov Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c index 415919a6ac1a..acd73f717a08 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_masquerade.c @@ -131,13 +131,14 @@ static void nf_nat_masq_schedule(struct net *net, union nf_inet_addr *addr, put_net(net); } -static int device_cmp(struct nf_conn *i, void *ifindex) +static int device_cmp(struct nf_conn *i, void *arg) { const struct nf_conn_nat *nat = nfct_nat(i); + const struct masq_dev_work *w = arg; if (!nat) return 0; - return nat->masq_index == (int)(long)ifindex; + return nat->masq_index == w->ifindex; } static int masq_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, @@ -153,8 +154,8 @@ static int masq_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, * and forget them. */ - nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net(net, device_cmp, - (void *)(long)dev->ifindex, 0, 0); + nf_nat_masq_schedule(net, NULL, dev->ifindex, + device_cmp, GFP_KERNEL); } return NOTIFY_DONE; @@ -162,35 +163,45 @@ static int masq_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, static int inet_cmp(struct nf_conn *ct, void *ptr) { - struct in_ifaddr *ifa = (struct in_ifaddr *)ptr; - struct net_device *dev = ifa->ifa_dev->dev; struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple; + struct masq_dev_work *w = ptr; - if (!device_cmp(ct, (void *)(long)dev->ifindex)) + if (!device_cmp(ct, ptr)) return 0; tuple = &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple; - return ifa->ifa_address == tuple->dst.u3.ip; + return nf_inet_addr_cmp(&w->addr, &tuple->dst.u3); } static int masq_inet_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { - struct in_device *idev = ((struct in_ifaddr *)ptr)->ifa_dev; - struct net *net = dev_net(idev->dev); + const struct in_ifaddr *ifa = ptr; + const struct in_device *idev; + const struct net_device *dev; + union nf_inet_addr addr; + + if (event != NETDEV_DOWN) + return NOTIFY_DONE; /* The masq_dev_notifier will catch the case of the device going * down. So if the inetdev is dead and being destroyed we have * no work to do. Otherwise this is an individual address removal * and we have to perform the flush. */ + idev = ifa->ifa_dev; if (idev->dead) return NOTIFY_DONE; - if (event == NETDEV_DOWN) - nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net(net, inet_cmp, ptr, 0, 0); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + + addr.ip = ifa->ifa_address; + + dev = idev->dev; + nf_nat_masq_schedule(dev_net(idev->dev), &addr, dev->ifindex, + inet_cmp, GFP_KERNEL); return NOTIFY_DONE; } @@ -253,19 +264,6 @@ nf_nat_masquerade_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_nat_range2 *range, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_nat_masquerade_ipv6); -static int inet6_cmp(struct nf_conn *ct, void *work) -{ - struct masq_dev_work *w = (struct masq_dev_work *)work; - struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple; - - if (!device_cmp(ct, (void *)(long)w->ifindex)) - return 0; - - tuple = &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple; - - return nf_inet_addr_cmp(&w->addr, &tuple->dst.u3); -} - /* atomic notifier; can't call nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net (it can sleep). * * Defer it to the system workqueue. @@ -289,7 +287,7 @@ static int masq_inet6_event(struct notifier_block *this, addr.in6 = ifa->addr; - nf_nat_masq_schedule(dev_net(dev), &addr, dev->ifindex, inet6_cmp, + nf_nat_masq_schedule(dev_net(dev), &addr, dev->ifindex, inet_cmp, GFP_ATOMIC); return NOTIFY_DONE; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc8072153aafd65bff1b3679a112cb6ba71ab375 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 11:56:25 +0200 Subject: netfilter: iptable_raw: drop bogus net_init annotation This is a leftover from the times when this function was wired up via pernet_operations. Now its called when userspace asks for the table. With CONFIG_NET_NS=n, iptable_raw_table_init memory has been discarded already and we get a kernel crash. Other tables are fine, __net_init annotation was removed already. Fixes: fdacd57c79b7 ("netfilter: x_tables: never register tables by default") Reported-by: youling 257 Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_raw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_raw.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_raw.c index b88e0f36cd05..8265c6765705 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_raw.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_raw.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ iptable_raw_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, static struct nf_hook_ops *rawtable_ops __read_mostly; -static int __net_init iptable_raw_table_init(struct net *net) +static int iptable_raw_table_init(struct net *net) { struct ipt_replace *repl; const struct xt_table *table = &packet_raw; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b53deef054e58fe4f37c66211b8ece9f8fc1aa13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 18:50:17 +0200 Subject: netfilter: log: work around missing softdep backend module iptables/nftables has two types of log modules: 1. backend, e.g. nf_log_syslog, which implement the functionality 2. frontend, e.g. xt_LOG or nft_log, which call the functionality provided by backend based on nf_tables or xtables rule set. Problem is that the request_module() call to load the backed in nf_logger_find_get() might happen with nftables transaction mutex held in case the call path is via nf_tables/nft_compat. This can cause deadlocks (see 'Fixes' tags for details). The chosen solution as to let modprobe deal with this by adding 'pre: ' soft dep tag to xt_LOG (to load the syslog backend) and xt_NFLOG (to load nflog backend). Eric reports that this breaks on systems with older modprobe that doesn't support softdeps. Another, similar issue occurs when someone either insmods xt_(NF)LOG directly or unloads the backend module (possible if no log frontend is in use): because the frontend module is already loaded, modprobe is not invoked again so the softdep isn't evaluated. Add a workaround: If nf_logger_find_get() returns -ENOENT and call is not via nft_compat, load the backend explicitly and try again. Else, let nft_compat ask for deferred request_module via nf_tables infra. Softdeps are kept in-place, so with newer modprobe the dependencies are resolved from userspace. Fixes: cefa31a9d461 ("netfilter: nft_log: perform module load from nf_tables") Fixes: a38b5b56d6f4 ("netfilter: nf_log: add module softdeps") Reported-and-tested-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c | 10 +++++++++- net/netfilter/xt_NFLOG.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c index 272bcdb1392d..f69cc73c5813 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* Used for matches where *info is larger than X byte */ #define NFT_MATCH_LARGE_THRESH 192 @@ -257,8 +258,22 @@ nft_target_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, nft_compat_wait_for_destructors(); ret = xt_check_target(&par, size, proto, inv); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENOENT) { + const char *modname = NULL; + + if (strcmp(target->name, "LOG") == 0) + modname = "nf_log_syslog"; + else if (strcmp(target->name, "NFLOG") == 0) + modname = "nfnetlink_log"; + + if (modname && + nft_request_module(ctx->net, "%s", modname) == -EAGAIN) + return -EAGAIN; + } + return ret; + } /* The standard target cannot be used */ if (!target->target) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c b/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c index 2ff75f7637b0..f39244f9c0ed 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ log_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) static int log_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) { const struct xt_log_info *loginfo = par->targinfo; + int ret; if (par->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && par->family != NFPROTO_IPV6) return -EINVAL; @@ -58,7 +59,14 @@ static int log_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) return -EINVAL; } - return nf_logger_find_get(par->family, NF_LOG_TYPE_LOG); + ret = nf_logger_find_get(par->family, NF_LOG_TYPE_LOG); + if (ret != 0 && !par->nft_compat) { + request_module("%s", "nf_log_syslog"); + + ret = nf_logger_find_get(par->family, NF_LOG_TYPE_LOG); + } + + return ret; } static void log_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_NFLOG.c b/net/netfilter/xt_NFLOG.c index fb5793208059..e660c3710a10 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_NFLOG.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_NFLOG.c @@ -42,13 +42,21 @@ nflog_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) static int nflog_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) { const struct xt_nflog_info *info = par->targinfo; + int ret; if (info->flags & ~XT_NFLOG_MASK) return -EINVAL; if (info->prefix[sizeof(info->prefix) - 1] != '\0') return -EINVAL; - return nf_logger_find_get(par->family, NF_LOG_TYPE_ULOG); + ret = nf_logger_find_get(par->family, NF_LOG_TYPE_ULOG); + if (ret != 0 && !par->nft_compat) { + request_module("%s", "nfnetlink_log"); + + ret = nf_logger_find_get(par->family, NF_LOG_TYPE_ULOG); + } + + return ret; } static void nflog_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par) -- cgit v1.2.3 From e9edc188fc76499b0b9bd60364084037f6d03773 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 15:15:56 -0700 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: serialize hash resizes and cleanups Syzbot was able to trigger the following warning [1] No repro found by syzbot yet but I was able to trigger similar issue by having 2 scripts running in parallel, changing conntrack hash sizes, and: for j in `seq 1 1000` ; do unshare -n /bin/true >/dev/null ; done It would take more than 5 minutes for net_namespace structures to be cleaned up. This is because nf_ct_iterate_cleanup() has to restart everytime a resize happened. By adding a mutex, we can serialize hash resizes and cleanups and also make get_next_corpse() faster by skipping over empty buckets. Even without resizes in the picture, this patch considerably speeds up network namespace dismantles. [1] INFO: task syz-executor.0:8312 can't die for more than 144 seconds. task:syz-executor.0 state:R running task stack:25672 pid: 8312 ppid: 6573 flags:0x00004006 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4955 [inline] __schedule+0x940/0x26f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6236 preempt_schedule_common+0x45/0xc0 kernel/sched/core.c:6408 preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x18 arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S:35 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x109/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:390 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:32 [inline] get_next_corpse net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2252 [inline] nf_ct_iterate_cleanup+0x15a/0x450 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2275 nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list+0x14c/0x4f0 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2469 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:171 setup_net+0x639/0xa30 net/core/net_namespace.c:349 copy_net_ns+0x319/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:470 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3128 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3202 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3200 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f63da68e739 RSP: 002b:00007f63d7c05188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f63da792f80 RCX: 00007f63da68e739 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000000 RBP: 00007f63da6e8cc4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f63da792f80 R13: 00007fff50b75d3f R14: 00007f63d7c05300 R15: 0000000000022000 Showing all locks held in the system: 1 lock held by khungtaskd/27: #0: ffffffff8b980020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6446 2 locks held by kworker/u4:2/153: #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1198 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:634 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:661 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x896/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2268 #1: ffffc9000140fdb0 ((kfence_timer).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8ca/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2272 1 lock held by systemd-udevd/2970: 1 lock held by in:imklog/6258: #0: ffff88807f970ff0 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0xe9/0x100 fs/file.c:990 3 locks held by kworker/1:6/8158: 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/8312: 2 locks held by kworker/u4:13/9320: 1 lock held by syz-executor.5/10178: 1 lock held by syz-executor.4/10217: Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 97b91d62589d..770a63103c7a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ static __read_mostly struct kmem_cache *nf_conntrack_cachep; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(nf_conntrack_locks_all_lock); static __read_mostly bool nf_conntrack_locks_all; +/* serialize hash resizes and nf_ct_iterate_cleanup */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(nf_conntrack_mutex); + #define GC_SCAN_INTERVAL (120u * HZ) #define GC_SCAN_MAX_DURATION msecs_to_jiffies(10) @@ -2263,28 +2266,31 @@ get_next_corpse(int (*iter)(struct nf_conn *i, void *data), spinlock_t *lockp; for (; *bucket < nf_conntrack_htable_size; (*bucket)++) { + struct hlist_nulls_head *hslot = &nf_conntrack_hash[*bucket]; + + if (hlist_nulls_empty(hslot)) + continue; + lockp = &nf_conntrack_locks[*bucket % CONNTRACK_LOCKS]; local_bh_disable(); nf_conntrack_lock(lockp); - if (*bucket < nf_conntrack_htable_size) { - hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(h, n, &nf_conntrack_hash[*bucket], hnnode) { - if (NF_CT_DIRECTION(h) != IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) - continue; - /* All nf_conn objects are added to hash table twice, one - * for original direction tuple, once for the reply tuple. - * - * Exception: In the IPS_NAT_CLASH case, only the reply - * tuple is added (the original tuple already existed for - * a different object). - * - * We only need to call the iterator once for each - * conntrack, so we just use the 'reply' direction - * tuple while iterating. - */ - ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); - if (iter(ct, data)) - goto found; - } + hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(h, n, hslot, hnnode) { + if (NF_CT_DIRECTION(h) != IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) + continue; + /* All nf_conn objects are added to hash table twice, one + * for original direction tuple, once for the reply tuple. + * + * Exception: In the IPS_NAT_CLASH case, only the reply + * tuple is added (the original tuple already existed for + * a different object). + * + * We only need to call the iterator once for each + * conntrack, so we just use the 'reply' direction + * tuple while iterating. + */ + ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); + if (iter(ct, data)) + goto found; } spin_unlock(lockp); local_bh_enable(); @@ -2302,26 +2308,20 @@ found: static void nf_ct_iterate_cleanup(int (*iter)(struct nf_conn *i, void *data), void *data, u32 portid, int report) { - unsigned int bucket = 0, sequence; + unsigned int bucket = 0; struct nf_conn *ct; might_sleep(); - for (;;) { - sequence = read_seqcount_begin(&nf_conntrack_generation); - - while ((ct = get_next_corpse(iter, data, &bucket)) != NULL) { - /* Time to push up daises... */ + mutex_lock(&nf_conntrack_mutex); + while ((ct = get_next_corpse(iter, data, &bucket)) != NULL) { + /* Time to push up daises... */ - nf_ct_delete(ct, portid, report); - nf_ct_put(ct); - cond_resched(); - } - - if (!read_seqcount_retry(&nf_conntrack_generation, sequence)) - break; - bucket = 0; + nf_ct_delete(ct, portid, report); + nf_ct_put(ct); + cond_resched(); } + mutex_unlock(&nf_conntrack_mutex); } struct iter_data { @@ -2557,8 +2557,10 @@ int nf_conntrack_hash_resize(unsigned int hashsize) if (!hash) return -ENOMEM; + mutex_lock(&nf_conntrack_mutex); old_size = nf_conntrack_htable_size; if (old_size == hashsize) { + mutex_unlock(&nf_conntrack_mutex); kvfree(hash); return 0; } @@ -2598,6 +2600,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_hash_resize(unsigned int hashsize) nf_conntrack_all_unlock(); local_bh_enable(); + mutex_unlock(&nf_conntrack_mutex); + synchronize_net(); kvfree(old_hash); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6c90731980655280ea07ce4b21eb97457bf86286 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Karsten Graul Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 21:18:14 +0200 Subject: net/smc: add missing error check in smc_clc_prfx_set() Coverity stumbled over a missing error check in smc_clc_prfx_set(): *** CID 1475954: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN) /net/smc/smc_clc.c: 233 in smc_clc_prfx_set() >>> CID 1475954: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN) >>> Calling "kernel_getsockname" without checking return value (as is done elsewhere 8 out of 10 times). 233 kernel_getsockname(clcsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addrs); Add the return code check in smc_clc_prfx_set(). Fixes: c246d942eabc ("net/smc: restructure netinfo for CLC proposal msgs") Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_clc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_clc.c b/net/smc/smc_clc.c index e286dafd6e88..6ec1ebe878ae 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_clc.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_clc.c @@ -230,7 +230,8 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_set(struct socket *clcsock, goto out_rel; } /* get address to which the internal TCP socket is bound */ - kernel_getsockname(clcsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addrs); + if (kernel_getsockname(clcsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addrs) < 0) + goto out_rel; /* analyze IP specific data of net_device belonging to TCP socket */ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addrs; rcu_read_lock(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a18cee4791b1123d0a6579a7c89f4b87e48abe03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Karsten Graul Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 21:18:15 +0200 Subject: net/smc: fix 'workqueue leaked lock' in smc_conn_abort_work The abort_work is scheduled when a connection was detected to be out-of-sync after a link failure. The work calls smc_conn_kill(), which calls smc_close_active_abort() and that might end up calling smc_close_cancel_work(). smc_close_cancel_work() cancels any pending close_work and tx_work but needs to release the sock_lock before and acquires the sock_lock again afterwards. So when the sock_lock was NOT acquired before then it may be held after the abort_work completes. Thats why the sock_lock is acquired before the call to smc_conn_kill() in __smc_lgr_terminate(), but this is missing in smc_conn_abort_work(). Fix that by acquiring the sock_lock first and release it after the call to smc_conn_kill(). Fixes: b286a0651e44 ("net/smc: handle incoming CDC validation message") Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c index af227b65669e..8280c938be80 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_core.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c @@ -1474,7 +1474,9 @@ static void smc_conn_abort_work(struct work_struct *work) abort_work); struct smc_sock *smc = container_of(conn, struct smc_sock, conn); + lock_sock(&smc->sk); smc_conn_kill(conn, true); + release_sock(&smc->sk); sock_put(&smc->sk); /* sock_hold done by schedulers of abort_work */ } -- cgit v1.2.3 From e5845aa0eadda3d8a950eb8845c1396827131f30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 01:49:18 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: fix dsa_tree_setup error path Since the blamed commit, dsa_tree_teardown_switches() was split into two smaller functions, dsa_tree_teardown_switches and dsa_tree_teardown_ports. However, the error path of dsa_tree_setup stopped calling dsa_tree_teardown_ports. Fixes: a57d8c217aad ("net: dsa: flush switchdev workqueue before tearing down CPU/DSA ports") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index f14897d9b31d..f54639a3a822 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ static int dsa_tree_setup(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) teardown_master: dsa_tree_teardown_master(dst); teardown_switches: + dsa_tree_teardown_ports(dst); dsa_tree_teardown_switches(dst); teardown_cpu_ports: dsa_tree_teardown_cpu_ports(dst); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5135e96a3dd2f4555ae6981c3155a62bcf3227f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 00:42:08 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres The Linux device model permits both the ->shutdown and ->remove driver methods to get called during a shutdown procedure. Example: a DSA switch which sits on an SPI bus, and the SPI bus driver calls this on its ->shutdown method: spi_unregister_controller -> device_for_each_child(&ctlr->dev, NULL, __unregister); -> spi_unregister_device(to_spi_device(dev)); -> device_del(&spi->dev); So this is a simple pattern which can theoretically appear on any bus, although the only other buses on which I've been able to find it are I2C: i2c_del_adapter -> device_for_each_child(&adap->dev, NULL, __unregister_client); -> i2c_unregister_device(client); -> device_unregister(&client->dev); The implication of this pattern is that devices on these buses can be unregistered after having been shut down. The drivers for these devices might choose to return early either from ->remove or ->shutdown if the other callback has already run once, and they might choose that the ->shutdown method should only perform a subset of the teardown done by ->remove (to avoid unnecessary delays when rebooting). So in other words, the device driver may choose on ->remove to not do anything (therefore to not unregister an MDIO bus it has registered on ->probe), because this ->remove is actually triggered by the device_shutdown path, and its ->shutdown method has already run and done the minimally required cleanup. This used to be fine until the blamed commit, but now, the following BUG_ON triggers: void mdiobus_free(struct mii_bus *bus) { /* For compatibility with error handling in drivers. */ if (bus->state == MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED) { kfree(bus); return; } BUG_ON(bus->state != MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED); bus->state = MDIOBUS_RELEASED; put_device(&bus->dev); } In other words, there is an attempt to free an MDIO bus which was not unregistered. The attempt to free it comes from the devres release callbacks of the SPI device, which are executed after the device is unregistered. I'm not saying that the fact that MDIO buses allocated using devres would automatically get unregistered wasn't strange. I'm just saying that the commit didn't care about auditing existing call paths in the kernel, and now, the following code sequences are potentially buggy: (a) devm_mdiobus_alloc followed by plain mdiobus_register, for a device located on a bus that unregisters its children on shutdown. After the blamed patch, either both the alloc and the register should use devres, or none should. (b) devm_mdiobus_alloc followed by plain mdiobus_register, and then no mdiobus_unregister at all in the remove path. After the blamed patch, nobody unregisters the MDIO bus anymore, so this is even more buggy than the previous case which needs a specific bus configuration to be seen, this one is an unconditional bug. In this case, DSA falls into category (a), it tries to be helpful and registers an MDIO bus on behalf of the switch, which might be on such a bus. I've no idea why it does it under devres. It does this on probe: if (!ds->slave_mii_bus && ds->ops->phy_read) alloc and register mdio bus and this on remove: if (ds->slave_mii_bus && ds->ops->phy_read) unregister mdio bus I _could_ imagine using devres because the condition used on remove is different than the condition used on probe. So strictly speaking, DSA cannot determine whether the ds->slave_mii_bus it sees on remove is the ds->slave_mii_bus that _it_ has allocated on probe. Using devres would have solved that problem. But nonetheless, the existing code already proceeds to unregister the MDIO bus, even though it might be unregistering an MDIO bus it has never registered. So I can only guess that no driver that implements ds->ops->phy_read also allocates and registers ds->slave_mii_bus itself. So in that case, if unregistering is fine, freeing must be fine too. Stop using devres and free the MDIO bus manually. This will make devres stop attempting to free a still registered MDIO bus on ->shutdown. Fixes: ac3a68d56651 ("net: phy: don't abuse devres in devm_mdiobus_register()") Reported-by: Lino Sanfilippo Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Lino Sanfilippo Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index f54639a3a822..b29262eee00b 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int dsa_switch_setup(struct dsa_switch *ds) devlink_params_publish(ds->devlink); if (!ds->slave_mii_bus && ds->ops->phy_read) { - ds->slave_mii_bus = devm_mdiobus_alloc(ds->dev); + ds->slave_mii_bus = mdiobus_alloc(); if (!ds->slave_mii_bus) { err = -ENOMEM; goto teardown; @@ -890,13 +890,16 @@ static int dsa_switch_setup(struct dsa_switch *ds) err = mdiobus_register(ds->slave_mii_bus); if (err < 0) - goto teardown; + goto free_slave_mii_bus; } ds->setup = true; return 0; +free_slave_mii_bus: + if (ds->slave_mii_bus && ds->ops->phy_read) + mdiobus_free(ds->slave_mii_bus); teardown: if (ds->ops->teardown) ds->ops->teardown(ds); @@ -921,8 +924,11 @@ static void dsa_switch_teardown(struct dsa_switch *ds) if (!ds->setup) return; - if (ds->slave_mii_bus && ds->ops->phy_read) + if (ds->slave_mii_bus && ds->ops->phy_read) { mdiobus_unregister(ds->slave_mii_bus); + mdiobus_free(ds->slave_mii_bus); + ds->slave_mii_bus = NULL; + } dsa_switch_unregister_notifier(ds); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 977d293e23b48a1129830d7968605f61c4af71a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 13:12:17 +0200 Subject: mptcp: ensure tx skbs always have the MPTCP ext Due to signed/unsigned comparison, the expression: info->size_goal - skb->len > 0 evaluates to true when the size goal is smaller than the skb size. That results in lack of tx cache refill, so that the skb allocated by the core TCP code lacks the required MPTCP skb extensions. Due to the above, syzbot is able to trigger the following WARN_ON(): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 810 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1366 mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x1362/0x1bc0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1366 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 810 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x1362/0x1bc0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1366 Code: ff 4c 8b 74 24 50 48 8b 5c 24 58 e9 0f fb ff ff e8 13 44 8b f8 4c 89 e7 45 31 ed e8 98 57 2e fe e9 81 f4 ff ff e8 fe 43 8b f8 <0f> 0b 41 bd ea ff ff ff e9 6f f4 ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 b9 8e d2 f8 e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000531f6a0 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 000000000000697f RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90012107000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff88eac9e2 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffff888078b15780 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff88eac017 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801de0a280 R13: 0000000000006b58 R14: ffff888066278280 R15: ffff88803c2fe9c0 FS: 00007fd9f866e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007faebcb2f718 CR3: 00000000267cb000 CR4: 00000000001506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __mptcp_push_pending+0x1fb/0x6b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1547 mptcp_release_cb+0xfe/0x210 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3003 release_sock+0xb4/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3206 sk_stream_wait_memory+0x604/0xed0 net/core/stream.c:145 mptcp_sendmsg+0xc39/0x1bc0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1749 inet6_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:643 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 sock_write_iter+0x2a0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:1057 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2163 [inline] new_sync_write+0x40b/0x640 fs/read_write.c:507 vfs_write+0x7cf/0xae0 fs/read_write.c:594 ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:647 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd9f866e188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056c038 RCX: 00000000004665f9 RDX: 00000000000e7b78 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000004bfcc4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056c038 R13: 0000000000a9fb1f R14: 00007fd9f866e300 R15: 0000000000022000 Fix the issue rewriting the relevant expression to avoid sign-related problems - note: size_goal is always >= 0. Additionally, ensure that the skb in the tx cache always carries the relevant extension. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+263a248eec3e875baa7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1094c6fe7280 ("mptcp: fix possible divide by zero") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index 2602f1386160..dbcebf56798f 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ static int mptcp_sendmsg_frag(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk, goto alloc_skb; } - must_collapse = (info->size_goal - skb->len > 0) && + must_collapse = (info->size_goal > skb->len) && (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags < sysctl_max_skb_frags); if (must_collapse) { size_bias = skb->len; @@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ static int mptcp_sendmsg_frag(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk, } alloc_skb: - if (!must_collapse && !ssk->sk_tx_skb_cache && + if (!must_collapse && !mptcp_alloc_tx_skb(sk, ssk, info->data_lock_held)) return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 93ec1320b0170d7a207eda2d119c669b673401ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 10:50:06 +0200 Subject: xfrm: fix rcu lock in xfrm_notify_userpolicy() As stated in the comment above xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(), rcu read lock must be held before calling this function. Reported-by: syzbot+3d9866419b4aa8f985d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 703b94b93c19 ("xfrm: notify default policy on update") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 0eba0c27c665..3a3cb09eec12 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1967,6 +1967,7 @@ static int xfrm_notify_userpolicy(struct net *net) int len = NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(*up)); struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_buff *skb; + int err; skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (skb == NULL) @@ -1988,7 +1989,11 @@ static int xfrm_notify_userpolicy(struct net *net) nlmsg_end(skb, nlh); - return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_POLICY); + rcu_read_lock(); + err = xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_POLICY); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return err; } static int xfrm_set_default(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 98d46b021f6ee246c7a73f9d490d4cddb4511a3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 10:35:59 +0200 Subject: Revert "mac80211: do not use low data rates for data frames with no ack flag" This reverts commit d333322361e7 ("mac80211: do not use low data rates for data frames with no ack flag"). Returning false early in rate_control_send_low breaks sending broadcast packets, since rate control will not select a rate for it. Before re-introducing a fixed version of this patch, we should probably also make some changes to rate control to be more conservative in selecting rates for no-ack packets and also prevent using probing rates on them, since we won't get any feedback. Fixes: d333322361e7 ("mac80211: do not use low data rates for data frames with no ack flag") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210906083559.9109-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rate.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rate.c b/net/mac80211/rate.c index e5935e3d7a07..8c6416129d5b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rate.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rate.c @@ -392,10 +392,6 @@ static bool rate_control_send_low(struct ieee80211_sta *pubsta, int mcast_rate; bool use_basicrate = false; - if (ieee80211_is_tx_data(txrc->skb) && - info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_NO_ACK) - return false; - if (!pubsta || rc_no_data_or_no_ack_use_min(txrc)) { __rate_control_send_low(txrc->hw, sband, pubsta, info, txrc->rate_idx_mask); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fe94bac626d9c1c5bc98ab32707be8a9d7f8adba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chih-Kang Chang Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 15:32:40 +0800 Subject: mac80211: Fix ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate frag_tail bug In ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate() set a pointer frag_tail point to the end of skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list, and use it to bind other skb in the end of this function. But when execute ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate() ->ieee80211_amsdu_realloc_pad()->pskb_expand_head(), the address of skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list will be changed. However, the ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate() not update frag_tail after call pskb_expand_head(). That will cause the second skb can't bind to the head skb appropriately.So we update the address of frag_tail to fix it. Fixes: 6e0456b54545 ("mac80211: add A-MSDU tx support") Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang Signed-off-by: Zong-Zhe Yang Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830073240.12736-1-pkshih@realtek.com [reword comment] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 2d1193ed3eb5..824bed71be13 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -3380,6 +3380,14 @@ static bool ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (!ieee80211_amsdu_prepare_head(sdata, fast_tx, head)) goto out; + /* If n == 2, the "while (*frag_tail)" loop above didn't execute + * and frag_tail should be &skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list. + * However, ieee80211_amsdu_prepare_head() can reallocate it. + * Reload frag_tail to have it pointing to the correct place. + */ + if (n == 2) + frag_tail = &skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list; + /* * Pad out the previous subframe to a multiple of 4 by adding the * padding to the next one, that's being added. Note that head->len -- cgit v1.2.3 From a6555f844549cd190eb060daef595f94d3de1582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 22:42:30 +0800 Subject: mac80211: Drop frames from invalid MAC address in ad-hoc mode WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9 at net/mac80211/sta_info.c:554 sta_info_insert_rcu+0x121/0x12a0 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7+ #253 Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_iface_work RIP: 0010:sta_info_insert_rcu+0x121/0x12a0 ... Call Trace: ieee80211_ibss_finish_sta+0xbc/0x170 ieee80211_ibss_work+0x13f/0x7d0 ieee80211_iface_work+0x37a/0x500 process_one_work+0x357/0x850 worker_thread+0x41/0x4d0 If an Ad-Hoc node receives packets with invalid source MAC address, it hits a WARN_ON in sta_info_insert_check(), this can spam the log. Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827144230.39944-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 99ed68f7dc36..c4071b015c18 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -4131,7 +4131,8 @@ static bool ieee80211_accept_frame(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (!bssid) return false; if (ether_addr_equal(sdata->vif.addr, hdr->addr2) || - ether_addr_equal(sdata->u.ibss.bssid, hdr->addr2)) + ether_addr_equal(sdata->u.ibss.bssid, hdr->addr2) || + !is_valid_ether_addr(hdr->addr2)) return false; if (ieee80211_is_beacon(hdr->frame_control)) return true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 13cb6d826e0ac0d144b0d48191ff1a111d32f0c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Bianconi Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 14:45:22 +0200 Subject: mac80211: limit injected vht mcs/nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100 R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8 R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740 netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401 bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline] __sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 Reported-by: syzbot+0196ac871673f0c20f68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 646e76bb5daf4 ("mac80211: parse VHT info in injected frames") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c26c3f02dcb38ab63b2f2534cb463d95ee81bb13.1632141760.git.lorenzo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 824bed71be13..8921088a5df6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -2209,7 +2209,11 @@ bool ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap(struct sk_buff *skb, } vht_mcs = iterator.this_arg[4] >> 4; + if (vht_mcs > 11) + vht_mcs = 0; vht_nss = iterator.this_arg[4] & 0xF; + if (!vht_nss || vht_nss > 8) + vht_nss = 1; break; /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From b9731062ce8afd35cf723bf3a8ad55d208f915a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 15:40:05 +0200 Subject: mac80211: mesh: fix potentially unaligned access The pointer here points directly into the frame, so the access is potentially unaligned. Use get_unaligned_le16 to avoid that. Fixes: 3f52b7e328c5 ("mac80211: mesh power save basics") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210920154009.3110ff75be0c.Ib6a2ff9e9cc9bc6fca50fce631ec1ce725cc926b@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mesh_ps.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh_ps.c b/net/mac80211/mesh_ps.c index 204830a55240..3fbd0b9ff913 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh_ps.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh_ps.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ /* * Copyright 2012-2013, Marco Porsch * Copyright 2012-2013, cozybit Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2021 Intel Corporation */ #include "mesh.h" @@ -588,7 +589,7 @@ void ieee80211_mps_frame_release(struct sta_info *sta, /* only transmit to PS STA with announced, non-zero awake window */ if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_PS_STA) && - (!elems->awake_window || !le16_to_cpu(*elems->awake_window))) + (!elems->awake_window || !get_unaligned_le16(elems->awake_window))) return; if (!test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_MPSP_OWNER)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3106a0847525befe3e22fc723909d1b21eb0d520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 13:25:40 +0300 Subject: nexthop: Fix memory leaks in nexthop notification chain listeners syzkaller discovered memory leaks [1] that can be reduced to the following commands: # ip nexthop add id 1 blackhole # devlink dev reload pci/0000:06:00.0 As part of the reload flow, mlxsw will unregister its netdevs and then unregister from the nexthop notification chain. Before unregistering from the notification chain, mlxsw will receive delete notifications for nexthop objects using netdevs registered by mlxsw or their uppers. mlxsw will not receive notifications for nexthops using netdevs that are not dismantled as part of the reload flow. For example, the blackhole nexthop above that internally uses the loopback netdev as its nexthop device. One way to fix this problem is to have listeners flush their nexthop tables after unregistering from the notification chain. This is error-prone as evident by this patch and also not symmetric with the registration path where a listener receives a dump of all the existing nexthops. Therefore, fix this problem by replaying delete notifications for the listener being unregistered. This is symmetric to the registration path and also consistent with the netdev notification chain. The above means that unregister_nexthop_notifier(), like register_nexthop_notifier(), will have to take RTNL in order to iterate over the existing nexthops and that any callers of the function cannot hold RTNL. This is true for mlxsw and netdevsim, but not for the VXLAN driver. To avoid a deadlock, change the latter to unregister its nexthop listener without holding RTNL, making it symmetric to the registration path. [1] unreferenced object 0xffff88806173d600 (size 512): comm "syz-executor.0", pid 1290, jiffies 4295583142 (age 143.507s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 41 9d 1e 60 80 88 ff ff 08 d6 73 61 80 88 ff ff A..`......sa.... 08 d6 73 61 80 88 ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..sa............ backtrace: [] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline] [] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x96/0x490 mm/slab.h:522 [] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3206 [inline] [] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3214 [inline] [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x163/0x370 mm/slub.c:3231 [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:591 [inline] [] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:721 [inline] [] mlxsw_sp_nexthop_obj_group_create drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c:4918 [inline] [] mlxsw_sp_nexthop_obj_new drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c:5054 [inline] [] mlxsw_sp_nexthop_obj_event+0x59a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c:5239 [] notifier_call_chain+0xbd/0x210 kernel/notifier.c:83 [] blocking_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:318 [inline] [] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x72/0xa0 kernel/notifier.c:306 [] call_nexthop_notifiers+0x156/0x310 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:244 [] insert_nexthop net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2336 [inline] [] nexthop_add net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2644 [inline] [] rtm_new_nexthop+0x14e8/0x4d10 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2913 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x448/0xbf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x173/0x480 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 [] rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5590 [] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] [] netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x8e1/0xe30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 [] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] [] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline] [] ____sys_sendmsg+0x874/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2409 [] ___sys_sendmsg+0x104/0x170 net/socket.c:2463 [] __sys_sendmsg+0x111/0x1f0 net/socket.c:2492 [] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2501 [inline] [] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2499 [inline] [] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7d/0xc0 net/socket.c:2499 Fixes: 2a014b200bbd ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add support for nexthop objects") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Petr Machata Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c index 0e75fd3e57b4..9e8100728d46 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c +++ b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c @@ -3567,6 +3567,7 @@ static struct notifier_block nh_netdev_notifier = { }; static int nexthops_dump(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb, + enum nexthop_event_type event_type, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { struct rb_root *root = &net->nexthop.rb_root; @@ -3577,8 +3578,7 @@ static int nexthops_dump(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb, struct nexthop *nh; nh = rb_entry(node, struct nexthop, rb_node); - err = call_nexthop_notifier(nb, net, NEXTHOP_EVENT_REPLACE, nh, - extack); + err = call_nexthop_notifier(nb, net, event_type, nh, extack); if (err) break; } @@ -3592,7 +3592,7 @@ int register_nexthop_notifier(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb, int err; rtnl_lock(); - err = nexthops_dump(net, nb, extack); + err = nexthops_dump(net, nb, NEXTHOP_EVENT_REPLACE, extack); if (err) goto unlock; err = blocking_notifier_chain_register(&net->nexthop.notifier_chain, @@ -3605,8 +3605,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_nexthop_notifier); int unregister_nexthop_notifier(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb) { - return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&net->nexthop.notifier_chain, - nb); + int err; + + rtnl_lock(); + err = blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&net->nexthop.notifier_chain, + nb); + if (err) + goto unlock; + nexthops_dump(net, nb, NEXTHOP_EVENT_DEL, NULL); +unlock: + rtnl_unlock(); + return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_nexthop_notifier); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f7e745f8e94492a8ac0b0a26e25f2b19d342918f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 00:05:04 -0400 Subject: sctp: break out if skb_header_pointer returns NULL in sctp_rcv_ootb We should always check if skb_header_pointer's return is NULL before using it, otherwise it may cause null-ptr-deref, as syzbot reported: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv_ootb net/sctp/input.c:705 [inline] RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv+0x1d84/0x3220 net/sctp/input.c:196 Call Trace: sctp6_rcv+0x38/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1109 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2e9/0x1ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:422 ip6_input_finish+0x62/0x170 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:463 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline] ip6_input+0x9c/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:472 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:76 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x28c/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:297 Fixes: 3acb50c18d8d ("sctp: delay as much as possible skb_linearize") Reported-by: syzbot+581aff2ae6b860625116@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index 5ef86fdb1176..1f1786021d9c 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static int sctp_rcv_ootb(struct sk_buff *skb) ch = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(*ch), &_ch); /* Break out if chunk length is less then minimal. */ - if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(_ch)) + if (!ch || ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(_ch)) break; ch_end = offset + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From ea1300b9df7c8e8b65695a08b8f6aaf4b25fec9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 17:04:11 -0700 Subject: mptcp: don't return sockets in foreign netns mptcp_token_get_sock() may return a mptcp socket that is in a different net namespace than the socket that received the token value. The mptcp syncookie code path had an explicit check for this, this moves the test into mptcp_token_get_sock() function. Eventually token.c should be converted to pernet storage, but such change is not suitable for net tree. Fixes: 2c5ebd001d4f0 ("mptcp: refactor token container") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/mptcp_diag.c | 2 +- net/mptcp/protocol.h | 2 +- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 2 +- net/mptcp/syncookies.c | 13 +------------ net/mptcp/token.c | 11 ++++++++--- net/mptcp/token_test.c | 14 ++++++++------ 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/mptcp_diag.c b/net/mptcp/mptcp_diag.c index f48eb6315bbb..292374fb0779 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/mptcp_diag.c +++ b/net/mptcp/mptcp_diag.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static int mptcp_diag_dump_one(struct netlink_callback *cb, struct sock *sk; net = sock_net(in_skb->sk); - msk = mptcp_token_get_sock(req->id.idiag_cookie[0]); + msk = mptcp_token_get_sock(net, req->id.idiag_cookie[0]); if (!msk) goto out_nosk; diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.h b/net/mptcp/protocol.h index d3e6fd1615f1..dc984676c5eb 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.h +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.h @@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ int mptcp_token_new_connect(struct sock *sk); void mptcp_token_accept(struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock *r, struct mptcp_sock *msk); bool mptcp_token_exists(u32 token); -struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(u32 token); +struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(struct net *net, u32 token); struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_iter_next(const struct net *net, long *s_slot, long *s_num); void mptcp_token_destroy(struct mptcp_sock *msk); diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index 1de7ce883c37..6172f380dfb7 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static struct mptcp_sock *subflow_token_join_request(struct request_sock *req) struct mptcp_sock *msk; int local_id; - msk = mptcp_token_get_sock(subflow_req->token); + msk = mptcp_token_get_sock(sock_net(req_to_sk(req)), subflow_req->token); if (!msk) { SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_JOINNOTOKEN); return NULL; diff --git a/net/mptcp/syncookies.c b/net/mptcp/syncookies.c index 37127781aee9..7f22526346a7 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/syncookies.c +++ b/net/mptcp/syncookies.c @@ -108,18 +108,12 @@ bool mptcp_token_join_cookie_init_state(struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock *subfl e->valid = 0; - msk = mptcp_token_get_sock(e->token); + msk = mptcp_token_get_sock(net, e->token); if (!msk) { spin_unlock_bh(&join_entry_locks[i]); return false; } - /* If this fails, the token got re-used in the mean time by another - * mptcp socket in a different netns, i.e. entry is outdated. - */ - if (!net_eq(sock_net((struct sock *)msk), net)) - goto err_put; - subflow_req->remote_nonce = e->remote_nonce; subflow_req->local_nonce = e->local_nonce; subflow_req->backup = e->backup; @@ -128,11 +122,6 @@ bool mptcp_token_join_cookie_init_state(struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock *subfl subflow_req->msk = msk; spin_unlock_bh(&join_entry_locks[i]); return true; - -err_put: - spin_unlock_bh(&join_entry_locks[i]); - sock_put((struct sock *)msk); - return false; } void __init mptcp_join_cookie_init(void) diff --git a/net/mptcp/token.c b/net/mptcp/token.c index a98e554b034f..e581b341c5be 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/token.c +++ b/net/mptcp/token.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ found: /** * mptcp_token_get_sock - retrieve mptcp connection sock using its token + * @net: restrict to this namespace * @token: token of the mptcp connection to retrieve * * This function returns the mptcp connection structure with the given token. @@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ found: * * returns NULL if no connection with the given token value exists. */ -struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(u32 token) +struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(struct net *net, u32 token) { struct hlist_nulls_node *pos; struct token_bucket *bucket; @@ -251,11 +252,15 @@ struct mptcp_sock *mptcp_token_get_sock(u32 token) again: sk_nulls_for_each_rcu(sk, pos, &bucket->msk_chain) { msk = mptcp_sk(sk); - if (READ_ONCE(msk->token) != token) + if (READ_ONCE(msk->token) != token || + !net_eq(sock_net(sk), net)) continue; + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) goto not_found; - if (READ_ONCE(msk->token) != token) { + + if (READ_ONCE(msk->token) != token || + !net_eq(sock_net(sk), net)) { sock_put(sk); goto again; } diff --git a/net/mptcp/token_test.c b/net/mptcp/token_test.c index e1bd6f0a0676..5d984bec1cd8 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/token_test.c +++ b/net/mptcp/token_test.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ static struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock *build_req_sock(struct kunit *test) GFP_USER); KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, req); mptcp_token_init_request((struct request_sock *)req); + sock_net_set((struct sock *)req, &init_net); return req; } @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ static void mptcp_token_test_req_basic(struct kunit *test) KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, mptcp_token_new_request((struct request_sock *)req)); KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test, 0, (int)req->token); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, null_msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(req->token)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, null_msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(&init_net, req->token)); /* cleanup */ mptcp_token_destroy_request((struct request_sock *)req); @@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static struct mptcp_sock *build_msk(struct kunit *test) msk = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(struct mptcp_sock), GFP_USER); KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, msk); refcount_set(&((struct sock *)msk)->sk_refcnt, 1); + sock_net_set((struct sock *)msk, &init_net); return msk; } @@ -74,11 +76,11 @@ static void mptcp_token_test_msk_basic(struct kunit *test) mptcp_token_new_connect((struct sock *)icsk)); KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test, 0, (int)ctx->token); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ctx->token, msk->token); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(ctx->token)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(&init_net, ctx->token)); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2, (int)refcount_read(&sk->sk_refcnt)); mptcp_token_destroy(msk); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, null_msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(ctx->token)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, null_msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(&init_net, ctx->token)); } static void mptcp_token_test_accept(struct kunit *test) @@ -90,11 +92,11 @@ static void mptcp_token_test_accept(struct kunit *test) mptcp_token_new_request((struct request_sock *)req)); msk->token = req->token; mptcp_token_accept(req, msk); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(msk->token)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(&init_net, msk->token)); /* this is now a no-op */ mptcp_token_destroy_request((struct request_sock *)req); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(msk->token)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(&init_net, msk->token)); /* cleanup */ mptcp_token_destroy(msk); @@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ static void mptcp_token_test_destroyed(struct kunit *test) /* simulate race on removal */ refcount_set(&sk->sk_refcnt, 0); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, null_msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(msk->token)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, null_msk, mptcp_token_get_sock(&init_net, msk->token)); /* cleanup */ mptcp_token_destroy(msk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f4a08909e2c740f8045efc74c4cf82eeaae3e36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Davide Caratti Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 17:04:12 -0700 Subject: mptcp: allow changing the 'backup' bit when no sockets are open current Linux refuses to change the 'backup' bit of MPTCP endpoints, i.e. using MPTCP_PM_CMD_SET_FLAGS, unless it finds (at least) one subflow that matches the endpoint address. There is no reason for that, so we can just ignore the return value of mptcp_nl_addr_backup(). In this way, endpoints can reconfigure their 'backup' flag even if no MPTCP sockets are open (or more generally, in case the MP_PRIO message is not sent out). Fixes: 0f9f696a502e ("mptcp: add set_flags command in PM netlink") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index c4f9a5ce3815..050eea231528 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -1718,9 +1718,7 @@ static int mptcp_nl_cmd_set_flags(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) list_for_each_entry(entry, &pernet->local_addr_list, list) { if (addresses_equal(&entry->addr, &addr.addr, true)) { - ret = mptcp_nl_addr_backup(net, &entry->addr, bkup); - if (ret) - return ret; + mptcp_nl_addr_backup(net, &entry->addr, bkup); if (bkup) entry->flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 597aa16c782496bf74c5dc3b45ff472ade6cee64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiao Liang Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 23:03:19 +0800 Subject: net: ipv4: Fix rtnexthop len when RTA_FLOW is present Multipath RTA_FLOW is embedded in nexthop. Dump it in fib_add_nexthop() to get the length of rtnexthop correct. Fixes: b0f60193632e ("ipv4: Refactor nexthop attributes in fib_dump_info") Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 16 +++++++++------- net/ipv6/route.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c index b42c429cebbe..3364cb9c67e0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c @@ -1661,7 +1661,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fib_nexthop_info); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) int fib_add_nexthop(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct fib_nh_common *nhc, - int nh_weight, u8 rt_family) + int nh_weight, u8 rt_family, u32 nh_tclassid) { const struct net_device *dev = nhc->nhc_dev; struct rtnexthop *rtnh; @@ -1679,6 +1679,9 @@ int fib_add_nexthop(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct fib_nh_common *nhc, rtnh->rtnh_flags = flags; + if (nh_tclassid && nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_FLOW, nh_tclassid)) + goto nla_put_failure; + /* length of rtnetlink header + attributes */ rtnh->rtnh_len = nlmsg_get_pos(skb) - (void *)rtnh; @@ -1706,14 +1709,13 @@ static int fib_add_multipath(struct sk_buff *skb, struct fib_info *fi) } for_nexthops(fi) { - if (fib_add_nexthop(skb, &nh->nh_common, nh->fib_nh_weight, - AF_INET) < 0) - goto nla_put_failure; + u32 nh_tclassid = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID - if (nh->nh_tclassid && - nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_FLOW, nh->nh_tclassid)) - goto nla_put_failure; + nh_tclassid = nh->nh_tclassid; #endif + if (fib_add_nexthop(skb, &nh->nh_common, nh->fib_nh_weight, + AF_INET, nh_tclassid) < 0) + goto nla_put_failure; } endfor_nexthops(fi); mp_end: diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index dbc224023977..9b9ef09382ab 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -5681,14 +5681,15 @@ static int rt6_fill_node(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, goto nla_put_failure; if (fib_add_nexthop(skb, &rt->fib6_nh->nh_common, - rt->fib6_nh->fib_nh_weight, AF_INET6) < 0) + rt->fib6_nh->fib_nh_weight, AF_INET6, + 0) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, next_sibling, &rt->fib6_siblings, fib6_siblings) { if (fib_add_nexthop(skb, &sibling->fib6_nh->nh_common, sibling->fib6_nh->fib_nh_weight, - AF_INET6) < 0) + AF_INET6, 0) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b193e15ac69d56f35e1d8e2b5d16cbd47764d053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=E7=8E=8B=E8=B4=87?= Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2021 10:35:58 +0800 Subject: net: prevent user from passing illegal stab size We observed below report when playing with netlink sock: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_api.c:580:10 shift exponent 249 is too large for 32-bit type CPU: 0 PID: 685 Comm: a.out Not tainted Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x4e __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x161/0x182 __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len+0xf0/0x190 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2ed/0x15b0 it seems like kernel won't check the stab log value passing from user, and will use the insane value later to calculate pkt_len. This patch just add a check on the size/cell_log to avoid insane calculation. Reported-by: Abaci Signed-off-by: Michael Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_api.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index 5e90e9b160e3..12f39a2dffd4 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ static struct qdisc_size_table *qdisc_get_stab(struct nlattr *opt, return stab; } + if (s->size_log > STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX || + s->cell_log > STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid logarithmic size of size table"); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + stab = kmalloc(sizeof(*stab) + tsize * sizeof(u16), GFP_KERNEL); if (!stab) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 94513069eb549737bcfc3d988d6ed4da948a2de8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 11:58:39 +0200 Subject: mac80211: fix use-after-free in CCMP/GCMP RX When PN checking is done in mac80211, for fragmentation we need to copy the PN to the RX struct so we can later use it to do a comparison, since commit bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame"). Unfortunately, in that commit I used the 'hdr' variable without it being necessarily valid, so use-after-free could occur if it was necessary to reallocate (parts of) the frame. Fix this by reloading the variable after the code that results in the reallocations, if any. This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214401. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927115838.12b9ac6bb233.I1d066acd5408a662c3b6e828122cd314fcb28cdb@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/wpa.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index bca47fad5a16..4eed23e27610 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -520,6 +520,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } + /* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */ + hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data; + data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; @@ -749,6 +752,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } + /* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */ + hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data; + data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 111461d573741c17eafad029ac93474fa9adcce0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MichelleJin Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 03:34:57 +0000 Subject: mac80211: check return value of rhashtable_init When rhashtable_init() fails, it returns -EINVAL. However, since error return value of rhashtable_init is not checked, it can cause use of uninitialized pointers. So, fix unhandled errors of rhashtable_init. Signed-off-by: MichelleJin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927033457.1020967-4-shjy180909@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mesh_pathtbl.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh_pathtbl.c b/net/mac80211/mesh_pathtbl.c index efbefcbac3ac..7cab1cf09bf1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh_pathtbl.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh_pathtbl.c @@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ static struct mesh_table *mesh_table_alloc(void) atomic_set(&newtbl->entries, 0); spin_lock_init(&newtbl->gates_lock); spin_lock_init(&newtbl->walk_lock); - rhashtable_init(&newtbl->rhead, &mesh_rht_params); + if (rhashtable_init(&newtbl->rhead, &mesh_rht_params)) { + kfree(newtbl); + return NULL; + } return newtbl; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 435b08ec0094ac1e128afe6cfd0d9311a8c617a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 14:39:21 +0200 Subject: bpf, test, cgroup: Use sk_{alloc,free} for test cases BPF test infra has some hacks in place which kzalloc() a socket and perform minimum init via sock_net_set() and sock_init_data(). As a result, the sk's skcd->cgroup is NULL since it didn't go through proper initialization as it would have been the case from sk_alloc(). Rather than re-adding a NULL test in sock_cgroup_ptr() just for this, use sk_{alloc,free}() pair for the test socket. The latter also allows to get rid of the bpf_sk_storage_free() special case. Fixes: 8520e224f547 ("bpf, cgroups: Fix cgroup v2 fallback on v1/v2 mixed mode") Fixes: b7a1848e8398 ("bpf: add BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN support for flow dissector") Fixes: 2cb494a36c98 ("bpf: add tests for direct packet access from CGROUP_SKB") Reported-by: syzbot+664b58e9a40fbb2cec71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+33f36d0754d4c5c0e102@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Tested-by: syzbot+664b58e9a40fbb2cec71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+33f36d0754d4c5c0e102@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210927123921.21535-2-daniel@iogearbox.net --- net/bpf/test_run.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c index 2eb0e55ef54d..b5f4ef35357c 100644 --- a/net/bpf/test_run.c +++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c @@ -552,6 +552,12 @@ static void convert_skb_to___skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct __sk_buff *__skb) __skb->gso_segs = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs; } +static struct proto bpf_dummy_proto = { + .name = "bpf_dummy", + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .obj_size = sizeof(struct sock), +}; + int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { @@ -596,20 +602,19 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, break; } - sk = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sock), GFP_USER); + sk = sk_alloc(net, AF_UNSPEC, GFP_USER, &bpf_dummy_proto, 1); if (!sk) { kfree(data); kfree(ctx); return -ENOMEM; } - sock_net_set(sk, net); sock_init_data(NULL, sk); skb = build_skb(data, 0); if (!skb) { kfree(data); kfree(ctx); - kfree(sk); + sk_free(sk); return -ENOMEM; } skb->sk = sk; @@ -682,8 +687,7 @@ out: if (dev && dev != net->loopback_dev) dev_put(dev); kfree_skb(skb); - bpf_sk_storage_free(sk); - kfree(sk); + sk_free(sk); kfree(ctx); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 339031bafe6b281cf2dcb8364217288b9fdab555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 16:44:34 +0200 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: fix boot failure with nf_conntrack.enable_hooks=1 This is a revert of 7b1957b049 ("netfilter: nf_defrag_ipv4: use net_generic infra") and a partial revert of 8b0adbe3e3 ("netfilter: nf_defrag_ipv6: use net_generic infra"). If conntrack is builtin and kernel is booted with: nf_conntrack.enable_hooks=1 .... kernel will fail to boot due to a NULL deref in nf_defrag_ipv4_enable(): Its called before the ipv4 defrag initcall is made, so net_generic() returns NULL. To resolve this, move the user refcount back to struct net so calls to those functions are possible even before their initcalls have run. Fixes: 7b1957b04956 ("netfilter: nf_defrag_ipv4: use net_generic infra") Fixes: 8b0adbe3e38d ("netfilter: nf_defrag_ipv6: use net_generic infra"). Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c | 30 +++++++++--------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c | 25 +++++++++---------------- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c index 613432a36f0a..e61ea428ea18 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c @@ -20,13 +20,8 @@ #endif #include -static unsigned int defrag4_pernet_id __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(defrag4_mutex); -struct defrag4_pernet { - unsigned int users; -}; - static int nf_ct_ipv4_gather_frags(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u_int32_t user) { @@ -111,19 +106,15 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops ipv4_defrag_ops[] = { static void __net_exit defrag4_net_exit(struct net *net) { - struct defrag4_pernet *nf_defrag = net_generic(net, defrag4_pernet_id); - - if (nf_defrag->users) { + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users) { nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ipv4_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv4_defrag_ops)); - nf_defrag->users = 0; + net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users = 0; } } static struct pernet_operations defrag4_net_ops = { .exit = defrag4_net_exit, - .id = &defrag4_pernet_id, - .size = sizeof(struct defrag4_pernet), }; static int __init nf_defrag_init(void) @@ -138,24 +129,23 @@ static void __exit nf_defrag_fini(void) int nf_defrag_ipv4_enable(struct net *net) { - struct defrag4_pernet *nf_defrag = net_generic(net, defrag4_pernet_id); int err = 0; mutex_lock(&defrag4_mutex); - if (nf_defrag->users == UINT_MAX) { + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users == UINT_MAX) { err = -EOVERFLOW; goto out_unlock; } - if (nf_defrag->users) { - nf_defrag->users++; + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users) { + net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users++; goto out_unlock; } err = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ipv4_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv4_defrag_ops)); if (err == 0) - nf_defrag->users = 1; + net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users = 1; out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&defrag4_mutex); @@ -165,12 +155,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_defrag_ipv4_enable); void nf_defrag_ipv4_disable(struct net *net) { - struct defrag4_pernet *nf_defrag = net_generic(net, defrag4_pernet_id); - mutex_lock(&defrag4_mutex); - if (nf_defrag->users) { - nf_defrag->users--; - if (nf_defrag->users == 0) + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users) { + net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users--; + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv4_users == 0) nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ipv4_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv4_defrag_ops)); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c index a0108415275f..5c47be29b9ee 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static const char nf_frags_cache_name[] = "nf-frags"; -unsigned int nf_frag_pernet_id __read_mostly; +static unsigned int nf_frag_pernet_id __read_mostly; static struct inet_frags nf_frags; static struct nft_ct_frag6_pernet *nf_frag_pernet(struct net *net) diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c index e8a59d8bf2ad..cb4eb1d2c620 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c @@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ #include #include -extern unsigned int nf_frag_pernet_id; - static DEFINE_MUTEX(defrag6_mutex); static enum ip6_defrag_users nf_ct6_defrag_user(unsigned int hooknum, @@ -91,12 +89,10 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops ipv6_defrag_ops[] = { static void __net_exit defrag6_net_exit(struct net *net) { - struct nft_ct_frag6_pernet *nf_frag = net_generic(net, nf_frag_pernet_id); - - if (nf_frag->users) { + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users) { nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ipv6_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv6_defrag_ops)); - nf_frag->users = 0; + net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users = 0; } } @@ -134,24 +130,23 @@ static void __exit nf_defrag_fini(void) int nf_defrag_ipv6_enable(struct net *net) { - struct nft_ct_frag6_pernet *nf_frag = net_generic(net, nf_frag_pernet_id); int err = 0; mutex_lock(&defrag6_mutex); - if (nf_frag->users == UINT_MAX) { + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users == UINT_MAX) { err = -EOVERFLOW; goto out_unlock; } - if (nf_frag->users) { - nf_frag->users++; + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users) { + net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users++; goto out_unlock; } err = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ipv6_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv6_defrag_ops)); if (err == 0) - nf_frag->users = 1; + net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users = 1; out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&defrag6_mutex); @@ -161,12 +156,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_defrag_ipv6_enable); void nf_defrag_ipv6_disable(struct net *net) { - struct nft_ct_frag6_pernet *nf_frag = net_generic(net, nf_frag_pernet_id); - mutex_lock(&defrag6_mutex); - if (nf_frag->users) { - nf_frag->users--; - if (nf_frag->users == 0) + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users) { + net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users--; + if (net->nf.defrag_ipv6_users == 0) nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ipv6_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv6_defrag_ops)); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From e189ae161dd784aa5d454b0832f818cacc0e131b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 00:37:03 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: add position handle in event notification Add position handle to allow to identify the rule location from netlink events. Otherwise, userspace cannot incrementally update a userspace cache through monitoring events. Skip handle dump if the rule has been either inserted (at the beginning of the ruleset) or appended (at the end of the ruleset), the NLM_F_APPEND netlink flag is sufficient in these two cases. Handle NLM_F_REPLACE as NLM_F_APPEND since the rule replacement expansion appends it after the specified rule handle. Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index b9546defdc28..085783b14075 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -2866,8 +2866,7 @@ static int nf_tables_fill_rule_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 flags, int family, const struct nft_table *table, const struct nft_chain *chain, - const struct nft_rule *rule, - const struct nft_rule *prule) + const struct nft_rule *rule, u64 handle) { struct nlmsghdr *nlh; const struct nft_expr *expr, *next; @@ -2887,9 +2886,8 @@ static int nf_tables_fill_rule_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, NFTA_RULE_PAD)) goto nla_put_failure; - if (event != NFT_MSG_DELRULE && prule) { - if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_RULE_POSITION, - cpu_to_be64(prule->handle), + if (event != NFT_MSG_DELRULE && handle) { + if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_RULE_POSITION, cpu_to_be64(handle), NFTA_RULE_PAD)) goto nla_put_failure; } @@ -2925,7 +2923,10 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_rule *rule, int event) { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx->net); + const struct nft_rule *prule; struct sk_buff *skb; + u64 handle = 0; + u16 flags = 0; int err; if (!ctx->report && @@ -2936,9 +2937,18 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (skb == NULL) goto err; + if (event == NFT_MSG_NEWRULE && + !list_is_first(&rule->list, &ctx->chain->rules) && + !list_is_last(&rule->list, &ctx->chain->rules)) { + prule = list_prev_entry(rule, list); + handle = prule->handle; + } + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_APPEND | NLM_F_REPLACE)) + flags |= NLM_F_APPEND; + err = nf_tables_fill_rule_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, ctx->seq, - event, 0, ctx->family, ctx->table, - ctx->chain, rule, NULL); + event, flags, ctx->family, ctx->table, + ctx->chain, rule, handle); if (err < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); goto err; @@ -2964,6 +2974,7 @@ static int __nf_tables_dump_rules(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); const struct nft_rule *rule, *prule; unsigned int s_idx = cb->args[0]; + u64 handle; prule = NULL; list_for_each_entry_rcu(rule, &chain->rules, list) { @@ -2975,12 +2986,17 @@ static int __nf_tables_dump_rules(struct sk_buff *skb, memset(&cb->args[1], 0, sizeof(cb->args) - sizeof(cb->args[0])); } + if (prule) + handle = prule->handle; + else + handle = 0; + if (nf_tables_fill_rule_info(skb, net, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, NLM_F_MULTI | NLM_F_APPEND, table->family, - table, chain, rule, prule) < 0) + table, chain, rule, handle) < 0) return 1; nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlmsg_hdr(skb)); @@ -3143,7 +3159,7 @@ static int nf_tables_getrule(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info, err = nf_tables_fill_rule_info(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, info->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, 0, - family, table, chain, rule, NULL); + family, table, chain, rule, 0); if (err < 0) goto err_fill_rule_info; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2c964c558641a3bddaee5719c9e6d8805f777812 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sat, 25 Sep 2021 00:27:38 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: reverse order in rule replacement expansion Deactivate old rule first, then append the new rule, so rule replacement notification via netlink first reports the deletion of the old rule with handle X in first place, then it adds the new rule (reusing the handle X of the replaced old rule). Note that the abort path releases the transaction that has been created by nft_delrule() on error. Fixes: ca08987885a1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: deactivate expressions in rule replecement routine") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 085783b14075..c8acd26c7201 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -3419,17 +3419,15 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info, } if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) { + err = nft_delrule(&ctx, old_rule); + if (err < 0) + goto err_destroy_flow_rule; + trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule); if (trans == NULL) { err = -ENOMEM; goto err_destroy_flow_rule; } - err = nft_delrule(&ctx, old_rule); - if (err < 0) { - nft_trans_destroy(trans); - goto err_destroy_flow_rule; - } - list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list); } else { trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a9f5970767d11eadc805d5283f202612c7ba1f59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 17:29:24 -0700 Subject: net: udp: annotate data race around udp_sk(sk)->corkflag up->corkflag field can be read or written without any lock. Annotate accesses to avoid possible syzbot/KCSAN reports. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/udp.c | 10 +++++----- net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 8851c9463b4b..2a7825a5b842 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) __be16 dport; u8 tos; int err, is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk); - int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE; + int corkreq = READ_ONCE(up->corkflag) || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE; int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *); struct sk_buff *skb; struct ip_options_data opt_copy; @@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ int udp_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, int offset, } up->len += size; - if (!(up->corkflag || (flags&MSG_MORE))) + if (!(READ_ONCE(up->corkflag) || (flags&MSG_MORE))) ret = udp_push_pending_frames(sk); if (!ret) ret = size; @@ -2662,9 +2662,9 @@ int udp_lib_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, switch (optname) { case UDP_CORK: if (val != 0) { - up->corkflag = 1; + WRITE_ONCE(up->corkflag, 1); } else { - up->corkflag = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(up->corkflag, 0); lock_sock(sk); push_pending_frames(sk); release_sock(sk); @@ -2787,7 +2787,7 @@ int udp_lib_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, switch (optname) { case UDP_CORK: - val = up->corkflag; + val = READ_ONCE(up->corkflag); break; case UDP_ENCAP: diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index ea53847b5b7e..e505bb007e9f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@ int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen; bool connected = false; int ulen = len; - int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE; + int corkreq = READ_ONCE(up->corkflag) || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE; int err; int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk); int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f4bd73b5a950866f6c6fc98a7b684d307c5d586a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 09:42:27 +0900 Subject: af_unix: Return errno instead of NULL in unix_create1(). unix_create1() returns NULL on error, and the callers assume that it never fails for reasons other than out of memory. So, the callers always return -ENOMEM when unix_create1() fails. However, it also returns NULL when the number of af_unix sockets exceeds twice the limit controlled by sysctl: fs.file-max. In this case, the callers should return -ENFILE like alloc_empty_file(). This patch changes unix_create1() to return the correct error value instead of NULL on error. Out of curiosity, the assumption has been wrong since 1999 due to this change introduced in 2.2.4 [0]. diff -u --recursive --new-file v2.2.3/linux/net/unix/af_unix.c linux/net/unix/af_unix.c --- v2.2.3/linux/net/unix/af_unix.c Tue Jan 19 11:32:53 1999 +++ linux/net/unix/af_unix.c Sun Mar 21 07:22:00 1999 @@ -388,6 +413,9 @@ { struct sock *sk; + if (atomic_read(&unix_nr_socks) >= 2*max_files) + return NULL; + MOD_INC_USE_COUNT; sk = sk_alloc(PF_UNIX, GFP_KERNEL, 1); if (!sk) { [0]: https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.2/patch-2.2.4.gz Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 92345c9bb60c..f505b89bda6a 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -828,20 +828,25 @@ struct proto unix_stream_proto = { static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern, int type) { - struct sock *sk = NULL; struct unix_sock *u; + struct sock *sk; + int err; atomic_long_inc(&unix_nr_socks); - if (atomic_long_read(&unix_nr_socks) > 2 * get_max_files()) - goto out; + if (atomic_long_read(&unix_nr_socks) > 2 * get_max_files()) { + err = -ENFILE; + goto err; + } if (type == SOCK_STREAM) sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_UNIX, GFP_KERNEL, &unix_stream_proto, kern); else /*dgram and seqpacket */ sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_UNIX, GFP_KERNEL, &unix_dgram_proto, kern); - if (!sk) - goto out; + if (!sk) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } sock_init_data(sock, sk); @@ -861,20 +866,23 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern, init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay); memset(&u->scm_stat, 0, sizeof(struct scm_stat)); unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk); -out: - if (sk == NULL) - atomic_long_dec(&unix_nr_socks); - else { - local_bh_disable(); - sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1); - local_bh_enable(); - } + + local_bh_disable(); + sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1); + local_bh_enable(); + return sk; + +err: + atomic_long_dec(&unix_nr_socks); + return ERR_PTR(err); } static int unix_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int kern) { + struct sock *sk; + if (protocol && protocol != PF_UNIX) return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; @@ -901,7 +909,11 @@ static int unix_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT; } - return unix_create1(net, sock, kern, sock->type) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; + sk = unix_create1(net, sock, kern, sock->type); + if (IS_ERR(sk)) + return PTR_ERR(sk); + + return 0; } static int unix_release(struct socket *sock) @@ -1314,12 +1326,15 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, we will have to recheck all again in any case. */ - err = -ENOMEM; - /* create new sock for complete connection */ newsk = unix_create1(sock_net(sk), NULL, 0, sock->type); - if (newsk == NULL) + if (IS_ERR(newsk)) { + err = PTR_ERR(newsk); + newsk = NULL; goto out; + } + + err = -ENOMEM; /* Allocate skb for sending to listening sock */ skb = sock_wmalloc(newsk, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f936bb42aeb94a069bec7c9e04100d199c372956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 16:10:49 +0200 Subject: net: bridge: mcast: Associate the seqcount with its protecting lock. The sequence count bridge_mcast_querier::seq is protected by net_bridge::multicast_lock but seqcount_init() does not associate the seqcount with the lock. This leads to a warning on PREEMPT_RT because preemption is still enabled. Let seqcount_init() associate the seqcount with lock that protects the write section. Remove lockdep_assert_held_once() because lockdep already checks whether the associated lock is held. Fixes: 67b746f94ff39 ("net: bridge: mcast: make sure querier port/address updates are consistent") Reported-by: Mike Galbraith Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Tested-by: Mike Galbraith Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210928141049.593833-1-bigeasy@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 6 ++---- net/bridge/br_private.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index 3523c8c7068f..f3d751105343 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -1677,8 +1677,6 @@ static void br_multicast_update_querier(struct net_bridge_mcast *brmctx, int ifindex, struct br_ip *saddr) { - lockdep_assert_held_once(&brmctx->br->multicast_lock); - write_seqcount_begin(&querier->seq); querier->port_ifidx = ifindex; memcpy(&querier->addr, saddr, sizeof(*saddr)); @@ -3867,13 +3865,13 @@ void br_multicast_ctx_init(struct net_bridge *br, brmctx->ip4_other_query.delay_time = 0; brmctx->ip4_querier.port_ifidx = 0; - seqcount_init(&brmctx->ip4_querier.seq); + seqcount_spinlock_init(&brmctx->ip4_querier.seq, &br->multicast_lock); brmctx->multicast_igmp_version = 2; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) brmctx->multicast_mld_version = 1; brmctx->ip6_other_query.delay_time = 0; brmctx->ip6_querier.port_ifidx = 0; - seqcount_init(&brmctx->ip6_querier.seq); + seqcount_spinlock_init(&brmctx->ip6_querier.seq, &br->multicast_lock); #endif timer_setup(&brmctx->ip4_mc_router_timer, diff --git a/net/bridge/br_private.h b/net/bridge/br_private.h index b4cef3a97f12..e8136db44462 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_private.h +++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct bridge_mcast_other_query { struct bridge_mcast_querier { struct br_ip addr; int port_ifidx; - seqcount_t seq; + seqcount_spinlock_t seq; }; /* IGMP/MLD statistics */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 49054556289e8787501630b7c7a9d407da02e296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 11:59:17 +0200 Subject: net: introduce and use lock_sock_fast_nested() Syzkaller reported a false positive deadlock involving the nl socket lock and the subflow socket lock: MPTCP: kernel_bind error, err=-98 ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.15.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor998/6520 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880795718a0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x267/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2738 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1612 [inline] ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x23/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2720 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by syz-executor998/6520: #0: ffffffff8d176c50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:802 #1: ffffffff8d176d08 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: ffffffff8d176d08 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x3e0/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:790 #2: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1612 [inline] #2: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x23/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2720 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 6520 Comm: syz-executor998 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2944 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2987 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3776 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold+0x149/0x3ab kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590 lock_sock_fast+0x36/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3229 mptcp_close+0x267/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2738 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:431 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_release+0x87/0x1b0 net/socket.c:677 mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket+0x238/0x2c0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:900 mptcp_nl_cmd_add_addr+0x359/0x930 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1170 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 sock_no_sendpage+0x101/0x150 net/core/sock.c:2980 kernel_sendpage.part.0+0x1a0/0x340 net/socket.c:3504 kernel_sendpage net/socket.c:3501 [inline] sock_sendpage+0xe5/0x140 net/socket.c:1003 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2ad/0x380 fs/splice.c:364 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:418 [inline] __splice_from_pipe+0x43e/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:562 splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:597 [inline] generic_splice_sendpage+0xd4/0x140 fs/splice.c:746 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:767 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x110/0x180 fs/splice.c:936 splice_direct_to_actor+0x34b/0x8c0 fs/splice.c:891 do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:979 do_sendfile+0xae9/0x1240 fs/read_write.c:1249 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1314 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1300 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1300 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f215cb69969 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc96bb3868 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f215cbad072 RCX: 00007f215cb69969 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffc96bb3a08 R09: 00007ffc96bb3a08 R10: 0000000100000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc96bb387c R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 the problem originates from uncorrect lock annotation in the mptcp code and is only visible since commit 2dcb96bacce3 ("net: core: Correct the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations"), but is present since the port-based endpoint support initial implementation. This patch addresses the issue introducing a nested variant of lock_sock_fast() and using it in the relevant code path. Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Fixes: 2dcb96bacce3 ("net: core: Correct the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations") Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1dd53f7a89b299d59eaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 20 ++------------------ net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 512e629f9780..7060d183216e 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -3210,24 +3210,8 @@ void release_sock(struct sock *sk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_sock); -/** - * lock_sock_fast - fast version of lock_sock - * @sk: socket - * - * This version should be used for very small section, where process wont block - * return false if fast path is taken: - * - * sk_lock.slock locked, owned = 0, BH disabled - * - * return true if slow path is taken: - * - * sk_lock.slock unlocked, owned = 1, BH enabled - */ -bool lock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk) __acquires(&sk->sk_lock.slock) +bool __lock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk) __acquires(&sk->sk_lock.slock) { - /* The sk_lock has mutex_lock() semantics here. */ - mutex_acquire(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, 0, 0, _RET_IP_); - might_sleep(); spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock); @@ -3256,7 +3240,7 @@ bool lock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk) __acquires(&sk->sk_lock.slock) spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock); return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(lock_sock_fast); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__lock_sock_fast); int sock_gettstamp(struct socket *sock, void __user *userstamp, bool timeval, bool time32) diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index dbcebf56798f..e5df0b5971c8 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -2735,7 +2735,7 @@ cleanup: inet_csk(sk)->icsk_mtup.probe_timestamp = tcp_jiffies32; mptcp_for_each_subflow(mptcp_sk(sk), subflow) { struct sock *ssk = mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock(subflow); - bool slow = lock_sock_fast(ssk); + bool slow = lock_sock_fast_nested(ssk); sock_orphan(ssk); unlock_sock_fast(ssk, slow); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d5ef190693a7d76c5c192d108e8dec48307b46ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Buslov Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 18:08:49 +0300 Subject: net: sched: flower: protect fl_walk() with rcu Patch that refactored fl_walk() to use idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul() also removed rcu protection of individual filters which causes following use-after-free when filter is deleted concurrently. Fix fl_walk() to obtain rcu read lock while iterating and taking the filter reference and temporary release the lock while calling arg->fn() callback that can sleep. KASAN trace: [ 352.773640] ================================================================== [ 352.775041] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.776304] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881c8251480 by task tc/2987 [ 352.777862] CPU: 3 PID: 2987 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #2 [ 352.778980] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 352.781022] Call Trace: [ 352.781573] dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a [ 352.782332] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 [ 352.783400] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.784292] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.785138] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 352.785851] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.786587] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [ 352.787337] fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.788163] ? fl_put+0x10/0x10 [cls_flower] [ 352.789007] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 [ 352.790102] tcf_chain_dump+0x231/0x450 [ 352.790878] ? tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty+0x170/0x170 [ 352.791833] ? __might_sleep+0x2e/0xc0 [ 352.792594] ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170 [ 352.793400] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 [ 352.794477] tc_dump_tfilter+0x385/0x4b0 [ 352.795262] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180 [ 352.796103] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xc0 [ 352.796974] ? __build_skb_around+0x10e/0x130 [ 352.797826] netlink_dump+0x2c0/0x560 [ 352.798563] ? netlink_getsockopt+0x430/0x430 [ 352.799433] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 [ 352.800542] __netlink_dump_start+0x356/0x440 [ 352.801397] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3ff/0x550 [ 352.802190] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180 [ 352.802872] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 352.803668] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180 [ 352.804344] ? _copy_from_iter_nocache+0x800/0x800 [ 352.805202] ? kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [ 352.805900] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0 [ 352.806587] ? rht_deferred_worker+0x6b0/0x6b0 [ 352.807455] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 352.808324] ? netlink_ack+0x4d0/0x4d0 [ 352.809086] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x62/0x3d0 [ 352.809951] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480 [ 352.810744] ? netlink_attachskb+0x430/0x430 [ 352.811586] ? __alloc_skb+0xd7/0x200 [ 352.812349] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680 [ 352.813132] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480 [ 352.813952] ? __import_iovec+0x192/0x210 [ 352.814759] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480 [ 352.815580] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80 [ 352.816299] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0 [ 352.817096] ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 [ 352.817873] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x150/0x150 [ 352.818753] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140 [ 352.819518] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x110/0x110 [ 352.820402] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0xf4/0x1a0 [ 352.821110] ? __copy_msghdr_from_user+0x260/0x260 [ 352.821934] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x81/0xd0 [ 352.822680] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xef3/0x1b20 [ 352.823549] ? rb_insert_color+0x2a/0x270 [ 352.824373] ? copy_page_range+0x16b0/0x16b0 [ 352.825209] ? perf_event_update_userpage+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 352.826190] ? __fget_light+0xd9/0xf0 [ 352.826941] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130 [ 352.827613] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 [ 352.828377] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c5/0x8a0 [ 352.829184] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x52/0x60 [ 352.830001] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x32/0x160 [ 352.830845] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 352.831445] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 352.832331] RIP: 0033:0x7f7bee973c17 [ 352.833078] Code: 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 [ 352.836202] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbb368e28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 352.837524] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7bee973c17 [ 352.838715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcbb368e50 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 352.839838] RBP: 00007ffcbb36d090 R08: 00000000cea96d79 R09: 00007f7beea34a40 [ 352.841021] R10: 00000000004059bb R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000046563f [ 352.842208] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffcbb36d088 [ 352.843784] Allocated by task 2960: [ 352.844451] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 352.845173] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [ 352.845873] fl_change+0x282/0x22db [cls_flower] [ 352.846696] tc_new_tfilter+0x6cf/0x1180 [ 352.847493] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x471/0x550 [ 352.848323] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0 [ 352.849097] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480 [ 352.849886] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680 [ 352.850678] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80 [ 352.851398] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0 [ 352.852202] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140 [ 352.852967] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130 [ 352.853718] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 352.854457] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 352.855830] Freed by task 7: [ 352.856421] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 352.857139] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [ 352.857854] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [ 352.858609] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130 [ 352.859348] kfree+0xa7/0x3c0 [ 352.859951] process_one_work+0x44d/0x780 [ 352.860685] worker_thread+0x2e2/0x7e0 [ 352.861390] kthread+0x1f4/0x220 [ 352.862022] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 352.862955] Last potentially related work creation: [ 352.863758] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 352.864378] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0 [ 352.865028] insert_work+0x30/0x160 [ 352.865617] __queue_work+0x351/0x670 [ 352.866261] rcu_work_rcufn+0x30/0x40 [ 352.866917] rcu_core+0x3b2/0xdb0 [ 352.867561] __do_softirq+0xf6/0x386 [ 352.868708] Second to last potentially related work creation: [ 352.869779] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 352.870560] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0 [ 352.871426] call_rcu+0x5f/0x5c0 [ 352.872108] queue_rcu_work+0x44/0x50 [ 352.872855] __fl_put+0x17c/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.873733] fl_delete+0xc7/0x100 [cls_flower] [ 352.874607] tc_del_tfilter+0x510/0xb30 [ 352.886085] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x471/0x550 [ 352.886875] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0 [ 352.887636] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480 [ 352.888285] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680 [ 352.888942] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80 [ 352.889583] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0 [ 352.890311] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140 [ 352.891019] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130 [ 352.891716] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 352.892395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 352.893666] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881c8251000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 [ 352.895696] The buggy address is located 1152 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8881c8251000, ffff8881c8251800) [ 352.897640] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 352.898492] page:00000000213bac35 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1c8250 [ 352.900110] head:00000000213bac35 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 352.901541] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 352.902908] raw: 002ffff800010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888100042f00 [ 352.904391] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 352.905861] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 352.907323] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 352.908218] ffff8881c8251380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 352.909471] ffff8881c8251400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 352.910735] >ffff8881c8251480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 352.912012] ^ [ 352.912642] ffff8881c8251500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 352.913919] ffff8881c8251580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 352.915185] ================================================================== Fixes: d39d714969cd ("idr: introduce idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul()") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov Acked-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/cls_flower.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/cls_flower.c b/net/sched/cls_flower.c index 23b21253b3c3..eb6345a027e1 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_flower.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_flower.c @@ -2188,18 +2188,24 @@ static void fl_walk(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tcf_walker *arg, arg->count = arg->skip; + rcu_read_lock(); idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul(&head->handle_idr, f, tmp, id) { /* don't return filters that are being deleted */ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&f->refcnt)) continue; + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (arg->fn(tp, f, arg) < 0) { __fl_put(f); arg->stop = 1; + rcu_read_lock(); break; } __fl_put(f); arg->count++; + rcu_read_lock(); } + rcu_read_unlock(); arg->cookie = id; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a5b8fd657881003ea11c193d147c8f4ba143725d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 08:32:24 -0700 Subject: net: dev_addr_list: handle first address in __hw_addr_add_ex struct dev_addr_list is used for device addresses, unicast addresses and multicast addresses. The first of those needs special handling of the main address - netdev->dev_addr points directly the data of the entry and drivers write to it freely, so we can't maintain it in the rbtree (for now, at least, to be fixed in net-next). Current work around sprinkles special handling of the first address on the list throughout the code but it missed the case where address is being added. First address will not be visible during subsequent adds. Syzbot found a warning where unicast addresses are modified without holding the rtnl lock, tl;dr is that team generates the same modification multiple times, not necessarily when right locks are held. In the repro we have: macvlan -> team -> veth macvlan adds a unicast address to the team. Team then pushes that address down to its memebers (veths). Next something unrelated makes team sync member addrs again, and because of the bug the addr entries get duplicated in the veths. macvlan gets removed, removes its addr from team which removes only one of the duplicated addresses from veths. This removal is done under rtnl. Next syzbot uses iptables to add a multicast addr to team (which does not hold rtnl lock). Team syncs veth addrs, but because veths' unicast list still has the duplicate it will also get sync, even though this update is intended for mc addresses. Again, uc address updates need rtnl lock, boom. Reported-by: syzbot+7a2ab2cdc14d134de553@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 406f42fa0d3c ("net-next: When a bond have a massive amount of VLANs with IPv6 addresses, performance of changing link state, attaching a VRF, changing an IPv6 address, etc. go down dramtically.") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev_addr_lists.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c b/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c index 8c39283c26ae..f0cb38344126 100644 --- a/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c +++ b/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ static int __hw_addr_add_ex(struct netdev_hw_addr_list *list, if (addr_len > MAX_ADDR_LEN) return -EINVAL; + ha = list_first_entry(&list->list, struct netdev_hw_addr, list); + if (ha && !memcmp(addr, ha->addr, addr_len) && + (!addr_type || addr_type == ha->type)) + goto found_it; + while (*ins_point) { int diff; @@ -64,6 +69,7 @@ static int __hw_addr_add_ex(struct netdev_hw_addr_list *list, } else if (diff > 0) { ins_point = &parent->rb_right; } else { +found_it: if (exclusive) return -EEXIST; if (global) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 15:57:50 -0700 Subject: af_unix: fix races in sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred accesses Jann Horn reported that SO_PEERCRED and SO_PEERGROUPS implementations are racy, as af_unix can concurrently change sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred. In order to fix this issue, this patch adds a new spinlock that needs to be used whenever these fields are read or written. Jann also pointed out that l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb() is currently reading sk->sk_peer_pid which makes no sense, as this field is only possibly set by AF_UNIX sockets. We will have to clean this in a separate patch. This could be done by reverting b48596d1dc25 "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add get_peer_pid callback" or implementing what was truly expected. Fixes: 109f6e39fa07 ("af_unix: Allow SO_PEERCRED to work across namespaces.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Jann Horn Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Cc: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/unix/af_unix.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 7060d183216e..c1601f75ec4b 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1376,6 +1376,16 @@ set_sndbuf: } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_setsockopt); +static const struct cred *sk_get_peer_cred(struct sock *sk) +{ + const struct cred *cred; + + spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + cred = get_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred); + spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + + return cred; +} static void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred, struct ucred *ucred) @@ -1552,7 +1562,11 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, struct ucred peercred; if (len > sizeof(peercred)) len = sizeof(peercred); + + spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); cred_to_ucred(sk->sk_peer_pid, sk->sk_peer_cred, &peercred); + spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + if (copy_to_user(optval, &peercred, len)) return -EFAULT; goto lenout; @@ -1560,20 +1574,23 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, case SO_PEERGROUPS: { + const struct cred *cred; int ret, n; - if (!sk->sk_peer_cred) + cred = sk_get_peer_cred(sk); + if (!cred) return -ENODATA; - n = sk->sk_peer_cred->group_info->ngroups; + n = cred->group_info->ngroups; if (len < n * sizeof(gid_t)) { len = n * sizeof(gid_t); + put_cred(cred); return put_user(len, optlen) ? -EFAULT : -ERANGE; } len = n * sizeof(gid_t); - ret = groups_to_user((gid_t __user *)optval, - sk->sk_peer_cred->group_info); + ret = groups_to_user((gid_t __user *)optval, cred->group_info); + put_cred(cred); if (ret) return ret; goto lenout; @@ -1935,9 +1952,10 @@ static void __sk_destruct(struct rcu_head *head) sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; } - if (sk->sk_peer_cred) - put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred); + /* We do not need to acquire sk->sk_peer_lock, we are the last user. */ + put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred); put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid); + if (likely(sk->sk_net_refcnt)) put_net(sock_net(sk)); sk_prot_free(sk->sk_prot_creator, sk); @@ -3145,6 +3163,8 @@ void sock_init_data(struct socket *sock, struct sock *sk) sk->sk_peer_pid = NULL; sk->sk_peer_cred = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + sk->sk_write_pending = 0; sk->sk_rcvlowat = 1; sk->sk_rcvtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index f505b89bda6a..efac5989edb5 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -608,20 +608,42 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion) static void init_peercred(struct sock *sk) { - put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid); - if (sk->sk_peer_cred) - put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred); + const struct cred *old_cred; + struct pid *old_pid; + + spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + old_pid = sk->sk_peer_pid; + old_cred = sk->sk_peer_cred; sk->sk_peer_pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current)); sk->sk_peer_cred = get_current_cred(); + spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + + put_pid(old_pid); + put_cred(old_cred); } static void copy_peercred(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peersk) { - put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid); - if (sk->sk_peer_cred) - put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred); + const struct cred *old_cred; + struct pid *old_pid; + + if (sk < peersk) { + spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + spin_lock_nested(&peersk->sk_peer_lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + } else { + spin_lock(&peersk->sk_peer_lock); + spin_lock_nested(&sk->sk_peer_lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + } + old_pid = sk->sk_peer_pid; + old_cred = sk->sk_peer_cred; sk->sk_peer_pid = get_pid(peersk->sk_peer_pid); sk->sk_peer_cred = get_cred(peersk->sk_peer_cred); + + spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock); + spin_unlock(&peersk->sk_peer_lock); + + put_pid(old_pid); + put_cred(old_cred); } static int unix_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2ba5acfb34957e8a7fe47cd78c77ca88e9cc2b03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 09:59:21 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: fix sign error causing rpcsec_gss drops If sd_max is unsigned, then sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN is a very large number whenever sd_max is less than GSS_SEQ_WIN, and the comparison: seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN in gss_check_seq_num is pretty much always true, even when that's clearly not what was intended. This was causing pynfs to hang when using krb5, because pynfs uses zero as the initial gss sequence number. That's perfectly legal, but this logic error causes knfsd to drop the rpc in that case. Out-of-order sequence IDs in the first GSS_SEQ_WIN (128) calls will also cause this. Fixes: 10b9d99a3dbb ("SUNRPC: Augment server-side rpcgss tracepoints") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 475a965b7b43..1ea82a2e63af 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static bool gss_check_seq_num(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci, } __set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win); goto ok; - } else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) { + } else if (seq_num + GSS_SEQ_WIN <= sd->sd_max) { goto toolow; } if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 560ee196fe9e5037e5015e2cdb14b3aecb1cd7dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2021 14:22:39 -0700 Subject: net_sched: fix NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() syzbot reported another NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() [1] I could repro the issue with : unshare -n tc qd add dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 200000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit tc qd replace dev lo parent 1:0 pfifo_fast tc qd change dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 300000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit pfifo_fast does not have a change() operation. Make fifo_set_limit() more robust about this. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 1cf99067 P4D 1cf99067 PUD 7ca49067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14443 Comm: syz-executor959 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e2f7310 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8d6ecc00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888024c27910 RDI: ffff888071e34000 RBP: ffff888071e34000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8fcfb947 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024c27910 R13: ffff888071e34018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801ef74800 FS: 00007f321d897700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000722c3000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: fifo_set_limit net/sched/sch_fifo.c:242 [inline] fifo_set_limit+0x198/0x210 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:227 tbf_change+0x6ec/0x16d0 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:418 qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline] tc_modify_qdisc+0xd9a/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: fb0305ce1b03 ("net-sched: consolidate default fifo qdisc setup") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210930212239.3430364-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/sch_fifo.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_fifo.c b/net/sched/sch_fifo.c index a579a4131d22..e1040421b797 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_fifo.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_fifo.c @@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ int fifo_set_limit(struct Qdisc *q, unsigned int limit) if (strncmp(q->ops->id + 1, "fifo", 4) != 0) return 0; + if (!q->ops->change) + return 0; + nla = kmalloc(nla_attr_size(sizeof(struct tc_fifo_qopt)), GFP_KERNEL); if (nla) { nla->nla_type = RTM_NEWQDISC; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6fb721cf781808ee2ca5e737fb0592cc68de3381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2021 09:59:35 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: honor NLM_F_CREATE and NLM_F_EXCL in event notification Include the NLM_F_CREATE and NLM_F_EXCL flags in netlink event notifications, otherwise userspace cannot distiguish between create and add commands. Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- net/netfilter/nft_quota.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index c8acd26c7201..c0851fec11d4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -780,6 +780,7 @@ static void nf_tables_table_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event) { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net; struct sk_buff *skb; + u16 flags = 0; int err; if (!ctx->report && @@ -790,8 +791,11 @@ static void nf_tables_table_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event) if (skb == NULL) goto err; + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL)) + flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL); + err = nf_tables_fill_table_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, ctx->seq, - event, 0, ctx->family, ctx->table); + event, flags, ctx->family, ctx->table); if (err < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); goto err; @@ -1563,6 +1567,7 @@ static void nf_tables_chain_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event) { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net; struct sk_buff *skb; + u16 flags = 0; int err; if (!ctx->report && @@ -1573,8 +1578,11 @@ static void nf_tables_chain_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event) if (skb == NULL) goto err; + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL)) + flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL); + err = nf_tables_fill_chain_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, ctx->seq, - event, 0, ctx->family, ctx->table, + event, flags, ctx->family, ctx->table, ctx->chain); if (err < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); @@ -2945,6 +2953,8 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, } if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_APPEND | NLM_F_REPLACE)) flags |= NLM_F_APPEND; + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL)) + flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL); err = nf_tables_fill_rule_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, ctx->seq, event, flags, ctx->family, ctx->table, @@ -3957,8 +3967,9 @@ static void nf_tables_set_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_flags) { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx->net); - struct sk_buff *skb; u32 portid = ctx->portid; + struct sk_buff *skb; + u16 flags = 0; int err; if (!ctx->report && @@ -3969,7 +3980,10 @@ static void nf_tables_set_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (skb == NULL) goto err; - err = nf_tables_fill_set(skb, ctx, set, event, 0); + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL)) + flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL); + + err = nf_tables_fill_set(skb, ctx, set, event, flags); if (err < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); goto err; @@ -5245,12 +5259,13 @@ static int nf_tables_getsetelem(struct sk_buff *skb, static void nf_tables_setelem_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_set *set, const struct nft_set_elem *elem, - int event, u16 flags) + int event) { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net; struct net *net = ctx->net; u32 portid = ctx->portid; struct sk_buff *skb; + u16 flags = 0; int err; if (!ctx->report && !nfnetlink_has_listeners(net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES)) @@ -5260,6 +5275,9 @@ static void nf_tables_setelem_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (skb == NULL) goto err; + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL)) + flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL); + err = nf_tables_fill_setelem_info(skb, ctx, 0, portid, event, flags, set, elem); if (err < 0) { @@ -6935,7 +6953,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delobj(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info, void nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table, struct nft_object *obj, u32 portid, u32 seq, int event, - int family, int report, gfp_t gfp) + u16 flags, int family, int report, gfp_t gfp) { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net); struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -6960,8 +6978,9 @@ void nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table, if (skb == NULL) goto err; - err = nf_tables_fill_obj_info(skb, net, portid, seq, event, 0, family, - table, obj, false); + err = nf_tables_fill_obj_info(skb, net, portid, seq, event, + flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL), + family, table, obj, false); if (err < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); goto err; @@ -6978,7 +6997,7 @@ static void nf_tables_obj_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_object *obj, int event) { nft_obj_notify(ctx->net, ctx->table, obj, ctx->portid, ctx->seq, event, - ctx->family, ctx->report, GFP_KERNEL); + ctx->flags, ctx->family, ctx->report, GFP_KERNEL); } /* @@ -7759,6 +7778,7 @@ static void nf_tables_flowtable_notify(struct nft_ctx *ctx, { struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx->net); struct sk_buff *skb; + u16 flags = 0; int err; if (!ctx->report && @@ -7769,8 +7789,11 @@ static void nf_tables_flowtable_notify(struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (skb == NULL) goto err; + if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL)) + flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL); + err = nf_tables_fill_flowtable_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, - ctx->seq, event, 0, + ctx->seq, event, flags, ctx->family, flowtable, hook_list); if (err < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); @@ -8648,7 +8671,7 @@ static int nf_tables_commit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) nft_setelem_activate(net, te->set, &te->elem); nf_tables_setelem_notify(&trans->ctx, te->set, &te->elem, - NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM, 0); + NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM); nft_trans_destroy(trans); break; case NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM: @@ -8656,7 +8679,7 @@ static int nf_tables_commit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) nf_tables_setelem_notify(&trans->ctx, te->set, &te->elem, - NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM, 0); + NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM); nft_setelem_remove(net, te->set, &te->elem); if (!nft_setelem_is_catchall(te->set, &te->elem)) { atomic_dec(&te->set->nelems); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_quota.c b/net/netfilter/nft_quota.c index 0363f533a42b..c4d1389f7185 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_quota.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_quota.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static void nft_quota_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, if (overquota && !test_and_set_bit(NFT_QUOTA_DEPLETED_BIT, &priv->flags)) nft_obj_notify(nft_net(pkt), obj->key.table, obj, 0, 0, - NFT_MSG_NEWOBJ, nft_pf(pkt), 0, GFP_ATOMIC); + NFT_MSG_NEWOBJ, 0, nft_pf(pkt), 0, GFP_ATOMIC); } static int nft_quota_do_init(const struct nlattr * const tb[], -- cgit v1.2.3 From b44d52a50bc6f191f0ae03f65de8401f3ef039b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lunn Date: Sun, 3 Oct 2021 17:50:53 +0200 Subject: dsa: tag_dsa: Fix mask for trunked packets A packet received on a trunk will have bit 2 set in Forward DSA tagged frame. Bit 1 can be either 0 or 1 and is otherwise undefined and bit 0 indicates the frame CFI. Masking with 7 thus results in frames as being identified as being from a trunk when in fact they are not. Fix the mask to just look at bit 2. Fixes: 5b60dadb71db ("net: dsa: tag_dsa: Support reception of packets from LAG devices") Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/tag_dsa.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c b/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c index 77d0ce89ab77..e5127b7d1c6a 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *dsa_rcv_ll(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, cmd = dsa_header[0] >> 6; switch (cmd) { case DSA_CMD_FORWARD: - trunk = !!(dsa_header[1] & 7); + trunk = !!(dsa_header[1] & 4); break; case DSA_CMD_TO_CPU: -- cgit v1.2.3 From dbe0b88064494b7bb6a9b2aa7e085b14a3112d44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 18:05:07 -0700 Subject: net: bridge: use nla_total_size_64bit() in br_get_linkxstats_size() bridge_fill_linkxstats() is using nla_reserve_64bit(). We must use nla_total_size_64bit() instead of nla_total_size() for corresponding data structure. Fixes: 1080ab95e3c7 ("net: bridge: add support for IGMP/MLD stats and export them via netlink") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov Cc: Vivien Didelot Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c index 6c58fc14d2cb..29b8f6373fb9 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c @@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ static size_t br_get_linkxstats_size(const struct net_device *dev, int attr) } return numvls * nla_total_size(sizeof(struct bridge_vlan_xstats)) + - nla_total_size(sizeof(struct br_mcast_stats)) + + nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(struct br_mcast_stats)) + nla_total_size(0); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0854a0513321cf70bea5fa483ebcaa983cc7c62e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 18:05:08 -0700 Subject: net: bridge: fix under estimation in br_get_linkxstats_size() Commit de1799667b00 ("net: bridge: add STP xstats") added an additional nla_reserve_64bit() in br_fill_linkxstats(), but forgot to update br_get_linkxstats_size() accordingly. This can trigger the following in rtnl_stats_get() WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE); Fixes: de1799667b00 ("net: bridge: add STP xstats") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Vivien Didelot Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c index 29b8f6373fb9..5c6c4305ed23 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c @@ -1667,6 +1667,7 @@ static size_t br_get_linkxstats_size(const struct net_device *dev, int attr) return numvls * nla_total_size(sizeof(struct bridge_vlan_xstats)) + nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(struct br_mcast_stats)) + + (p ? nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(p->stp_xstats)) : 0) + nla_total_size(0); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a56d447f196fa9973c568f54c0d76d5391c3b0c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 12:55:22 -0700 Subject: net/sched: sch_taprio: properly cancel timer from taprio_destroy() There is a comment in qdisc_create() about us not calling ops->reset() in some cases. err_out4: /* * Any broken qdiscs that would require a ops->reset() here? * The qdisc was never in action so it shouldn't be necessary. */ As taprio sets a timer before actually receiving a packet, we need to cancel it from ops->destroy, just in case ops->reset has not been called. syzbot reported: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: hrtimer hint: advance_sched+0x0/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:22 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8441 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 8441 Comm: syz-executor813 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505 Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 00 00 00 48 8b 14 dd e0 d3 e3 89 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c7 e3 89 e8 5b 86 11 05 <0f> 0b 83 05 85 03 92 09 01 48 83 c4 18 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000130f330 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802baeb880 RSI: ffffffff815d87b5 RDI: fffff52000261e58 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff815d25ee R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff898dd020 R13: ffffffff89e3ce20 R14: ffffffff81653630 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000f0d300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffb64b3e000 CR3: 0000000036557000 CR4: 00000000001506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:987 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x301/0x420 lib/debugobjects.c:1018 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1603 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x171/0x240 mm/slub.c:1653 slab_free mm/slub.c:3213 [inline] kfree+0xe4/0x540 mm/slub.c:4267 qdisc_create+0xbcf/0x1320 net/sched/sch_api.c:1299 tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c8/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1663 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5571 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2403 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2457 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2486 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 Fixes: 44d4775ca518 ("net/sched: sch_taprio: reset child qdiscs before freeing them") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Davide Caratti Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes Acked-by: Davide Caratti Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c index 1ab2fc933a21..b9fd18d98646 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c @@ -1641,6 +1641,10 @@ static void taprio_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch) list_del(&q->taprio_list); spin_unlock(&taprio_list_lock); + /* Note that taprio_reset() might not be called if an error + * happens in qdisc_create(), after taprio_init() has been called. + */ + hrtimer_cancel(&q->advance_timer); taprio_disable_offload(dev, q, NULL); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7707a4d01a648e4c655101a469c956cb11273655 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 14:24:15 -0700 Subject: netlink: annotate data races around nlk->bound While existing code is correct, KCSAN is reporting a data-race in netlink_insert / netlink_sendmsg [1] It is correct to read nlk->bound without a lock, as netlink_autobind() will acquire all needed locks. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_insert / netlink_sendmsg write to 0xffff8881031c8b30 of 1 bytes by task 18752 on cpu 0: netlink_insert+0x5cc/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:597 netlink_autobind+0xa9/0x150 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:842 netlink_sendmsg+0x479/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2392 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2446 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2475 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2484 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2482 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2482 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881031c8b30 of 1 bytes by task 18751 on cpu 1: netlink_sendmsg+0x270/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x2a8/0x370 net/socket.c:2019 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2031 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2027 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 net/socket.c:2027 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x00 -> 0x01 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 18751 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: da314c9923fe ("netlink: Replace rhash_portid with bound") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index 24b7cf447bc5..ada47e59647a 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -594,7 +594,10 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid) /* We need to ensure that the socket is hashed and visible. */ smp_wmb(); - nlk_sk(sk)->bound = portid; + /* Paired with lockless reads from netlink_bind(), + * netlink_connect() and netlink_sendmsg(). + */ + WRITE_ONCE(nlk_sk(sk)->bound, portid); err: release_sock(sk); @@ -1012,7 +1015,8 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, if (nlk->ngroups < BITS_PER_LONG) groups &= (1UL << nlk->ngroups) - 1; - bound = nlk->bound; + /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */ + bound = READ_ONCE(nlk->bound); if (bound) { /* Ensure nlk->portid is up-to-date. */ smp_rmb(); @@ -1098,8 +1102,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, /* No need for barriers here as we return to user-space without * using any of the bound attributes. + * Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert(). */ - if (!nlk->bound) + if (!READ_ONCE(nlk->bound)) err = netlink_autobind(sock); if (err == 0) { @@ -1888,7 +1893,8 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) dst_group = nlk->dst_group; } - if (!nlk->bound) { + /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */ + if (!READ_ONCE(nlk->bound)) { err = netlink_autobind(sock); if (err) goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d0c6416bd7091647f6041599f396bfa19ae30368 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiang Wang Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 23:25:28 +0000 Subject: unix: Fix an issue in unix_shutdown causing the other end read/write failures Commit 94531cfcbe79 ("af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap") sets unix domain socket peer state to TCP_CLOSE in unix_shutdown. This could happen when the local end is shutdown but the other end is not. Then, the other end will get read or write failures which is not expected. Fix the issue by setting the local state to shutdown. Fixes: 94531cfcbe79 ("af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap") Reported-by: Casey Schaufler Suggested-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Jiang Wang Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Tested-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Song Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211004232530.2377085-1-jiang.wang@bytedance.com --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index f505b89bda6a..915afcae6a12 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -2860,6 +2860,9 @@ static int unix_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int mode) unix_state_lock(sk); sk->sk_shutdown |= mode; + if ((sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM || sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) && + mode == SHUTDOWN_MASK) + sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE; other = unix_peer(sk); if (other) sock_hold(other); @@ -2882,12 +2885,10 @@ static int unix_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int mode) other->sk_shutdown |= peer_mode; unix_state_unlock(other); other->sk_state_change(other); - if (peer_mode == SHUTDOWN_MASK) { + if (peer_mode == SHUTDOWN_MASK) sk_wake_async(other, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP); - other->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE; - } else if (peer_mode & RCV_SHUTDOWN) { + else if (peer_mode & RCV_SHUTDOWN) sk_wake_async(other, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_IN); - } } if (other) sock_put(other); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d34367991933d28bd7331f67a759be9a8c474014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 14:04:17 -0700 Subject: rtnetlink: fix if_nlmsg_stats_size() under estimation rtnl_fill_statsinfo() is filling skb with one mandatory if_stats_msg structure. nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(struct if_stats_msg), flags); But if_nlmsg_stats_size() never considered the needed storage. This bug did not show up because alloc_skb(X) allocates skb with extra tailroom, because of added alignments. This could very well be changed in the future to have deterministic behavior. Fixes: 10c9ead9f3c6 ("rtnetlink: add new RTM_GETSTATS message to dump link stats") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Roopa Prabhu Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index 972c8cb303a5..8ccce85562a1 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -5262,7 +5262,7 @@ nla_put_failure: static size_t if_nlmsg_stats_size(const struct net_device *dev, u32 filter_mask) { - size_t size = 0; + size_t size = NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct if_stats_msg)); if (stats_attr_valid(filter_mask, IFLA_STATS_LINK_64, 0)) size += nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats64)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8d6c414cd2fb74aa6812e9bfec6178f8246c4f3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Manning Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 14:03:42 +0100 Subject: net: prefer socket bound to interface when not in VRF The commit 6da5b0f027a8 ("net: ensure unbound datagram socket to be chosen when not in a VRF") modified compute_score() so that a device match is always made, not just in the case of an l3mdev skb, then increments the score also for unbound sockets. This ensures that sockets bound to an l3mdev are never selected when not in a VRF. But as unbound and bound sockets are now scored equally, this results in the last opened socket being selected if there are matches in the default VRF for an unbound socket and a socket bound to a dev that is not an l3mdev. However, handling prior to this commit was to always select the bound socket in this case. Reinstate this handling by incrementing the score only for bound sockets. The required isolation due to choosing between an unbound socket and a socket bound to an l3mdev remains in place due to the device match always being made. The same approach is taken for compute_score() for stream sockets. Fixes: 6da5b0f027a8 ("net: ensure unbound datagram socket to be chosen when not in a VRF") Fixes: e78190581aff ("net: ensure unbound stream socket to be chosen when not in a VRF") Signed-off-by: Mike Manning Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cf0a8523-b362-1edf-ee78-eef63cbbb428@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/udp.c | 3 ++- net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/udp.c | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 80aeaf9e6e16..bfb522e51346 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -242,8 +242,10 @@ static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, if (!inet_sk_bound_dev_eq(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, dif, sdif)) return -1; + score = sk->sk_bound_dev_if ? 2 : 1; - score = sk->sk_family == PF_INET ? 2 : 1; + if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) + score++; if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_incoming_cpu) == raw_smp_processor_id()) score++; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 2a7825a5b842..8536b2a7210b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, dif, sdif); if (!dev_match) return -1; - score += 4; + if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) + score += 4; if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_incoming_cpu) == raw_smp_processor_id()) score++; diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c index 55c290d55605..67c9114835c8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, if (!inet_sk_bound_dev_eq(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, dif, sdif)) return -1; - score = 1; + score = sk->sk_bound_dev_if ? 2 : 1; if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_incoming_cpu) == raw_smp_processor_id()) score++; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index e505bb007e9f..8d785232b479 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, dev_match = udp_sk_bound_dev_eq(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); if (!dev_match) return -1; - score++; + if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) + score++; if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_incoming_cpu) == raw_smp_processor_id()) score++; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 612f71d7328c14369924384ad2170aae2a6abd92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 15:05:00 -0700 Subject: mptcp: fix possible stall on recvmsg() recvmsg() can enter an infinite loop if the caller provides the MSG_WAITALL, the data present in the receive queue is not sufficient to fulfill the request, and no more data is received by the peer. When the above happens, mptcp_wait_data() will always return with no wait, as the MPTCP_DATA_READY flag checked by such function is set and never cleared in such code path. Leveraging the above syzbot was able to trigger an RCU stall: rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 0-...!: (10499 ticks this GP) idle=0af/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=10678/10678 fqs=1 (t=10500 jiffies g=13089 q=109) rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10497 jiffies! g13089 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=1 rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump: task:rcu_preempt state:R running task stack:28696 pid: 14 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4955 [inline] __schedule+0x940/0x26f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6236 schedule+0xd3/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:6315 schedule_timeout+0x14a/0x2a0 kernel/time/timer.c:1881 rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x186/0x810 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1955 rcu_gp_kthread+0x1de/0x320 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2128 kthread+0x405/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:327 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1: NMI backtrace for cpu 1 CPU: 1 PID: 8510 Comm: syz-executor827 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-next-20210920-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:bytes_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:84 [inline] RIP: 0010:memory_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:102 [inline] RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned_n mm/kasan/generic.c:128 [inline] RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned mm/kasan/generic.c:159 [inline] RIP: 0010:check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline] RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0xc8/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 Code: 38 00 74 ed 48 8d 50 08 eb 09 48 83 c0 01 48 39 d0 74 7a 80 38 00 74 f2 48 89 c2 b8 01 00 00 00 48 85 d2 75 56 5b 5d 41 5c c3 <48> 85 d2 74 5e 48 01 ea eb 09 48 83 c0 01 48 39 d0 74 50 80 38 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cd676c8 EFLAGS: 00000283 RAX: ffffed100e9a110e RBX: ffffed100e9a110f RCX: ffffffff88ea062a RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888074d08870 RBP: ffffed100e9a110e R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888074d08877 R10: ffffed100e9a110e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888074d08000 R13: ffff888074d08000 R14: ffff888074d08088 R15: ffff888074d08000 FS: 0000555556d8e300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 S: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000180 CR3: 0000000068909000 CR4: 00000000001506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline] test_and_clear_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:83 [inline] mptcp_release_cb+0x14a/0x210 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3016 release_sock+0xb4/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3204 mptcp_wait_data net/mptcp/protocol.c:1770 [inline] mptcp_recvmsg+0xfd1/0x27b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2080 inet6_recvmsg+0x11b/0x5e0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:944 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x527/0x600 net/socket.c:2626 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2670 do_recvmmsg+0x24d/0x6d0 net/socket.c:2764 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2843 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2866 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2859 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x20b/0x260 net/socket.c:2859 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fc200d2dc39 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc5758e5a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fc200d2dc39 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00000000200017c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000f0b5ff R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00007ffc5758e5d0 R14: 00007ffc5758e5c0 R15: 0000000000000003 Fix the issue by replacing the MPTCP_DATA_READY bit with direct inspection of the msk receive queue. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3360da629681aa0d22fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 7a6a6cbc3e59 ("mptcp: recvmsg() can drain data from multiple subflow") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 55 ++++++++++++++-------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index e5df0b5971c8..d073b2111382 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -528,7 +528,6 @@ static bool mptcp_check_data_fin(struct sock *sk) sk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN; smp_mb__before_atomic(); /* SHUTDOWN must be visible first */ - set_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags); switch (sk->sk_state) { case TCP_ESTABLISHED: @@ -742,10 +741,9 @@ void mptcp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) /* Wake-up the reader only for in-sequence data */ mptcp_data_lock(sk); - if (move_skbs_to_msk(msk, ssk)) { - set_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags); + if (move_skbs_to_msk(msk, ssk)) sk->sk_data_ready(sk); - } + mptcp_data_unlock(sk); } @@ -847,7 +845,6 @@ static void mptcp_check_for_eof(struct mptcp_sock *msk) sk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN; smp_mb__before_atomic(); /* SHUTDOWN must be visible first */ - set_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags); sk->sk_data_ready(sk); } @@ -1759,21 +1756,6 @@ out: return copied ? : ret; } -static void mptcp_wait_data(struct sock *sk, long *timeo) -{ - DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); - struct mptcp_sock *msk = mptcp_sk(sk); - - add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); - sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); - - sk_wait_event(sk, timeo, - test_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags), &wait); - - sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); - remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); -} - static int __mptcp_recvmsg_mskq(struct mptcp_sock *msk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags, @@ -2077,19 +2059,7 @@ static int mptcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, } pr_debug("block timeout %ld", timeo); - mptcp_wait_data(sk, &timeo); - } - - if (skb_queue_empty_lockless(&sk->sk_receive_queue) && - skb_queue_empty(&msk->receive_queue)) { - /* entire backlog drained, clear DATA_READY. */ - clear_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags); - - /* .. race-breaker: ssk might have gotten new data - * after last __mptcp_move_skbs() returned false. - */ - if (unlikely(__mptcp_move_skbs(msk))) - set_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags); + sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo, NULL); } out_err: @@ -2098,9 +2068,9 @@ out_err: tcp_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, &tss); } - pr_debug("msk=%p data_ready=%d rx queue empty=%d copied=%d", - msk, test_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags), - skb_queue_empty_lockless(&sk->sk_receive_queue), copied); + pr_debug("msk=%p rx queue empty=%d:%d copied=%d", + msk, skb_queue_empty_lockless(&sk->sk_receive_queue), + skb_queue_empty(&msk->receive_queue), copied); if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) mptcp_rcv_space_adjust(msk, copied); @@ -2368,7 +2338,6 @@ static void mptcp_check_fastclose(struct mptcp_sock *msk) inet_sk_state_store(sk, TCP_CLOSE); sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK; smp_mb__before_atomic(); /* SHUTDOWN must be visible first */ - set_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags); set_bit(MPTCP_WORK_CLOSE_SUBFLOW, &msk->flags); mptcp_close_wake_up(sk); @@ -3385,8 +3354,14 @@ unlock_fail: static __poll_t mptcp_check_readable(struct mptcp_sock *msk) { - return test_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags) ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : - 0; + /* Concurrent splices from sk_receive_queue into receive_queue will + * always show at least one non-empty queue when checked in this order. + */ + if (skb_queue_empty_lockless(&((struct sock *)msk)->sk_receive_queue) && + skb_queue_empty_lockless(&msk->receive_queue)) + return 0; + + return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; } static __poll_t mptcp_check_writeable(struct mptcp_sock *msk) @@ -3421,7 +3396,7 @@ static __poll_t mptcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, state = inet_sk_state_load(sk); pr_debug("msk=%p state=%d flags=%lx", msk, state, msk->flags); if (state == TCP_LISTEN) - return mptcp_check_readable(msk); + return test_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags) ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : 0; if (state != TCP_SYN_SENT && state != TCP_SYN_RECV) { mask |= mptcp_check_readable(msk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 95f7f3e7dc6bd2e735cb5de11734ea2222b1e05a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Karsten Graul Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 16:14:40 +0200 Subject: net/smc: improved fix wait on already cleared link Commit 8f3d65c16679 ("net/smc: fix wait on already cleared link") introduced link refcounting to avoid waits on already cleared links. This patch extents and improves the refcounting to cover all remaining possible cases for this kind of error situation. Fixes: 15e1b99aadfb ("net/smc: no WR buffer wait for terminating link group") Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_cdc.c | 7 +++++- net/smc/smc_core.c | 20 +++++++++-------- net/smc/smc_llc.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ net/smc/smc_tx.c | 22 +++++-------------- net/smc/smc_wr.h | 14 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_cdc.c b/net/smc/smc_cdc.c index f23f558054a7..99acd337ba90 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_cdc.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_cdc.c @@ -150,9 +150,11 @@ static int smcr_cdc_get_slot_and_msg_send(struct smc_connection *conn) again: link = conn->lnk; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_cdc_get_free_slot(conn, link, &wr_buf, NULL, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; spin_lock_bh(&conn->send_lock); if (link != conn->lnk) { @@ -160,6 +162,7 @@ again: spin_unlock_bh(&conn->send_lock); smc_wr_tx_put_slot(link, (struct smc_wr_tx_pend_priv *)pend); + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); if (again) return -ENOLINK; again = true; @@ -167,6 +170,8 @@ again: } rc = smc_cdc_msg_send(conn, wr_buf, pend); spin_unlock_bh(&conn->send_lock); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c index 8280c938be80..d2206743dc71 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_core.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c @@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ struct smc_link *smc_switch_conns(struct smc_link_group *lgr, to_lnk = &lgr->lnk[i]; break; } - if (!to_lnk) { + if (!to_lnk || !smc_wr_tx_link_hold(to_lnk)) { smc_lgr_terminate_sched(lgr); return NULL; } @@ -981,24 +981,26 @@ again: read_unlock_bh(&lgr->conns_lock); /* pre-fetch buffer outside of send_lock, might sleep */ rc = smc_cdc_get_free_slot(conn, to_lnk, &wr_buf, NULL, &pend); - if (rc) { - smcr_link_down_cond_sched(to_lnk); - return NULL; - } + if (rc) + goto err_out; /* avoid race with smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty() */ spin_lock_bh(&conn->send_lock); smc_switch_link_and_count(conn, to_lnk); rc = smc_switch_cursor(smc, pend, wr_buf); spin_unlock_bh(&conn->send_lock); sock_put(&smc->sk); - if (rc) { - smcr_link_down_cond_sched(to_lnk); - return NULL; - } + if (rc) + goto err_out; goto again; } read_unlock_bh(&lgr->conns_lock); + smc_wr_tx_link_put(to_lnk); return to_lnk; + +err_out: + smcr_link_down_cond_sched(to_lnk); + smc_wr_tx_link_put(to_lnk); + return NULL; } static void smcr_buf_unuse(struct smc_buf_desc *rmb_desc, diff --git a/net/smc/smc_llc.c b/net/smc/smc_llc.c index 2e7560eba981..72f4b72eb175 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_llc.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_llc.c @@ -383,9 +383,11 @@ int smc_llc_send_confirm_link(struct smc_link *link, struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; confllc = (struct smc_llc_msg_confirm_link *)wr_buf; memset(confllc, 0, sizeof(*confllc)); confllc->hd.common.type = SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK; @@ -402,6 +404,8 @@ int smc_llc_send_confirm_link(struct smc_link *link, confllc->max_links = SMC_LLC_ADD_LNK_MAX_LINKS; /* send llc message */ rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } @@ -415,9 +419,11 @@ static int smc_llc_send_confirm_rkey(struct smc_link *send_link, struct smc_link *link; int i, rc, rtok_ix; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(send_link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(send_link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; rkeyllc = (struct smc_llc_msg_confirm_rkey *)wr_buf; memset(rkeyllc, 0, sizeof(*rkeyllc)); rkeyllc->hd.common.type = SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_RKEY; @@ -444,6 +450,8 @@ static int smc_llc_send_confirm_rkey(struct smc_link *send_link, (u64)sg_dma_address(rmb_desc->sgt[send_link->link_idx].sgl)); /* send llc message */ rc = smc_wr_tx_send(send_link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(send_link); return rc; } @@ -456,9 +464,11 @@ static int smc_llc_send_delete_rkey(struct smc_link *link, struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; rkeyllc = (struct smc_llc_msg_delete_rkey *)wr_buf; memset(rkeyllc, 0, sizeof(*rkeyllc)); rkeyllc->hd.common.type = SMC_LLC_DELETE_RKEY; @@ -467,6 +477,8 @@ static int smc_llc_send_delete_rkey(struct smc_link *link, rkeyllc->rkey[0] = htonl(rmb_desc->mr_rx[link->link_idx]->rkey); /* send llc message */ rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } @@ -480,9 +492,11 @@ int smc_llc_send_add_link(struct smc_link *link, u8 mac[], u8 gid[], struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; addllc = (struct smc_llc_msg_add_link *)wr_buf; memset(addllc, 0, sizeof(*addllc)); @@ -504,6 +518,8 @@ int smc_llc_send_add_link(struct smc_link *link, u8 mac[], u8 gid[], } /* send llc message */ rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } @@ -517,9 +533,11 @@ int smc_llc_send_delete_link(struct smc_link *link, u8 link_del_id, struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; delllc = (struct smc_llc_msg_del_link *)wr_buf; memset(delllc, 0, sizeof(*delllc)); @@ -536,6 +554,8 @@ int smc_llc_send_delete_link(struct smc_link *link, u8 link_del_id, delllc->reason = htonl(reason); /* send llc message */ rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } @@ -547,9 +567,11 @@ static int smc_llc_send_test_link(struct smc_link *link, u8 user_data[16]) struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; testllc = (struct smc_llc_msg_test_link *)wr_buf; memset(testllc, 0, sizeof(*testllc)); testllc->hd.common.type = SMC_LLC_TEST_LINK; @@ -557,6 +579,8 @@ static int smc_llc_send_test_link(struct smc_link *link, u8 user_data[16]) memcpy(testllc->user_data, user_data, sizeof(testllc->user_data)); /* send llc message */ rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } @@ -567,13 +591,16 @@ static int smc_llc_send_message(struct smc_link *link, void *llcbuf) struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; - if (!smc_link_usable(link)) + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; memcpy(wr_buf, llcbuf, sizeof(union smc_llc_msg)); - return smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); + rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); + return rc; } /* schedule an llc send on link, may wait for buffers, @@ -586,13 +613,16 @@ static int smc_llc_send_message_wait(struct smc_link *link, void *llcbuf) struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; - if (!smc_link_usable(link)) + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; memcpy(wr_buf, llcbuf, sizeof(union smc_llc_msg)); - return smc_wr_tx_send_wait(link, pend, SMC_LLC_WAIT_TIME); + rc = smc_wr_tx_send_wait(link, pend, SMC_LLC_WAIT_TIME); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); + return rc; } /********************************* receive ***********************************/ @@ -672,9 +702,11 @@ static int smc_llc_add_link_cont(struct smc_link *link, struct smc_buf_desc *rmb; u8 n; + if (!smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_llc_add_pending_send(link, &wr_buf, &pend); if (rc) - return rc; + goto put_out; addc_llc = (struct smc_llc_msg_add_link_cont *)wr_buf; memset(addc_llc, 0, sizeof(*addc_llc)); @@ -706,7 +738,10 @@ static int smc_llc_add_link_cont(struct smc_link *link, addc_llc->hd.length = sizeof(struct smc_llc_msg_add_link_cont); if (lgr->role == SMC_CLNT) addc_llc->hd.flags |= SMC_LLC_FLAG_RESP; - return smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); + rc = smc_wr_tx_send(link, pend); +put_out: + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); + return rc; } static int smc_llc_cli_rkey_exchange(struct smc_link *link, diff --git a/net/smc/smc_tx.c b/net/smc/smc_tx.c index c79361dfcdfb..738a4a99c827 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_tx.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_tx.c @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static int smc_tx_rdma_writes(struct smc_connection *conn, /* Wakeup sndbuf consumers from any context (IRQ or process) * since there is more data to transmit; usable snd_wnd as max transmit */ -static int _smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty(struct smc_connection *conn) +static int smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty(struct smc_connection *conn) { struct smc_cdc_producer_flags *pflags = &conn->local_tx_ctrl.prod_flags; struct smc_link *link = conn->lnk; @@ -505,8 +505,11 @@ static int _smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty(struct smc_connection *conn) struct smc_wr_buf *wr_buf; int rc; + if (!link || !smc_wr_tx_link_hold(link)) + return -ENOLINK; rc = smc_cdc_get_free_slot(conn, link, &wr_buf, &wr_rdma_buf, &pend); if (rc < 0) { + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); if (rc == -EBUSY) { struct smc_sock *smc = container_of(conn, struct smc_sock, conn); @@ -547,22 +550,7 @@ static int _smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty(struct smc_connection *conn) out_unlock: spin_unlock_bh(&conn->send_lock); - return rc; -} - -static int smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty(struct smc_connection *conn) -{ - struct smc_link *link = conn->lnk; - int rc = -ENOLINK; - - if (!link) - return rc; - - atomic_inc(&link->wr_tx_refcnt); - if (smc_link_usable(link)) - rc = _smcr_tx_sndbuf_nonempty(conn); - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&link->wr_tx_refcnt)) - wake_up_all(&link->wr_tx_wait); + smc_wr_tx_link_put(link); return rc; } diff --git a/net/smc/smc_wr.h b/net/smc/smc_wr.h index 423b8709f1c9..2bc626f230a5 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_wr.h +++ b/net/smc/smc_wr.h @@ -60,6 +60,20 @@ static inline void smc_wr_tx_set_wr_id(atomic_long_t *wr_tx_id, long val) atomic_long_set(wr_tx_id, val); } +static inline bool smc_wr_tx_link_hold(struct smc_link *link) +{ + if (!smc_link_usable(link)) + return false; + atomic_inc(&link->wr_tx_refcnt); + return true; +} + +static inline void smc_wr_tx_link_put(struct smc_link *link) +{ + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&link->wr_tx_refcnt)) + wake_up_all(&link->wr_tx_wait); +} + static inline void smc_wr_wakeup_tx_wait(struct smc_link *lnk) { wake_up_all(&lnk->wr_tx_wait); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1b1499a817c90fd1ce9453a2c98d2a01cca0e775 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:44:30 +0200 Subject: nfc: nci: fix the UAF of rf_conn_info object The nci_core_conn_close_rsp_packet() function will release the conn_info with given conn_id. However, it needs to set the rf_conn_info to NULL to prevent other routines like nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() to trigger the UAF. Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/nfc/nci/rsp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c b/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c index a2e72c003805..b911ab78bed9 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c @@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ static void nci_core_conn_close_rsp_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev, ndev->cur_conn_id); if (conn_info) { list_del(&conn_info->list); + if (conn_info == ndev->rf_conn_info) + ndev->rf_conn_info = NULL; devm_kfree(&ndev->nfc_dev->dev, conn_info); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1bec0f05062cf21e78093b1c4a2ae744e2873b8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:47:08 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: fix bridge_num not getting cleared after ports leaving the bridge The dp->bridge_num is zero-based, with -1 being the encoding for an invalid value. But dsa_bridge_num_put used to check for an invalid value by comparing bridge_num with 0, which is of course incorrect. The result is that the bridge_num will never get cleared by dsa_bridge_num_put, and further port joins to other bridges will get a bridge_num larger than the previous one, and once all the available bridges with TX forwarding offload supported by the hardware get exhausted, the TX forwarding offload feature is simply disabled. In the case of sja1105, 7 iterations of the loop below are enough to exhaust the TX forwarding offload bits, and further bridge joins operate without that feature. ip link add br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 while :; do ip link set sw0p2 master br0 && sleep 1 ip link set sw0p2 nomaster && sleep 1 done This issue is enough of an indication that having the dp->bridge_num invalid encoding be a negative number is prone to bugs, so this will be changed to a one-based value, with the dp->bridge_num of zero being the indication of no bridge. However, that is material for net-next. Fixes: f5e165e72b29 ("net: dsa: track unique bridge numbers across all DSA switch trees") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index b29262eee00b..6d5cc0217133 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void dsa_bridge_num_put(const struct net_device *bridge_dev, int bridge_num) /* Check if the bridge is still in use, otherwise it is time * to clean it up so we can reuse this bridge_num later. */ - if (!dsa_bridge_num_find(bridge_dev)) + if (dsa_bridge_num_find(bridge_dev) < 0) clear_bit(bridge_num, &dsa_fwd_offloading_bridges); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c7709a02c18aabebc3b2988d24661763a0449443 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:47:09 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: tag_dsa: send packets with TX fwd offload from VLAN-unaware bridges using VID 0 The present code is structured this way due to an incomplete thought process. In Documentation/networking/switchdev.rst we document that if a bridge is VLAN-unaware, then the presence or lack of a pvid on a bridge port (or on the bridge itself, for that matter) should not affect the ability to receive and transmit tagged or untagged packets. If the bridge on behalf of which we are sending this packet is VLAN-aware, then the TX forwarding offload API ensures that the skb will be VLAN-tagged (if the packet was sent by user space as untagged, it will get transmitted town to the driver as tagged with the bridge device's pvid). But if the bridge is VLAN-unaware, it may or may not be VLAN-tagged. In fact the logic to insert the bridge's PVID came from the idea that we should emulate what is being done in the VLAN-aware case. But we shouldn't. It appears that injecting packets using a VLAN ID of 0 serves the purpose of forwarding the packets to the egress port with no VLAN tag added or stripped by the hardware, and no filtering being performed. So we can simply remove the superfluous logic. One reason why this logic is broken is that when CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING=n, we call br_vlan_get_pvid_rcu() but that returns an error and we do error out, dropping all packets on xmit. Not really smart. This is also an issue when the user deletes the bridge pvid: $ bridge vlan del dev br0 vid 1 self As mentioned, in both cases, packets should still flow freely, and they do just that on any net device where the bridge is not offloaded, but on mv88e6xxx they don't. Fixes: d82f8ab0d874 ("net: dsa: tag_dsa: offload the bridge forwarding process") Reported-by: Andrew Lunn Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20211003155141.2241314-1-andrew@lunn.ch/ Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20210928233708.1246774-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com/ Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/tag_dsa.c | 20 ++------------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c b/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c index e5127b7d1c6a..68d5ddc3ef35 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c @@ -129,12 +129,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *dsa_xmit_ll(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, u8 tag_dev, tag_port; enum dsa_cmd cmd; u8 *dsa_header; - u16 pvid = 0; - int err; if (skb->offload_fwd_mark) { struct dsa_switch_tree *dst = dp->ds->dst; - struct net_device *br = dp->bridge_dev; cmd = DSA_CMD_FORWARD; @@ -144,19 +141,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *dsa_xmit_ll(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, */ tag_dev = dst->last_switch + 1 + dp->bridge_num; tag_port = 0; - - /* If we are offloading forwarding for a VLAN-unaware bridge, - * inject packets to hardware using the bridge's pvid, since - * that's where the packets ingressed from. - */ - if (!br_vlan_enabled(br)) { - /* Safe because __dev_queue_xmit() runs under - * rcu_read_lock_bh() - */ - err = br_vlan_get_pvid_rcu(br, &pvid); - if (err) - return NULL; - } } else { cmd = DSA_CMD_FROM_CPU; tag_dev = dp->ds->index; @@ -188,8 +172,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *dsa_xmit_ll(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, dsa_header[0] = (cmd << 6) | tag_dev; dsa_header[1] = tag_port << 3; - dsa_header[2] = pvid >> 8; - dsa_header[3] = pvid & 0xff; + dsa_header[2] = 0; + dsa_header[3] = 0; } return skb; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5bded8259ee3815a91791462dfb3312480779c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:47:11 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: isolate the ATU databases of standalone and bridged ports Similar to commit 6087175b7991 ("net: dsa: mt7530: use independent VLAN learning on VLAN-unaware bridges"), software forwarding between an unoffloaded LAG port (a bonding interface with an unsupported policy) and a mv88e6xxx user port directly under a bridge is broken. We adopt the same strategy, which is to make the standalone ports not find any ATU entry learned on a bridge port. Theory: the mv88e6xxx ATU is looked up by FID and MAC address. There are as many FIDs as VIDs (4096). The FID is derived from the VID when possible (the VTU maps a VID to a FID), with a fallback to the port based default FID value when not (802.1Q Mode is disabled on the port, or the classified VID isn't present in the VTU). The mv88e6xxx driver makes the following use of FIDs and VIDs: - the port's DefaultVID (to which untagged & pvid-tagged packets get classified) is 0 and is absent from the VTU, so this kind of packets is processed in FID 0, the default FID assigned by mv88e6xxx_setup_port. - every time a bridge VLAN is created, mv88e6xxx_port_vlan_join() -> mv88e6xxx_atu_new() associates a FID with that VID which increases linearly starting from 1. Like this: bridge vlan add dev lan0 vid 100 # FID 1 bridge vlan add dev lan1 vid 100 # still FID 1 bridge vlan add dev lan2 vid 1024 # FID 2 The FID allocation made by the driver is sub-optimal for the following reasons: (a) A standalone port has a DefaultPVID of 0 and a default FID of 0 too. A VLAN-unaware bridged port has a DefaultPVID of 0 and a default FID of 0 too. The difference is that the bridged ports may learn ATU entries, while the standalone port has the requirement that it must not, and must not find them either. Standalone ports must not use the same FID as ports belonging to a bridge. All standalone ports can use the same FID, since the ATU will never have an entry in that FID. (b) Multiple VLAN-unaware bridges will all use a DefaultPVID of 0 and a default FID of 0 on all their ports. The FDBs will not be isolated between these bridges. Every VLAN-unaware bridge must use the same FID on all its ports, different from the FID of other bridge ports. (c) Each bridge VLAN uses a unique FID which is useful for Independent VLAN Learning, but the same VLAN ID on multiple VLAN-aware bridges will result in the same FID being used by mv88e6xxx_atu_new(). The correct behavior is for VLAN 1 in br0 to have a different FID compared to VLAN 1 in br1. This patch cannot fix all the above. Traditionally the DSA framework did not care about this, and the reality is that DSA core involvement is needed for the aforementioned issues to be solved. The only thing we can solve here is an issue which does not require API changes, and that is issue (a), aka use a different FID for standalone ports vs ports under VLAN-unaware bridges. The first step is deciding what VID and FID to use for standalone ports, and what VID and FID for bridged ports. The 0/0 pair for standalone ports is what they used up till now, let's keep using that. For bridged ports, there are 2 cases: - VLAN-aware ports will never end up using the port default FID, because packets will always be classified to a VID in the VTU or dropped otherwise. The FID is the one associated with the VID in the VTU. - On VLAN-unaware ports, we _could_ leave their DefaultVID (pvid) at zero (just as in the case of standalone ports), and just change the port's default FID from 0 to a different number (say 1). However, Tobias points out that there is one more requirement to cater to: cross-chip bridging. The Marvell DSA header does not carry the FID in it, only the VID. So once a packet crosses a DSA link, if it has a VID of zero it will get classified to the default FID of that cascade port. Relying on a port default FID for upstream cascade ports results in contradictions: a default FID of 0 breaks ATU isolation of bridged ports on the downstream switch, a default FID of 1 breaks standalone ports on the downstream switch. So not only must standalone ports have different FIDs compared to bridged ports, they must also have different DefaultVID values. IEEE 802.1Q defines two reserved VID values: 0 and 4095. So we simply choose 4095 as the DefaultVID of ports belonging to VLAN-unaware bridges, and VID 4095 maps to FID 1. For the xmit operation to look up the same ATU database, we need to put VID 4095 in DSA tags sent to ports belonging to VLAN-unaware bridges too. All shared ports are configured to map this VID to the bridging FID, because they are members of that VLAN in the VTU. Shared ports don't need to have 802.1QMode enabled in any way, they always parse the VID from the DSA header, they don't need to look at the 802.1Q header. We install VID 4095 to the VTU in mv88e6xxx_setup_port(), with the mention that mv88e6xxx_vtu_setup() which was located right below that call was flushing the VTU so those entries wouldn't be preserved. So we need to relocate the VTU flushing prior to the port initialization during ->setup(). Also note that this is why it is safe to assume that VID 4095 will get associated with FID 1: the user ports haven't been created, so there is no avenue for the user to create a bridge VLAN which could otherwise race with the creation of another FID which would otherwise use up the non-reserved FID value of 1. [ Currently mv88e6xxx_port_vlan_join() doesn't have the option of specifying a preferred FID, it always calls mv88e6xxx_atu_new(). ] mv88e6xxx_port_db_load_purge() is the function to access the ATU for FDB/MDB entries, and it used to determine the FID to use for VLAN-unaware FDB entries (VID=0) using mv88e6xxx_port_get_fid(). But the driver only called mv88e6xxx_port_set_fid() once, during probe, so no surprises, the port FID was always 0, the call to get_fid() was redundant. As much as I would have wanted to not touch that code, the logic is broken when we add a new FID which is not the port-based default. Now the port-based default FID only corresponds to standalone ports, and FDB/MDB entries belong to the bridging service. So while in the future, when the DSA API will support FDB isolation, we will have to figure out the FID based on the bridge number, for now there's a single bridging FID, so hardcode that. Lastly, the tagger needs to check, when it is transmitting a VLAN untagged skb, whether it is sending it towards a bridged or a standalone port. When we see it is bridged we assume the bridge is VLAN-unaware. Not because it cannot be VLAN-aware but: - if we are transmitting from a VLAN-aware bridge we are likely doing so using TX forwarding offload. That code path guarantees that skbs have a vlan hwaccel tag in them, so we would not enter the "else" branch of the "if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021Q))" condition. - if we are transmitting on behalf of a VLAN-aware bridge but with no TX forwarding offload (no PVT support, out of space in the PVT, whatever), we would indeed be transmitting with VLAN 4095 instead of the bridge device's pvid. However we would be injecting a "From CPU" frame, and the switch won't learn from that - it only learns from "Forward" frames. So it is inconsequential for address learning. And VLAN 4095 is absolutely enough for the frame to exit the switch, since we never remove that VLAN from any port. Fixes: 57e661aae6a8 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Link aggregation support") Reported-by: Tobias Waldekranz Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/tag_dsa.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c b/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c index 68d5ddc3ef35..b3da4b2ea11c 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_dsa.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ * 6 6 2 2 4 2 N */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -164,16 +165,21 @@ static struct sk_buff *dsa_xmit_ll(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, dsa_header[2] &= ~0x10; } } else { + struct net_device *br = dp->bridge_dev; + u16 vid; + + vid = br ? MV88E6XXX_VID_BRIDGED : MV88E6XXX_VID_STANDALONE; + skb_push(skb, DSA_HLEN + extra); dsa_alloc_etype_header(skb, DSA_HLEN + extra); - /* Construct untagged DSA tag. */ + /* Construct DSA header from untagged frame. */ dsa_header = dsa_etype_header_pos_tx(skb) + extra; dsa_header[0] = (cmd << 6) | tag_dev; dsa_header[1] = tag_port << 3; - dsa_header[2] = 0; - dsa_header[3] = 0; + dsa_header[2] = vid >> 8; + dsa_header[3] = vid & 0xff; } return skb; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 14132690860e4d06aa3e1c4d7d8e9866ba7756dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:49:57 +0200 Subject: mqprio: Correct stats in mqprio_dump_class_stats(). Introduction of lockless subqueues broke the class statistics. Before the change stats were accumulated in `bstats' and `qstats' on the stack which was then copied to struct gnet_dump. After the change the `bstats' and `qstats' are initialized to 0 and never updated, yet still fed to gnet_dump. The code updates the global qdisc->cpu_bstats and qdisc->cpu_qstats instead, clobbering them. Most likely a copy-paste error from the code in mqprio_dump(). __gnet_stats_copy_basic() and __gnet_stats_copy_queue() accumulate the values for per-CPU case but for global stats they overwrite the value, so only stats from the last loop iteration / tc end up in sch->[bq]stats. Use the on-stack [bq]stats variables again and add the stats manually in the global case. Fixes: ce679e8df7ed2 ("net: sched: add support for TCQ_F_NOLOCK subqueues to sch_mqprio") Cc: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211007175000.2334713-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de/ Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c index 8766ab5b8788..5eb3b1b7ae5e 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c @@ -529,22 +529,28 @@ static int mqprio_dump_class_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, for (i = tc.offset; i < tc.offset + tc.count; i++) { struct netdev_queue *q = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i); struct Qdisc *qdisc = rtnl_dereference(q->qdisc); - struct gnet_stats_basic_cpu __percpu *cpu_bstats = NULL; - struct gnet_stats_queue __percpu *cpu_qstats = NULL; spin_lock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); + if (qdisc_is_percpu_stats(qdisc)) { - cpu_bstats = qdisc->cpu_bstats; - cpu_qstats = qdisc->cpu_qstats; + qlen = qdisc_qlen_sum(qdisc); + + __gnet_stats_copy_basic(NULL, &bstats, + qdisc->cpu_bstats, + &qdisc->bstats); + __gnet_stats_copy_queue(&qstats, + qdisc->cpu_qstats, + &qdisc->qstats, + qlen); + } else { + qlen += qdisc->q.qlen; + bstats.bytes += qdisc->bstats.bytes; + bstats.packets += qdisc->bstats.packets; + qstats.backlog += qdisc->qstats.backlog; + qstats.drops += qdisc->qstats.drops; + qstats.requeues += qdisc->qstats.requeues; + qstats.overlimits += qdisc->qstats.overlimits; } - - qlen = qdisc_qlen_sum(qdisc); - __gnet_stats_copy_basic(NULL, &sch->bstats, - cpu_bstats, &qdisc->bstats); - __gnet_stats_copy_queue(&sch->qstats, - cpu_qstats, - &qdisc->qstats, - qlen); spin_unlock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1951b3f19cfe822709c890a337906823c223c7c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Sat, 9 Oct 2021 15:26:07 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: hold rtnl_lock in dsa_switch_setup_tag_protocol It was a documented fact that ds->ops->change_tag_protocol() offered rtnetlink mutex protection to the switch driver, since there was an ASSERT_RTNL right before the call in dsa_switch_change_tag_proto() (initiated from sysfs). The blamed commit introduced another call path for ds->ops->change_tag_protocol() which does not hold the rtnl_mutex. This is: dsa_tree_setup -> dsa_tree_setup_switches -> dsa_switch_setup -> dsa_switch_setup_tag_protocol -> ds->ops->change_tag_protocol() -> dsa_port_setup -> dsa_slave_create -> register_netdevice(slave_dev) -> dsa_tree_setup_master -> dsa_master_setup -> dev->dsa_ptr = cpu_dp The reason why the rtnl_mutex is held in the sysfs call path is to ensure that, once the master and all the DSA interfaces are down (which is required so that no packets flow), they remain down during the tagging protocol change. The above calling order illustrates the fact that it should not be risky to change the initial tagging protocol to the one specified in the device tree at the given time: - packets cannot enter the dsa_switch_rcv() packet type handler since netdev_uses_dsa() for the master will not yet return true, since dev->dsa_ptr has not yet been populated - packets cannot enter the dsa_slave_xmit() function because no DSA interface has yet been registered So from the DSA core's perspective, holding the rtnl_mutex is indeed not necessary. Yet, drivers may need to do things which need rtnl_mutex protection. For example: felix_set_tag_protocol -> felix_setup_tag_8021q -> dsa_tag_8021q_register -> dsa_tag_8021q_setup -> dsa_tag_8021q_port_setup -> vlan_vid_add -> ASSERT_RTNL These drivers do not really have a choice to take the rtnl_mutex themselves, since in the sysfs case, the rtnl_mutex is already held. Fixes: deff710703d8 ("net: dsa: Allow default tag protocol to be overridden from DT") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index 6d5cc0217133..da18094b5a04 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -811,7 +811,9 @@ static int dsa_switch_setup_tag_protocol(struct dsa_switch *ds) if (!dsa_is_cpu_port(ds, port)) continue; + rtnl_lock(); err = ds->ops->change_tag_protocol(ds, port, tag_ops->proto); + rtnl_unlock(); if (err) { dev_err(ds->dev, "Unable to use tag protocol \"%s\": %pe\n", tag_ops->name, ERR_PTR(err)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0edf0824e0dc359ed76bf96af986e6570ca2c0b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Boyd Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 14:59:45 -0700 Subject: af_unix: Rename UNIX-DGRAM to UNIX to maintain backwards compatability Then name of this protocol changed in commit 94531cfcbe79 ("af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap") because that commit added stream support to the af_unix protocol. Renaming the existing protocol makes a ChromeOS protocol test[1] fail now that the name has changed in /proc/net/protocols from "UNIX" to "UNIX-DGRAM". Let's put the name back to how it was while keeping the stream protocol as "UNIX-STREAM" so that the procfs interface doesn't change. This fixes the test and maintains backwards compatibility in proc. Cc: Jiang Wang Cc: Andrii Nakryiko Cc: Cong Wang Cc: Jakub Sitnicki Cc: John Fastabend Cc: Dmitry Osipenko Link: https://source.chromium.org/chromiumos/chromiumos/codesearch/+/main:src/platform/tast-tests/src/chromiumos/tast/local/bundles/cros/network/supported_protocols.go;l=50;drc=e8b1c3f94cb40a054f4aa1ef1aff61e75dc38f18 [1] Fixes: 94531cfcbe79 ("af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 0878ab86597b..89f9e85ae970 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static void unix_unhash(struct sock *sk) } struct proto unix_dgram_proto = { - .name = "UNIX-DGRAM", + .name = "UNIX", .owner = THIS_MODULE, .obj_size = sizeof(struct unix_sock), .close = unix_close, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2bbc977ca689e5e18e8cf98f68854f92bd053c97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Justin Iurman Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2021 20:04:11 +0200 Subject: ipv6: ioam: move the check for undefined bits The check for undefined bits in the trace type is moved from the input side to the output side, while the input side is relaxed and now inserts default empty values when an undefined bit is set. Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ioam6.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/ipv6/ioam6_iptunnel.c | 6 +++- 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ioam6.c b/net/ipv6/ioam6.c index 5e8961004832..d128172bb549 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ioam6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ioam6.c @@ -770,6 +770,66 @@ static void __ioam6_fill_trace_data(struct sk_buff *skb, data += sizeof(__be32); } + /* bit12 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit12) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit13 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit13) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit14 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit14) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit15 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit15) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit16 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit16) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit17 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit17) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit18 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit18) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit19 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit19) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit20 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit20) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + + /* bit21 undefined: filled with empty value */ + if (trace->type.bit21) { + *(__be32 *)data = cpu_to_be32(IOAM6_U32_UNAVAILABLE); + data += sizeof(__be32); + } + /* opaque state snapshot */ if (trace->type.bit22) { if (!sc) { @@ -791,16 +851,10 @@ void ioam6_fill_trace_data(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ioam6_schema *sc; u8 sclen = 0; - /* Skip if Overflow flag is set OR - * if an unknown type (bit 12-21) is set + /* Skip if Overflow flag is set */ - if (trace->overflow || - trace->type.bit12 | trace->type.bit13 | trace->type.bit14 | - trace->type.bit15 | trace->type.bit16 | trace->type.bit17 | - trace->type.bit18 | trace->type.bit19 | trace->type.bit20 | - trace->type.bit21) { + if (trace->overflow) return; - } /* NodeLen does not include Opaque State Snapshot length. We need to * take it into account if the corresponding bit is set (bit 22) and diff --git a/net/ipv6/ioam6_iptunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ioam6_iptunnel.c index f9ee04541c17..9b7b726f8f45 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ioam6_iptunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ioam6_iptunnel.c @@ -75,7 +75,11 @@ static bool ioam6_validate_trace_hdr(struct ioam6_trace_hdr *trace) u32 fields; if (!trace->type_be32 || !trace->remlen || - trace->remlen > IOAM6_TRACE_DATA_SIZE_MAX / 4) + trace->remlen > IOAM6_TRACE_DATA_SIZE_MAX / 4 || + trace->type.bit12 | trace->type.bit13 | trace->type.bit14 | + trace->type.bit15 | trace->type.bit16 | trace->type.bit17 | + trace->type.bit18 | trace->type.bit19 | trace->type.bit20 | + trace->type.bit21) return false; trace->nodelen = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 43a4b4dbd48c9006ef64df3a12acf33bdfe11c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Alvin=20=C5=A0ipraga?= Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 13:27:31 +0200 Subject: net: dsa: fix spurious error message when unoffloaded port leaves bridge MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Flip the sign of a return value check, thereby suppressing the following spurious error: port 2 failed to notify DSA_NOTIFIER_BRIDGE_LEAVE: -EOPNOTSUPP ... which is emitted when removing an unoffloaded DSA switch port from a bridge. Fixes: d371b7c92d19 ("net: dsa: Unset vlan_filtering when ports leave the bridge") Signed-off-by: Alvin Šipraga Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211012112730.3429157-1-alvin@pqrs.dk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/switch.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/switch.c b/net/dsa/switch.c index 1c797ec8e2c2..6466d0539af9 100644 --- a/net/dsa/switch.c +++ b/net/dsa/switch.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int dsa_switch_bridge_leave(struct dsa_switch *ds, if (extack._msg) dev_err(ds->dev, "port %d: %s\n", info->port, extack._msg); - if (err && err != EOPNOTSUPP) + if (err && err != -EOPNOTSUPP) return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 28da0555c3b542d605e4ca26eea6a740cf2c9174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 17:37:25 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: move sja1110_process_meta_tstamp inside the tagging protocol driver The problem is that DSA tagging protocols really must not depend on the switch driver, because this creates a circular dependency at insmod time, and the switch driver will effectively not load when the tagging protocol driver is missing. The code was structured in the way it was for a reason, though. The DSA driver-facing API for PTP timestamping relies on the assumption that two-step TX timestamps are provided by the hardware in an out-of-band manner, typically by raising an interrupt and making that timestamp available inside some sort of FIFO which is to be accessed over SPI/MDIO/etc. So the API puts .port_txtstamp into dsa_switch_ops, because it is expected that the switch driver needs to save some state (like put the skb into a queue until its TX timestamp arrives). On SJA1110, TX timestamps are provided by the switch as Ethernet packets, so this makes them be received and processed by the tagging protocol driver. This in itself is great, because the timestamps are full 64-bit and do not require reconstruction, and since Ethernet is the fastest I/O method available to/from the switch, PTP timestamps arrive very quickly, no matter how bottlenecked the SPI connection is, because SPI interaction is not needed at all. DSA's code structure and strict isolation between the tagging protocol driver and the switch driver break the natural code organization. When the tagging protocol driver receives a packet which is classified as a metadata packet containing timestamps, it passes those timestamps one by one to the switch driver, which then proceeds to compare them based on the recorded timestamp ID that was generated in .port_txtstamp. The communication between the tagging protocol and the switch driver is done through a method exported by the switch driver, sja1110_process_meta_tstamp. To satisfy build requirements, we force a dependency to build the tagging protocol driver as a module when the switch driver is a module. However, as explained in the first paragraph, that causes the circular dependency. To solve this, move the skb queue from struct sja1105_private :: struct sja1105_ptp_data to struct sja1105_private :: struct sja1105_tagger_data. The latter is a data structure for which hacks have already been put into place to be able to create persistent storage per switch that is accessible from the tagging protocol driver (see sja1105_setup_ports). With the skb queue directly accessible from the tagging protocol driver, we can now move sja1110_process_meta_tstamp into the tagging driver itself, and avoid exporting a symbol. Fixes: 566b18c8b752 ("net: dsa: sja1105: implement TX timestamping for SJA1110") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210908220834.d7gmtnwrorhharna@skbuf/ Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/tag_sja1105.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_sja1105.c b/net/dsa/tag_sja1105.c index c054f48541c8..2edede9ddac9 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_sja1105.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_sja1105.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "dsa_priv.h" @@ -53,6 +54,11 @@ #define SJA1110_TX_TRAILER_LEN 4 #define SJA1110_MAX_PADDING_LEN 15 +enum sja1110_meta_tstamp { + SJA1110_META_TSTAMP_TX = 0, + SJA1110_META_TSTAMP_RX = 1, +}; + /* Similar to is_link_local_ether_addr(hdr->h_dest) but also covers PTP */ static inline bool sja1105_is_link_local(const struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -520,6 +526,43 @@ static struct sk_buff *sja1105_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, is_meta); } +static void sja1110_process_meta_tstamp(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port, + u8 ts_id, enum sja1110_meta_tstamp dir, + u64 tstamp) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_tmp, *skb_match = NULL; + struct dsa_port *dp = dsa_to_port(ds, port); + struct skb_shared_hwtstamps shwt = {0}; + struct sja1105_port *sp = dp->priv; + + if (!dsa_port_is_sja1105(dp)) + return; + + /* We don't care about RX timestamps on the CPU port */ + if (dir == SJA1110_META_TSTAMP_RX) + return; + + spin_lock(&sp->data->skb_txtstamp_queue.lock); + + skb_queue_walk_safe(&sp->data->skb_txtstamp_queue, skb, skb_tmp) { + if (SJA1105_SKB_CB(skb)->ts_id != ts_id) + continue; + + __skb_unlink(skb, &sp->data->skb_txtstamp_queue); + skb_match = skb; + + break; + } + + spin_unlock(&sp->data->skb_txtstamp_queue.lock); + + if (WARN_ON(!skb_match)) + return; + + shwt.hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime(sja1105_ticks_to_ns(tstamp)); + skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb_match, &shwt); +} + static struct sk_buff *sja1110_rcv_meta(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 rx_header) { u8 *buf = dsa_etype_header_pos_rx(skb) + SJA1110_HEADER_LEN; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4ac0567e40b334b54988e3c28a2425ff9c8bdd35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 17:37:26 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: sja1105: break dependency between dsa_port_is_sja1105 and switch driver It's nice to be able to test a tagging protocol with dsa_loop, but not at the cost of losing the ability of building the tagging protocol and switch driver as modules, because as things stand, there is a circular dependency between the two. Tagging protocol drivers cannot depend on switch drivers, that is a hard fact. The reasoning behind the blamed patch was that accessing dp->priv should first make sure that the structure behind that pointer is what we really think it is. Currently the "sja1105" and "sja1110" tagging protocols only operate with the sja1105 switch driver, just like any other tagging protocol and switch combination. The only way to mix and match them is by modifying the code, and this applies to dsa_loop as well (by default that uses DSA_TAG_PROTO_NONE). So while in principle there is an issue, in practice there isn't one. Until we extend dsa_loop to allow user space configuration, treat the problem as a non-issue and just say that DSA ports found by tag_sja1105 are always sja1105 ports, which is in fact true. But keep the dsa_port_is_sja1105 function so that it's easy to patch it during testing, and rely on dead code elimination. Fixes: 994d2cbb08ca ("net: dsa: tag_sja1105: be dsa_loop-safe") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210908220834.d7gmtnwrorhharna@skbuf/ Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/Kconfig b/net/dsa/Kconfig index 548285539752..bca1b5d66df2 100644 --- a/net/dsa/Kconfig +++ b/net/dsa/Kconfig @@ -138,7 +138,6 @@ config NET_DSA_TAG_LAN9303 config NET_DSA_TAG_SJA1105 tristate "Tag driver for NXP SJA1105 switches" - depends on NET_DSA_SJA1105 || !NET_DSA_SJA1105 select PACKING help Say Y or M if you want to enable support for tagging frames with the -- cgit v1.2.3 From deab6b1cd9789bb9bd466d5e76aecb8b336259b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 14:40:40 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: tag_ocelot: break circular dependency with ocelot switch lib driver As explained here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210908220834.d7gmtnwrorhharna@skbuf/ DSA tagging protocol drivers cannot depend on symbols exported by switch drivers, because this creates a circular dependency that breaks module autoloading. The tag_ocelot.c file depends on the ocelot_ptp_rew_op() function exported by the common ocelot switch lib. This function looks at OCELOT_SKB_CB(skb) and computes how to populate the REW_OP field of the DSA tag, for PTP timestamping (the command: one-step/two-step, and the TX timestamp identifier). None of that requires deep insight into the driver, it is quite stateless, as it only depends upon the skb->cb. So let's make it a static inline function and put it in include/linux/dsa/ocelot.h, a file that despite its name is used by the ocelot switch driver for populating the injection header too - since commit 40d3f295b5fe ("net: mscc: ocelot: use common tag parsing code with DSA"). With that function declared as static inline, its body is expanded inside each call site, so the dependency is broken and the DSA tagger can be built without the switch library, upon which the felix driver depends. Fixes: 39e5308b3250 ("net: mscc: ocelot: support PTP Sync one-step timestamping") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/Kconfig | 2 -- net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c | 1 - net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/Kconfig b/net/dsa/Kconfig index bca1b5d66df2..d166377d7085 100644 --- a/net/dsa/Kconfig +++ b/net/dsa/Kconfig @@ -101,8 +101,6 @@ config NET_DSA_TAG_RTL4_A config NET_DSA_TAG_OCELOT tristate "Tag driver for Ocelot family of switches, using NPI port" - depends on MSCC_OCELOT_SWITCH_LIB || \ - (MSCC_OCELOT_SWITCH_LIB=n && COMPILE_TEST) select PACKING help Say Y or M if you want to enable NPI tagging for the Ocelot switches diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c index 8025ed778d33..605b51ca6921 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ /* Copyright 2019 NXP */ #include -#include #include "dsa_priv.h" static void ocelot_xmit_common(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev, diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c index 59072930cb02..1e4e66ea6796 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ * that on egress */ #include +#include #include #include #include "dsa_priv.h" -- cgit v1.2.3 From 49f885b2d97093451410e7279aa29d81e094e108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 14:40:41 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: tag_ocelot_8021q: break circular dependency with ocelot switch lib Michael reported that when using the "ocelot-8021q" tagging protocol, the switch driver module must be manually loaded before the tagging protocol can be loaded/is available. This appears to be the same problem described here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210908220834.d7gmtnwrorhharna@skbuf/ where due to the fact that DSA tagging protocols make use of symbols exported by the switch drivers, circular dependencies appear and this breaks module autoloading. The ocelot_8021q driver needs the ocelot_can_inject() and ocelot_port_inject_frame() functions from the switch library. Previously the wrong approach was taken to solve that dependency: shims were provided for the case where the ocelot switch library was compiled out, but that turns out to be insufficient, because the dependency when the switch lib _is_ compiled is problematic too. We cannot declare ocelot_can_inject() and ocelot_port_inject_frame() as static inline functions, because these access I/O functions like __ocelot_write_ix() which is called by ocelot_write_rix(). Making those static inline basically means exposing the whole guts of the ocelot switch library, not ideal... We already have one tagging protocol driver which calls into the switch driver during xmit but not using any exported symbol: sja1105_defer_xmit. We can do the same thing here: create a kthread worker and one work item per skb, and let the switch driver itself do the register accesses to send the skb, and then consume it. Fixes: 0a6f17c6ae21 ("net: dsa: tag_ocelot_8021q: add support for PTP timestamping") Reported-by: Michael Walle Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/Kconfig | 2 -- net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/Kconfig b/net/dsa/Kconfig index d166377d7085..d8ee15f1c7a9 100644 --- a/net/dsa/Kconfig +++ b/net/dsa/Kconfig @@ -112,8 +112,6 @@ config NET_DSA_TAG_OCELOT config NET_DSA_TAG_OCELOT_8021Q tristate "Tag driver for Ocelot family of switches, using VLAN" - depends on MSCC_OCELOT_SWITCH_LIB || \ - (MSCC_OCELOT_SWITCH_LIB=n && COMPILE_TEST) help Say Y or M if you want to enable support for tagging frames with a custom VLAN-based header. Frames that require timestamping, such as diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c index 1e4e66ea6796..d05c352f96e5 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c @@ -10,10 +10,31 @@ */ #include #include -#include -#include #include "dsa_priv.h" +static struct sk_buff *ocelot_defer_xmit(struct dsa_port *dp, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct felix_deferred_xmit_work *xmit_work; + struct felix_port *felix_port = dp->priv; + + xmit_work = kzalloc(sizeof(*xmit_work), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!xmit_work) + return NULL; + + /* Calls felix_port_deferred_xmit in felix.c */ + kthread_init_work(&xmit_work->work, felix_port->xmit_work_fn); + /* Increase refcount so the kfree_skb in dsa_slave_xmit + * won't really free the packet. + */ + xmit_work->dp = dp; + xmit_work->skb = skb_get(skb); + + kthread_queue_work(felix_port->xmit_worker, &xmit_work->work); + + return NULL; +} + static struct sk_buff *ocelot_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) { @@ -21,18 +42,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *ocelot_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 tx_vid = dsa_8021q_tx_vid(dp->ds, dp->index); u16 queue_mapping = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb); u8 pcp = netdev_txq_to_tc(netdev, queue_mapping); - struct ocelot *ocelot = dp->ds->priv; - int port = dp->index; - u32 rew_op = 0; - rew_op = ocelot_ptp_rew_op(skb); - if (rew_op) { - if (!ocelot_can_inject(ocelot, 0)) - return NULL; - - ocelot_port_inject_frame(ocelot, port, 0, rew_op, skb); - return NULL; - } + if (ocelot_ptp_rew_op(skb)) + return ocelot_defer_xmit(dp, skb); return dsa_8021q_xmit(skb, netdev, ETH_P_8021Q, ((pcp << VLAN_PRIO_SHIFT) | tx_vid)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 43ba33b4f143965a451cfdc1e826b61f6933c887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 14:40:43 +0300 Subject: net: dsa: tag_ocelot_8021q: fix inability to inject STP BPDUs into BLOCKING ports When setting up a bridge with stp_state 1, topology changes are not detected and loops are not blocked. This is because the standard way of transmitting a packet, based on VLAN IDs redirected by VCAP IS2 to the right egress port, does not override the port STP state (in the case of Ocelot switches, that's really the PGID_SRC masks). To force a packet to be injected into a port that's BLOCKING, we must send it as a control packet, which means in the case of this tagger to send it using the manual register injection method. We already do this for PTP frames, extend the logic to apply to any link-local MAC DA. Fixes: 7c83a7c539ab ("net: dsa: add a second tagger for Ocelot switches based on tag_8021q") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c index d05c352f96e5..3412051981d7 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ocelot_8021q.c @@ -42,8 +42,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *ocelot_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 tx_vid = dsa_8021q_tx_vid(dp->ds, dp->index); u16 queue_mapping = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb); u8 pcp = netdev_txq_to_tc(netdev, queue_mapping); + struct ethhdr *hdr = eth_hdr(skb); - if (ocelot_ptp_rew_op(skb)) + if (ocelot_ptp_rew_op(skb) || is_link_local_ether_addr(hdr->h_dest)) return ocelot_defer_xmit(dp, skb); return dsa_8021q_xmit(skb, netdev, ETH_P_8021Q, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f922d9e374f0ca7d1b241666c792f403c6120aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 03:19:09 +0300 Subject: Revert "net: procfs: add seq_puts() statement for dev_mcast" This reverts commit ec18e8455484370d633a718c6456ddbf6eceef21. It turns out that there are user space programs which got broken by that change. One example is the "ifstat" program shipped by Debian: https://packages.debian.org/source/bullseye/ifstat which, confusingly enough, seems to not have anything in common with the much more familiar (at least to me) ifstat program from iproute2: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/iproute2/iproute2.git/tree/misc/ifstat.c root@debian:~# ifstat ifstat: /proc/net/dev: unsupported format. This change modified the header (first two lines of text) in /proc/net/dev so that it looks like this: root@debian:~# cat /proc/net/dev Interface| Receive | Transmit | bytes packets errs drop fifo frame compressed multicast| bytes packets errs drop fifo colls carrier compressed lo: 97400 1204 0 0 0 0 0 0 97400 1204 0 0 0 0 0 0 bond0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sit0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 eno2: 5002206 6651 0 0 0 0 0 0 105518642 1465023 0 0 0 0 0 0 swp0: 134531 2448 0 0 0 0 0 0 99599598 1464381 0 0 0 0 0 0 swp1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 swp2: 4867675 4203 0 0 0 0 0 0 58134 631 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw0p0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw0p1: 124739 2448 0 1422 0 0 0 0 93741184 1464369 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw0p2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p0: 4850863 4203 0 0 0 0 0 0 54722 619 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p3: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 br0: 10508 212 0 212 0 0 0 212 61369558 958857 0 0 0 0 0 0 whereas before it looked like this: root@debian:~# cat /proc/net/dev Inter-| Receive | Transmit face |bytes packets errs drop fifo frame compressed multicast|bytes packets errs drop fifo colls carrier compressed lo: 13160 164 0 0 0 0 0 0 13160 164 0 0 0 0 0 0 bond0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sit0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 eno2: 30824 268 0 0 0 0 0 0 3332 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 swp0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 swp1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 swp2: 30824 268 0 0 0 0 0 0 2428 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw0p0: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw0p1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw0p2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p0: 29752 268 0 0 0 0 0 0 1564 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 sw2p3: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 The reason why the ifstat shipped by Debian (v1.1, with a Debian patch upgrading it to 1.1-8.1 at the time of writing) is broken is because its "proc" driver/backend parses the header very literally: main/drivers.c#L825 if (!data->checked && strncmp(buf, "Inter-|", 7)) goto badproc; and there's no way in which the header can be changed such that programs parsing like that would not get broken. Even if we fix this ancient and very "lightly" maintained program to parse the text output of /proc/net/dev in a more sensible way, this story seems bound to repeat again with other programs, and modifying them all could cause more trouble than it's worth. On the other hand, the reverted patch had no other reason than an aesthetic one, so reverting it is the simplest way out. I don't know what other distributions would be affected; the fact that Debian doesn't ship the iproute2 version of the program (a different code base altogether, which uses netlink and not /proc/net/dev) is surprising in itself. Fixes: ec18e8455484 ("net: procfs: add seq_puts() statement for dev_mcast") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20211009163511.vayjvtn3rrteglsu@skbuf/ Cc: Yajun Deng Cc: Matthieu Baerts Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013001909.3164185-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/core/net-procfs.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/net-procfs.c b/net/core/net-procfs.c index eab5fc88a002..d8b9dbabd4a4 100644 --- a/net/core/net-procfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-procfs.c @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static void dev_seq_printf_stats(struct seq_file *seq, struct net_device *dev) struct rtnl_link_stats64 temp; const struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats = dev_get_stats(dev, &temp); - seq_printf(seq, "%9s: %16llu %12llu %4llu %6llu %4llu %5llu %10llu %9llu " - "%16llu %12llu %4llu %6llu %4llu %5llu %7llu %10llu\n", + seq_printf(seq, "%6s: %7llu %7llu %4llu %4llu %4llu %5llu %10llu %9llu " + "%8llu %7llu %4llu %4llu %4llu %5llu %7llu %10llu\n", dev->name, stats->rx_bytes, stats->rx_packets, stats->rx_errors, stats->rx_dropped + stats->rx_missed_errors, @@ -103,11 +103,11 @@ static void dev_seq_printf_stats(struct seq_file *seq, struct net_device *dev) static int dev_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) - seq_puts(seq, "Interface| Receive " - " | Transmit\n" - " | bytes packets errs drop fifo frame " - "compressed multicast| bytes packets errs " - " drop fifo colls carrier compressed\n"); + seq_puts(seq, "Inter-| Receive " + " | Transmit\n" + " face |bytes packets errs drop fifo frame " + "compressed multicast|bytes packets errs " + "drop fifo colls carrier compressed\n"); else dev_seq_printf_stats(seq, v); return 0; @@ -259,14 +259,14 @@ static int ptype_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct packet_type *pt = v; if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) - seq_puts(seq, "Type Device Function\n"); + seq_puts(seq, "Type Device Function\n"); else if (pt->dev == NULL || dev_net(pt->dev) == seq_file_net(seq)) { if (pt->type == htons(ETH_P_ALL)) seq_puts(seq, "ALL "); else seq_printf(seq, "%04x", ntohs(pt->type)); - seq_printf(seq, " %-9s %ps\n", + seq_printf(seq, " %-8s %ps\n", pt->dev ? pt->dev->name : "", pt->func); } @@ -327,14 +327,12 @@ static int dev_mc_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct netdev_hw_addr *ha; struct net_device *dev = v; - if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { - seq_puts(seq, "Ifindex Interface Refcount Global_use Address\n"); + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) return 0; - } netif_addr_lock_bh(dev); netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, dev) { - seq_printf(seq, "%-7d %-9s %-8d %-10d %*phN\n", + seq_printf(seq, "%-4d %-15s %-5d %-5d %*phN\n", dev->ifindex, dev->name, ha->refcount, ha->global_use, (int)dev->addr_len, ha->addr); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0911ab31896f0e908540746414a77dd63912748d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyang Xuan Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 11:49:32 +0800 Subject: nfc: fix error handling of nfc_proto_register() When nfc proto id is using, nfc_proto_register() return -EBUSY error code, but forgot to unregister proto. Fix it by adding proto_unregister() in the error handling case. Fixes: c7fe3b52c128 ("NFC: add NFC socket family") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013034932.2833737-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/nfc/af_nfc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/nfc/af_nfc.c b/net/nfc/af_nfc.c index 6024fad905ff..dda323e0a473 100644 --- a/net/nfc/af_nfc.c +++ b/net/nfc/af_nfc.c @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ int nfc_proto_register(const struct nfc_protocol *nfc_proto) proto_tab[nfc_proto->id] = nfc_proto; write_unlock(&proto_tab_lock); + if (rc) + proto_unregister(nfc_proto->proto); + return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfc_proto_register); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 58e7dcc9ca29c14e44267a4d0ea61e3229124907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyang Xuan Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:50:12 +0800 Subject: NFC: digital: fix possible memory leak in digital_tg_listen_mdaa() 'params' is allocated in digital_tg_listen_mdaa(), but not free when digital_send_cmd() failed, which will cause memory leak. Fix it by freeing 'params' if digital_send_cmd() return failed. Fixes: 1c7a4c24fbfd ("NFC Digital: Add target NFC-DEP support") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/nfc/digital_core.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/nfc/digital_core.c b/net/nfc/digital_core.c index fefc03674f4f..d63d2e5dc60c 100644 --- a/net/nfc/digital_core.c +++ b/net/nfc/digital_core.c @@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ int digital_tg_configure_hw(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, int type, int param) static int digital_tg_listen_mdaa(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, u8 rf_tech) { struct digital_tg_mdaa_params *params; + int rc; params = kzalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL); if (!params) @@ -291,8 +292,12 @@ static int digital_tg_listen_mdaa(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, u8 rf_tech) get_random_bytes(params->nfcid2 + 2, NFC_NFCID2_MAXSIZE - 2); params->sc = DIGITAL_SENSF_FELICA_SC; - return digital_send_cmd(ddev, DIGITAL_CMD_TG_LISTEN_MDAA, NULL, params, - 500, digital_tg_recv_atr_req, NULL); + rc = digital_send_cmd(ddev, DIGITAL_CMD_TG_LISTEN_MDAA, NULL, params, + 500, digital_tg_recv_atr_req, NULL); + if (rc) + kfree(params); + + return rc; } static int digital_tg_listen_md(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, u8 rf_tech) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 291c932fc3692e4d211a445ba8aa35663831bac7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyang Xuan Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:50:32 +0800 Subject: NFC: digital: fix possible memory leak in digital_in_send_sdd_req() 'skb' is allocated in digital_in_send_sdd_req(), but not free when digital_in_send_cmd() failed, which will cause memory leak. Fix it by freeing 'skb' if digital_in_send_cmd() return failed. Fixes: 2c66daecc409 ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-A technology support") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/nfc/digital_technology.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/nfc/digital_technology.c b/net/nfc/digital_technology.c index 84d2345c75a3..3adf4589852a 100644 --- a/net/nfc/digital_technology.c +++ b/net/nfc/digital_technology.c @@ -465,8 +465,12 @@ static int digital_in_send_sdd_req(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, skb_put_u8(skb, sel_cmd); skb_put_u8(skb, DIGITAL_SDD_REQ_SEL_PAR); - return digital_in_send_cmd(ddev, skb, 30, digital_in_recv_sdd_res, - target); + rc = digital_in_send_cmd(ddev, skb, 30, digital_in_recv_sdd_res, + target); + if (rc) + kfree_skb(skb); + + return rc; } static void digital_in_recv_sens_res(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, void *arg, -- cgit v1.2.3 From a2d859e3fc97e79d907761550dbc03ff1b36479c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eiichi Tsukata Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 17:27:29 -0300 Subject: sctp: account stream padding length for reconf chunk sctp_make_strreset_req() makes repeated calls to sctp_addto_chunk() which will automatically account for padding on each call. inreq and outreq are already 4 bytes aligned, but the payload is not and doing SCTP_PAD4(a + b) (which _sctp_make_chunk() did implicitly here) is different from SCTP_PAD4(a) + SCTP_PAD4(b) and not enough. It led to possible attempt to use more buffer than it was allocated and triggered a BUG_ON. Cc: Vlad Yasevich Cc: Neil Horman Cc: Greg KH Fixes: cc16f00f6529 ("sctp: add support for generating stream reconf ssn reset request chunk") Reported-by: Eiichi Tsukata Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Reviewed-by: Xin Long Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b97c1f8b0c7ff79ac4ed206fc2c49d3612e0850c.1634156849.git.mleitner@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index b8fa8f1a7277..c7503fd64915 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -3697,7 +3697,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_req( outlen = (sizeof(outreq) + stream_len) * out; inlen = (sizeof(inreq) + stream_len) * in; - retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, outlen + inlen); + retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, SCTP_PAD4(outlen) + SCTP_PAD4(inlen)); if (!retval) return NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1fcd794518b7644169595c66b1bfe726d1f498ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2021 05:50:50 -0400 Subject: icmp: fix icmp_ext_echo_iio parsing in icmp_build_probe In icmp_build_probe(), the icmp_ext_echo_iio parsing should be done step by step and skb_header_pointer() return value should always be checked, this patch fixes 3 places in there: - On case ICMP_EXT_ECHO_CTYPE_NAME, it should only copy ident.name from skb by skb_header_pointer(), its len is ident_len. Besides, the return value of skb_header_pointer() should always be checked. - On case ICMP_EXT_ECHO_CTYPE_INDEX, move ident_len check ahead of skb_header_pointer(), and also do the return value check for skb_header_pointer(). - On case ICMP_EXT_ECHO_CTYPE_ADDR, before accessing iio->ident.addr. ctype3_hdr.addrlen, skb_header_pointer() should be called first, then check its return value and ident_len. On subcases ICMP_AFI_IP and ICMP_AFI_IP6, also do check for ident. addr.ctype3_hdr.addrlen and skb_header_pointer()'s return value. On subcase ICMP_AFI_IP, the len for skb_header_pointer() should be "sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr) + sizeof(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr) + sizeof(struct in_addr)" or "ident_len". v1->v2: - To make it more clear, call skb_header_pointer() once only for iio->indent's parsing as Jakub Suggested. v2->v3: - The extobj_hdr.length check against sizeof(_iio) should be done before calling skb_header_pointer(), as Eric noticed. Fixes: d329ea5bd884 ("icmp: add response to RFC 8335 PROBE messages") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Xin Long Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/31628dd76657ea62f5cf78bb55da6b35240831f1.1634205050.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 8b30cadff708..b7e277d8a84d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -1054,14 +1054,19 @@ bool icmp_build_probe(struct sk_buff *skb, struct icmphdr *icmphdr) iio = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_ext_hdr), sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr), &_iio); if (!ext_hdr || !iio) goto send_mal_query; - if (ntohs(iio->extobj_hdr.length) <= sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr)) + if (ntohs(iio->extobj_hdr.length) <= sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr) || + ntohs(iio->extobj_hdr.length) > sizeof(_iio)) goto send_mal_query; ident_len = ntohs(iio->extobj_hdr.length) - sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr); + iio = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_ext_hdr), + sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr) + ident_len, &_iio); + if (!iio) + goto send_mal_query; + status = 0; dev = NULL; switch (iio->extobj_hdr.class_type) { case ICMP_EXT_ECHO_CTYPE_NAME: - iio = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_ext_hdr), sizeof(_iio), &_iio); if (ident_len >= IFNAMSIZ) goto send_mal_query; memset(buff, 0, sizeof(buff)); @@ -1069,30 +1074,24 @@ bool icmp_build_probe(struct sk_buff *skb, struct icmphdr *icmphdr) dev = dev_get_by_name(net, buff); break; case ICMP_EXT_ECHO_CTYPE_INDEX: - iio = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_ext_hdr), sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr) + - sizeof(iio->ident.ifindex), &_iio); if (ident_len != sizeof(iio->ident.ifindex)) goto send_mal_query; dev = dev_get_by_index(net, ntohl(iio->ident.ifindex)); break; case ICMP_EXT_ECHO_CTYPE_ADDR: - if (ident_len != sizeof(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr) + + if (ident_len < sizeof(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr) || + ident_len != sizeof(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr) + iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr.addrlen) goto send_mal_query; switch (ntohs(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr.afi)) { case ICMP_AFI_IP: - iio = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_ext_hdr), sizeof(iio->extobj_hdr) + - sizeof(struct in_addr), &_iio); - if (ident_len != sizeof(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr) + - sizeof(struct in_addr)) + if (iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr.addrlen != sizeof(struct in_addr)) goto send_mal_query; dev = ip_dev_find(net, iio->ident.addr.ip_addr.ipv4_addr); break; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case ICMP_AFI_IP6: - iio = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_ext_hdr), sizeof(_iio), &_iio); - if (ident_len != sizeof(iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr) + - sizeof(struct in6_addr)) + if (iio->ident.addr.ctype3_hdr.addrlen != sizeof(struct in6_addr)) goto send_mal_query; dev = ipv6_stub->ipv6_dev_find(net, &iio->ident.addr.ip_addr.ipv6_addr, dev); dev_hold(dev); -- cgit v1.2.3