From bf4afc53b77aeaa48b5409da5c8da6bb4eff7f43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 16:37:42 -0800
Subject: Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument

This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using

    git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
        xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'

to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.

Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.

For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/keys/key.c                       | 2 +-
 security/keys/keyctl.c                    | 4 ++--
 security/keys/keyring.c                   | 2 +-
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c          | 2 +-
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 +-
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c | 4 ++--
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 6 +++---
 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/keys')

diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 8ca0777f22d3..091ee084bc30 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ try_again:
 		spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
 
 		user = NULL;
-		candidate = kmalloc_obj(struct key_user, GFP_KERNEL);
+		candidate = kmalloc_obj(struct key_user);
 		if (unlikely(!candidate))
 			goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 7d8a0de7c7c4..ef855d69c97a 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1796,13 +1796,13 @@ long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t id, int watch_queue_fd, int watch_id)
 	if (watch_id >= 0) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		if (!key->watchers) {
-			wlist = kzalloc_obj(*wlist, GFP_KERNEL);
+			wlist = kzalloc_obj(*wlist);
 			if (!wlist)
 				goto err_wqueue;
 			init_watch_list(wlist, NULL);
 		}
 
-		watch = kzalloc_obj(*watch, GFP_KERNEL);
+		watch = kzalloc_obj(*watch);
 		if (!watch)
 			goto err_wlist;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 9a1685035be5..b39038f7dd31 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static struct key_restriction *keyring_restriction_alloc(
 	key_restrict_link_func_t check)
 {
 	struct key_restriction *keyres =
-		kzalloc_obj(struct key_restriction, GFP_KERNEL);
+		kzalloc_obj(struct key_restriction);
 
 	if (!keyres)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index f0de3e9d9743..a7d7538c1f70 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	kenter("%d,", target->serial);
 
 	/* allocate a auth record */
-	rka = kzalloc_obj(*rka, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka = kzalloc_obj(*rka);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
 	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index fb9ff3d18292..0b142d941cd2 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
 	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err;
-	p = kzalloc_obj(*p, GFP_KERNEL);
+	p = kzalloc_obj(*p);
 	if (!p)
 		goto err;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
index aab8fbc49280..bf42c6679245 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
 	struct trusted_key_options *options;
 	struct trusted_pkwm_options *pkwm;
 
-	options = kzalloc_obj(*options, GFP_KERNEL);
+	options = kzalloc_obj(*options);
 
 	if (options) {
-		pkwm = kzalloc_obj(*pkwm, GFP_KERNEL);
+		pkwm = kzalloc_obj(*pkwm);
 
 		if (!pkwm) {
 			kfree_sensitive(options);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index ce9b26dd846e..6ea728f1eae6 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 	int i;
 
 	/* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
-	td = kmalloc_obj(*td, GFP_KERNEL);
+	td = kmalloc_obj(*td);
 	if (!td)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
 	if (tpm2 < 0)
 		return NULL;
 
-	options = kzalloc_obj(*options, GFP_KERNEL);
+	options = kzalloc_obj(*options);
 	if (options) {
 		/* set any non-zero defaults */
 		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static int __init init_digests(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	digests = kzalloc_objs(*digests, chip->nr_allocated_banks, GFP_KERNEL);
+	digests = kzalloc_objs(*digests, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
 	if (!digests)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
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