diff options
| author | Bingquan Chen <patzilla007@gmail.com> | 2026-04-18 19:20:06 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2026-04-22 20:16:34 -0700 |
| commit | 2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5 (patch) | |
| tree | 969614ac3dcb05512e41e2b90b8940d8a6b49b3b | |
| parent | 3bfcf396081ace536733b454ff128d53116581e5 (diff) | |
net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
Fixes: 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")
Signed-off-by: Bingquan Chen <patzilla007@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418112006.78823-1-patzilla007@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/packet/af_packet.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 4b043241fd56..8e6f3a734ba0 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2718,7 +2718,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) { struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; struct net_device *dev; - struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr = NULL; + struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; + bool has_vnet_hdr = false; struct sockcm_cookie sockc; __be16 proto; int err, reserve = 0; @@ -2819,16 +2820,20 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; if (vnet_hdr_sz) { - vnet_hdr = data; data += vnet_hdr_sz; tp_len -= vnet_hdr_sz; - if (tp_len < 0 || - __packet_snd_vnet_parse(vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { + if (tp_len < 0) { + tp_len = -EINVAL; + goto tpacket_error; + } + memcpy(&vnet_hdr, data - vnet_hdr_sz, sizeof(vnet_hdr)); + if (__packet_snd_vnet_parse(&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { tp_len = -EINVAL; goto tpacket_error; } copylen = __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), - vnet_hdr->hdr_len); + vnet_hdr.hdr_len); + has_vnet_hdr = true; } copylen = max_t(int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len); skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk, @@ -2865,12 +2870,12 @@ tpacket_error: } } - if (vnet_hdr_sz) { - if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, vnet_hdr, vio_le())) { + if (has_vnet_hdr) { + if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, &vnet_hdr, vio_le())) { tp_len = -EINVAL; goto tpacket_error; } - virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, vnet_hdr); + virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, &vnet_hdr); } skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb; |
