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authorYung Chih Su <yuuchihsu@gmail.com>2026-03-02 14:02:47 +0800
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2026-03-03 17:20:37 -0800
commit4ee7fa6cf78ff26d783d39e2949d14c4c1cd5e7f (patch)
tree2e258ec5466c4dce2ab1f5debfc7ab7e9b36153e
parent67edfec516d30d3e62925c397be4a1e5185802fc (diff)
net: ipv4: fix ARM64 alignment fault in multipath hash seed
`struct sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed` contains two u32 fields (user_seed and mp_seed), making it an 8-byte structure with a 4-byte alignment requirement. In `fib_multipath_hash_from_keys()`, the code evaluates the entire struct atomically via `READ_ONCE()`: mp_seed = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed).mp_seed; While this silently works on GCC by falling back to unaligned regular loads which the ARM64 kernel tolerates, it causes a fatal kernel panic when compiled with Clang and LTO enabled. Commit e35123d83ee3 ("arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CONFIG_LTO=y") strengthens `READ_ONCE()` to use Load-Acquire instructions (`ldar` / `ldapr`) to prevent compiler reordering bugs under Clang LTO. Since the macro evaluates the full 8-byte struct, Clang emits a 64-bit `ldar` instruction. ARM64 architecture strictly requires `ldar` to be naturally aligned, thus executing it on a 4-byte aligned address triggers a strict Alignment Fault (FSC = 0x21). Fix the read side by moving the `READ_ONCE()` directly to the `u32` member, which emits a safe 32-bit `ldar Wn`. Furthermore, Eric Dumazet pointed out that `WRITE_ONCE()` on the entire struct in `proc_fib_multipath_hash_set_seed()` is also flawed. Analysis shows that Clang splits this 8-byte write into two separate 32-bit `str` instructions. While this avoids an alignment fault, it destroys atomicity and exposes a tear-write vulnerability. Fix this by explicitly splitting the write into two 32-bit `WRITE_ONCE()` operations. Finally, add the missing `READ_ONCE()` when reading `user_seed` in `proc_fib_multipath_hash_seed()` to ensure proper pairing and concurrency safety. Fixes: 4ee2a8cace3f ("net: ipv4: Add a sysctl to set multipath hash seed") Signed-off-by: Yung Chih Su <yuuchihsu@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260302060247.7066-1-yuuchihsu@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--include/net/ip_fib.h2
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c5
2 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/ip_fib.h b/include/net/ip_fib.h
index b4495c38e0a0..318593743b6e 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_fib.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_fib.h
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static inline u32 fib_multipath_hash_from_keys(const struct net *net,
siphash_aligned_key_t hash_key;
u32 mp_seed;
- mp_seed = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed).mp_seed;
+ mp_seed = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed.mp_seed);
fib_multipath_hash_construct_key(&hash_key, mp_seed);
return flow_hash_from_keys_seed(keys, &hash_key);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index 643763bc2142..5654cc9c8a0b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static void proc_fib_multipath_hash_set_seed(struct net *net, u32 user_seed)
proc_fib_multipath_hash_rand_seed),
};
- WRITE_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed, new);
+ WRITE_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed.user_seed, new.user_seed);
+ WRITE_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed.mp_seed, new.mp_seed);
}
static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_seed(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
@@ -500,7 +501,7 @@ static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_seed(const struct ctl_table *table, int write
int ret;
mphs = &net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed;
- user_seed = mphs->user_seed;
+ user_seed = READ_ONCE(mphs->user_seed);
tmp = *table;
tmp.data = &user_seed;