Merge tag 'drm-misc-next-fixes-2026-06-11' of https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/misc/kernel into drm-next

drm-misc-next-fixes for v7.2:
- Fix agp_amd64_probe error propagation.
- Require carveout when PASID is not enabled amdxdna.
- Clear variable to prevent second unbind in amdxdna.
- Add separate Kconfig option for DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM_CC_SHARED.

Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>

From: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c7a9dbb0-a5c8-4e67-904e-1a52b3de9bb4@linux.intel.com

4 files changed, 27 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/accel/amdxdna/amdxdna_pci_drv.c b/drivers/accel/amdxdna/amdxdna_pci_drv.c
index c677293c1ae7..65489bb3f2b0 100644
--- a/drivers/accel/amdxdna/amdxdna_pci_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/accel/amdxdna/amdxdna_pci_drv.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int amdxdna_sva_init(struct amdxdna_client *client)
 	client->pasid = iommu_sva_get_pasid(client->sva);
 	if (client->pasid == IOMMU_PASID_INVALID) {
 		iommu_sva_unbind_device(client->sva);
+		client->sva = NULL;
 		XDNA_ERR(xdna, "SVA get pasid failed");
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
@@ -120,8 +121,14 @@ static int amdxdna_drm_open(struct drm_device *ddev, struct drm_file *filp)
 
 	if (!amdxdna_iova_on(xdna)) {
 		/* No need to fail open since user may use pa + carveout later. */
-		if (amdxdna_sva_init(client))
+		if (amdxdna_sva_init(client)) {
 			XDNA_WARN(xdna, "PASID not available for pid %d", client->pid);
+			if (!amdxdna_use_carveout(xdna)) {
+				XDNA_ERR(xdna, "PASID unavailable and carveout not configured");
+				kfree(client);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 	mmgrab(client->mm);
 	init_srcu_struct(&client->hwctx_srcu);
diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
index 2505df1f4e69..6741270e0a98 100644
--- a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static int agp_amd64_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	/* Fill in the mode register */
 	pci_read_config_dword(pdev, bridge->capndx+PCI_AGP_STATUS, &bridge->mode);
 
-	if (cache_nbs(pdev, cap_ptr) == -1) {
+	if (cache_nbs(pdev, cap_ptr) < 0) {
 		agp_put_bridge(bridge);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig
index e273fb18feca..bb729e91545c 100644
--- a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ config DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM
 	  Choose this option to enable the system dmabuf heap. The system heap
 	  is backed by pages from the buddy allocator. If in doubt, say Y.
 
+config DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM_CC_SHARED
+	bool "DMA-BUF System Heap for decrypted CoCo VMs"
+	depends on DMABUF_HEAPS && ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT && DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM=y
+	help
+	  Choose this option to enable the system_cc_shared dmabuf heap. This
+	  allows allocating shared (decrypted) memory for confidential computing
+	  (CoCo) VMs.
+
 config DMABUF_HEAPS_CMA
 	tristate "DMA-BUF CMA Heap"
 	depends on DMABUF_HEAPS && DMA_CMA
diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c
index c92bdec356fc..c8959eadc71d 100644
--- a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c
+++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ struct dma_heap_attachment {
 	bool cc_shared;
 };
 
+#define cc_shared_buffer(b) (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM_CC_SHARED) && \
+				(b)->cc_shared)
+
 #define LOW_ORDER_GFP (GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ZERO)
 #define HIGH_ORDER_GFP  (((GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_NOWARN \
 				| __GFP_NORETRY) & ~__GFP_RECLAIM) \
@@ -161,7 +164,7 @@ static struct sg_table *system_heap_map_dma_buf(struct dma_buf_attachment *attac
 	unsigned long attrs;
 	int ret;
 
-	attrs = a->cc_shared ? DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED : 0;
+	attrs = cc_shared_buffer(a) ? DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED : 0;
 	ret = dma_map_sgtable(attachment->dev, table, direction, attrs);
 	if (ret)
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
@@ -233,7 +236,7 @@ static int system_heap_mmap(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	int i, ret;
 
 	prot = vma->vm_page_prot;
-	if (buffer->cc_shared)
+	if (cc_shared_buffer(buffer))
 		prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
 
 	for_each_sgtable_sg(table, sg, i) {
@@ -282,7 +285,7 @@ static void *system_heap_do_vmap(struct system_heap_buffer *buffer)
 	}
 
 	prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
-	if (buffer->cc_shared)
+	if (cc_shared_buffer(buffer))
 		prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
 	vaddr = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, prot);
 	vfree(pages);
@@ -349,7 +352,7 @@ static void system_heap_dma_buf_release(struct dma_buf *dmabuf)
 		 * Intentionally leak pages that cannot be re-encrypted
 		 * to prevent shared memory from being reused.
 		 */
-		if (buffer->cc_shared &&
+		if (cc_shared_buffer(buffer) &&
 		    system_heap_set_page_encrypted(page))
 			continue;
 
@@ -456,7 +459,7 @@ static struct dma_buf *system_heap_allocate(struct dma_heap *heap,
 		list_del(&page->lru);
 	}
 
-	if (cc_shared) {
+	if (cc_shared_buffer(buffer)) {
 		for_each_sgtable_sg(table, sg, i) {
 			ret = system_heap_set_page_decrypted(sg_page(sg));
 			if (ret)
@@ -485,7 +488,7 @@ free_pages:
 		 * Intentionally leak pages that cannot be re-encrypted
 		 * to prevent shared memory from being reused.
 		 */
-		if (buffer->cc_shared &&
+		if (cc_shared_buffer(buffer) &&
 		    system_heap_set_page_encrypted(p))
 			continue;
 		__free_pages(p, compound_order(p));
@@ -525,6 +528,7 @@ static int __init system_heap_create(void)
 		return PTR_ERR(sys_heap);
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGHMEM) ||
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM_CC_SHARED) ||
 	    !cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;