diff options
| author | Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr> | 2026-10-08 09:35:53 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2026-11-04 13:46:50 +0800 |
| commit | 828c3b265b6df877dced3dde56ea41daa2e6181e (patch) | |
| tree | 945145eeae530677179862f0960a8325a1d3826f | |
| parent | 6628e7d4c6b25c8d18f1345e3a20d21829aae7e4 (diff) | |
crypto: caam - reject overlong RSA CRT parameters
caam_read_rsa_crt() right-aligns dP, dQ, and qInv in buffers sized
from the corresponding prime. rsa_parse_priv_key() only bounds these
integers against n, so a malformed key can provide, for example, a
two-byte dP with a one-byte p. dstlen - nbytes then underflows and
memcpy() writes outside the allocation during set_priv_key(). KASAN
reports a slab-out-of-bounds write in caam_read_rsa_crt().
Reject empty or overlong CRT parameters after stripping leading zeros.
qInv is consumed by CAAM as a p-sized value, so size it from p rather
than q to match the DMA mapping in set_rsa_priv_f3_pdb(). Let the
top-level key cleanup handle partial form-3 allocations and return the
specific error to the caller.
Also test nbytes before dereferencing it while stripping zeros, so an
all-zero integer does not read one byte beyond its input.
Fixes: 4a651b122adb ("crypto: caam - add support for RSA key form 3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 75 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c index ac515ed8c575..2082adaae585 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c @@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static void caam_rsa_free_key(struct caam_rsa_key *key) static void caam_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(const u8 **ptr, size_t *nbytes) { - while (!**ptr && *nbytes) { + while (*nbytes && !**ptr) { (*ptr)++; (*nbytes)--; } @@ -896,22 +896,22 @@ static void caam_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(const u8 **ptr, size_t *nbytes) * @ptr : pointer to {dP, dQ, qInv} CRT member * @nbytes: length in bytes of {dP, dQ, qInv} CRT member * @dstlen: length in bytes of corresponding p or q prime factor + * @dst : pointer to the zero-padded output buffer */ -static u8 *caam_read_rsa_crt(const u8 *ptr, size_t nbytes, size_t dstlen) +static int caam_read_rsa_crt(const u8 *ptr, size_t nbytes, size_t dstlen, + u8 **dst) { - u8 *dst; - caam_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &nbytes); - if (!nbytes) - return NULL; + if (!nbytes || nbytes > dstlen) + return -EINVAL; - dst = kzalloc(dstlen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!dst) - return NULL; + *dst = kzalloc(dstlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*dst) + return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(dst + (dstlen - nbytes), ptr, nbytes); + memcpy(*dst + (dstlen - nbytes), ptr, nbytes); - return dst; + return 0; } /** @@ -991,6 +991,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx, size_t p_sz = raw_key->p_sz; size_t q_sz = raw_key->q_sz; unsigned aligned_size; + int ret; rsa_key->p = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key->p, &p_sz); if (!rsa_key->p) @@ -999,57 +1000,39 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx, rsa_key->q = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key->q, &q_sz); if (!rsa_key->q) - goto free_p; + return -ENOMEM; rsa_key->q_sz = q_sz; aligned_size = ALIGN(raw_key->p_sz, dma_get_cache_alignment()); rsa_key->tmp1 = kzalloc(aligned_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rsa_key->tmp1) - goto free_q; + return -ENOMEM; aligned_size = ALIGN(raw_key->q_sz, dma_get_cache_alignment()); rsa_key->tmp2 = kzalloc(aligned_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rsa_key->tmp2) - goto free_tmp1; + return -ENOMEM; rsa_key->priv_form = FORM2; - rsa_key->dp = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->dp, raw_key->dp_sz, p_sz); - if (!rsa_key->dp) - goto free_tmp2; + ret = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->dp, raw_key->dp_sz, p_sz, + &rsa_key->dp); + if (ret) + return ret; - rsa_key->dq = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->dq, raw_key->dq_sz, q_sz); - if (!rsa_key->dq) - goto free_dp; + ret = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->dq, raw_key->dq_sz, q_sz, + &rsa_key->dq); + if (ret) + return ret; - rsa_key->qinv = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->qinv, raw_key->qinv_sz, - q_sz); - if (!rsa_key->qinv) - goto free_dq; + ret = caam_read_rsa_crt(raw_key->qinv, raw_key->qinv_sz, p_sz, + &rsa_key->qinv); + if (ret) + return ret; rsa_key->priv_form = FORM3; return 0; - -free_dq: - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dq); - rsa_key->dq = NULL; -free_dp: - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dp); - rsa_key->dp = NULL; -free_tmp2: - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp2); - rsa_key->tmp2 = NULL; -free_tmp1: - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp1); - rsa_key->tmp1 = NULL; -free_q: - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->q); - rsa_key->q = NULL; -free_p: - kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->p); - rsa_key->p = NULL; - return -ENOMEM; } static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key, @@ -1067,6 +1050,8 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key, if (ret) return ret; + ret = -ENOMEM; + /* Copy key in DMA zone */ rsa_key->d = kmemdup(raw_key.d, raw_key.d_sz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rsa_key->d) @@ -1103,7 +1088,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key, err: caam_rsa_free_key(rsa_key); - return -ENOMEM; + return ret; } static unsigned int caam_rsa_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) |
