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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-04-05 10:09:33 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-04-05 10:09:33 -0700
commit1791c390149f56313c425e8add1fd15baf40afb8 (patch)
tree7a5ad3d2f0b3c9026c84badde1519f55333d568e /Documentation
parent7a60c79bd0547adba3cefde40ced4a1f376305be (diff)
parentf387e2e2b9d302688dbdceebe9aade221c90f09e (diff)
Merge tag 'char-misc-7.0-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc/iio driver fixes from Greg KH: "Here are a relativly large number of small char/misc/iio and other driver fixes for 7.0-rc7. There's a bunch, but overall they are all small fixes for issues that people have been having that I finally caught up with getting merged due to delays on my end. The "largest" change overall is just some documentation updates to the security-bugs.rst file to hopefully tell the AI tools (and any users that actually read the documentation), how to send us better security bug reports as the quantity of reports these past few weeks has increased dramatically due to tools getting better at "finding" things. Included in here are: - lots of small IIO driver fixes for issues reported in 7.0-rc - gpib driver fixes - comedi driver fixes - interconnect driver fix - nvmem driver fixes - mei driver fix - counter driver fix - binder rust driver fixes - some other small misc driver fixes All of these have been in linux-next this week with no reported issues" * tag 'char-misc-7.0-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (63 commits) Documentation: fix two typos in latest update to the security report howto Documentation: clarify the mandatory and desirable info for security reports Documentation: explain how to find maintainers addresses for security reports Documentation: minor updates to the security contacts .get_maintainer.ignore: add myself nvmem: zynqmp_nvmem: Fix buffer size in DMA and memcpy nvmem: imx: assign nvmem_cell_info::raw_len misc: fastrpc: check qcom_scm_assign_mem() return in rpmsg_probe misc: fastrpc: possible double-free of cctx->remote_heap comedi: dt2815: add hardware detection to prevent crash comedi: runflags cannot determine whether to reclaim chanlist comedi: Reinit dev->spinlock between attachments to low-level drivers comedi: me_daq: Fix potential overrun of firmware buffer comedi: me4000: Fix potential overrun of firmware buffer comedi: ni_atmio16d: Fix invalid clean-up after failed attach gpib: fix use-after-free in IO ioctl handlers gpib: lpvo_usb: fix memory leak on disconnect gpib: Fix fluke driver s390 compile issue lis3lv02d: Omit IRQF_ONESHOT if no threaded handler is provided lis3lv02d: fix kernel-doc warnings ...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst154
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
index c0cf93e11565..27b028e85861 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
@@ -5,8 +5,138 @@ Security bugs
Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
-disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
-Linux kernel security team.
+disclosed as quickly as possible.
+
+Preparing your report
+---------------------
+
+Like with any bug report, a security bug report requires a lot of analysis work
+from the developers, so the more information you can share about the issue, the
+better. Please review the procedure outlined in
+Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst if you are unclear about what
+information is helpful. The following information are absolutely necessary in
+**any** security bug report:
+
+ * **affected kernel version range**: with no version indication, your report
+ will not be processed. A significant part of reports are for bugs that
+ have already been fixed, so it is extremely important that vulnerabilities
+ are verified on recent versions (development tree or latest stable
+ version), at least by verifying that the code has not changed since the
+ version where it was detected.
+
+ * **description of the problem**: a detailed description of the problem, with
+ traces showing its manifestation, and why you consider that the observed
+ behavior as a problem in the kernel, is necessary.
+
+ * **reproducer**: developers will need to be able to reproduce the problem to
+ consider a fix as effective. This includes both a way to trigger the issue
+ and a way to confirm it happens. A reproducer with low complexity
+ dependencies will be needed (source code, shell script, sequence of
+ instructions, file-system image etc). Binary-only executables are not
+ accepted. Working exploits are extremely helpful and will not be released
+ without consent from the reporter, unless they are already public. By
+ definition if an issue cannot be reproduced, it is not exploitable, thus it
+ is not a security bug.
+
+ * **conditions**: if the bug depends on certain configuration options,
+ sysctls, permissions, timing, code modifications etc, these should be
+ indicated.
+
+In addition, the following information are highly desirable:
+
+ * **suspected location of the bug**: the file names and functions where the
+ bug is suspected to be present are very important, at least to help forward
+ the report to the appropriate maintainers. When not possible (for example,
+ "system freezes each time I run this command"), the security team will help
+ identify the source of the bug.
+
+ * **a proposed fix**: bug reporters who have analyzed the cause of a bug in
+ the source code almost always have an accurate idea on how to fix it,
+ because they spent a long time studying it and its implications. Proposing
+ a tested fix will save maintainers a lot of time, even if the fix ends up
+ not being the right one, because it helps understand the bug. When
+ proposing a tested fix, please always format it in a way that can be
+ immediately merged (see Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst).
+ This will save some back-and-forth exchanges if it is accepted, and you
+ will be credited for finding and fixing this issue. Note that in this case
+ only a ``Signed-off-by:`` tag is needed, without ``Reported-by:`` when the
+ reporter and author are the same.
+
+ * **mitigations**: very often during a bug analysis, some ways of mitigating
+ the issue appear. It is useful to share them, as they can be helpful to
+ keep end users protected during the time it takes them to apply the fix.
+
+Identifying contacts
+--------------------
+
+The most effective way to report a security bug is to send it directly to the
+affected subsystem's maintainers and Cc: the Linux kernel security team. Do
+not send it to a public list at this stage, unless you have good reasons to
+consider the issue as being public or trivial to discover (e.g. result of a
+widely available automated vulnerability scanning tool that can be repeated by
+anyone).
+
+If you're sending a report for issues affecting multiple parts in the kernel,
+even if they're fairly similar issues, please send individual messages (think
+that maintainers will not all work on the issues at the same time). The only
+exception is when an issue concerns closely related parts maintained by the
+exact same subset of maintainers, and these parts are expected to be fixed all
+at once by the same commit, then it may be acceptable to report them at once.
+
+One difficulty for most first-time reporters is to figure the right list of
+recipients to send a report to. In the Linux kernel, all official maintainers
+are trusted, so the consequences of accidentally including the wrong maintainer
+are essentially a bit more noise for that person, i.e. nothing dramatic. As
+such, a suitable method to figure the list of maintainers (which kernel
+security officers use) is to rely on the get_maintainer.pl script, tuned to
+only report maintainers. This script, when passed a file name, will look for
+its path in the MAINTAINERS file to figure a hierarchical list of relevant
+maintainers. Calling it a first time with the finest level of filtering will
+most of the time return a short list of this specific file's maintainers::
+
+ $ ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --no-l --no-r --pattern-depth 1 \
+ drivers/example.c
+ Developer One <dev1@example.com> (maintainer:example driver)
+ Developer Two <dev2@example.org> (maintainer:example driver)
+
+These two maintainers should then receive the message. If the command does not
+return anything, it means the affected file is part of a wider subsystem, so we
+should be less specific::
+
+ $ ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --no-l --no-r drivers/example.c
+ Developer One <dev1@example.com> (maintainer:example subsystem)
+ Developer Two <dev2@example.org> (maintainer:example subsystem)
+ Developer Three <dev3@example.com> (maintainer:example subsystem [GENERAL])
+ Developer Four <dev4@example.org> (maintainer:example subsystem [GENERAL])
+
+Here, picking the first, most specific ones, is sufficient. When the list is
+long, it is possible to produce a comma-delimited e-mail address list on a
+single line suitable for use in the To: field of a mailer like this::
+
+ $ ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --no-tree --no-l --no-r --no-n --m \
+ --no-git-fallback --no-substatus --no-rolestats --no-multiline \
+ --pattern-depth 1 drivers/example.c
+ dev1@example.com, dev2@example.org
+
+or this for the wider list::
+
+ $ ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --no-tree --no-l --no-r --no-n --m \
+ --no-git-fallback --no-substatus --no-rolestats --no-multiline \
+ drivers/example.c
+ dev1@example.com, dev2@example.org, dev3@example.com, dev4@example.org
+
+If at this point you're still facing difficulties spotting the right
+maintainers, **and only in this case**, it's possible to send your report to
+the Linux kernel security team only. Your message will be triaged, and you
+will receive instructions about whom to contact, if needed. Your message may
+equally be forwarded as-is to the relevant maintainers.
+
+Sending the report
+------------------
+
+Reports are to be sent over e-mail exclusively. Please use a working e-mail
+address, preferably the same that you want to appear in ``Reported-by`` tags
+if any. If unsure, send your report to yourself first.
The security team and maintainers almost always require additional
information beyond what was initially provided in a report and rely on
@@ -18,20 +148,12 @@ run additional tests. Reports where the reporter does not respond promptly
or cannot effectively discuss their findings may be abandoned if the
communication does not quickly improve.
-As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
-will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
-'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
-information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
-be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
-made public.
-
+The report must be sent to maintainers, with the security team in ``Cc:``.
The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
-who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
-If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
-that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
-security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
-understand and fix the security vulnerability.
+who will help verify the bug report and assist developers working on a fix.
+It is possible that the security team will bring in extra help from area
+maintainers to understand and fix the security vulnerability.
Please send **plain text** emails without attachments where possible.
It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
@@ -42,7 +164,9 @@ reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
Markdown, HTML and RST formatted reports are particularly frowned upon since
they're quite hard to read for humans and encourage to use dedicated viewers,
sometimes online, which by definition is not acceptable for a confidential
-security report.
+security report. Note that some mailers tend to mangle formatting of plain
+text by default, please consult Documentation/process/email-clients.rst for
+more info.
Disclosure and embargoed information
------------------------------------