Merge tag 'hardening-v7.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - randomize_kstack: Improve implementation across arches (Ryan Roberts)

 - lkdtm/fortify: Drop unneeded FORTIFY_STR_OBJECT test

 - refcount: Remove unused __signed_wrap function annotations

* tag 'hardening-v7.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  lkdtm/fortify: Drop unneeded FORTIFY_STR_OBJECT test
  refcount: Remove unused __signed_wrap function annotations
  randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches
  randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c
index 1249d82c1cd0..85da7e050d97 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c
@@ -79,16 +79,5 @@ void noinstr __no_stack_protector do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
 					   regs->regs[7], regs->regs[8], regs->regs[9]);
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10
-	 * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
-	 * when applying stack alignment constraints: 16-bytes (i.e. 4-bits)
-	 * aligned, which will remove the 4 low bits from any entropy chosen
-	 * here.
-	 *
-	 * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4].
-	 */
-	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_cycles());
-
 	syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
 }