diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-12-02 08:01:39 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-12-02 08:01:39 -0800 |
| commit | 1dce50698a5ceedaca806e0a78573886a363dc95 (patch) | |
| tree | 6ce44b381ce5935c0f5546534b87666ab1140bf5 /arch/x86/include | |
| parent | 4a26e7032d7d57c998598c08a034872d6f0d3945 (diff) | |
| parent | 4322c8f81c58da493a3c46eda32f0e7534a350a0 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'core-uaccess-2025-11-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scoped user access updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Scoped user mode access and related changes:
- Implement the missing u64 user access function on ARM when
CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE=n.
This makes it possible to access a 64bit value in generic code with
[unsafe_]get_user(). All other architectures and ARM variants
provide the relevant accessors already.
- Ensure that ASM GOTO jump label usage in the user mode access
helpers always goes through a local C scope label indirection
inside the helpers.
This is required because compilers are not supporting that a ASM
GOTO target leaves a auto cleanup scope. GCC silently fails to emit
the cleanup invocation and CLANG fails the build.
[ Editor's note: gcc-16 will have fixed the code generation issue
in commit f68fe3ddda4 ("eh: Invoke cleanups/destructors in asm
goto jumps [PR122835]"). But we obviously have to deal with clang
and older versions of gcc, so.. - Linus ]
This provides generic wrapper macros and the conversion of affected
architecture code to use them.
- Scoped user mode access with auto cleanup
Access to user mode memory can be required in hot code paths, but
if it has to be done with user controlled pointers, the access is
shielded with a speculation barrier, so that the CPU cannot
speculate around the address range check. Those speculation
barriers impact performance quite significantly.
This cost can be avoided by "masking" the provided pointer so it is
guaranteed to be in the valid user memory access range and
otherwise to point to a guaranteed unpopulated address space. This
has to be done without branches so it creates an address dependency
for the access, which the CPU cannot speculate ahead.
This results in repeating and error prone programming patterns:
if (can_do_masked_user_access())
from = masked_user_read_access_begin((from));
else if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from)))
return -EFAULT;
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
user_read_access_end();
return 0;
Efault:
user_read_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
which can be replaced with scopes and automatic cleanup:
scoped_user_read_access(from, Efault)
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
return 0;
Efault:
return -EFAULT;
- Convert code which implements the above pattern over to
scope_user.*.access(). This also corrects a couple of imbalanced
masked_*_begin() instances which are harmless on most
architectures, but prevent PowerPC from implementing the masking
optimization.
- Add a missing speculation barrier in copy_from_user_iter()"
* tag 'core-uaccess-2025-11-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
lib/strn*,uaccess: Use masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin when required
scm: Convert put_cmsg() to scoped user access
iov_iter: Add missing speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter()
iov_iter: Convert copy_from_user_iter() to masked user access
select: Convert to scoped user access
x86/futex: Convert to scoped user access
futex: Convert to get/put_user_inline()
uaccess: Provide put/get_user_inline()
uaccess: Provide scoped user access regions
arm64: uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
s390/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
riscv/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
powerpc/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
x86/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
uaccess: Provide ASM GOTO safe wrappers for unsafe_*_user()
ARM: uaccess: Implement missing __get_user_asm_dword()
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 75 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 12 |
2 files changed, 39 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h index 6e2458088800..fe5d9a10d900 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h @@ -46,38 +46,31 @@ do { \ } while(0) static __always_inline int arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int oparg, int *oval, - u32 __user *uaddr) + u32 __user *uaddr) { - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - uaddr = masked_user_access_begin(uaddr); - else if (!user_access_begin(uaddr, sizeof(u32))) - return -EFAULT; - - switch (op) { - case FUTEX_OP_SET: - unsafe_atomic_op1("xchgl %0, %2", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_ADD: - unsafe_atomic_op1(LOCK_PREFIX "xaddl %0, %2", oval, - uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_OR: - unsafe_atomic_op2("orl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_ANDN: - unsafe_atomic_op2("andl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, ~oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_XOR: - unsafe_atomic_op2("xorl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - default: - user_access_end(); - return -ENOSYS; + scoped_user_rw_access(uaddr, Efault) { + switch (op) { + case FUTEX_OP_SET: + unsafe_atomic_op1("xchgl %0, %2", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_ADD: + unsafe_atomic_op1(LOCK_PREFIX "xaddl %0, %2", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_OR: + unsafe_atomic_op2("orl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_ANDN: + unsafe_atomic_op2("andl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, ~oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_XOR: + unsafe_atomic_op2("xorl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + default: + return -ENOSYS; + } } - user_access_end(); return 0; Efault: - user_access_end(); return -EFAULT; } @@ -86,21 +79,19 @@ static inline int futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr, { int ret = 0; - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - uaddr = masked_user_access_begin(uaddr); - else if (!user_access_begin(uaddr, sizeof(u32))) - return -EFAULT; - asm volatile("\n" - "1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgl %3, %2\n" - "2:\n" - _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, %0) \ - : "+r" (ret), "=a" (oldval), "+m" (*uaddr) - : "r" (newval), "1" (oldval) - : "memory" - ); - user_access_end(); - *uval = oldval; + scoped_user_rw_access(uaddr, Efault) { + asm_inline volatile("\n" + "1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgl %3, %2\n" + "2:\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, %0) + : "+r" (ret), "=a" (oldval), "+m" (*uaddr) + : "r" (newval), "1" (oldval) + : "memory"); + *uval = oldval; + } return ret; +Efault: + return -EFAULT; } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 91a3fb8ae7ff..367297b188c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -528,18 +528,18 @@ static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *pt #define user_access_save() smap_save() #define user_access_restore(x) smap_restore(x) -#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ __put_user_size((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), label) #ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ do { \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), err_label); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ } while (0) #else // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ do { \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ @@ -618,11 +618,11 @@ do { \ } while (0) #ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ __get_user_size(*((type *)(dst)), (__force type __user *)(src), \ sizeof(type), err_label) #else // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ do { \ int __kr_err; \ \ @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ do { \ } while (0) #endif // CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ __put_user_size(*((type *)(src)), (__force type __user *)(dst), \ sizeof(type), err_label) |
