diff options
| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2021-03-21 22:13:47 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-05-11 14:47:19 +0200 |
| commit | 5c22421fb35fe408a7170c2225ef3452dc944bd5 (patch) | |
| tree | 5787f632a684f4ce64545493b9ddb14bba337f91 /drivers/char/random.c | |
| parent | 2d78ede60615421167dcac2690c844676a9c7870 (diff) | |
random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness
[ Upstream commit a181e0fdb2164268274453b5b291589edbb9b22d ]
On big endian CPUs, the ChaCha20-based CRNG is using the wrong
endianness for the ChaCha20 constants.
This doesn't matter cryptographically, but technically it means it's not
ChaCha20 anymore. Fix it to always use the standard constants.
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index f462b9d2f5a5..340ad21491e2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); crng_init_try_arch(crng); crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; @@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); |