ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg()

The main loop in __ice_clean_ctrlq first checks if a VF might be malicious
before calling ice_vc_process_vf_msg(). This results in duplicate code in
both functions to obtain a reference to the VF, and exports the
ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_virtchnl.c unnecessarily.

Refactor ice_is_malicious_vf() to be a static function that takes a pointer
to the VF. Call this in ice_vc_process_vf_msg() just after we obtain a
reference to the VF by calling ice_get_vf_by_id.

Pass the mailbox data from the __ice_clean_ctrlq function into
ice_vc_process_vf_msg() instead of calling ice_is_malicious_vf().

This reduces the number of exported functions and avoids the need to obtain
the VF reference twice for every mailbox message.

Note that the state check for ICE_VF_STATE_DIS is kept in
ice_is_malicious_vf() and we call this before checking that state in
ice_vc_process_vf_msg. This is intentional, as we stop responding to VF
messages from a VF once we detect that it may be overflowing the mailbox.
This ensures that we continue to silently ignore the message as before
without responding via ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf().

Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
index 648a383fad85..cd747718de73 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
@@ -63,10 +63,8 @@ int
 ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 v_opcode,
 		      enum virtchnl_status_code v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen);
 bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id);
-bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
-		    struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
-void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event);
+void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+			   struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
 #else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
 static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_dflt_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
 static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
@@ -86,16 +84,9 @@ static inline bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf __always_unused *pf,
-		    struct ice_rq_event_info __always_unused *event,
-		    struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
 static inline void
-ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
+ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+		      struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
 {
 }
 #endif /* !CONFIG_PCI_IOV */