diff options
| author | Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> | 2026-10-12 14:19:35 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> | 2026-10-15 13:53:08 +0200 |
| commit | da0ad36d2e95fb029c3a14ad99a78beebc29507f (patch) | |
| tree | 262209a20d6054ccbaa923a1ce28dfabc41e4a12 /drivers | |
| parent | a278b88b766128e6ef5a5de0f350d897ccd14cb6 (diff) | |
efi: Initialize all configuration table addresses to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR
The addresses of the MOK variable table, the confidential computing
secret area and the unaccepted memory table in struct efi are only
initialized to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR if support for the respective
table is enabled, and are left at 0 otherwise. This is harmless for
the existing users, which are compiled out in that case, but code that
consumes the table addresses in struct efi generically, such as a kexec
loader that passes the configuration tables on to the incoming kernel,
would mistake 0 for a valid table address.
So initialize all of them unconditionally: efi_config_parse_tables()
only assigns them if support for the table is enabled, and so they
remain EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 14b9c7ebb5df..9bc22de0d67e 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -47,15 +47,9 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { .tpm_final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .ovmf_debug_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .mem_reserve = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, -#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET .coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY .unaccepted = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, -#endif }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); |