diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> | 2025-09-05 20:59:13 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> | 2025-09-05 21:01:51 -0700 |
commit | 19591f7e781fd1e68228f5b3bee60be6425af886 (patch) | |
tree | bfb8b2d50c1e2d0eb3006f582fae72d00259974f /fs/crypto/hkdf.c | |
parent | 0e6608d4938eb209616e8673c95364bb2a7d55bd (diff) |
fscrypt: use HMAC-SHA512 library for HKDF
For the HKDF-SHA512 key derivation needed by fscrypt, just use the
HMAC-SHA512 library functions directly. These functions were introduced
in v6.17, and they provide simple and efficient direct support for
HMAC-SHA512. This ends up being quite a bit simpler and more efficient
than using crypto/hkdf.c, as it avoids the generic crypto layer:
- The HMAC library can't fail, so callers don't need to handle errors
- No inefficient indirect calls
- No inefficient and error-prone dynamic allocations
- No inefficient and error-prone loading of algorithm by name
- Less stack usage
Benchmarks on x86_64 show that deriving a per-file key gets about 30%
faster, and FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY gets nearly twice as fast.
The only small downside is the HKDF-Expand logic gets duplicated again.
Then again, even considering that, the new fscrypt_hkdf_expand() is only
7 lines longer than the version that called hkdf_expand(). Later we
could add HKDF support to lib/crypto/, but for now let's just do this.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250906035913.1141532-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/hkdf.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/hkdf.c | 109 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/hkdf.c b/fs/crypto/hkdf.c index b1ef506cd341..706f56d0076e 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hkdf.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hkdf.c @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* + * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation + * Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010): + * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme". + * * This is used to derive keys from the fscrypt master keys (or from the * "software secrets" which hardware derives from the fscrypt master keys, in * the case that the fscrypt master keys are hardware-wrapped keys). @@ -7,10 +11,6 @@ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC */ -#include <crypto/hash.h> -#include <crypto/hkdf.h> -#include <crypto/sha2.h> - #include "fscrypt_private.h" /* @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ * HKDF-SHA512 being much faster than HKDF-SHA256, as the longer digest size of * SHA-512 causes HKDF-Expand to only need to do one iteration rather than two. */ -#define HKDF_HMAC_ALG "hmac(sha512)" #define HKDF_HASHLEN SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE /* @@ -44,54 +43,24 @@ */ /* - * Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master key as the input keying material, - * and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed by the resulting pseudorandom key. - * - * Afterwards, the keyed HMAC transform object can be used for HKDF-Expand many - * times without having to recompute HKDF-Extract each time. + * Compute HKDF-Extract using 'master_key' as the input keying material, and + * prepare the resulting HMAC key in 'hkdf'. Afterwards, 'hkdf' can be used for + * HKDF-Expand many times without having to recompute HKDF-Extract each time. */ -int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key, - unsigned int master_key_size) +void fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct hmac_sha512_key *hkdf, const u8 *master_key, + unsigned int master_key_size) { - struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN]; u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN]; - int err; - - hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(HKDF_HMAC_ALG, 0, FSCRYPT_CRYPTOAPI_MASK); - if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm)) { - fscrypt_err(NULL, "Error allocating " HKDF_HMAC_ALG ": %ld", - PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm)); - return PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm); - } - - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm) != sizeof(prk))) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto err_free_tfm; - } - - err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size, - default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN, prk); - if (err) - goto err_free_tfm; - - err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, prk, sizeof(prk)); - if (err) - goto err_free_tfm; - hkdf->hmac_tfm = hmac_tfm; - goto out; - -err_free_tfm: - crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm); -out: + hmac_sha512_usingrawkey(default_salt, sizeof(default_salt), + master_key, master_key_size, prk); + hmac_sha512_preparekey(hkdf, prk, sizeof(prk)); memzero_explicit(prk, sizeof(prk)); - return err; } /* - * HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3). This expands the pseudorandom key, which - * was already keyed into 'hkdf->hmac_tfm' by fscrypt_init_hkdf(), into 'okmlen' + * HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3). Expand the HMAC key 'hkdf' into 'okmlen' * bytes of output keying material parameterized by the application-specific * 'info' of length 'infolen' bytes, prefixed by "fscrypt\0" and the 'context' * byte. This is thread-safe and may be called by multiple threads in parallel. @@ -100,30 +69,32 @@ out: * adds to its application-specific info strings to guarantee that it doesn't * accidentally repeat an info string when using HKDF for different purposes.) */ -int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context, - const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen, - u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen) -{ - SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_tfm); - u8 *full_info; - int err; - - full_info = kzalloc(infolen + 9, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!full_info) - return -ENOMEM; - desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm; - - memcpy(full_info, "fscrypt\0", 8); - full_info[8] = context; - memcpy(full_info + 9, info, infolen); - - err = hkdf_expand(hkdf->hmac_tfm, full_info, infolen + 9, - okm, okmlen); - kfree_sensitive(full_info); - return err; -} - -void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf) +void fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct hmac_sha512_key *hkdf, u8 context, + const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen, + u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen) { - crypto_free_shash(hkdf->hmac_tfm); + struct hmac_sha512_ctx ctx; + u8 counter = 1; + u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN]; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_HASHLEN); + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASHLEN) { + hmac_sha512_init(&ctx, hkdf); + if (i != 0) + hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, &okm[i - HKDF_HASHLEN], + HKDF_HASHLEN); + hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, "fscrypt\0", 8); + hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, &context, 1); + hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, info, infolen); + hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, &counter, 1); + if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) { + hmac_sha512_final(&ctx, tmp); + memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + } else { + hmac_sha512_final(&ctx, &okm[i]); + } + counter++; + } } |