diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-06-15 03:00:58 +0530 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-06-15 03:00:58 +0530 |
| commit | 9c9e6bd4cca02f2d183eb260451fb6018f9ee67e (patch) | |
| tree | 5c351e1db3b13ffce9ce02c95173e58d35975d1f /fs/exec.c | |
| parent | 5d15ab717d503ff10b585a144870648b9a88c616 (diff) | |
| parent | 38205ecbe6b6dc47968ad4e9c978e2117720969e (diff) | |
Merge tag 'kernel-7.2-rc1.task_exec_state' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull task_exec_state updates from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces a new per-task task_exec_state structure and relocates
the dumpable mode and the user namespace captured at execve() from
mm_struct onto it. It stays attached to the task for its full
lifetime.
__ptrace_may_access() and several /proc owner and visibility checks
need to consult two pieces of state for any observable task, including
zombies that have already gone through exit_mm(): the dumpable mode
and the user namespace captured at execve(). Both live on mm_struct
today, which exit_mm() clears from the task long before the task is
reaped. A reader that races with do_exit() observes task->mm == NULL
and either fails the check or falls back to init_user_ns - which
denies legitimate access to non-dumpable zombies that were running in
a nested user namespace.
mm_struct loses ->user_ns and the dumpability bits in ->flags.
MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS is reserved so the MMF_DUMP_FILTER_* layout exposed
via /proc/<pid>/coredump_filter stays stable. task->user_dumpable and
its exit_mm() snapshot are removed.
task_exec_state is the privilege domain established by an execve().
Within a thread group it is shared via refcount; across thread groups
each task has its own:
- CLONE_VM siblings (thread-group members, io_uring workers)
refcount-share the parent's exec_state.
- Non-CLONE_VM clones (fork(), vfork() without CLONE_VM) allocate a
fresh exec_state inheriting the parent's dumpable mode and user_ns.
- execve() in the child allocates a fresh instance and installs it
under task_lock + exec_update_lock via task_exec_state_replace().
- Credential changes (setresuid, capset, ...) and
prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) update dumpability on the current task's
exec_state, i.e., on the thread group's shared instance.
On top of this exec_mmap() no longer tears down the old mm while
holding exec_update_lock for writing and cred_guard_mutex. Neither
lock is needed for that: exec_update_lock only exists to make the mm
swap atomic with the later commit_creds() and all its readers operate
on the new mm; none looks at the detached old mm.
The cost was real: __mmput() runs exit_mmap() over the entire old
address space and can block in exit_aio() waiting for in-flight AIO,
so execve() of a large process blocked ptrace_attach() and every
exec_update_lock reader for the duration of the teardown.
The old mm is now stashed in bprm->old_mm and released from
setup_new_exec() after both locks are dropped, with a backstop in
free_bprm() for the error paths"
* tag 'kernel-7.2-rc1.task_exec_state' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
exec: free the old mm outside the exec locks
exec_state: relocate dumpable information
ptrace: add ptracer_access_allowed()
exec: introduce struct task_exec_state
sched/coredump: introduce enum task_dumpable
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 65 |
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index ba12b4c466f6..824b46c069ae 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/sched/coredump.h> +#include <linux/sched/exec_state.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> @@ -263,6 +264,9 @@ static int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (!mm) goto err; + /* Staged for would_dump() narrowing; consumed by begin_new_exec(). */ + bprm->user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns()); + /* Save current stack limit for all calculations made during exec. */ task_lock(current->group_leader); bprm->rlim_stack = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK]; @@ -832,14 +836,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code); /* * Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct. * On success, this function returns with exec_update_lock - * held for writing. + * held for writing. The replaced address space is stashed in + * bprm->old_mm for setup_new_exec() to release outside the lock. */ -static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) +static int exec_mmap(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { + struct task_exec_state *exec_state __free(put_task_exec_state) = NULL; + struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm; struct task_struct *tsk; struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm; int ret; + exec_state = alloc_task_exec_state(bprm->user_ns); + if (!exec_state) + return -ENOMEM; + /* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */ tsk = current; old_mm = current->mm; @@ -870,6 +881,7 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) tsk->active_mm = mm; tsk->mm = mm; mm_init_cid(mm, tsk); + exec_state = task_exec_state_replace(tsk, exec_state); /* * This prevents preemption while active_mm is being loaded and * it and mm are being updated, which could cause problems for @@ -888,15 +900,22 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) if (old_mm) { mmap_read_unlock(old_mm); BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm); - setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm); - mm_update_next_owner(old_mm); - mmput(old_mm); + /* Defer teardown to setup_new_exec(), outside the exec locks. */ + bprm->old_mm = old_mm; return 0; } mmdrop_lazy_tlb(active_mm); return 0; } +/* Release the address space replaced by exec, outside the exec locks. */ +static void exec_mm_put_old(struct mm_struct *old_mm) +{ + setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(¤t->signal->maxrss, old_mm); + mm_update_next_owner(old_mm); + mmput(old_mm); +} + static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; @@ -1145,7 +1164,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) * Release all of the old mmap stuff */ acct_arg_size(bprm, 0); - retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm); + retval = exec_mmap(bprm); if (retval) goto out; @@ -1210,9 +1229,9 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); + task_exec_state_set_dumpable(suid_dumpable); else - set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); + task_exec_state_set_dumpable(TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER); perf_event_exec(); @@ -1261,7 +1280,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) * wait until new credentials are committed * by commit_creds() above */ - if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) + if (task_exec_state_get_dumpable(me) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) perf_event_exit_task(me); /* * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent @@ -1298,14 +1317,14 @@ void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) struct user_namespace *old, *user_ns; bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP; - /* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */ - user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns; + /* Ensure bprm->user_ns contains the executable. */ + user_ns = old = bprm->user_ns; while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) && !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap, inode)) user_ns = user_ns->parent; if (old != user_ns) { - bprm->mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); + bprm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); put_user_ns(old); } } @@ -1328,6 +1347,12 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE; up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock); mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + + /* The exec locks are dropped: release the old address space now. */ + if (bprm->old_mm) { + exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm); + bprm->old_mm = NULL; + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); @@ -1375,6 +1400,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) acct_arg_size(bprm, 0); mmput(bprm->mm); } + if (bprm->user_ns) + put_user_ns(bprm->user_ns); free_arg_pages(bprm); if (bprm->cred) { /* in case exec fails before de_thread() succeeds */ @@ -1382,6 +1409,9 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); abort_creds(bprm->cred); } + /* exec swapped the mm but failed before setup_new_exec() freed it */ + if (bprm->old_mm) + exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm); do_close_execat(bprm->file); if (bprm->executable) fput(bprm->executable); @@ -1905,17 +1935,6 @@ void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt); -/* - * set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags. - */ -void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value) -{ - if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT)) - return; - - __mm_flags_set_mask_dumpable(mm, value); -} - static inline struct user_arg_ptr native_arg(const char __user *const __user *p) { return (struct user_arg_ptr){.ptr.native = p}; |
