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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-06-15 03:00:58 +0530
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-06-15 03:00:58 +0530
commit9c9e6bd4cca02f2d183eb260451fb6018f9ee67e (patch)
tree5c351e1db3b13ffce9ce02c95173e58d35975d1f /fs/exec.c
parent5d15ab717d503ff10b585a144870648b9a88c616 (diff)
parent38205ecbe6b6dc47968ad4e9c978e2117720969e (diff)
Merge tag 'kernel-7.2-rc1.task_exec_state' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull task_exec_state updates from Christian Brauner: "This introduces a new per-task task_exec_state structure and relocates the dumpable mode and the user namespace captured at execve() from mm_struct onto it. It stays attached to the task for its full lifetime. __ptrace_may_access() and several /proc owner and visibility checks need to consult two pieces of state for any observable task, including zombies that have already gone through exit_mm(): the dumpable mode and the user namespace captured at execve(). Both live on mm_struct today, which exit_mm() clears from the task long before the task is reaped. A reader that races with do_exit() observes task->mm == NULL and either fails the check or falls back to init_user_ns - which denies legitimate access to non-dumpable zombies that were running in a nested user namespace. mm_struct loses ->user_ns and the dumpability bits in ->flags. MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS is reserved so the MMF_DUMP_FILTER_* layout exposed via /proc/<pid>/coredump_filter stays stable. task->user_dumpable and its exit_mm() snapshot are removed. task_exec_state is the privilege domain established by an execve(). Within a thread group it is shared via refcount; across thread groups each task has its own: - CLONE_VM siblings (thread-group members, io_uring workers) refcount-share the parent's exec_state. - Non-CLONE_VM clones (fork(), vfork() without CLONE_VM) allocate a fresh exec_state inheriting the parent's dumpable mode and user_ns. - execve() in the child allocates a fresh instance and installs it under task_lock + exec_update_lock via task_exec_state_replace(). - Credential changes (setresuid, capset, ...) and prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) update dumpability on the current task's exec_state, i.e., on the thread group's shared instance. On top of this exec_mmap() no longer tears down the old mm while holding exec_update_lock for writing and cred_guard_mutex. Neither lock is needed for that: exec_update_lock only exists to make the mm swap atomic with the later commit_creds() and all its readers operate on the new mm; none looks at the detached old mm. The cost was real: __mmput() runs exit_mmap() over the entire old address space and can block in exit_aio() waiting for in-flight AIO, so execve() of a large process blocked ptrace_attach() and every exec_update_lock reader for the duration of the teardown. The old mm is now stashed in bprm->old_mm and released from setup_new_exec() after both locks are dropped, with a backstop in free_bprm() for the error paths" * tag 'kernel-7.2-rc1.task_exec_state' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: exec: free the old mm outside the exec locks exec_state: relocate dumpable information ptrace: add ptracer_access_allowed() exec: introduce struct task_exec_state sched/coredump: introduce enum task_dumpable
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c65
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index ba12b4c466f6..824b46c069ae 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/sched/exec_state.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
@@ -263,6 +264,9 @@ static int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!mm)
goto err;
+ /* Staged for would_dump() narrowing; consumed by begin_new_exec(). */
+ bprm->user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
+
/* Save current stack limit for all calculations made during exec. */
task_lock(current->group_leader);
bprm->rlim_stack = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK];
@@ -832,14 +836,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code);
/*
* Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct.
* On success, this function returns with exec_update_lock
- * held for writing.
+ * held for writing. The replaced address space is stashed in
+ * bprm->old_mm for setup_new_exec() to release outside the lock.
*/
-static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
+static int exec_mmap(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct task_exec_state *exec_state __free(put_task_exec_state) = NULL;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm;
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm;
int ret;
+ exec_state = alloc_task_exec_state(bprm->user_ns);
+ if (!exec_state)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
@@ -870,6 +881,7 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
tsk->active_mm = mm;
tsk->mm = mm;
mm_init_cid(mm, tsk);
+ exec_state = task_exec_state_replace(tsk, exec_state);
/*
* This prevents preemption while active_mm is being loaded and
* it and mm are being updated, which could cause problems for
@@ -888,15 +900,22 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
if (old_mm) {
mmap_read_unlock(old_mm);
BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm);
- setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm);
- mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
- mmput(old_mm);
+ /* Defer teardown to setup_new_exec(), outside the exec locks. */
+ bprm->old_mm = old_mm;
return 0;
}
mmdrop_lazy_tlb(active_mm);
return 0;
}
+/* Release the address space replaced by exec, outside the exec locks. */
+static void exec_mm_put_old(struct mm_struct *old_mm)
+{
+ setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&current->signal->maxrss, old_mm);
+ mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
+ mmput(old_mm);
+}
+
static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
@@ -1145,7 +1164,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
*/
acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
- retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
+ retval = exec_mmap(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out;
@@ -1210,9 +1229,9 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
!(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ task_exec_state_set_dumpable(suid_dumpable);
else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ task_exec_state_set_dumpable(TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER);
perf_event_exec();
@@ -1261,7 +1280,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
* wait until new credentials are committed
* by commit_creds() above
*/
- if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ if (task_exec_state_get_dumpable(me) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER)
perf_event_exit_task(me);
/*
* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
@@ -1298,14 +1317,14 @@ void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
struct user_namespace *old, *user_ns;
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
- /* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */
- user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns;
+ /* Ensure bprm->user_ns contains the executable. */
+ user_ns = old = bprm->user_ns;
while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
!privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap, inode))
user_ns = user_ns->parent;
if (old != user_ns) {
- bprm->mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+ bprm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
put_user_ns(old);
}
}
@@ -1328,6 +1347,12 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+
+ /* The exec locks are dropped: release the old address space now. */
+ if (bprm->old_mm) {
+ exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm);
+ bprm->old_mm = NULL;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
@@ -1375,6 +1400,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
mmput(bprm->mm);
}
+ if (bprm->user_ns)
+ put_user_ns(bprm->user_ns);
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
/* in case exec fails before de_thread() succeeds */
@@ -1382,6 +1409,9 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
+ /* exec swapped the mm but failed before setup_new_exec() freed it */
+ if (bprm->old_mm)
+ exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm);
do_close_execat(bprm->file);
if (bprm->executable)
fput(bprm->executable);
@@ -1905,17 +1935,6 @@ void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
-/*
- * set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags.
- */
-void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
-{
- if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT))
- return;
-
- __mm_flags_set_mask_dumpable(mm, value);
-}
-
static inline struct user_arg_ptr native_arg(const char __user *const __user *p)
{
return (struct user_arg_ptr){.ptr.native = p};